But plenty of people see retribution as an end in itself. — Pfhorrest
Then the argument would be that they have an incoherent conception of liberty — Pfhorrest
Because I’m here for casual philosophical discourse, to share my thoughts with anyone to whom they are new and interesting, and to find out if there are any related things that are new and interesting to me that I can mull over and evolve my own thoughts with. I don’t care to fight interminable fights with people who are saying nothing new to me and who find nothing I’m saying new to them, when there’s nothing on the line that we must reach agreement on soon. — Pfhorrest
Again, It's these 'plenty of people' who I've never heard of. Retributions as an end in itself - really? — Isaac
That all sounds very charming (although utterly pointless) but not at all the purpose of a forum. As I said, it think you've mistaken it for you personal blog - where we can read your thoughts if we're interested in them, or some kind of compendium of random opinion. What makes a forum different from either of these is that once a topic is created it is created to be the mutually available topic a community can use to debate the merits of or issues with. You seem to see this space rather as a supply of free web space anyone can dip into if they want a soapbox. Maybe that's what the creators and maintainers intended, I don't know, but it's not what a public forum means to me. Once you open a thread it's not 'your' thread, you haven't rented the space as a publishing platform, it's public space into which you put an idea.
We circle back (thankfully) to the start of this whole sub-thread. The deep suspicion people naturally have of these 'grand systems'. And here we find that suspicion well-grounded. what you describe sounds more like a recruitment drive, not a community venture - put your theory out there, see if anyone bites, if there's any trouble just ignore it, move on and try again later. It's a good scheme. If someone complains about a lack of engagement with the issues you can play the casual, carefree Cassandra of ideas "oh well, if they don't believe me, no bother, move on", but if someone disrupts your sermon with their own ideas you can play the Coeus on your passionate quest for truth so that the dissenter's 'bad faith' in repeatedly disrupting 'your' quest can be held against them. — Isaac
I love a quote from Dogen, the founder of the Soto school of Zen Buddhism: "Before one studies, mountains are mountains and waters are waters; after a first glimpse into the truth, mountains are no longer mountains and waters are no longer waters; after enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and waters once again waters." — Pfhorrest
It sounds like you read only the first half of the first sentence of the bit you quoted, and overlooked the second half: "...and to find out if there are any related things that are new and interesting to me that I can mull over and evolve my own thoughts with." — Pfhorrest
My point is only that I'm not here for competitive discussions, where we're fighting to convince each other that "I'm right and you're wrong", but rather cooperative ones, where we're sharing our views and reasons for holding them, but not caring whether or not anyone in particular is persuaded to change their mind because of that, only caring whether anyone in the discourse got any new ideas to chew on. — Pfhorrest
That's my issue with the way you engage. It feels like I'm being pelted with the same familiar contrary points of view over and over again, never something new. And I'm not interested in pelting you with my point of view over and over again in retaliation. That's intellectually boring and emotionally tiresome. — Pfhorrest
What I loved about formally studying philosophy at university, and what I hoped to replicate some semblance of here, was how I was getting exposed to interesting new ideas and the arguments both for and against them — Pfhorrest
What exactly do you see different about this place to a series of personal blogs? — Isaac
If your 'quest for truth' is already filtered and screened by your own proclivities (what seems right to you), then it can't be a shared, co-operative quest, can it? We can't share in a process that results from your personal filters, that's your quest. You say "A follows from B" and your interlocutor says "No A does not follow from B". You can see if that seems right to you, but unless your claim 'A follows from B' is something you pulled out of your arse (as I believe you Americans put it), then it's opposite is obviously not going to be something that seems right to you, we have to presume you've at least given it that much thought. So anything which calls into question whether A does in fact follow from B is going to be either part of a Web of Beliefs that's radically different to yours, that's going to take some serious work to understand, or it's going to be based off some empirical data you're not aware of and so seems wrong on the face of it. A rare third way might be that someone shares your general Web of Beliefs, and your empirical knowledge, but is wise enough (or you daft enough) for them to spot a fatal error in the logic by which you've connected those beliefs. Holding out for that (and only that) on a public forum like this is vagary. — Isaac
What you seem to be looking for is this goldilocks perfection of an approach that's not so different from yours that it's hard work to understand, but not so similar that it's somehting you've already encountered. — Isaac
It's not that I can't imagine why you would possibly think the things that you think. — Pfhorrest
it's not that I can't comprehend why they would think that, because I used to think something much like that myself. — Pfhorrest
I don't see anything new, and I see the faults with it that I already found back when that was my own position — Pfhorrest
when they keep insisting that I come look at this view that I'm already quite familiar with as though it's something new and persuasive — Pfhorrest
And here I though we might be dealing with something more interesting than the boring old internet messiah. — Isaac
My primary objection to your hedonism-as-emprical-data-points approach comes from Bayesian modelling approaches to neuroscience applied to affect states. It was only published a few years ago, and then only in the cognitive science papers. I'm truly impressed that you've read it, understood it, and already rejected it years before it was even published despite having no qualifications in the field at all and there being very few objections to it even now... Truly the work of genius, I'm obviously out of my league even talking to you. — Isaac
I don't quote follow what you mean that that "totally implodes the entire concept of 'ethical hedonism'", though. — Pfhorrest
well, if the definition of 'hedonism' is extended to include 'acting for the greater good' it isnt really hedonism any more, it's virtue instead. — ernest meyer
Hedonism refers to a family of theories, all of which have in common that pleasure plays a central role in them. Psychological or motivational hedonism claims that our behavior is determined by desires to increase pleasure and to decrease pain.[1][2] Normative or ethical hedonism, on the other hand, is not about how we actually act but how we ought to act: we should pursue pleasure and avoid pain.[2] Axiological hedonism, which is sometimes treated as a part of ethical hedonism, is the thesis that only pleasure has intrinsic value.[1][3][4] Applied to well-being or what is good for someone, it is the thesis that pleasure and suffering are the only components of well-being.[5] — wikipedia
Just when it seemed like we were actually having an actual polite conversation and coming to at least a productive sharing of thoughts on a topic... — Pfhorrest
This kind of thing really gives an air of you just looking to shoot down anyone who is insufficiently meek in your eyes — Pfhorrest
If I was arrogant I would be trying to get real philosophy journals to publish my thoughts. — Pfhorrest
because philosophy is supposed to be logically prior to empirical data. — Pfhorrest
Changing the target valences to match the external events is a perfectly fine way of achieving that match, on my account. And if one were to take a change-the-external-events approach anyway, and the target valences were unpredictable in advance, one obvious strategy would be to enable the subject to better adjust their environment in real time as their target valences change — Pfhorrest
But in any case, the breadth or fundamentality I'm talking about here is relative to the sets of intuitions we're discussing, and is basically a measure of how interconnected that intuition is to all the others, as in, how many others depend on that being true, and would have to be rejected along with it if we rejected it. — Pfhorrest
Uilitarianism refers to maximization of 'happiness,' not 'pleasure,' — ernest meyer
Although different varieties of utilitarianism admit different characterizations, the basic idea behind all of them is to in some sense maximize utility, which is often defined in terms of well-being or related concepts. For instance, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, described utility as "that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness...[or] to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered."
[...]
...the seeds of the theory can be found in the hedonists Aristippus and Epicurus, who viewed happiness as the only good...
[...]
...Bentham introduces a method of calculating the value of pleasures and pains, which has come to be known as the hedonic calculus... — Wikipedia on Utilitarianism
Bentham, an ethical hedonist, believed the moral rightness or wrongness of an action to be a function of the amount of pleasure or pain that it produced. — Wikipedia on Hedonic Calculus
Are you suggesting that a doctor is dealing with a different subject when he prescribes pain medicine than you are when you say that 'suffering' is bad and should be avoided? — Isaac
The very act of having philosophy will affect your target valences. — Isaac
Changing the target valences to match the external events is a perfectly fine way of achieving that match — Pfhorrest
Your system relies on static data points of hedonic value — Isaac
if one were to take a change-the-external-events approach anyway, and the target valences were unpredictable in advance, one obvious strategy would be to enable the subject to better adjust their environment in real time as their target valences change — Pfhorrest
You can only talk about how moral beliefs are interconnected with and depend upon other beliefs after you put them into a theoretical framework. — SophistiCat
the breadth or fundamentality I'm talking about here is relative to the sets of intuitions we're discussing — Pfhorrest
With empirical beliefs we have shared ways of establishing facts and validating theories. We have shared intuitions about the object of study, such as its objectivity and permanence, and that allows us to agree on how to conduct investigations, make progress and settle conflicts. None of that seems to apply to moral beliefs. We certainly share a good deal of our moral beliefs and tendencies, we have shared ways of transmitting and enforcing our morals, but I don't think that we have anything like shared intuitions about metaethics. — SophistiCat
There are people whose moral beliefs conflict with yours (e.g. they value retribution, regardless of whether it increases your hedonistic metric of good). What are you going to tell them? — SophistiCat
A doctor (rightly IMO) takes as given that reducing pain and suffering is an end goal, and then concerns himself with the means to do so. If someone was self-harming because they thought they morally deserved it, a doctor would see that as a sign of poor mental health — Pfhorrest
Your system relies on static data points of hedonic value — Isaac
I literally just said otherwise in my last post, and you even quoted it: — Pfhorrest
You can say what the answer was yesterday, but by the time you've worked out what the answer is today it's already not the answer any more. — Isaac
I'm saying that the 'pain' a doctor deals with is psycho-physiological and responds to medicines based on it's psycho-physiological properties. Those properties are facts of biology and psychology.
If you claim, as a philosopher, to be dealing with the reduction of 'suffering' you're either dealing with something entirely different, or the subject of your enquiry is a physiological event with biological properties. — Isaac
The point I'm arguing, which you've failed to answer is quite clearly written...
You can say what the answer was yesterday, but by the time you've worked out what the answer is today it's already not the answer any more. — Isaac — Isaac
I'm absolutely not saying that we need to be able to predict perfectly exactly what everyone's target valence will be so as to preemptively prepare a static, unchanging world that will perfectly satisfy everyone's target valences. — Pfhorrest
the breadth or fundamentality I'm talking about here is relative to the sets of intuitions we're discussing
We're talking about whatever theoretical framework our interlocutors already have. — Pfhorrest
I hope you would agree that those post-truth type of people are epistemically wrong, and that in principle philosophical arguments could be given as to why they're wrong, and why the scientific method is better than their unsorted mess of relativism mixed with dogmatism. And that those arguments hold sound even if it comes to pass that most of the world abandons science and devolves into epistemic chaos. — Pfhorrest
I view my arguments about ethics as like that. I know there's not broad consensus on them, but that's beside the point, just like it would be beside the point of arguments for science to say that most of the world rejects science. What's philosophically right or wrong, true or false, sound or unsound, etc, is not dependent on how many people accept it. — Pfhorrest
Unstructured sets don't have such relational properties. — SophistiCat
So what is philosophically right about your moral theory, as opposed to others, besides its being your theory? — SophistiCat
we don't need to know anything about brains to discuss whether or not it is the case that suffering and suffering alone (as a kind of experience, in the first person) is intrinsically a bad state of affairs. — Pfhorrest
But of course we need to know about brains to properly discuss how to reduce suffering, since it turns out upon third person observation of the physical world that the experience of suffering is a product of brain function. — Pfhorrest
the philosophy is just laying the groundwork for why and how to go do a science of some kind, rather than some ineffectual non-science that will at best yield non-answers. — Pfhorrest
I directly responded to that, immediately after the bit you quoted:
I'm absolutely not saying that we need to be able to predict perfectly exactly what everyone's target valence will be so as to preemptively prepare a static, unchanging world that will perfectly satisfy everyone's target valences. — Pfhorrest
The problem with idealistic ideologies like yours is that they are an all-or-nothing, now-or-never kind of deal. Anything that is less than the perfect application of an idealistic ideology is still a complete failure.FWIW Baker misrepresents that I don't care whether my methodology "actually has the potential for ever being applied by humans". It's an aspirational methodology, an ideal to strive toward, and doing anything closer to it is still better than doing things farther from it (IMO, of course), even if it does turn out that we're so irreparably flawed that we'll never do it perfectly. We definitely can apply my methodology at least sometimes, at least to some degree, and that's fine enough for me. — Pfhorrest
Of course we do. 'Bad' is not synonymous with 'feels bad currently'. So in order to know whether first person experiences of suffering are 'badly we need to know something of the future consequences of first person suffering. These are not given as part of the first person experience but rather as results of empirical investigations. — Isaac
Right. And any moral theory (of your negative hedonistic type) is a means of reducing suffering. If you start any proposition with "One ought to..." you're talking about a method, not simply a logical fact. — Isaac
What you think you're doing is immaterial to issue. — Isaac
No. You responded as if to a suggestion that we could not achieve perfection in our predictions. That's not the issue I raised. I didn't say "We shan't be able to get it perfect", I said we shan't be able to do it at all. — Isaac
The problem with idealistic ideologies like yours is that they are an all-or-nothing, now-or-never kind of deal. Anything that is less than the perfect application of an idealistic ideology is still a complete failure. — baker
doing anything closer to it is still better than doing things farther from it (IMO, of course), even if it does turn out that we're so irreparably flawed that we'll never do it perfectly. We definitely can apply my methodology at least sometimes, at least to some degree, and that's fine enough for me. — Pfhorrest
because of your commitment to equality, will have to value their judgment — baker
Define "suffering".
— baker
A phenomenal experience with negative world-to-mind fit. — Pfhorrest
I don't understand what this means.
What is a "negative world-to-mind fit"? — baker
If all the inferences making up my theory are correct, what makes it right is that to do otherwise ends up implying merely giving up on trying to answer moral questions, in one way or another; so every attempt at answering moral questions is at least poorly or halfheartedly doing the same things I advocate, and what I advocate is to do what's already being done some and working some, just better and more consistently, and avoid altogether the parts that, if people were consistent about them, would conclude with just giving up. — Pfhorrest
I didn't say anything about only considering present first-person experiences. Future suffering or enjoyment is still a first-person experience. True, we can't know the relationship between present and future experiences entirely in the first person, we have to do a third-person study of the world to establish that, but that's once again a question of particular means, not of general ends, and so not something I'm saying anything about here when doing philosophy, but a subject for some logically posterior scientific investigation. — Pfhorrest
he doesn't seem to care whether his theory of morality actually has the potential for ever being applied by humans. — baker
The part of moral theory we're discussing here is deciding on what are good ends. That's not in itself a means to achieving those ends, it's just deciding what ends to try to achieve. How to achieve them is a separate, later question. — Pfhorrest
What you think you're doing is immaterial to issue. — Isaac
So you get to tell me what my views are, and I don't get to clarify that what you think I'm saying or doing isn't actually what I'm trying to say or do? — Pfhorrest
You're taking too much emphasis on the "perfect" part, unless you want to deny that even something so vague as "certain kinds of people in certain contexts will tend to find certain things pleasant and certain other things unpleasant" is impossible to predict, — Pfhorrest
I've already said it but I'll say it again: I'm not suggesting that we have to make the world one exact unchanging way that will make everyone satisfied forever, and so figure out exactly what exact unchanging static state of the world that would be. Just that we have to (do our best to) ensure that the world and people's target valences always align, which can (and probably would best) be done in a dynamic way, enabling people to adjust the part of the world around them to satisfy their appetites in real time. — Pfhorrest
The affect resulting from finding oneself in some set of circumstances changes with the model that each person has of those circumstances and the likely affect they would cause. This model is itself effected by one's own moral thinking and that of one's culture. To resolve a moral dilemma (using positive affect in all people in all circumstances as a target) one would need to know what affect each option of the dilemma was likely to result in, not just now (that would be the cliched hedonism you deny) but in the future and for future generations. At least to a level of probability capable of significantly distinguishing between options.
But the feedback inherent in the fact that your decision will change the affects felt in the future means that you cannot possibly have a clue in any but the most obvious of cases. Anything remotely complex and the chaos effects of the multiple feedbacks would quickly render the likelihood incalculable. So only simple, clear cut cases could be decided this way.
And then you remind us that your model is not meant for simple clear cut cases as we've already worked these out.
You might argue that the rate of change in affect is slower than the rate at which we could discover the effects of acting on such a change... But the rate of change in affect (and the rate at which we can calculate the effects) are both empirical matters, and you've assured us that your approach here does not rely on empirical data for its soundness. — Isaac
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