ould your larger interest example be similar to a reference to an analogy of a "grain of sand or a pile of sand"? If so, I would like to offer a solution of how to view the larger picture without reference to vagueness. — Don Wade
For our pragmatic purposes, there is a heap or a bald person. And we can be looser or more precise about the matter to the degree we might agree that a less vague, or even more vague, definition is useful.
And this would be a positive feature. Language would seize up if it had to be exact beyond the point that exactitude is useful. In semiotics, meaningfulness is measured as the differences that make a difference. — apokrisis
Language would seize up if it had to be exact beyond the point that exactitude is useful. — apokrisis
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, it's the very smallest size of heap.
Game over. People often finish up claiming 2 had been their position all along. Perhaps it should have been, and the puzzle is a fraud. — bongo fury
But what kind of larger interest are you thinking about that does not rely on the vagueness of a "for all practical purposes" more or less answer? — apokrisis
Yes, I think that the very first post I ever communicated with you on was you speaking about the idea of levels, when I began referring to the dance track, by Avicii, 'Levels.' — Jack Cummins
Don't you think it would seize up for the opposite reason, too? — bongo fury
The interesting (and paradoxical) thing is that the clarity is so easily achieved. — bongo fury
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain is a heap?
[2] No of course not, and I know I'm a long way from the smallest number of grains that could possibly be the smallest heap! Far enough that a single grain is an obvious case of a non-heap!
Of course, later on, the same player may feel differently...
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, it's the very smallest size of heap.
Game over. People often finish up claiming 2 had been their position all along. Perhaps it should have been, and the puzzle is a fraud. — bongo fury
Vagueness also seems to be an integral part of our thinking even though we believe we are being precise. So, is vagueness itself a philosophy? — Don Wade
I thought I was clear that fruitful oppositions are what it is always about. So you can be too vague, and also too pernickety, in your language. — apokrisis
How is that my position? — apokrisis
And we can be looser or more precise about the matter to the degree we might agree that a less vague, or even more vague, definition is useful. — apokrisis
Language would seize up if it had to be exact beyond the point that exactitude is useful. — apokrisis
"Is that man bald?" "Is that a heap of wheat?" Given a logic of vagueness, more or less becomes the best possible answer. — apokrisis
And this larger view can change its mind. It can insist on a sharper dividing line as to a definition of baldness, or relax it as well. — apokrisis
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, [when pressed for details we must admit] it's the very smallest size of heap. — bongo fury
My own response would be to question your claims of being certain that a single grain is a single grain. — apokrisis
In the sorites-paradox example the group of sand-grains is at one level, and the sand-pile is at another level. We can have knowledge that both can exist at the same time but they exist, in the mind, only at different levels - hence the paradox. The concept of levels solves the paradox. — Don Wade
But is it too pernickety to insist that a single grain is absolutely and obviously not a heap? That's what I was trying to get at.
So if push comes to shove, just specify the precise (possibly unitary) size of heap. Everything is on a spectrum. — bongo fury
Vagueness also seems to be an integral part of our thinking even though we believe we are being precise. So, is vagueness itself a philosophy? — Don Wade
No communication of one person to another can be entirely definite i.e. non-vague… [W]herever degree or any other possibility of continuous variation subsists, absolute precision is impossible. Much else must be vague because no man’s interpretation of words is based on exactly the same experience as any other man’s. Even in our most intellectual conceptions, the more we strive to be precise, the more unattainable precision seems. It should never be forgotten that our own thinking is carried on as a dialogue and thought mostly in a lesser degree, is subject to almost every imperfection of language.
( from “Critical Philosophy and the Philosophy of Common-Sense”)
— C S P
Yet the obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways in which things have been interpreted, are such that while the particular Dasein drifts along towards an ever-increasing groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under their protecting shelter. — Heidegger
https://www.waggish.org/2011/jacob-bronowski-william-empson-wittgenstein-and-ambiguity/Most of human sentences are in fact aimed at getting rid of the ambiguity which one has unfortunately left trailing in the previous sentence. Now I believe this to be absolutely inherent in the relation between the symbolism of language (that is, an exact symbolism) and the brain processes that it stands for. It is not possible to get rid of ambiguity in our statements, because that would press symbolism beyond its capabilities. And it is not possible to get rid of ambiguity because the number of responses that the brain could make never has a sharp edge because the thing is not a digital machine. So we have to work with the ambiguities. And nearly all discussions about Turing’s theorem or about poetry always come back to the central point about ambiguity. One of my fellow mathematicians, William Empson, who did mathematics with me at Cambridge, turned to poetry and at once published a book called Seven Types of Ambiguity–it is still a kind of minor bible, but a bible written by a mathematician, never forget that.
Ambiguity, multivalence, the fact that language simply cannot be regarded as a clear and final exposition of what it says, is central both to science, and, of course, to literature. — Brownowski
So as Don says, — apokrisis
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2]Well certainly, a single grain is the very smallest size of heap. — bongo fury
Or rather, the right predicate value is "vague". — apokrisis
No communication of one person to another can be entirely definite i.e. non-vague… — C S P
But then in fact, this categorical division allows us to construct spectrums of possibility. We can see the range of different balances of lumped~split, grouped~scattered, general~individual that lie between the polar extremes. — apokrisis
I looked at the post you referred to and it seems that the philosophy of levels is about viewing from a closer level in contrast to seeing from the larger perspective. I came across an associate idea when I was studying English literature at school, which was the idea of the microcosm and macrocosm as perspectives. This distinction has a history going back to Aristotle, but you are quite possibly familiar with it, and perhaps it is part of your own philosophy. — Jack Cummins
The delightful thing about the sorites is that it can spring up again from the rubble... — bongo fury
I agree that vagueness (and/or ambiguity) is integral to our thinking. Look up a word in the dictionary and you get other words, which you can then look up, and get still other words. Without a rough sense of what basic words mean (including words like 'mean') you can't get anywhere. And this point ignores the intrinsic limitations of dictionaries. A market is perhaps a good metaphor for language. The sounds and scribbles have various somewhat predictable effects when used skillfully, without, however, even becoming perfectly clear. — T H E
... they all operate perfectly well as alphabets (or conceptual schemes) of two characters (concepts) separated by a comfortable no-mans-land. The puzzle is how to look closely at that without it reverting (under however much cover of mystical pazazz) to a mere spectrum. — bongo fury
But yes it can in the sense that we can reproduce digital or alphabet-based text or speech or music indefinitely. Puzzling, certainly, when we look closer at the fuzzy boundaries of the characters, phonemes, notes and tones. — bongo fury
I believe "Levels" will clear up a lot of the vagueness. — Don Wade
We can only have one group of properties in our mind at any specific time. Such as: we can focus on the grain of sand, or the pile of sand - but not both. (That is, not at the same time.) This is similar to the (Rubin Vase) analogy. We will be aware of the other group - but the mind can't visualize both groups at the same time. — Don Wade
But that is where a logic of vagueness comes in. It can add a third metaphysical-strength ingredient to the story. It says that both poles of any such categorical dichotomy must arise - by reciprocal constraint - out of the common resource which is a vagueness. — apokrisis
The brain cannot visualize (4) grains of sand that are close to each other. In order to visualize four grains of sand the brain must employ a trick - that is, it will visualize two groups of (2) grains each. — Don Wade
This thought experiment demonstrates why the paradox is not based on "vague predicates", but is based on how the brain visualizes images. — Don Wade
A spectrum suggests unbroken continuity. — apokrisis
[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, it's the very smallest size of heap. — bongo fury
But the sorites paradox demands discrete acts of addition or subtraction. — apokrisis
So we have the two poles of a metaphysical spectrum right there. The discrete~continuous. And the confusion arises in trying to satisfy these two formally antithetical constraints at the same time. — apokrisis
But the meaning of bits (the signified) seems to remain somewhat vague. — T H E
What? Visualising four grains seems easy. Especially if they are arranged as four corners of a square. — apokrisis
Yes of course "spectrum" might suggest unbroken continuity. — bongo fury
A spectrum is a condition that is not limited to a specific set of values but can vary, without steps, across a continuum.
No, not at all, the discrete version is enough.
All of your strenuous metaphysics might be missing the point. — bongo fury
I applaud your effort, but visualizing a square (one shape - or (1) item) is not the same as (4) distinct grains. — Don Wade
Again, I refer to the example of the Rubin Vase: — Don Wade
Yes, with the interesting exception of systems of notation, as investigated by Goodman (along with the varieties of vagueness) in Languages of Art. — bongo fury
It both might and usually does.... — apokrisis
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