Edit: If all (perception and understanding of) reality is subjective then the burden of proof is not on the claimant but on the disagreer. — New2K2

Sounds like the standard approach in religious apologetics.

The burden of proof lies with the less reality orientated disputant - the less authoritative party. — J O Lambert

Agreed. For only such a person would take up that burden.

That is the category error - when a statement is asserted to be about the empircal state-of-affairs when it is really about the person's feelings or emotional state. — Harry Hindu

Because every statement ever made is first constructed by a subject, and because a subject has feelings, then any implied empirical statement is really a statement about feelings, hence a category error?

Too absurd to be true, so I’ll grant the benefit of the doubt and assume that’s not what you meant.

The burden of proof lies with the less reality orientated disputant - the less authoritative party. — J O Lambert

"Less reality oriented" and "less authoritative" aren't always married. The King (authority) has little inclination to prove he is naked. It's always on that little boy in the crowd (more reality oriented). But, as Baker said, only his ilk would take up such a burden. And that is so even if the burden should be on the King, according to the King's own rules.

Nah. I used all to refer to my faculties of perception, and hence my unique experience. In other words, I wanted to encompass the various modes of perception under the quantifier 'all'. It was not a statement about the universality of perception for other entities (human or otherwise). — emancipate

But your faculties of perception are not all faculties of perception. You seem to have a problem with how to use words, or are simply moving the goal posts.

Because every statement ever made is first constructed by a subject, and because a subject has feelings, then any implied empirical statement is really a statement about feelings, hence a category error?

Too absurd to be true, so I’ll grant the benefit of the doubt and assume that’s not what you meant. — Mww

If statements are about feelings, then what are feelings about? Are you an anti-realist or solipsist?

Hi James,
Mr. Baker' s muse was not being quite serious. Delusional dotards are the bane of all our lives.

I have multiple faculties of perception. I used the word 'all' to encompass them. As a quantifier. As an umbrella term. I think it is you who struggles with words. But this is pure sophistry, as is usual in philosophy discussions.

If statements are about feelings, then what are feelings about? — Harry Hindu

And if they’re not, why would it matter?

Are you an anti-realist or solipsist? — Harry Hindu

Depends. Is there prize or penalty for the right answer?

More thoughts:

I think Logic determined that it would be illogical for Logic to place the burden of proof upon the student. I think Logic arrived at this conclusion thus:

Where A = “Because I said so” and B = “the burden is upon you to prove I am wrong” then A = B. Since Logic has already said that A cannot = B, then one of the two must give. Logic decided that B must give, and therefor Logic (never in doubt about itself), assumed the burden of proving that “Because I said so” is correct. Logic now sits in a dark corner, wringing its illogical little hands, and sweating in consternation. The crowds gather ‘round their King in defense and attack any who would deny that A = B.

To put Logic in a better light, I think Logic assumed the burden because Logic is a child of Philosophy. Philosophy, as a lover of wisdom, is a fan of the question. While the student will have questions, so too will the "teacher." The true teacher does not ask the question rhetorically, but in a sincere desire to know what the student thinks, all in a search for truth. If the burden of proof is placed upon those who ask, then the love of wisdom, Philosophy, Logic, and the asking stop. Where the student asks why does X = X and the teacher says "The burden is upon you to figure that out" then the only logical response of the student would be this: "If the burden is upon me, and you've got nothing to contribute, then I'll no longer ask you. Sorry to have wasted your precious time."

Socrates, overseeing this exchange says "Jailer, get me that poison!"

I have multiple faculties of perception. I used the word 'all' to encompass them. As a quantifier. As an umbrella term. I think it is you who struggles with words. But this is pure sophistry, as is usual in philosophy discussions. — emancipate

What interest would I have in "all" of your faculties if perception? What use would it be for me if your faculties of perception are not similar to mine, and how would either of us know if they are or not, if all knowledge is subjective?

And if they’re not, why would it matter? — Mww

Exactly. If feelings aren't about anything, then your words and your feelings wouldn't matter to anyone except yourself, so what would be the point in putting your feelings into words to tell others how you feel? There would be nothing anyone could do about how you feel because there would be no reason for how you feel.

How are we even communicating if our words don't exist apart from us after we type them for others to observe and read? I would be reading my own feelings, not your words and you reading your feelings, not my words. Our feeling of reading words is about words that exist on the screen, not our feelings, or we'd never get at what each other are saying.

I merely wished to highlight that your universalist claim*, that any assertion about reality must be objective, doesn't actually hold up universally. I wasn't making an objective assertion about reality when speaking of my faculties of perception.

*Any time you try to make a case for what reality is, and how it is, then you are making an objective statement. — Harry Hindu

You: If statements are about feelings, then what are feelings about?
Me: And if they’re not, why would it matter?
You: Exactly. If feelings aren't about anything, then your words and your feelings wouldn't matter...

Statements not about feelings are statements about things.
Feelings don’t matter in statements not about feelings but about things.
Statements not about feelings doesn't mean feelings aren’t about anything.
Feelings are always about something. If feelings aren’t about anything, statements with feeling as predicates are worthless tautologies, re: beauty is a feeling.

Our feeling of reading words is about words that exist on the screen — Harry Hindu

No. Our understanding of reading words is about words that exist, and that from an assertorial judgement on a given cognition on empirical grounds; feeling is only an aesthetic judgement that is not given from any cognition, but on a priori ground alone. Understanding is an affect on experience; feeling is an affect on personality (technically, subjectivity) because of an experience.

Do try to separate feelings from cognitions, psychology from philosophy.

I wasn't making an objective assertion about reality when speaking of my faculties of perception.

*Any time you try to make a case for what reality is, and how it is, then you are making an objective statement. — emancipate

Yet you failed to do so and don't even realize it. So you weren't making the case for how your faculties of perception are regardless of what I think your faculties of perception are? Or are you saying that your faculties of perception are not part of reality (real)?

I am saying that what I said is partially true. :wink:

Ah we are such good sophists. Going round and round and getting nowhere. I'm stepping off now. Good game.

Statements not about feelings are statements about things. — Mww

Feelings are things. Ideas are things. Feelings and ideas are a causal part of the world, just like everything else we make statements about.

Feelings don’t matter in statements not about feelings but about things. — Mww

...which was the point I was making about the distinction between objective and subjective statements - when you confuse talking about things that are not your feelings with talking about your feelings. When you tell me the apple is red, are you talking about the apple or your feeling?

Statements not about feelings doesn't mean feelings aren’t about anything.
Feelings are always about something. If feelings aren’t about anything, statements with feeling as predicates are worthless tautologies, re: beauty is a feeling. — Mww

That is the answer to my question:
Excellent, then we agree that words are about feelings and other things, as well as feelings are about other feelings and other things. You can have feelings about the way others feel, just as you can have feelings about your favorite sports team losing, or the injury to your toe after stubbing it. Now, can we agree that confusing words that are about your feelings with things that are not your feelings is a category error and what makes a statement subjective rather than objective?

Because every statement ever made is first constructed by a subject, and because a subject has feelings, then any implied empirical statement is really a statement about feelings, hence a category error? — Mww

Making a statement is a behavior. All behaviors make statements (leave effects). Effects make statements about their causes. Your behavior (the statement that you make) is indicative of your ideas and feelings. I can gather what you think from what you state, just as I can gather what a dog feels from it's yelp and what tree rings state about the age of a tree. We apply the same type of reasoning in determining what words mean as we do in determining what tree rings mean.

No. Our understanding of reading words is about words that exist, and that from an assertorial judgement on a given cognition on empirical grounds; feeling is only an aesthetic judgement that is not given from any cognition, but on a priori ground alone. Understanding is an affect on experience; feeling is an affect on personality (technically, subjectivity) because of an experience.

Do try to separate feelings from cognitions, psychology from philosophy. — Mww

I'm not understanding. You see scribbles on the screen. Is your visual experience the same thing as the scribbles on the screen? If not then your visual experience is about the scribbles on the screen. Understanding only comes after you have a visual experience that is OF, or ABOUT the thing you are looking at. Understanding is then OF, or ABOUT, your visual experience, while your visual experience is OF, or ABOUT the very thing light is reflecting off of that you then see. One might say that what you see is more about the light than the object it reflects off of. So then in talking about what we see, are we talking about light or the object that the light reflects off of?

Feeling is a tactile sensation. Seeing is a visual sensation. Hearing is an auditory sensation. Smelling is an olfactory sensation, and tasting is a gustatory sensation. We know the world through our sensations. One sensation can verify what the other is informing us of. They are all the same in that they inform us of some state-of-affairs, whether it be the state of our bodies and brains, or the state of the weather. What we talk about are our sensations. We have good reason to believe that our sensations are about the world, so that are words are about the world, not just our sensations.

I am saying that what I said is partially true. :wink: — emancipate

Which part? What does it even mean to be partially true? Doesn't it mean the same as partially false? What does it mean to be true or false?

Ah we are such good sophists. Going round and round and getting nowhere. I'm stepping off now. Good game. — emancipate

I didn't see it as a game. But you obviously did because you kept moving the goal posts. When one sees language as a game and the other doesn't, where else would you expect a conversation to go?

So, it's not a game but there are goalposts. I see. Are the goalposts for scoring points or merely decoration?

So, it's not a game but there are goalposts. I see. — emancipate

See what - the truth?

See what - the truth? — Harry Hindu

Partially.

Feelings are things. Ideas are things. Feelings and ideas are a causal part of the world, just like everything else we make statements about. — Harry Hindu

I disagree. That which is given to sensibility is a thing, that which to us becomes phenomena. Causality for things in the world requires both sufficient reason and necessity; feelings are sufficient reason for some things but do not carry necessity for those same things, so fails the criteria for causality of things in the world.

But, if you ain’t buyin’ none of that, that feelings are not things, c’mon over and we’ll crack open this brand new jug of righteousness, grill up some happy, top off the evening with nice game of timid, and we’ll talk about these......er..... things.
—————-

Feelings don’t matter in statements not about feelings but about things.
— Mww
...which was the point I was making about the distinction between objective and subjective statements - when you confuse talking about things that are not your feelings with talking about your feelings. When you tell me the apple is red, are you talking about the apple or your feeling? — Harry Hindu

One cannot talk intelligibly about his feelings without some object in the predicate of the proposition, that identifies them, that predicate immediately makes the proposition objective. A purely subjective proposition has the form, “I feel bad”. Or, “Juicy ripe apples make me feel happy”, where the predicate is the feeling. Both worthless tautologies. A big fat.....yeah, and???

Rather than a category error, I think the distinction between objective and subjective statements is what can be possibly done with them. Objective, possible dialogue; subjective, no dialogue, or amendment to an objective statement in order to facilitate a possible dialogue.

Or not. Too much bother, methinks. The technicalities beyond the scope.