On the contrary, my ethical concept does address "changes to the status quo" but implicitly in this formulationIt seems that your scale works off an ideal as opposed to changes in the status quo like mine so that's interesting. — Yun Jae Jung
This provides an ethical motivation for politics (e.g. mass struggle, human solidarity, ... as well as 'just governance') which is the arena for, as you say, Yun, "changes to the status quo" (assuming you mean normative, or everyday, injustices). And also I bring up "evil" which inherently demands – calls for – resistance like (e.g.) plague, famine, predation, etc.Moral Right indicates judgments, conduct or relationships for preventing or reducing harm and/or injustice (i.e. misery) — 180 Proof
Nonsense. Definitions of "moral good & bad" are evaluated for how adaptive they are for 'prosocially coexisting'. There's nothing "meta" or circular going on. In other words, a morality language game works adequately for the form-of-life (e.g. social commons) within which it's embedded or it does not work adequately thereby requiring further development (i.e. playing that language game differently, so to speak).Indeed, the definition of good and bad itself can be said to be good or bad (in a moral sense). — TheMadFool
Pretty much. yes, it is an extraordinary insight, undermining much of what passes for moral theorising hereabouts.
Try using it next time someone tells us what it good and what is right. Or on 180. — Banno
Good is anything that raises an individual's quality of life; — Yun Jae Jung
Nonsense. Definitions of "moral good & bad" are evaluated for how adaptive they are for 'prosocially coexisting'. There's nothing "meta" or circular going on. In other words, a morality language game works adequately for the form-of-life (e.g. social commons) within which it's embedded or it does not work adequately thereby requiring further development (i.e. playing that language game differently, so to speak).
That said, Fool, assuming my objection is without warrant, tell me where I go wrong – e.g. trip over Moore's "indefinability" canard – defining "moral good and bad" — 180 Proof
Well, you're obviously mistaken, my friend. A definition of "moral good & bad" is not either 'morally good or bad' but rather either instrumentally good (useful) or bad (not useful) for "building a moral theory". A good cup of coffee, for instance, is not "morally good" – that's language gone on holiday.What do you mean "nonsense"? To me, it's obvious that the definitions of good and bad - the foundations of any moral theory - must themselves be judged by the same criteria they employ to sort thoughts, words, and deeds into moral and immoral which is the very purpose of building a moral theory. — TheMadFool
Well, you're obviously mistaken, my friend. A definition of "moral good & bad" is not either 'morally good or bad' but rather either instrumentally good (useful) or bad (not useful) for "building a moral theory". A good cup of coffee, for instance, is not "morally good" – that's language gone on holiday. — 180 Proof
You've lost me. I addressed your non-point, exposed and disposed of it, to wit: X can be good without being "morally good" as per my definition & follow-up here. Agree or not; any objection to it that (or any other) definition proffered by me I'm interested in considering. Semantic nonsense not so much. — 180 Proof
They are also the kinds of things that can be "good" (instrumental, or functional, useful) or "bad" (instrumental, or dysfunctional, not useful). A good steak, Fool, isn't "morally good" ... Furthermore, a physician and an auto mechanic give diagnoses: they aren't diagnoses which apply to both human health & automobiles; they are diagnostic methods applied to different, respective, domains & tasks. That's because it all depends on the language game we're playing, Fool, and depends on the forms-of-life within which we play them; mixing them (e.g. category error) creates nonsense such as yours. Besides, 'definitions for moral arguments or systems' are not also moral, any more than a barrel of apples isn't an apple."...thoughts, words, and deeds..." are the kind of things that can be good (moral) or bad (immoral). — TheMadFool
Nonsense. Definitions of "moral good & bad" are evaluated for how adaptive they are for 'prosocially coexisting'. There's nothing "meta" or circular going on. In other words, a morality language game works adequately for the form-of-life (e.g. social commons) within which it's embedded or it does not work adequately thereby requiring further development (i.e. playing that language game differently, so to speak).
That said, Fool, assuming my objection is without warrant, tell me where I go wrong – e.g. trip over Moore's "indefinability" canard – defining "moral good and bad"
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/518912
which I follow-up on a bit here
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/519090 — 180 Proof
He's welcome to demonstrate that "how adaptive they are for prosocially coexisting" doesn't amount to "going with the crowd" or "as the wind blows".I followed your link and here's the deal - you define morality as "how adaptive they are for prosocially coexisting" but is this, your, definition of morality itself, and I quote, "...adaptive for prosocially coexisting..."? — TheMadFool
He's welcome to demonstrate that "how adaptive they are for prosocially coexisting" doesn't amount to "going with the crowd" or "as the wind blows".
For example, ideas in favor of slavery were very adaptive for prosocially coexisting when living in a society where there was slavery. Were they therefore, morally good? — baker
The issue is about defining "morally good" not about defining "morality". Don't move the goal posts. — 180 Proof
Again, you're way off. I asked you to apply your analysis to my links in this post. Show me that your argument makes sense by using it to show me – which you haven't yet – that my definition of "moral good" doesn't make sense. Anything else, Fool, is just noise I've no interest in. — 180 Proof
Sorry. More noise. My definition please. — 180 Proof
I don't know what "something" pertains to so I can't answer. The paragraph from which you quote me out of context should suffice in showing what I'm talking about there.↪180 Proof, how do you determine the relevant point at which you measure "how adaptive for prosocially coexisting" something is? — baker
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