The real question is "What should I do, now, in this situation?" — Banno

How is that not haphazardly contingent?

If there is a way to know what one should do, why is it still a question?

Needless to say, most contemporary metaethicists reject divine command theory. But they are very stupid and prefer talking among themselves about whether morality is made of biscuit crumbs or a kind of cheese. — Bartricks

I don't think anyone or anything is stupid. We all have different beliefs. Questioning divine authority might very well be a sign of intelligence.

Well, I think most contemporary metaethicists are very stupid. They either think that the natural world somehow wants us to do things, or they think Platonic forms do. They're idiots, or insane, or they are hacks.

I think most contemporary metaethicists are very stupid — Bartricks

Then how do you justify your previous measure of self-evident premises as being those which professional philosophers deem self-evident after receiving their professional consideration? Here you're saying that nothing about the status of professional philosopher protects against idiocy, insanity or sophistry. So perhaps you could explain why their conclusions about what is and is not self-evident to reason rise above average if their conclusions are so decidedly below par here.

Do you actually think that moral issues can be adequately addressed without reference to the person's intention? — baker

Queer, that you could garner this from my post.

How is that not haphazardly contingent? — Mww

And if it is, it remains the core of morality.

Yes, it's a messy business.

Thus, moral norms and values are composed of the prescribing and proscribing and valuing activity of an external mind. And for reasons that I will leave for later discussion, that mind will be the mind of God. — Bartricks

Are you claiming to know the mind of God? Or simply the moral norms and values given to us? And if the latter, how do you know that whichever moral norms and values you choose are God's own and those that are said to come from God but differ from your own are not?

I do not see your point. I said most contemporary metaethicists are stupid, I didn't say most contemporary philosophers are stupid or that people who are not contemporary metaethicists are less stupid.

Your questions don't make much sense to me.
Imagine I come across a freshly painted sign that says "keep out". I conclude that someone doesn't want me to go any further. Analogous questions would be "are you claiming to know the mind of the signwriter or simply the signs given to us?" (Well, I know 'something' about the mind of the signwriter from the sign). And then your next question would be "how do you know that whichever sign you choose are by the sign writer and not your own?" Well, I appear to have come across the sign, not created it myself.

Imagine you come across two freshly painted signs next to each other. One says "keep out" and the other says "welcome". You conclude that someone doesn't want me to go any further and someone wants you to come in. One sign painter may have the authority to keep you out or invite you in and the other doesn't. Who painted the signs and what was on the sign painter's mind makes a difference.

Analogously, like the different signs, we have different books claiming to be the work of God making different commands. Which one you choose to follow is up to you. This is not a matter of God's subjectivity but your own. The fact that you did not paint the signs or write the books does not mean that God rather than some other person did. Your imagined scenario has not demonstrated that it is God's and not human's subjectivity at work.

I do not see your point.

A sign, to be a sign, needs a sign writer, yes?

"Keep out" is not a sign expressing someone's desire that I stay out unless someone wrote that sign.

Moral norms are no trespass signs. They need a sign writer.

You are making an unrelated point, namely that sometimes the signs seem to contradict.

So what? Does that imply signs don't need a sign writer? How? How on earth does that follow?

Does it imply that I wrote the signs? Er, no. How on earth does it imply that?

So I don't know what relevant point you are trying to make. You just seem to be reasoning very badly. I mean, are you seriously saying that if you are walking in the woods and you come across two signs next to one another and apparently painted by the same hand, one saying "stay out" and the other "welcome" you would conclude "well, I must have written those myself"?!? That is just bonkers.

A sign, to be a sign, needs a sign writer, yes? — Bartricks

Yes, but the question of who wrote it cannot be ignored. Your claim is that God wrote it. So, where is it written and how do you know God wrote it?

quote="Bartricks;521155"]You are making an unrelated point, namely that sometimes the signs seem to contradict.[/quote]

It has direct bearing on the issue because we find various claims that contradict each other. They could not all have been written by God.

If there is a way to know what one should do, why is it still a question? — Mww

The question shouldn’t exist because morality should be inherently there like thinking and breathing. Whether you believe in God or not it should already be known to you.

If you need to ask the definition of morality then you are seeking justification to contradict what you already know is right. Or another possibility, there is a deficiency in the mind which cannot recognize morality in its natural state.

This is where things get confusing. By what definition of morality are you asking about? To justify to do good, to do bad, to be selfish to help humanity?

You need to acknowledge the intention of having morality for morality to have meaning?

Let me ask you this. What is your intentions to have morality? To do good? To do evil? To serve or to self indulge? Is it to justify your actions to be virtuous?

Be true to yourself and admit the purpose. Than that will be your moral code.

I rather think Everydayman’s core is pretty tidy, as a rule.

It still remains, that the ground for how he acts, in response to "What should I do, now, in this situation?", isn’t given by the situation.

I'll go along with that; although what to do depends intimately on the situation.

"Haphazard" isn't right; one may choose to apply whatever rules one prefers. But to do even that is to choose.

If there is a way to know what one should do, why is it still a question?
— Mww

The question shouldn’t exist because morality should be inherently there like thinking — SteveMinjares

Agreed, and was my point.

As for the rest, too anthropological/psychological for me. I prefer my philosophy, and particularly moral theory, separate and distinct from them. I’m old-fashioned that way.

True, he can chose his rules. But if he chooses different rules for different situations, without a rule to rule them all, he is hard pressed to assume a standard of action, being rather at the whim and whimsy of his own desires.

Gotta be a bottom, do-not-cross, line somewhere, somehow, right?

What does your brand of virtue ethics say about that?

being rather at the whim and whimsy of his own desires. — Mww

Even should he choose one rule to rule them all - his precious - he is still making a choice, and hence remains subject to "the whim and whimsy of his own desires" - perhaps with the reassuring illusion of being rational.

Yes, but the question of who wrote it cannot be ignored. Your claim is that God wrote it. So, where is it written and how do you know God wrote it? — Fooloso4

Because the signs constitutive of moral norms need to have a writer if they are truly to be signs and not just 'apparent' signs.

The signs constitutive of moral norms do not have me or you as their author (for it is manifest to reason that if I order X to be done, that does not making Xing right; and likewise for you).

Thus the mind whose prescriptions to us are moral prescriptions is a mind other than any one of ours.

Moral prescriptions are just a subset of the prescriptions of Reason.

Thus, the prescriber whose prescriptions are moral prescriptions is a prescriber whose prescriptions constitute the prescriptions of Reason. The mind is therefore Reason.

As Reason is not bound by her own prescriptions, she can do anything. For what is or is not possible is in her gift. Thus with her all things are possible.

She is also the arbiter of knowledge, for 'to know' something is for there to be a reason for you to believe it, and having a reason to believe something is a matter of her wanting you to believe it or a matter of her approving of how you have come to believe it. And so she is omniscient as knowledge is constitutively determined by her attitudes.

She is also going to be morally perfect, for by hypothesis being morally perfect involves being fully approved of by Reason. And she is going fully to approve of herself as she is omnipotent and so if she disapproved of any aspect of herself she could just change herself so as to bring herself into line with her attitudes.

Thus, the mind whose prescriptions constitute moral prescriptions is a mind who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. That is, she is God.

Surely you’d grant that a virtuous man thwarts his desires for the sake of his precious, better known as self-respect.

If the illusion is persuasive enough, maybe it isn’t one.

There are too many questionable assumptions here posing as facts that it is pointless to argue with you.

Surely you’d grant that a virtuous man thwarts his desires for the sake of his precious, better known as self-respect. — Mww

Surely you’d grant that morality derives from respect for others, not for oneself...

But yes, I will agree with you that consistency - integrity - is worth pursuing.

no, you asked me a question and I answered it with an argument you cannot challenge.

Moral norms are no trespass signs. They need a sign writer. — Bartricks

It's called reason, and people do the best they can with it. And some do not even understand that, and as ignorance does, makes virtue of its vices and mocks what it does not understand. Try some Kant.

Just understand there is a danger to defining morality on your own conclusions

I understand that it contradicts what I said earlier but you need to acknowledge the dark side of morality.

How ego and arrogance can cloud the mind and spread cruelty and malicious behavior. Believing your actions are righteous but may be motivated by evil intentions.

The mind is not perfect, it is flawed and undisciplined and must be treated as unreliable.

So understand yourself and what motive these codes.

I am a man of faith with no religion but even I respect certain boundaries because I acknowledge my limitations.

It is not an argument I can't challenge. It is a weak and sophomoric argument. It is an argument I won't spend my time and energy challenging.

Er no. You can't challenge it.

I said most contemporary metaethicists are stupid — Bartricks

Metaethicists are philosophers, right? Or are you trying to claim that philosophy departments don't have metaethicists?

So when you say

The theory you're asserting (not defending) is the metaethical theory known as 'individual subjectivism'. It's a theory no professional philosopher defends — Bartricks

Experts don't defend it. — Bartricks

Moral norms and values appear external: there is no serious dispute about this, at least not among moral philosophers. — Bartricks

The 'experts' whose authority you're using to justify your claims that the premises you use are 'self-evident to reason' are expert by virtue of exactly the same training and testing regime you've just proven must be inadequate to ensure their analysis is even above the level of idiocy.

So by what justification should we accept their conclusions about other aspects of morality to be indicative of that which is self-evident to reason?

Surely you’d grant that morality derives from respect for others, not for oneself... — Banno

No, I would not. If what you say is the case, then I am morally destitute for no other reason than I hold no respect for another human. I am no more obliged to respect another than I am myself; the difference is the sense of loss associated with it, the loss of self-respect being the greatest possible affront to morality. Keeping in mind that to not respect is very far from to disrespect.

It is my philosophical contention that morality is given, as a pure subjective human condition, hence not derivable. The exhibition of it, on the other hand, by one from his sense of it, and the judgement of that, by another from his own sense of it, according to the Great and Highly Esteemed Roger Waters, “is what the fighting’s all about”.

Surely you’d grant that morality derives from respect for others, not for oneself... — Banno

I think, to use these terms, morality derives respect (care) for oneself by one habitualizing (non-reciprocal) respect (care) for others.