Firstly mental states are not identical to brain states; a state of happiness is a state of the person, not just a state of the brain. — Janus


How about "A mental state is a bodily state"

this would be to say that the mind can be exhaustively understood in terms of brain processes, which it obviously cannot. — Janus


Doesn't seem that obvious. — khaled

I think of a person as having both body and mind. I agree that mental states are body states, but I also think they are more than that; narrative comes into it as well. So for me it seems best to speak of mental states as states of persons.

As to understanding human behavior in terms of brain processes: it seems obvious to me that it is not presently possible, at least. And then when you consider that human behavior cannot be understood without understanding first person experience, and that first person experience cannot be objectified without losing its sense, the difficulty seems insurmountable.

but I also think they are more than that; narrative comes into it as well. — Janus

How so?

and that first person experience cannot be objectified without losing its sense — Janus

How so?

How so? — khaled

Regarding the narrative component of human life: it is obviously all-pervading. We are what we think we are; our selves are the stories we tell about our lives and who we are.

Regarding the irreducibility of first person experience, try this experiment; give an account of your first person experience in terms of brain processes, and then try to discover where you are in that description.

We are what we think we are; our selves are the stories we tell about our lives and who we are. — Janus

Sure but I don’t see how that makes mental states more than body states.

give an account of your first person experience in terms of brain processes, and then try to discover where you are in that description. — Janus

Doesn’t seem too challenging to someone who knows their neurology. Assuming this “you” is in any way a coherent concept we can mess with the brain enough to find out when it’s present and when it isn’t. The physical difference would be precisely this “you”

Sure but I don’t see how that makes mental states more than body states. — khaled

It's because there is a conceptual element there that is lacking in non-mental bodily states. So, it could be said that they are also bodily states, but are not just bodily states.

Doesn’t seem too challenging to someone who knows their neurology. Assuming this “you” is in any way a coherent concept we can mess with the brain enough to find out when it’s present and when it isn’t. The physical difference would be precisely this “you” — khaled

If you don't "know your neurology" then how could you know it is not "too challenging"? If you do, then you could present an example for scrutiny, and even if you don't, then you could present an example from someone who does "know their neurology" to support your case. Otherwise it just looks like an empty presumption.

then you could present an example from someone who does "know their neurology" to support your case. — Janus

There is no shortage of studies of self in neurology. Here is one:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292534980_The_Lost_Self_Pathologies_of_the_Brain_and_Identity

And as predicted what it does is: Look for cases where "you" isn't present and try to find what the significant variables are. Just like any other science.

It's because there is a conceptual element there that is lacking in non-mental bodily states. So, it could be said that they are also bodily states, but are not just bodily states. — Janus

I have.... no clue what this means. What's a "non-mental bodily state"?

Otherwise it just looks like an empty presumption. — Janus

But I explained why it isn't. If "You" is in any way a coherent concept then we should be able to find brain states where "You" is present and others when it isn't. Find the the difference between the two. That is "You".

And if it is empty presumption then its alternative (that we can never account for "You" neurologically) is also empty presumption.

I have.... no clue what this means. What's a "non-mental bodily state"? — khaled

Digestion, respiration, tendonitis, etc.,etc.,: the list is endless,

And as predicted what it does is: Look for cases where "you" isn't present and try to find what the significant variables are. Just like any other science. — khaled

Right, in order to understand the self; eliminate it just as I said. That sounds like an intelligent idea! The self is best understood as a narrative construct, and narratives are not understandable in terms of neural processes, but in terms of the narrative itself, which entails becoming familiar with the narrative.

But I explained why it isn't. If "You" is in any way a coherent concept then we should be able to find brain states where "You" is present and others when it isn't. Find the the difference between the two. That is "You".

And if it is empty presumption then its alternative (that we can never account for "You" neurologically) is also empty presumption. — khaled

Of course 'you' is a coherent concept; it must be since we use it effectively all the time. The only way it could be determined if "you is present" would be to ask the person.being studied.

You seem to be alluding to someone being conscious of the mental state they are in at a time as a criterion for whether "you is present". Perhaps the self can be equated with reflexive consciousness, perhaps not. It would need to be established that there are no subconscious narratives going on in people; how are you going to do that?

I have.... no clue what this means. What's a "non-mental bodily state"?
— khaled

Digestion, respiration, tendonitis, etc.,etc.,: the list is endless, — Janus

Ok... What is the "conceptual element lacking in digestion". I still don't understand what the sentence means at all.

Right, in order to understand the self; eliminate it just as I said. — Janus

Well you didn't even say that. And I definitely didn't say that.

and narratives are not understandable in terms of neural processes — Janus

You keep asserting this with no evidence. What's your reasoning?

it must be since we use it effectively all the time — Janus

Non sequitor. Often people use the same word to mean a bunch of different things. I suspect "You" as you use it is one such word.

It would need to be established that there are no subconscious narratives going on in people; how are you going to do that? — Janus

Wtf is a "subconscious narrative". And what does it mean for a narrative to "go on" inside someone. To have some sort of neurological impact? Because we CAN study that...

Mental states', as the term is ordinarily used, refers to states of a person. I have no idea what you think big toes and pubic hair have to do with it. — Janus

Are not big toes and public hairs part of a person? Are mental states of a person the same as the physical states of a person? If not, what is the difference between them?

I have.... no clue what this means. What's a "non-mental bodily state"?
— khaled

Digestion, respiration, tendonitis, etc.,etc.,: the list is endless, — Janus

So the body is composed of both mental and non-mental states? How do they interact? For instance, how do you know you have tendonitis when you have it?

Strange. You seem to believe that a processor can exist independent of its processing.
— Harry Hindu
I do? Cite where I've given you that impression. — 180 Proof

Here:

The latter makes sense and the former does not. "Mind" is predicate (processing), "brain" is subject (processor) like e.g. walk and legs, respiration and lungs, respectively. Mind(ing) is what a brain does. — 180 Proof

You said the former does not make sense and the latter does. If the former does not make sense and the latter is not saying the same as the former, then what else could you be saying?

You're right, I misread what you called "strange". I read it backwards, in fact, as 'processing can exist independent of its processor'. Yeah, there are examples (e.g. coma patients, chickens, fish) of mindless brains but, as far as I know, there aren't any examples of brainless minds. Infants & paraplegics have legs without walking just as there can be brains independent of minding. Why is that "strange"?

Ok... What is the "conceptual element lacking in digestion". I still don't understand what the sentence means at all. — khaled

Thought is a conceptual as well as a physical process. Digestion is just a physical process.

and narratives are not understandable in terms of neural processes — Janus


You keep asserting this with no evidence. What's your reasoning? — khaled

My reasoning is that I've never seen a narrative explained in terms of neural processes; I think they are different paradigms. But in any case show me one if you can find one.

it must be since we use it effectively all the time — Janus


Non sequitor. Often people use the same word to mean a bunch of different things. I suspect "You" as you use it is one such word. — khaled

If "You" is in any way a coherent concept then we should be able to find brain states where "You" is present and others when it isn't. Find the the difference between the two. That is "You". — khaled

Are you claiming that in order to be coherent a concept must have just one determinate association or meaning? Humans are narrative oriented. What we think of as me is the story I tell myself about my life. So my identity is not really complete until I have died.

Wtf is a "subconscious narrative". And what does it mean for a narrative to "go on" inside someone. To have some sort of neurological impact? Because we CAN study that... — khaled

A subconscious narrative would be subconscious thought processes. It's not hard to understand. I haven't anywhere denied that thought processes have neural correlates, but a thought process is distinct from a neural process insofar as one is physical, whereas the other is conceptual. If you can't see that obvious distinction then I don't know what else to say.

Right, in order to understand the self; eliminate it just as I said. — Janus


Well you didn't even say that. And I definitely didn't say that. — khaled

I didn't express that very clearly. What I meant was that neurological so-called explanations of the self eliminate it, which was what I had said and which seemed to be exemplified by this:

And as predicted what it does is: Look for cases where "you" isn't present and try to find what the significant variables are. Just like any other science. — khaled

The self cannot be found anywhere in a physical investigation of a neural process. That's because the self is a narrative. Neural processes don't have narratives that can be read off them like the physical script in books can.

Are not big toes and public hairs part of a person? Are mental states of a person the same as the physical states of a person? If not, what is the difference between them? — Harry Hindu

Physical states (or better, processes) like digestion do not necessarily involve conceptual thought, whereas mental processes just are conceptual thought processes. It amazes me that you seem to find this difficult to understand.

So the body is composed of both mental and non-mental states? How do they interact? For instance, how do you know you have tendonitis when you have it? — Harry Hindu

I don't know what you are asking. I haven't said the body is "composed of both mental and non-mental states". The body is physically composed. I may have tendonitis, a physical condition, without knowing it. I know I have tendonitis, when it is demonstrated to me beyond reasonable doubt that I have it, just like I know anything else.

Thought is a conceptual as well as a physical process. Digestion is just a physical process. — Janus

The hypothesis is that conceptual thought is a physical process. So I don’t see the difference.

My reasoning is that I've never seen a narrative explained in terms of neural processes — Janus

That you’ve never seen one means it’s fundamentally impossible to achieve?

What we think of as me is the story I tell myself about my life. — Janus

And this “telling” is not a neurological process? What is it then?

but a thought process is distinct from a neural process insofar as one is physical, whereas the other is conceptual. If you can't see that obvious distinction then I don't know what else to say. — Janus

Well no because it’s a fabricated distinction. It’s dualistic. And dualism doesn’t have to be the case. I know you claim not to be a dualist but I see no way to interpret “One is physical whereas the other is conceptual” in non dualistic terms.

You’ve defined thought processes to be different from anything physical. That is a choice. That is not some metaphysical truth. And I consider it a bad choice.

What you may want to consider is what makes mental/cognitive states different than other processes. It would seem that the a priori mental representations of the mind/brain are what presupposes any other process including digestion, gravity, or whatever. I know it is a bit cliched to do the "If a tree falls in the woods.." but it is part of the inextricably intertwined and part of the equation for why this problem is not as straightforward as it might seem. It especially makes it harder to simply analogize mental states to digestion, as presumably, digestion isn't a presupposition for our very knowing, but mental states are. In other words, digestion on its own cannot induce "inner sensations and representations", but brain states can. There is something about brain states that allows the very knowing of all the other states and this is really what makes it unique.

So it is not just equivocating brain states with mental states, but what we are really asking in a philosophical sense is why is there an "inner feeling" at all with mental states?

The hypothesis is that conceptual thought is a physical process. So I don’t see the difference. — khaled

The difference is that there is a clear conceptual difference between physical and conceptual processes. Think about logical entailment, for example: how do you explain that in physical terms?

That you’ve never seen one means it’s fundamentally impossible to achieve? — khaled

I haven't claimed it is impossible to achieve; I have claimed that it has not been achieved and that given the different conceptual paradigms a way to achieve it cannot be envisaged, and thus we have no reason to believe that it must be possible, or even that it is possible.

And this “telling” is not a neurological process? What is it then? — khaled

It is a conceptual process. As I said I haven't denied that the conceptual process of narrative doesn't have its physical underpinnings or counterparts. The physical and the conceptual are just two modes of inquiry, just different perspectives on things.

Think of Sellar's idea of the distinction between the logical space of causes and the logical space of reasons.Here's an example question for you to chew on: metaphor is an integral part of narrative, so what is the physical equivalent of metaphor or how do explain metaphor in physicalist terms?

Well no because it’s a fabricated distinction. It’s dualistic. And dualism doesn’t have to be the case. I know you claim not to be a dualist but I see no way to interpret “One is physical whereas the other is conceptual” in non dualistic terms.

You’ve defined thought processes to be different from anything physical. That is a choice. That is not some metaphysical truth. And I consider it a bad choice. — khaled

It's not a fabricated distinction, or at least not any more so than any other distinction. It's also not dualistic; I'm not proposing that there are two different substances. It's pluralistic; the claim is that since we cannot explain the conceptual in physical terms there is no good reason to think that the conceptual is reducible to the physical, Try to present a good reason if you think there is one.

Of course my advocating of the distinction is a choice, but it is a choice motivated by the fact that the distinction is a cogent one, despite any pretentious and incoherent physicalist claims to a reducibility which amounts to elimination. It's not a metaphysical claim either, because i am making no ontological claim about substances at all. It's just a semantic claim that says that valid distinctions should not be eliminated on the basis of some vague prejudice.

You haven't presented any worthy objections so far, just empty assertions. Can't you find anything to present other than that? I doubt you can, but I'm prepared to listen if you do.

You're right, I misread what you called "strange". I read it backwards, in fact, as 'processing can exist independent of its processor'. Yeah, there are examples (e.g. coma patients, chickens, fish) of mindless brains but, as far as I know, there aren't any examples of brainless minds. Infants & paraplegics have legs without walking just as there can be brains independent of minding. Why is that "strange"? — 180 Proof

If a processor processes, when it doesn't process does it still make sense to call it a processor? Is a brain still a brain without the activity, or just a lump of matter that takes up space? What's the difference between a brain that doesn't think and a leg that can't move besides their shape? They are both just lumps of biological matter.

Think about logical entailment, for example: how do you explain that in physical terms? — Janus

we cannot explain the conceptual in physical terms — Janus

You have this idea where logical entailment is a “thing out there”. Some law inherent in the universe or something. Whereas I think logical entailment is just another instinct. Something “makes sense” when it is logically entailed. And this “making sense” is a neural process. Logical entailment is a “local phenomena” so to speak.

We can explain logical entailment in the same way we can explain hunger.

You keep saying that you are saying nothing ontological but you keep splitting up the conceptual and physical ontologically as far as I can tell. That or you're just asserting that the conceptual cannot be explained in physical terms because...... idk.

You haven't presented any worthy objections so far, just empty assertions. Can't you find anything to present other than that? I doubt you can, but I'm prepared to listen if you do. — Janus

Funny I was just about to say that.

digestion isn't a presupposition for our very knowing — schopenhauer1

Can’t think on an empty stomach!

There is something about brain states that allows the very knowing of all the other states and this is really what makes it unique. — schopenhauer1

Sure but

So it is not just equivocating brain states with mental states — schopenhauer1

But I don’t see how this follows. What is the problem with equivocating brain states with mental states?

but what we are really asking in a philosophical sense is why is there an "inner feeling" at all with mental states? — schopenhauer1

I’m not sure if you’re alluding to the hard problem here. But if you are then I would say, if the problem makes sense, it’s not interesting anyways. It’s like asking “why is there gravity at all with matter”? Who cares? There just is.

This is, I think, the specific point on which Isaac and I differ. If I understand him aright, he thinks that there must be one brain state for one mind state. I suspect this is something he assumes for methodological reasons: it makes the MRI scans more impressive. — Banno

Just a fly-by post this, not intending to join the discussion, but you might find this paper interesting in this regard. It's not so much about brain states, apparently, as functional processes. What's interesting about this approach is that it requires that the process itself be recognised somehow as distinct from the actual neurons firing...and how do we recognise 'that' particular pattern...?

Thanks.

and how do we recognise 'that' particular pattern...? — Isaac

We find what's common in the degenerate neuronal systems that produce the same cognitive function?

Physical states (or better, processes) like digestion do not necessarily involve conceptual thought, whereas mental processes just are conceptual thought processes. It amazes me that you seem to find this difficult to understand. — Janus

What about processes in the brain that do not involve conceptual thought? The information in your consciousness was processed in the brain before appearing in consciousness. Are those not mental processes?

I don't know what you are asking. I haven't said the body is "composed of both mental and non-mental states". The body is physically composed. I may have tendonitis, a physical condition, without knowing it. I know I have tendonitis, when it is demonstrated to me beyond reasonable doubt that I have it, just like I know anything else. — Janus

Then you're saying that mental states are physical states -mind is the brain and vice versa? How is does the non-mental process of tendonitis become a mental conceptual thought?

You're right, I misread what you called "strange". I read it backwards, in fact, as 'processing can exist independent of its processor'. Yeah, there are examples (e.g. coma patients, chickens, fish) of mindless brains but, as far as I know, there aren't any examples of brainless minds. Infants & paraplegics have legs without walking just as there can be brains independent of minding. Why is that "strange"? — 180 Proof

Chickens and fish have minds, as they have brains and minds are what brains do, right? Jellyfish are an example of an organism that doesn't have a brain and therefore no mind, no? If not, then what is different between human and chicken brains such that one is minding and the other isn't?

A brain-dead brain may not have a mind as you think of it (do you really know what consciousness is?), but it still has information (and I assert that consciousness is just a type of information).

Brains are visual objects, or visual information of others mental processes. Believing that the world is as it appears visually is naive realism. Are you a naive realist?

We find what's common in the degenerate neuronal systems that produce the same cognitive function? — khaled

Trouble is what's common is possibly only that they produce the same cognitive function. Other than that...

The problem with any neuronal representation (and I agree with your general approach here nonetheless), is that a neuron itself has only two options (fire/don't) and only one variable to determine this outcome (degree of potentiation). So the neuron itself is of little help. That we have a Halle Berry neuron (should we accept that we do) is obviously not a feature of the neuron itself, no data is contained therein, but a feature of all the constituent neurons it's connect to. To simplify massively - imagine that the neuron is connected to the ones which fire for 'heads', 'arms' etc such that it fires in response to those, and then connected to neurons which fire your your vocal muscles in such a way as to say "Halle Berry". We can normally use its location, but that's really just a shorthand for its degree of connectivity to other locations (there's nothing stopping all your auditory cortex being scattered randomly through the brain, they just aren't).

So 'pattern of potentiation' becomes the identifier. As I think I mentioned to you in one of our other conversations, we can trace a 'fuzzy-edged' casdcade of neural activity from an external stimuli to a behavioural response and usually see a similar looking cascade in other people in the same situation. The trouble is - seeing as identifying that cascade by location is only shorthand for connectivity, in situations like recovery from brain damage, the only way we had of identifying that cascade has gone.

What we need (and what both Friston and Tonini advocate in separate papers) is a computational model of the neural network, rather than our current locational model. In such a model mental states are relationships between nodes rather than just arrangements, this allows them to be (theoretically!) mapped, not to neurological states, but to neurological computational processes. Imagine, rather than 'hungry' being when some pattern of lights fixed to a board light up, it's more whenever a pattern of gates are open on a farm such as to allow cattle to get from barn to parlour. We name it by whether it allows cattle to get from barn to parour, not by which gates are open where. This then allows for the degeneracy we see in these rare cases of recovery from brain damage.

Of course, none of this undermines the incredible utility of the locational model since it covers 99.999% of the population using an easy and fairly robust model. It's only my more fanatical colleagues in the philosophy department who might concern themselves with the fact that it's not 'The Truth™'

Anyway, I don't mean to derail your thread with a discussion of neuroscientific models, I just thought the concepts of degeneracy and pluripotentiality might be useful in assuaging some of the more serious objections to identity theory - issues around the lack of one-to-one relationships between mental states and neurological ones.

Of course, as regards counter-arguments you've still got to contend with the classic "it just doesn't feel that way...". I can't help you with that. All I can suggest is the equally powerful "That's what you say..." as a retort.

I've also struggled to see the distinction between identity theory and some reductionist theories. What's the difference between saying "The mind is the brain" and "The mind reduces to the brain"? So any help there would be appreciated. — khaled

I'd refer to the emic-etic distinction.

When talking about the mind, we talk about the emic.
When talking about the brain, we talk about the etic.

Are you a naive realist? — Harry Hindu

Are you?

You have this idea where logical entailment is a “thing out there”. Some law inherent in the universe or something. Whereas I think logical entailment is just another instinct. — khaled

You are imputing thoughts to me I haven't expressed or even suggested. Logical entailment is simply what seems self-evident to us. You say it is an instinct, whereas I might say it is grasped intuitively. On a basic level I have seen it manifested in the behavior of dogs.

You keep saying that you are saying nothing ontological but you keep splitting up the conceptual and physical ontologically as far as I can tell. That or you're just asserting that the conceptual cannot be explained in physical terms because...... idk. — khaled

I already said I am making a semantic claim based on the fact that there is a valid distinction between the physical and the conceptual. Say you are reading a poem and you feel moved by it; you cannot explain how it is that you are moved by the poem by simply examining the physical marks on the paper, the processes of visual perception involved in looking at them and the ensuing neural processes going on in the brain. You are moved by meaning, by the conceptual, and you can give some explanation of that in terms of semantic associations and allusions which, for some reason, are highly significant to you.

Something “makes sense” when it is logically entailed. And this “making sense” is a neural process. — khaled

Neural processes are just neural processes; they are physical, not logical processes; so it is a category error to speak of them as "making sense". Another way to understand this categorical distinction is to consider the fact that if neural processes are invariably associated with thought processes then some neural processes must be associated with thought processes that are not logically valid. Do you believe it would be possible to examine two different neural processes associated with two different thought processes, one logically valid and the other not, and tell just from that physical examination which thought process was logically valid and which was not?

What about processes in the brain that do not involve conceptual thought? The information in your consciousness was processed in the brain before appearing in consciousness. Are those not mental processes? — Harry Hindu

Are you claiming there are no subconscious thought processes?

Then you're saying that mental states are physical states -mind is the brain and vice versa? How is does the non-mental process of tendonitis become a mental conceptual thought? — Harry Hindu

No, I'm not saying that at all. In all I've said I've been arguing that the mind is not the brain simply because there is a valid distinction between the two concepts. The mind becomes aware of the pain caused by tendonitis. The tendonitis could have earlier been incipient and no pain felt, so there would have been no awareness of the tendonitis. To know (that is to come to believe under good authority) that I have tendonitis I have to research the symptoms or seek expert advice.

Logical entailment is simply what seems self-evident to us. — Janus

Right. And there is a neural difference between when something makes sense and when it doesn’t. That’s your logical entailment explained in physical terms.

you cannot explain how it is that you are moved by the poem by simply examining the physical marks on the paper, the processes of visual perception involved in looking at them and the ensuing neural processes going on in the brain — Janus

You keep asserting this. It doesn’t get any more convincing when you keep insisting on it.

Do you believe it would be possible to examine two different neural processes associated with two different thought processes, one logically valid and the other not, and tell just from that physical examination which thought process was logically valid and which was not? — Janus

Yes. Except that the neural process IS the thought. Not “is associated with” the thought.

Neural processes are just neural processes; they are physical, not logical processes — Janus

And again with the “I’m not making any ontological claims here, but thoughts ain’t physical and so they can’t be grasped by neurology”....

Are you a naive realist?
— Harry Hindu
Are you? — 180 Proof

Nope.

I was the one that asked you the question because of what you claimed,, not me, and because you can't answer it without appearing naive, you just throw the question back at me. Pathetic.

So it appears that your immaturity doesn't just become apparent when you are shown to be inconsistent in politics, but also in metaphysics? So no one can have serious "conversation" with you unless they agree with everything you say?