Essentialism only works when we know exactly what it means to be X – e.g. where X is a triangle or a bachelor. But when it comes to something like humanity or personhood then we have to abandon essentialism and accept instead a family resemblance among the things which we – as a matter of convention – designate as "human" or "person". — Michael

Sounds a lot like my beef when it comes to any absolute idealistic notion.

Indeed, idealistic notions only work when we know exactly what the standard of measure is that is the means with which we (can) field such absolute idealistic categorical notions.

I can only understand this sort of thinking when it is placed into a sort of context; that is a Contextualism where Essentialism is a 'subset'. The problem is when the context changes, so can the attributes within the standard of measure viewed as the essence for the essentialism to work in the first place. (It kind of screws up the absolute aspect of essentialism, as it is a subset of a relativistic perspective... opps! Did I just say that?)

I'll leave it at that for now, as I'm not all together too sure where this thread should journey. Me being a bit of a relativist and sort of void of absolutes kind makes such a debate moot. This probably has more to do with my understanding of what a thing would be.

Anyway...

... the issue of lumping things such a triangles with personhood is well... seems like a massive equivocation. What one can speak of regarding one notions is not necessarily what one can speak of regarding another notion, but indeed there are those who will try and possibly get away with it depending upon who is listening. ;)

Meow!

GREG

... the issue of lumping things such a triangles with personhood is well... seems like a massive equivocation. What one can speak of regarding one notions is not necessarily what one can speak of regarding another notion, but indeed there are those who will try and possibly get away with it depending upon who is listening. — Mayor of Simpleton

Actually, I offered "triangle" as an example of something which can be understood according to an essentialist account of identity, and so contrasts with "person".

I should also mention that you are not really the 'one' I had in mind when I said "one can speak of".

I suppose I needed to add a bit of context there as well. :D

Indeed a triangle is far easier to understand than a person. The standard of measure for a triangle is far easier to gain a consensus for than the standard of measure for a person. I suppose the gist of my rant is that just because one has a standard of measure a good number of notions, it does not mean that one can generalize about notions equally. Vastness, complexity, number of variables and other value factors making up a standard of measure are not equal...

... so the generalized overall concept of Essentialism collapses upon the weight of the relative variables making up the standard of measure.

Personally I consider Essentialism to be a subset of Contextualism which is either a (hasty) generalization for the sake of convenience/simplification or a categorical error in that it is idealism as a subset of relativism.

Meow!

GREG

Essentialism only works when we know exactly what it means to be X – e.g. where X is a triangle or a bachelor. But when it comes to something like humanity or personhood then we have to abandon essentialism and accept instead a family resemblance among the things which we – as a matter of convention – designate as "human" or "person". — Michael

I don't see how resorting to family resemblance offers a solution. You are still left with the requirement that for X to be a human (for example) that X have certain attributes, with those attributes being defined as "resemblances."

I would define a human as that entity that has certain a certain set of attributes, with no particular attribute being essential.

I don't see how resorting to family resemblance offers a solution. You are still left with the requirement that for X to be a human (for example) that X have certain attributes, with those attributes being defined as "resemblances." — Hanover

No, because rather than saying "this is what it means to be human" I would say "these are the things that we call 'human' and these are some of things that a lot of these things have in common". It's an entirely different approach – and one that doesn't require that there be necessary requirements to qualify as human. Because it's not about qualifying as human but about whether or not describing this thing as human is more-or-less consistent with how we already use the word.

But when it comes to something like humanity or personhood then we have to abandon essentialism and accept instead a family resemblance among the things which we – as a matter of convention – designate as "human" or "person". — Michael

Is essentialism confined to identifying one characteristic or trait as essential or can it identify a set of traits such that no single trait is necessary or sufficient in themselves but when all are absent, the identity of the object is essentially different? For instance, to be human is essentially to have any combination of traits {x, y, z} such that if one does not have any combination of traits {x, y ,z}, then they are not human. The essential feature is the "any combination of traits {x, y, z}".

Is essentialism confined to identifying one characteristic or trait as essential or can it identify a set of traits... — Soylent

There can be a set.

... such that no single trait is necessary or sufficient in themselves but when all are absent, the identity of the object is essentially different? For instance, to be human is essentially to have any combination of traits {x, y, z} such that if one does not have any combination of traits {x, y ,z}, then they are not human. The essential feature is the "any combination of traits {x, y, z}".

If we accept that to be human is to have any combination of traits {x, y, z} then A which has trait {x} and B which has trait {z} are both human but have nothing in common. I don't think this would count as essentialism. For essentialism to work there must be something (or many things) uniquely shared by all humans.

Essentialism is "the view that, for any specific entity (such as an animal, a group of people, a physical object, a concept), there is a set of attributes which are necessary to its identity and function"1.

Isn't there an assumption here, "any specific entity" must exist prior to having any specific attributes. Reality seems to present entities, which are all contingent, variable, and which reveal themselves to us.

I'm inclined to say x and z are not sufficient or necessary to qualify as being human, but if a being does not have any of {x, y, z}, then that being is not human. Another way to state it, having a trait x is does not make you human, but not having any of {x, y, z} means you are essentially not human. That may not fall under a strict heading of essentialism as a single property in common but closely fits your family resemblance idea.

*edited*

Doesn't essentialism live on in the workings of DNA? Or, put another way, isn't DNA itself very close to the ancient idea of 'essence'?

It's also worth reflecting on the relationship between the words 'essential' 'esse' and 'is'. 'Essential' means 'of the essence', i.e. 'what something really is', where 'esse' is a form of 'est' ('to be'). So 'essence' basically means 'is-ness' of something, what it takes or means for that thing to be.

The form (eidos) is not strictly speaking the same as the essence. Aristotle, I think, introduced the idea of 'substance', which I don't think is found in Plato (someone please tell me if I'm wrong about that.) The Platonist idea was perceptible through noesis, as something real, actually more real than what simply existed, but which we don't generally perceive because of our attachment to the sensory domain. Aristotle attempted to articulate the idea in terms of 'substance' which in my view changed the meaning of it quite considerably.

Essentialist thinking lives on in neo-scholastic philosophy. See Think, McFly, Think, by Edward Feser, for a exposition of the meaning of 'concept' and 'intellect' in this context.

The problem with this whole argument is that we know whether an entity is human, a tiger, a monkey, a frog and so on, not on the basis of running thought lists of properties.

So the essence of being some entity is not some one determinate property nor a determinate set of properties.

So is its essence something else, or is the notion of essence faulty?

The notion of determinate essence is misleading. Or to put it another way, the perfectly intelligible notion of essence becomes by a fallacy of misplaced concreteness, a notion of determinate essence, which creates stupid puzzles for idle minds.

No, because rather than saying "this is what it means to be human" I would say "these are the things that we call 'human' and these are some of things that a lot of these things have in common". It's an entirely different approach – and one that doesn't require that there be necessary requirements to qualify as human. Because it's not about qualifying as human but about whether or not describing this thing as human is more-or-less consistent with how we already use the word. — Michael

It is irrelevant whether we say "this is what is means to be human" or whether we say "this is what "human" means." In either event, you are attempting to identify a particular metaphysical attribute that is essential for humans (or "humans"). That is, whether we are (1) trying to figure out how we use a term or (2) trying to figure out what certain beings have in common, in either event, we are analyzing for similarities and trying to determine when two things are similar enough to be the same type of thing.

All of this is to say that your distinctions between actual humans, utterances that describe actual beings, and others' thoughts about human beings make no difference to this analysis. All are equally external objects that possess the same basic material metaphysical existence. Whether we are talking about things or words about things, both are equally metaphysically things.

I don't see why it matters at all whether we say that "all humans have the following similarities" as opposed to our saying "all uses of the term 'human" have the following similarities."

In either event, you are attempting to identify a particular metaphysical attribute that is essential for humans (or "humans"). — Hanover

No I'm not. I'm just saying "I call these things 'human' and these things 'not-human'". I'm not saying that the former have some particular metaphysical attribute that makes them human (or not human), and nor am I saying that my calling them 'human' or 'not-human' is only correct if they have (or don't) have some particular metaphysical attribute.

I'm just describing the use of the term 'human'. I'm not treating humanity as some (meta)physical identity with its own unique 'essence'.

I don't see why it matters at all whether we say that "all humans have the following similarities" as opposed to our saying "all uses of the term 'human" have the following similarities."

It might not. But I'm not saying either.

Or, put another way, isn't DNA itself very close to the ancient idea of 'essence'? — Wayfarer

I'm not sure DNA does the job on its own because DNA is pretty flexible in terms of incorporating new molecules without significant changes. In particular, I'm thinking of DNA transmigration from something like a viral infection. It might also be worthwhile to note that DNA as an essence would likely be a reference to a wild type allele, but DNA essence is weakened in the particular by the phenotype and later epigenetic changes.

DNA most certainly does not function like an essence. Unlike what most people think, there is no one-to-one correspondence between a DNA sequence and the protein which results from it. What sort of protein actually results from a DNA sequence is profoundly influenced by the cellular environment in which that synthesis takes place. In John Protevi's words,

"The standard picture is the slogan “DNA makes RNA. RNA makes protein. Proteins make us.”
But the real process is more complicated than this unilinear process... [Instead] One gene (DNA string) = many (mRNA transcripts) = many proteins ... Think of it this way: we have to learn to separate the heredity gene (as contiguous string of DNA passed down in reproduction) from the functional gene (end-product of transcription processes "forming," from separated strings of DNA, a gene which plays a role in protein synthesis).

And here's the important point: what controls the editing and splicing? It depends on the state of the cell at any one time. Thus control has migrated from DNA (structural plus regulatory genes) to the complex system in which DNA plays a (certainly very important) role, but no longer a controlling role. But the story is not over yet. Not only are different proteins formed from the "same" gene (that is, to repeat, different mature mRNA transcripts can be formed from the same primary mRNA transcript), but proteins function in different ways, according to the cellular context in which they find themselves. This change in protein function is due to changes in their structure; this is known as "allostery." So now we have, instead of "one protein = one function," the case that "one protein = many functions."

DNA is anything but a blueprint of a controller that functions like an essence. What results from a DNA sequence is as much modulated by 'external factors' as DNA itself modulates the process of Geneomic development. The whole process is thoroughly differential, the idea of DNA functioning as essence is entirely wrong.

It is interesting, though, that many criminal cases are nowadays solved by DNA evidence. The point about that evidence is that once a particular DNA sequence is identified, it can be matched to that of a person with pretty well absolute certainty; there is no chance that it belongs to someone else (leaving aside the problems of contamination or faulty procedures.) Is there anything other than DNA that could be used for such a purpose?

If everyone were a assigned a unique number at birth, this would no more speak to their essence than the use of DNA for the purposes of identification. Frankly, that we share 50% of our DNA with bananas should place the idea of DNA as essence under immediate suspicion to begin with.

I'm not actually trying to argue the case that DNA is actually an essence. The question that I asked was, does the idea of essentialism live on in the workings of DNA?

I'm sure that if you had asked Watson and Crick that question, they would have said 'most certainly'. After all, their discovery, one of the great scientific discoveries of the 20th century, grew out of the intellectual tradition in which such ideas as 'essence' (and 'form' and many other traditional philosophical ideas) were seminal parts. And such ideas have ways of turning up in new forms. So when they first discovered DNA, then I'm sure that they thought that it was indeed comparable to the traditional idea of 'essence' - Crick himself was quite convinced that human beings could be reduced to DNA without residue. I'm perfectly aware of epigenetics and gene expression and how that has cast doubt on the 'essentialist' kind of model that Watson and Crick might have advocated, and furthemore I don't subscribe to Crick's materialism (and he was an arch materialist). But I still think it is a point worthy of consideration in the context of the discussion. That's all I'm saying.

If the idea of essentialism lives on in DNA, it's because these outmoded ideas are so incredibly hard to shake that even scientists are quick to annex their discoveries to them, despite their doing total injustice to their own findings. That you yourself would find an affinity with what might as well be the apotheosis of biological reductionism says alot about just how damaging these ideas are, and just how far we need to go in expelling them from the field of thought.

I don't see why it matters at all whether we say that "all humans have the following similarities" as opposed to our saying "all uses of the term 'human" have the following similarities." — Hanover

Ah this is a common misconception. There are n + s conditions for both, and they are different. We need to analyse both conditions of description as well as ontology to get the proper picture.

Say, as I will now claim, the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a screwdriver (i.e. ontology) are ‘created to drive screws’. If so, the screwdriver itself needs to fit entirely within the conditions ‘created to drive screws’. As a result screwdrivers must be created to drive screws only. A multifunction tool that is created to drive screws as well as say, cut rope, pick food from your teeth and file your nails would not fit in the conditions ‘created to drive screws’ and thus not fit the definition of ‘screwdriver’ even though such multifunction tools are created to drive screws! This counter-intuitive result is important so I will attempt to set it out below in a different iteration.

As mentioned there are different conditions between correctly describing things as x, as to whether something is x. Of course the two are related, we often describe things as x if they are x.
The necessary and sufficiently conditions of correctly describing x as:

1) “A screwdriver”

are if and only if:

1a) x is a screwdriver

however the conditions of being

1b) A screwdriver

as I claim, has one necessary and sufficient condition - if and only if:

1c) created to drive screws

That condition 1c) is obviously met if and only if x is created to drive screws. A multifunction tool then that is created to do things over and above drive screws (like our aforementioned example that is also created to pick from food from your teeth) and would thus not be a screwdriver.
But confusingly there are also conditions that need to be met in order to be described as:

2) “created to drive screws”

Note that 2) is different from the conditions that are 1c) created to drive screws. 2) and 1c) differ in that 2) is a description while 1c) are a set of conditions (for ontology).
To be 2) described as “created to drive screws” there is only one necessary and sufficient condition, if and only if:

2a) x is created to drive screws.

Notice however that 1c) uses the description 2)!

Multifunction tools, and screwdrivers, then that both meet 2a) and can be described as being 2) created to drive screws. Things that meet 2a) however do not necessarily meet 1c). Indeed our multifunction tools that meets 2a) by being created to drive screws because they are not created to drive screws exclusively, do not meet 1c (and therefore not 1b), 1a) or 1)) and cannot then be screwdrivers, nor can correctly be described as such.

Note there is no infinite regression here. 2a) uses 2) and 2) uses 2a), not a further description which would be a problem if that description needed a description that needed a description and so on.

Using this method of understanding necessary and sufficient conditions, let us re-examine one of the few uncontroversial essentialist definitions - the example of ‘bachelor’- and examine why it is so uncontroversial.
The conditions of being correctly described as

3) “a bachelor”

(as opposed to being a bachelor) are if and only if:

3a) x is a bachelor

the conditions of being a bachelor however are if and only if x is:

3b) an unmarried man

uncontroversially, the conditions of being correctly described as ‘unmarried’ are:

3c) unmarried

and the conditions of being correctly described as a man are:

3d) a man

The reason that the conditions for ontology (3b) are uncontroversial is because unlike ‘screwdriver’ not only is every unmarried man necessarily 3c) unmarried and 3d) a man, but that all things 3c) unmarried and 3d) a man can be correctly described as ‘unmarried’ and ‘a man’. This follows, as people are described as ‘unmarried’, for example, only need to be unmarried. Although this would theoretically include anyone over and above ‘married’, married people can’t be over and above married (as opposed to over and above ‘created to drive screws’). This is due to marriage being a binary - it being absurd to be married and unmarried, say, unlike the way that multifunction tools that can be created to drive screws and created to pick food from teeth. This binary effect, also present in the quantifier ‘a’, the sex ‘male’, and species ‘human’ result in it being, in some sense, an accident of circumstance that the conditions of ‘bachelor’ works both as a description and also ontology.

The distinction between description and ontology is vital to defining things but can be hard to accept at an intuitive level. Under the distinction that I’ve made here, a vegan diet can be defined as having necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e. of ontology) of:

4a) eating non-animal products

It would be a mistake though, to suggest that an omnivore - say chewing on a cheeseburger with a piece of lettuce in - is following a vegan diet just because she iseating non-animal products. Why is this? Intuitively it seems as though our cheeseburger fan is eating non-animal products and should therefore meets the diet of 4a). The answer though, is that a sentence that includes ‘eating non-animal products’ (as per the italicised portion of the first sentence in this paragraph) itself is a description, rather than what I am calling conditions of ontology. It is the fact that a vegan diet is exclusively eating non-animal product that makes it vegan, and it is exclusively the diet that is exclusively eating non-animal product that can correctly be described as vegan. We should be able to see here that the idea that ‘eating non-animal products’ has its own necessary and sufficient conditions is just another way of phrasing the fact of distinction between description and ontology. To ignore this distinction however would be a serious mistake when defining concepts and thinking about essentialism.

This again...

Not relevant you think?