Sure.

Now, lets stipulate that there are two experiencers, A and B, and they are both experiencing the pain of stubbing a toe. Still with me?

The subjective is given. — Zophie

That helps, how?

It's a hint that you're taking a 'so what' position.

So what?

Utility.

Hrmph.

Oh, don't worry. It's defined in my list of acceptable arguments.

`Ah, missed that post.

Yep. Two people stub their toes. Go on.

Can those two experiences be compared?

one hit her left toe, the other, her right.

so... go on.

Can those two experiences be compared, yes or no?

Yes.

I answered by giving a comparison, which short of implies that one can compare them...

How?

What?

One hit her left foot, the other her right.

Make your point. It's lunch time.

That's spot on. — Manuel

If you think about it, this opens out into the question of the sense in which 'the world' exists independently of the experiencing subject. In other words, if you wish to depict the world as existing 'from no perspective', what is being lost, or being concealed, in that depiction? There is a subjective pole to experience, and therefore reality, which is concealed by the objectivist stance. And that is the insight that gave rise to phenomenology.

The notion of subjectivity is fraught with nonsense. — Banno

From a sympathetic review of Mind and Cosmos (and there were many more that weren't):

Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of what [is real]. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical 'stuff' that exists—namely, mental 'stuff'. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray.

In other words, even if it were possible to map out the exact pattern of brain waves that give rise to a person’s momentary complex of awareness, that mapping would only explain the physical correlate of these experiences, but it wouldn’t be them. A person doesn’t experience patterns, and her experiences are as irreducibly real as her brain waves are, and different from them.

Talk about physics, chemistry or physiology is distinct from talk about desire, intent or understanding. — Banno

However, there is a strong tendency in modern philosophy to account for the latter in terms of the former. That is the tendency which Nagel is arguing against. It was also what Wittgenstein opposed.

His work [was] opposed, as he once put it, to “the spirit which informs the vast stream of European and American civilisation in which all of us stand.” Nearly 50 years after his death, we can see, more clearly than ever, that the feeling that he was swimming against the tide was justified. If we wanted a label to describe this tide, we might call it “scientism,” the view that every intelligible question has either a scientific solution or no solution at all. It is against this view that Wittgenstein set his face. — Ray Monk

From here

"One hit her left foot"

Are you saying that "hitting her left foot" is an experience or causes an experience?

Sure, understood and agreed. Nothing new or surprising here.

But that Nagel's argument is agreeable does not make it cogent.

Yes.

Which is your preference? On such questions of grammar I am happy to accomodate you...

in the interests of expediting the discussion.

It's not a grammatical nitpick. You're either defining what a particular experience is or you're not talking about experience at all, you're talking about something that causes an experience.

Hitting your toe against the floor causes the experience of the pain of stubbing a toe, yes. I think that's what you meant. But when I ask you how experiences are compared and you say, "One hit her left foot, the other her right." you are not talking about experiences, you are talking about the causes of experiences. I have no problem with the idea of comparing causes of experiences. There's no tension there. But I would like to know how experiences can be compared. I don't think we can use language, because there's no way to verify what another person means when they refer to their own expereinces.

Unless you mean the physical act of hitting your toe on the floor is an actual experience. Are you a reductionist? That's one way to compare brain states: wire the two people up and see what's going on, but then that commits you to "brain states = mental states". Is that your view?

that Nagel's argument is agreeable does not make it cogent.... — Banno

...to a discussion about Nagel’ most famous paper.

For those somewhat familiar with Wittgenstein, grammar is not nitpicking.

You want to talk about experiences. I've giving you carte blanche to set up your argument as you wish.

You want to distinguish between hitting your toe and the experience of hitting your toe. Can you make this distinction clear?

Indeed; but I have to go back to Doing The Things this week, so I may not be able to enter into the discussion as much as I might desire.

This is the argument I just thought up.

If a materialist/physicalist admits that experiences are real, in any sense of the word, they have to admit experiences can be compared, else you get the existence in a physical universe of two incomparable real things (that would seem to be a problem, maybe not?). So then how would a materialist explain how experiences can be compared? Can we compare experiences by talking about them? But how can I ever verify what you mean when you refer to your own experiences? That referent is closed off to me. Measuring brain states? But then doesn't that commit a materialist to a strict reductionist view that mental states are identical to brain states?

Our exchange was very productive. I like this little argument. Maybe it crashes and burns.

Oh, OK.

I suspect a materialist would have little difficulty in adhering to the view that mental states are identical to brain states. So I don't see your argument convincing them.

I note that you dropped the use of subjective terms from your account. That pleases me, and I think improved it to the point where the difficulties could be seen.

Thanks for the chat.

Bread, cheese, Sicilian olives, french radishes, lettuce. A pleasant experience.

If I can force a materialist, through argumentation, to admit brain states ARE mental states (and not wuss out like most do and say brain states cause mental states, but they're somehow not the same thing) I'm pleased, because that to me is an absurdity (I also don't think it's that popular anymore, but I could be wrong on that), and the more absurd I can make materialism the better I feel because it's a horrible belief system. But I would like it to be false on the merits, and I think it fails catastrophically with regards to consciousness.

the more absurd I can make materialism the better I feel because it's a horrible belief system. — RogueAI

Oh..

I'm happy to let the physiology of brains continue on its merry path, and indeed will follow along with interest. I expect that a complete account will not result in a one-to-one correspondence between brain states and mind states; but I do not suppose that there is something going on in the brain that is outside the realm of the physical sciences - something supernatural.

But I would like to know how experiences can be compared. I don't think we can use language, because there's no way to verify what another person means when they refer to their own expereinces. — RogueAI

This heads toward the 'beetle-in-the-box' idea. How can 'pain' have a public meaning? And yet it does (there are right ways and wrong ways to use the word.) Same with 'red' and 'green' tho there's no way to check raw sensations. But then how does 'raw sensation' or how does 'experience' get public meaning?

1. There is something it is like to be a bat.

2. However much I learn about the objective world I can never know what it is like to be a bat.

3. Therefore there is something in reality that is outside of the objective world.

Do you agree with the argument? — Aoife Jones

What is it like to be a bat? To be able to fly on one's own steam, to be able to "see" with your ears and yet have poor eyesight, etc. Since I've never actually done that, I guess I'll never know. No one will I suppose.

What bothers me is if there's a subjective element to consciousness how is it that we can agree on anything at all? Thoughts, sensations (consciousness) are areas we've reached consensus on, something impossible were it that consciousness had a major subjective component that would've precluded such a possibility, no?

More can be said but I'm signing off for now.