An interesting debate on 'compatibalism (limited free will) vs incompatibilism (no free will)': — 180 Proof
Yeah Bartricks' definition is technically correct, but for the compatibilist accounts proposed by Dennett and cogni sci folks, they are a kind of "limited free will" in terms of the scientific parameters they’re trying to set right? — Saphsin
Wolf, I think, holds a bizarre asymmetrical view according to which right-doing and praisewothiness are compatible with determinism whereas wrongdoing and blame worthiness are not (or at least require alternative possibilities). An unstable view. — Bartricks
Yes, I do not deny that her view is coherent. Ought implies can, and ought not implies can not. Which seems sufficient to explain how it is that right-doing and wrong-doing might require different abilities (one to do, the other to do otherwise). — Bartricks
But it nevertheless seems prima facie implausible. For instance, it seems implausible that if determinism is true, then we are praiseworthy for all our right deeds, but blameless for our immoral ones. Intuitively if one is one, one is the other - it's a package deal.
I am not sure I follow. If right-doing requires the ability to do the right thing, then right-doing does not require the ability to do otherwise. But if wrongdoing does require the ability to do otherwise, then wrongdoing is plausibly incompatible with determinism in a way that right doing does not appear to be. — Bartricks
yes, I agree we all make are own choices. But I think some people are heavily influenced by others and don’t necessarily have complete freedom of will due to their environment. — Charlotte Thomas-Rowe
The reason of literally billions of people tells them that their wills are free and that they are responsible for the decisions they make. That is staggeringly good evidence. — Bartricks
I think it's more productive to get to the roots, like what are we exactly interested in? — Saphsin
This pragmatist believes that introspective knowledge (like a priori) is purely inferences from external facts. For example, the concept of self is created from the interactions we have with the world and not the other way around. This pragmatist further asserts that real and true are words that can only be understood in the context of 'what works' or in other words, its usefulness, such that what is the most useful is the truth. Thus, overwhelming evidence showing that believing in free will 'works' better for people, than not believing in free will existing is proof that free will exists.Consider the practical effects of the objects of your conception. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object. — Charles Sanders Peirce
there is broad agreement on the basic concept, despite disagreement reigning over exactly what it takes for our wills to answer to that concept. — Bartricks
I think free will in a dualistic framework is under doubt for example. As it requires “minds” causing physical changes. Yet we have extremely strong evidence that the only thing that can cause physical changes is physical stuff. That’s what the laws of conservation mean. — khaled
Right. But these “decisions” are mental things. — khaled
Are they supposed to have physical effects? — khaled
Or in other words, do you think free will exists if epiphenomenalism is true? — khaled
Physical stuff causing minds which do nothing — khaled
For instance, if I form the intention to do X and try to do X, and X occurs but entirely coincidentally and not as a product of my trying to do X, I remain fully morally responsible for trying to do X. Yes? — Bartricks
If so, then I think that bizarre and unmotivated thesis — Bartricks
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