A thesis.

The state of the art in argumentation theory takes descriptive, evaluative, or prescriptive statements as given categories of analysis. They can be included in a semantic framework treating of the sources of their acceptability -- facts, values, and methods -- or they can be included in a formal framework in which subject-predicate combinations are ranked according to their perceived cogency ('elegance?'). I usually take this basis as a more applicable alternative to the monotonic cannons of classical logic of which is (somehow) regularly violated by (functional) human reasoners in actual trials. I mention this because relativism also seems to come in descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive varieties. In this context, often the last two seem to be called normative relativism, and sometimes the last one seems to be called methodological relativism. By tying it to a framework I attempt to resolve the complaint of relativism's methodological ambiguity. Since this framework is all about language, that also means relativism potentially obtains everywhere language is used to make arguments if the insights of argumentation theory are correct. As for the general thesis:

Relativism: Any x subject does, can, or must, have y status relative to z system of y2 qualities.

By 'system' I mean a set of subjects working together as parts of some mechanism in an interconnecting network of a complex whole that can function as rules according to which something is done. This is a combination of both entries in the Oxford dictionary that is intended to be maximally flexible. Thus, the 'system' can be a simple as a prior psychological bias. That opens the door to talk of optical illusions, false memories and hypnotherapy -- all of which are real, effective, and classically erroneous. Incidentally, the 'all categories' page of PhilPapers contains numerous systems. If any of those categories can be expressed systematically, which they can, then absolutists are invited to identify the configuration of absolutism that their passions find to be most tasteful. As a final aside, you will notice my formal phrasing includes 'does', 'can', or 'must'. This is my attempt to imperfectly capture the meaning of the descriptive-evaluative-prescriptive distinction verbally, which is obviously tentative (and arbitrary).

As for 'qualities', they can be a set of policies, practices, precedents, predicates, principles, procedures, processes, properties, or propositions. There's no reason in particular why I chose p-words other than to show that it doesn't really matter what the base units are called as long as they function as part of a sufficiently acceptable argument. Again, names are arbitrary. In science it's popular to speak of 'mechanisms', so I take them as favored (or 'virtuous') because science is popular and people will judge me for it, and that is impractical. Analogously, in ethics there are 'morals'. Epistemology has 'beliefs', ontology has 'events', et cetera. Pick a domain, pick a base unit, identify a throughput and with enough work you may even develop a theory. Let's blasphemously call the thesis that I have outlined the 'rational dependence thesis'. If you accept this thesis you are absolutely supposed to be a rational kind of person who believes in reality according to my sufficiently detailed and hopefully reasonable definition.

Now with the starting rule defined, here are relativism's premises. Premise 1. Many, or at least more than one, z does, can, or must, exist. Systems are plural. Premise 2. Many, or at least more than one z, does, can, or must, exclude each other with incompatible arguments. Systems are conflicted. Premise 3. Many, or at least more than one z, does, can, or must, entail flaws of applicability, locality, neutrality, and validity. Systems are symmetrical. Conclusion. Many, or at least more than one z, does not, can not, or must not, entail absolute acceptability of the y of x. Absolutism is false. Rationalism and realism by some definitions is also false. Recourse. Any z does, can, or must, entail relative acceptability of the y of x as a defeasible provision of some recognized act or policy. You will notice that this is all quite commonsensical, and that this is, in fact, what is occurring, and what has always occurred. To deny the reality of pluralism takes us back to Parmenedes, and that seems somewhat unhelpful.

Here are some other general points supporting relativism. They are presumably as numerous as are the degrees and domains of technicality in all academia. 1. The status of epistemic justification uses either elemental relata from rule structures that are often concealed or uses the meaning of the term 'justified' in a way that is open to interpretation. 2. Statements of the form, "a is justified to believe x", express a proposition where it's absolutely true or false that a is justified to believe x according to some certain z or the z that a is committed to. 3. Z justification is eventually circular in a way which indicates methodological groundlessness. 4. Z customs, habits, and traditions are historically contingent which indicates methodological choices are similarly contingent. 5. Z methods are not determined by facts of nature or hidden truths as indicated by the constant underdetermination of complete theory by incomplete data. 6. Z necessarily hold their methods as true or acceptable by relying on and vindicating their own norms. 7. Z alternation involves a signal conversion to new rules that isn't licenced by the prior system. Et cetera.

As an aside, some people take the logic of self-refutation, or paradox, seriously. So here's a seriously trivial self-refutation argument against absolutism, in the style of absolutism: "Absolutism says the truth of everything is absolute to everything, but if that is true, the truth of absolutism is absolute to everything, therefore everything says the truth of absolutism is absolute." Which is false. Because I'm at least one 'everything' who disagrees.

Finally, there's a popular idea that relativism is incompatible with morality, or something like that. However, here are some ethical points that relativism recommends. 1. A belief-seeking agent does, can, or must, tolerate z other than their own. 2. A belief-seeking agent does, can, or must blamelessly select the arbitrary z that best rationalizes a belief. 3. A belief-seeking agent committed to and employing different z does not, can not, or must not, automatically constitute an unacceptable perspective. Naturally, relativism can be used to mount a position where moralists are themselves potentially immoral by their own lights for presuming their own moral expertise, while relativism, with its overtures of defeasibility and tolerance, tends to make more practicable claims.

That's it. Thanks for reading.