So in that sense, I suppose it's not a contradiction — Amalac

Yeah, I agree - I was mistaken.

It seems to me that you are arguing that there is no contradiction involved in the sceptical thesis and thus that the sceptical thesis is not self-refuting. (Unless I have misunderstood). — Bartricks

You have not misunderstood.

I take it that a theory is 'self-refuting' when there would be a practical contradiction involved in believing it. — Bartricks

I sort of agree in a sense. As Noam Chomsky pointed out, there are no sceptics (in practice).

However, I take one of Descartes' lessons to be that self-refuting positions are more certainly false than those that contain contradictions. For I know more certainly that I exist, than that the law of non-contradiction is true. — Bartricks

Hmm, I'm not sure if I agree with that. Bertrand Russell describes the status of our knowledge with regards to Descartes's cogito quite well in my opinion:

Descartes's indubitable facts are his own thoughts--using "thought" in the widest possible sense. "I think" is his ultimate premiss. Here the word "I" is really illegitimate; he ought to state his  ultimate premiss in the form "there are thoughts." The word "I" is grammatically convenient, but does not describe a datum. When he goes on to say "I am a thing which thinks," he is already using uncritically the apparatus of categories handed down by scholasticism. He nowhere proves that thoughts need a thinker, nor is there reason to believe this except in a grammatical sense. 

Fernando Savater gives an illustration of this: If you translate the statement “It rains” to spanish, you get “llueve” (the subject dissappears completely). And so, just as we would not argue that there must be something that “rains”, (an “it” in the same sense as an “I”) it may also be argued that it is not necessary for there to be some subject who “thinks”, and that maybe the right way of saying of describing the occurance is: “thinking is happening”, just as we would say “raining is happening”.

There is also the view that the self is merely a bundle or collection of perceptions, since we have no impression of self, and therefore no idea of self (this would be David Hume's criticism). Unless we say that we have an innate idea of the self.

And "It is raining, but no one believes it is raining" would be another, as although it is possibly true - there seems nothing impossible about the scenario described - to believe it is to render it false. — Bartricks

Well let's start by clarifying: If it is raining and I say “it is raining” , does that imply that I implicitly believe that it is raining? It would seem that way, for otherwise I would not claim it (unless I wanted to tell a lie, if it wasn't raining, and so “I believe it is raining” would be false, and “no one believes it is raining” could still be true).

It is not self-contradictory however, since if the human race perished tomorrow, and it was still raining on earth, then the proposition “It is raining, but nobody believes it is raining” would be true (and not even self-defeating, since it need not be uttered by someone in order for it to be true). But anyway, this is not the right thread to discuss the transcendental notion of truth.

All those points you mention will surely get us off topic, so I won't respond to them further, unless they are more directly related to the OP.

All those points you mention will surely get us off topic, so I won't respond to them further, unless they are more directly related to the OP. — Amalac

Well, I suppose what I'm saying is that you're conflating 'self-refuting' with 'contains a contradiction'. When philosophers dismiss radical scepticism on the grounds that it is self refuting, they are not thereby asserting that the thesis contains a contradiction. Yet that's what you've taken them to be doing and then proceeded to address that straw man argument.

It seems clear enough that radical scepticism - which I will understand to be the view that there are no reasons to believe anything - contains no contradiction. So I do not believe that there are many philosophers who would claim otherwise.

The claim, rather, is that it is 'self refuting'. "It is raining, but nobody believes it is raining" is one such thesis. It contains no contradiction. But it is self-refuting, for to believe it is to render it false.

The same is true where "there is no reason to believe anything" is concerned. For someone who believes it must, if they are not confused about the nature of what they believe, understand that this means there is no reason to believe that there is no reason to believe anything. This person therefore believes something and at the same time believes that they have no reason to believe it.
As Hitchens put it once, "what we have no reason to believe, we can dismiss without reason" or something like that.
Well, that applies to normative scepticism. The normative sceptic believes there are no reasons to believe anything, including that there are no normative reasons to believe things. They are, then, irrational. Not that they'll care, of course.

So I do not believe that there are many philosophers who would claim otherwise. — Bartricks

I have given a quote by Sextus Empiricus (the one Banno wrote), as well as the Hume quote in the OP, that show that a significant number of philosophers in the past did claim that, and at present you may find that many people do claim that scepticism is selfcontradictory (not merely impossible to believe). If you don't believe me:

lookup videos on that subject and what many philosophers have said about scepticism, and I'm sure you'll find many people using it. — Amalac

The claim, rather, is that it is 'self refuting'. "It is raining, but nobody believes it is raining" is one such thesis. It contains no contradiction. But it is self-refuting, for to believe it is to render it false. — Bartricks

I get your point here, but some kinds of sceptics (phyrronian sceptics, as opposed to academic sceptics for example) would not put forward the argument as a proof that no argument can be proved, or claiming that we should believe that “there is no reason to believe anything”, rather they would mention it so that they could pit the arguments against the claim “there is reason to believe something” against those in favor of it, and then suggest that we should suspend judgement as to whether or not there is reason to believe anything, since we seemingly have no way of knowing one way or the other in view of the apparent equipollence of each opposing arguments. The practical choice between the two would then be a matter of taste, they may say.

The same is true where "there is no reason to believe anything" is concerned. For someone who believes it must, if they are not confused about the nature of what they believe, understand that this means there is no reason to believe that there is no reason to believe anything. — Bartricks

Yes, but this is tendentiously put: making it out to necessarily be a positive belief when it need not be. It could be phrased "I find no reason to believe anything", without the implicit contradiction that would be involved in asserting "I believe that there is no reason to believe anything".

My approach to scepticism is based on the principle of sound reason known as Occam's Razor - which states that it is vain to do with more, that which can be done with fewer. Or, to put it another way, the simplest adequate explanation is the best. Scepticism violates these injunctions by disregarding what is apparent, to propose an explanation that raises more questions than it answers. While sceptical flights of fancy cannot be conclusively disproven; we may indeed, all be brains in jars - and this apparent reality merely an induced illusion, it's easier and more likely to accept that an objective reality exists, and we perceive it as it really is - albeit with limited sensory apparatus.

I have given a quote by Sextus Empiricus, as well as the Hume quote in the OP, that show that a significant number of philosophers in the past did claim that, and at present you may find that many people do claim that scepticism is selfcontradictory (not merely impossible to believe). If you don't believe me — Amalac

But who has made the argument you are addressing - so, the argument that radical scepticism contains a contradiction (as opposed to being self-refuting)? (I mean, Sextus and Hume are sceptics, right? So they are not the ones making the argument, they are simply addressing it - but that's not evidence that anyone has actually made it).

I get your point here, but some kinds of sceptics (phyrronian sceptics, as opposed to academic sceptics for example) would not put forward the argument as a proof that no argument can be proved, or claiming that we should believe that “there is no reason to believe anything”, rather they would mention it si that they could pit the arguments against the claim “there is reason to believe something” against those in favor of it, and then suggesting that we should suspend judgement as to whether or not there is reason to believe anything, since we seemingly have no way of knowing one way or the other in view of the apparent equipollence of each opposing argument. The practical choice between the two would then be a matter of taste, they may say. — Amalac

I do not really follow your meaning here. You accept, I take it, that the thesis that there are no reasons to do or believe anything is self-refuting?

Yes, but this is tendentiously put: making it out to necessarily be a positive belief when it need not be. — Janus

No, it's just accurate. The person who believes that normative scepticism is true, must also believe that there is no reason to believe that normative scepticism is true, otherwise in what sense do they truly believe that normative scepticism is true? To believe that normative scepticism is true, is to believe that there is positively no reason to believe anything. So they believe that there is positively no reason to believe that there is no reason to believe anything. They're irrational then, right?

There is no proof of anything, and I can prove it!

No, it's just accurate. The person who believes that normative scepticism is true, must also believe that there is no reason to believe that normative scepticism is true, otherwise in what sense do they truly believe that normative scepticism is true? To believe that normative scepticism is true, is to believe that there is positively no reason to believe anything. So they believe that there is positively no reason to believe that there is no reason to believe anything. They're irrational then, right? — Bartricks

Sure, that applies to the person who believes normative skepticism is true, For a start, the very idea of normative skepticism is self-contradictory, because to hold such a position would be to believe that everyone must hold the same criteria for judgement as oneself, and this would obviously be, contradicting the thesis, a positive belief.

But a person can be a radical skeptic on the more modest basis of finding no reason to believe anything. The two positions are not the same.

(I mean, Sextus and Hume are sceptics, right? So they are not the ones making the argument, they are simply addressing it - but that's not evidence that anyone has actually made it). — Bartricks

I suppose you are technically right. I can't (at present) tell you who exactly put forward the arguments mentioned by Sextus and Hume. The fact that they don't give the names of the proponents is also unhelpful.

Maybe they were lying and fabricated the arguments. Personally, I don't see any reason for them to lie about that, but I'm open to that possibility.

Later with more time I'll investigate to see if I can find who advanced the arguments that scepticism is selfcontradictory in antiquity.

I do not really follow your meaning here. You accept, I take it, that the thesis that there are no reasons to do or believe anything is self-refuting? — Bartricks

Self refuting in the sense you have described, yes. But I meant rather “self-contradictory”. Perhaps I should correct the title.

What I mean is that the academic sceptic makes negatively dogmatic claims such as “No belief can be justified”, “We know nothing”, etc. whereas the phyrronian suspends judgement and doesn't make any claims, neither affirmative nor negative.

Maybe they were lying and fabricated the arguments. Personally, I don't see any reason for them to lie about that, but I'm open to that possibility. — Amalac

Don't philosophers do this all the time? Not lie, I mean. But anticipate a range of objections to their own view, and then refute them. However, many of the anticipated objections have not actually been made by anyone.

But I meant rather “self-contradictory”. Perhaps I should correct the title. — Amalac

I think that's a straw man though, as the view that there is no reason to believe anything clearly contains no contradiction.

What I mean is that the academic sceptic makes negatively dogmatic claims such as “No belief can be justified”, “We know nothing”, etc. whereas the phyrronian suspends judgement and doesn't make any claims, neither affirmative nor negative. — Amalac

What is the Phyrronian thesis, though? That there is as much reason to believe any given proposition as disbelieve it?

Sure, that applies to the person who believes normative skepticism is true, For a start, the very idea of normative skepticism is self-contradictory, because to hold such a position would be to believe that everyone must hold the same criteria for judgement as oneself, and this would obviously be, contradicting the thesis, a positive belief. — Janus

I do not know what you mean. Normative scepticism - that is, the view that there are no reasons to do or believe anything - is not self-contradictory. There is no contradiction contained in the idea. But it is self-refuting in that anyone who attempts to defend it will have to assume it is false. It is indefensible, then, as if a defence works, then it is not true (for if there is epistemic reason to believe normative scepticism is true, then there is no epistemic reason to believe normative scepticism is true).

But a person can be a radical skeptic on the more modest basis of finding no reason to believe anything. The two positions are not the same. — Janus

Not really sure what your point is. Yes, we can distinguish between not being aware of a reason to believe something and positively believing there is no reason to believe something. My cat, for instance, doesn't see any reason to believe anything. But it'd be odd to describe my cat as a sceptic.

Let's assume that normative scepticism - which I will stipulate is the view that there are no reasons to do or believe anything - is false. Well, if that's true, then someone who doesn't see reason to do or believe anything is just suffering from a kind of rational blindness. They don't represent a philosophical position anymore than a visually blind person does.

The question is the mind being able to accept truth or will our ego deny the truth to continue supporting our own convictions.

The problem is not that proof exists. I believe it does exist. Is acknowledging the proof when you encounter it.

Proof is a threat to convictions and the mind is attached to convictions and ideals. Whatever convictions and ideals we uphold in our minds motivates us to move toward whatever goal we have in mind.

The problem is if you find the proof you may encounter a paradox. If that proof contradicts everything you learned and believe.

You find yourself at a crossroad to accept it and re-evaluate your values and morals. Or deny it in the hopes to maintain a resemblance of inner peace.

But if you are lucky the proof will align with your values. Who knows?

So this raise another question do you have the courage and mental discipline to accept the truth and make your ideal and values expendable? Will you be able to Adapt to the new reality?

However, many of the anticipated objections have not actually been made by anyone. — Bartricks

This I take to be the true state of the question, and cannot approve of that expeditious way, which some take with the sceptics, to reject at once all their arguments without enquiry or examination. If the sceptical reasonings be strong, say they, ’tis a proof, that reason may have some force and authority: if weak, they can never be sufficient to invalidate all the conclusions of our understanding. — David Hume

It seems clear to me that the “they” he mentions is not merely a rhetorical device, but maybe I'm wrong. It really sounds like he's adressing an argument he read or heard about from other philosophers.

I think the same about Sextus.

What is the Phyrronian thesis, though? That there is as much reason to believe any given proposition as disbelieve it? — Bartricks

I guess the phyrronian could say:

a) That they don't present any thesis

Or

b) Suspend judgement when you can't find out whether some belief is more likely to be true than its negation (which for them is always). This sounds similar to what you say.

In practice, however, the phyrronian can't suspend action and hope to survive at the same time.

Phyrrho held that no line of action could be more rational than any other.

If so, the choice of any action and the choice of any belief would be based on taste, sentiment and custom, as Hume would put it.

It seems clear to me that the “they” he mentions is not merely a rhetorical device, but maybe I'm wrong. It really sounds like he's adressing an argument he read or heard about from other philosophers. — Amalac

Yes, but the argument he describes there seems as if it is the self-refutation argument, not the contradiction argument. And Hume's response to it seems confused - he seems simply to be noting that the sceptic is fated to have to appeal to reason to undermine reason's authority, but this is no more than to acknowledge the inevitability of self-refutation, not to answer the charge.

If all skepticism is wrong, then anything goes.
Since that's not the case, some skepticism is right.

You might doubt anything, but not everything.

If all skepticism is right, then doubt about skepticism is also right.
Hence, unjustified belief can be right.

Seems the problem is the universal (or unqualified) statements.

The contradiction consists in saying there is no reason to believe anything, and yet I believe something, if the claim is that one should not believe anything without reason. Otherwise, sure, there would be no contradiction. That's why I specified "implicit".

As to your cat, it is not aware of the possibility of any philosophical standpoints, so your point there is profoundly irrelevant.

As to your cat, it is not aware of the possibility of any philosophical standpoints, so your point there is profoundly irrelevant. — Janus

Yes, that was the point. So pointing out that there are some who see no reason to believe things - such as my cat - was profoundly irrelevant.

The contradiction consists in saying there is no reason to believe anything, and yet I believe something, if the claim is that one should not believe anything without reason. — Janus

That's not a contradiction in the thesis, that's self-refutation. You're just saying what I said but putting different labels on things

If all skepticism is
wrong, then anything goes.
Since that's not the case, some skepticism is right. — jorndoe

I see, in that case which parts of scepticism do you think are right? For example, how far are things like Agrippa's Trilemma or the problem of the criterion problematic according to you?

If all skepticism is right, then doubt about skepticism is also right.
Hence, unjustified belief can be right. — jorndoe

Yes, a statement can be true despite being unjustified. The problem is, we need justification in order to avoid having to randomly guess which beliefs are true and which beliefs are false (and which are neither true nor false).

:up: As usual, you beat me to it!

in that case which parts of scepticism do you think are right? — Amalac

I guess that's where the harder work lies.
I don't see any particular reason to doubt we're chatting in English here, for example.
Some trivialities demand less doubt than other (perhaps more sweeping or less clear or evident) claims.

The problem is, we need justification in order to avoid having to randomly guess which beliefs are true and which beliefs are false (and which are neither true nor false). — Amalac

Right, so justification is typically where the work is.
Why doubt and why uphold? Both could take justification.

Anyway, the usual philosophical drive/search for unqualified principles has just failed in this case it seems.
There's more to the story of skepticism, some sort of demarcation?

Well, if someone states that: "if the arguments/claims of sceptics are valid/true, then they would refute themselves, therefore they can't be valid/true”, then they don't understand what philosophical scepticism is all about. The main claim of classical scepticism is:

"The Skeptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are brought first to epoché and then to ataraxia"
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of pyrrhonism", book 1 ch. 4.

and:

"After these remarks, our next task is to explain the goal of the Skeptic Way.Now the goal or end is that for the sake of which everything is done or considered, while it, in turn, is not done or considered for the sake of anything else; or, it is the ultimate object of the desires. We always say that as regards belief the Skeptic's goal is ataraxia, and that as regards things that are unavoidable it is having moderate pathè. For when the Skeptic set out to philosophize with the aim of assessing his phantasiai – that is, of determining which are true and which are false so as to achieve ataraxia – he landed in a controversy between positions of equal strength, and, being unable to resolve it, he suspended judgment."
-Ibid. ch. 12

Ascribing epistemological nihilism to all forms of scepticism misses the mark completely and only results in a straw man. Some people are (self-)sattisfied with knocking down straw effigies though.