In not drawing a sharp distinction there, you join both the pro-life movement — Srap Tasmaner

No. I don’t mean it literally. Me and shope understand each other. And I didn’t say anything about rights or dignity, those were introduced by him.

Because the people alive already have an interest. — schopenhauer1

The lifeguard did not have an interest to save the person in the water. But you didn’t care. It is true that the lifeguard had interests in general, but the only way to NOT have any interests or intentions is to not exist. So the difference again boils down to: “Is the person to be harmed born yet? if so, it becomes wrong to do unilaterally, if not it’s ok to balance”. Which I disagree with. Because it is special pleading.

But then you are contradicting yourself as far as using people. — schopenhauer1

I never said anything about using people. People use one another constantly. It's called a society. What I object to is any materialist computation of the worth or desirability of a human being.

The lifeguard did not have an interest to save the person in the water. But you didn’t care. It is true that the lifeguard had interests in general, but the only way to NOT have any interests or intentions is to not exist. So the difference again boils down to: “Is the person to be harmed born yet? if so, it becomes wrong to do unilaterally, if not it’s ok to balance”. Which I disagree with. Because it is special pleading. — khaled

First off, just as a meta-analysis of this whole debate, I sometimes lose track of my own argument(s) when it goes on this long and takes this many avenues. I just hope you can understand that at some level. Some posters on here just want to gnaw your face off no matter what, so they wouldn't care, but I think that is important because these debates become very modular really coming down to the last thing someone says rather than referencing 20 pages earlier. That takes too much time to reference all the time. In a traditional debate you have either a set time or it's done in a series of articles, but since this is continuous, you can keep on going and going, and there is no finality. I am not saying that's bad as obviously I keep going back to the debate forum, but I just want us to keep that in mind a meta-level of how these online debates go.

Anyways, keeping that in mind and knowing we are now in this particular phase in these debates, I would say that looking back at my axioms we have here an idea of "Don't cause unnecessary harm to another person if you don't have to". I related this to the idea of "dignity". So this becomes an interesting distinction between for me between what happens after birth and prior to (possible) birth. So I think that the caveat that we are stuck on is "if you don't have to". You are applying that to the whole picture. Everyone is aggregated in your view when applying this. Thus, the child being born is "necessary" for you because it might cause some "net positive" (this is assuming we can even calculate that which is another problem). However, "if you don't have to" in my argument is more connected to "person-affecting" view. That is to say, each individual is the target of "if you don't have to". While born, "if you don't have to" involves the community as well as the individual. But that does not mean I don't discount the people involved. Quite the contrary, if I took a baseball bat and whacked the lifeguard to wake him rather than nudge him, that would indeed be unnecessary. I am weighing some harm at a community level, but I am not completely ignoring the lifeguard's dignity as well. It was necessary for the drowning victim to be saved to respect his dignity, but that does not mean I can do anything I want to the lifeguard, and that his dignity is completely ignored.

However, in the case of the not yet born, what does "unnecessary" mean? Well, it would be unnecessary to bring about a whole lifetime of pain to ameliorate the people who already exist. Rather, to respect the dignity of the child, I would not put any of those considerations above the idea that I am enabling a lifetime of harm onto the child because maybe he would cure cancer or be someone's friend in the future. Rather, that would indeed be purely using that person for that cause. Notice in the case of the already born, that the weighing of dignity has to consider each person's interests and balance them against each other for the least violation of dignity. However, there is no "person" in this case to weigh these interests in this scenario. Rather, all we can do is apply the logic to its absolute logic of "don't cause unnecessary harm if you don't have to'. We are not weighing any mitigating factors here because there is no "person" who is the target for this. We are purely, that is to say, "absolutely" creating from "scratch" ALL instances of harm for a person rather than mitigating and ameliorating something.

And here is the important thing, we are actually creating the less absolute scenario of having to put someone in a position to have to need mitigation and amelioration in the first place. Now, you did put someone in the position where they will have to compromise, balance, and mitigate against other people. Now, instead of no new person who has to be a part of this "game" is recruited a new player, who has to play the game. That would be violating his dignity once born.

So there is a sense that each case needs to be looked at for "unnecessary harm". In the case of the not yet born, "unnecessary" becomes "not being born into harm" as it was unnecessary at the level of hte interests of that person for that person to be brought into the game. In the case of those who exist, unnecessary becomes "least amount of violation when possible to play the game". The lifeguard, being in the game of life already, has to already play by the rules of the "human survival/living in society" game. So, this compromises "absolute" rule of not violating dignity, but relativizes it to "the least amount of unnecessary suffering for that individual's dignity while balancing the other's people dignity". It becomes intricately caught up in playing in the game of survival in the social sphere. No such need exists prior to actually bringing the person into the world, and thus the absolute and ideal following of the rule would be the de facto application of the "Don't create unnecessary harm to someone else if you don't have to". No amelioration needs to take place for that person to balance against other people unlike the lifeguard and people already born.

In the case of the not yet born, "unnecessary" becomes "not being born into harm" as it was unnecessary at the level of hte interests of that person for that person to be brought into the game. In the case of those who exist, unnecessary becomes "least amount of violation when possible to play the game". — schopenhauer1

Well, it would be unnecessary to bring about a whole lifetime of pain to ameliorate the people who already exist. — schopenhauer1

Is the disagreement. The distinction between what “unless necessary” means for before and after birth is what I don’t get.

We are purely, that is to say, "absolutely" creating from "scratch" ALL instances of harm for a person rather than mitigating and ameliorating something. — schopenhauer1

We are doing both.

Is the disagreement. The distinction between what “unless necessary” means for before and after birth is what I don’t get. — khaled

Yes that is the main distinction here.

We are purely, that is to say, "absolutely" creating from "scratch" ALL instances of harm for a person rather than mitigating and ameliorating something.
— schopenhauer1

We are doing both. — khaled

But there is no "one" prior to birth that is part of that has interests that have to be ameliorated. The only people that have interests are the people already in the game. So I guess "dignity" for something with "no interests" (currently) is "Continue to not enable condition of any harm or that would be a violation". Once born, there are interests that are mitigated against other people because both have interests that can be ameliorated and balanced (currently).

"If we are in a position where we cannot ascribe propositions such as "people are suffering" or "people are not suffering" then the absence of suffering is not a moral good because it's not enjoyed by anyone."


If you are right, then the concept of euthanasia is absurd.

We are currently having a similar debate here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/525114

Thank you for the information. :)

Maybe quote the whole thing for starters. And no, quite obviously alleviating specific suffering where no other solution is available then euthanasia is entirely different from a blanket claim we should stop procreating because of suffering. But your leaping ahead. Let's first start with the fact living obviously doesn't cause suffering.

↪Antinatalist Maybe quote the whole thing for starters. And no, quite obviously alleviating specific suffering where no other solution is available then euthanasia is entirely different from a blanket claim we should stop procreating because of suffering. But your leaping ahead. Let's first start with the fact living obviously doesn't cause suffering. — Benkei

I have to disagree.

In some theoretical and hypothetical Utopia we can think, that life doesn´t cause suffering. But that´s Utopia, not the real world.

Antinatalism as a personal stance, like euthanasia or abortion, can be ethical, or a matter of conscience. I consider myself a conscientious antinatalist.

Antinatalism, however, as policy is totalitarian, almost theocratic (pace Mainländer). Eliminating the human species in order to eliminate human suffering is a reductio as insipid as "destroying the village in order to save the village". This means undermines its ends. Antinatalist fundies seem incorrigibly blind to this point; they've somehow lost the ethical plot – maximal reduction of suffering for already born sufferers – which has the distinct advantage of being desired by the vast majority of people (et al).

Having a child takes faith because you have to have the faith that the world is good

Having a child takes faith because you have to have the faith that the world is good — Gregory

Actually that is a very good response to @180 Proof

Antinatalist fundies seem incorrigibly blind to this point; they've somehow lost the ethical plot – maximal reduction of suffering for already born sufferers – which has the distinct advantage of being desired by the vast majority of people (et al). — 180 Proof

But as you point out, much of antinatalism is a sub-section of overall philosophical pessimism. Fundamentally, the problems are incorrigible. If you don't believe in throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm, if you don't believe in exposing new people to suffering.. that is the conclusion. Certainly though, giving to charity and helping out people in some capacity is noble to reduce harm, but that doesn't negate the causes that antinatalists focus on.

As @Gregory just stated, you think it narrow-minded that antinatalists have solely focused on their dissatisfaction with the current situation and its incorrigibleness, but the non-antinatalists have not focused on it enough.

If you don't believe in throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm, if you don't believe in exposing new people to suffering.. that is the conclusion. — schopenhauer1

I'll put it here too since you seem to want to espouse it in both threads.

Conception is unique - it's not like throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm because there are no 'people' whose will we can consider prior to birth (even a few months after birth there's not a sufficiently complex will for such a consideration), so contrary to what you say it is not the inevitable conclusion for people who do not like throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm. Such people may well hate throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm with a vengeance, but still consider the unique situation of having a child to be morally acceptable.

There are no other circumstances where the person who would experience that which we expect for them does not exist to be asked (or have their will considered) in our lives. Birth is the only one. So we have no intuition on the matter other than the one we use for birth, and that is 99.999999% in agreement that it's morally acceptable.

In fact, the closest we get to it in other aspects of life is resuscitation, and here we almost universally make the assumption that the person would want to live.

the absence of suffering is not a moral good because it's not enjoyed by anyone."
↪Benkei


If you are right, then the concept of euthanasia is absurd. — Antinatalist

Not at all because in euthanasia there is still a population of humans living in a world with less suffering in it as a result. The completion of the hard antinatalist program results in a world where the absence of suffering is of no consequence at all because there are no humans to enjoy living in a world without it.

As Gregory just stated, you think it narrow-minded that antinatalists have solely focused on their dissatisfaction with the current situation and its incorrigibleness, but the non-antinatalists have not focused on it enough. — schopenhauer1

It's simply not dire or exigent enough for natalists (or conscientious antinatalists) to advocate wholesale human extinction.

he absence of suffering is not a moral good because it's not enjoyed by anyone."
↪Benkei


If you are right, then the concept of euthanasia is absurd.
— Antinatalist

Not at all because in euthanasia there is still a population of humans living in a world with less suffering in it as a result. The completion of the hard antinatalist program results in a world where the absence of suffering is of no consequence at all because there are no humans to enjoy living in a world without it. — Isaac

Let´s assume there is entity called God. God created the world. God created also two billion human beings to live in the place called Hell. Living in Hell is living in extremely miserable place forever.

Let´s assume there is an alternative option. God didn´t exist. There was a world. And there were no people or place called Hell.

Are you saying that both scenarios are analogous?
The world without people suffering was not better world than the Hell?
(Because there were no people to enjoy the absence of suffering.)

Let´s assume there is entity called God. God created the world. God created also two billion human beings to live in the place called Hell. Living in Hell is living in extremely miserable place forever.

Let´s assume there is an alternative option. God didn´t exist. There was a world. And there were no people or place called Hell.

Are you saying that both scenarios are analogous?
The world without people suffering was not better world than the Hell? — Antinatalist

Yes, that's right.

It's just nonsensical to say the alternative would be 'better'. 'Better' is judgement, a state, of a human mind, without the human mind to contain the judgement it simply can't exist. It has no mind-independent existence such that it would still be 'better' even if there were no person to hold that thought. 'Better' in whose opinion?

Let´s assume there is entity called God. God created the world. God created also two billion human beings to live in the place called Hell. Living in Hell is living in extremely miserable place forever.

Let´s assume there is an alternative option. God didn´t exist. There was a world. And there were no people or place called Hell.

Are you saying that both scenarios are analogous?
The world without people suffering was not better world than the Hell?
— Antinatalist

Yes, that's right.

It's just nonsensical to say the alternative would be 'better'. 'Better' is judgement, a state, of a human mind, without the human mind to contain the judgement it simply can't exist. It has no mind-independent existence such that it would still be 'better' even if there were no person to hold that thought. 'Better' in whose opinion? — Isaac

That kind of thinking reminds me from some comments on language theory.
Some people say there are no non-linguistic thinking (Temple Grandin would disagree).

But at least in some cases the language acts as a nomination.

Therefore there could be values without the valuer.
Or at least there could be anti-values.

Therefore there could be values without the valuer. — Antinatalist

Lots of things could be. The important question is whether they need be, how useful it is to assume they are, what problems arise if we do etc.

So with values (without a valuer) - what advantage does seeing things that way give us? If it does give advantages, what are the disadvantages and are they sufficiently outweighed? Where would the values reside and what form would they take? If a value can exist without a valuer, then what happens when the values we know exist with a valuer contradict them?

I can see more problems than are worth it with a dualistic realm of 'values', but if you've got a good defence of the concept I'd like to hear it.

Antinatalism, however, as policy is totalitarian, almost theocratic (pace Mainländer). — 180 Proof

Sure. If people don't buy the argument, it's not worth beating them in the head with it.

In his case, however, I don't think it's possible to distinguish his anti-natalist views from his own way of being or personality. I'd have trouble believing he did not suffer from very severe depression.

It's not at all to imply that because of his outlook, his views are wrong. Not at all. But I can't help but wonder how he would have been had he not been a tragic case. Maybe he would not have written his philosophy.

It's interesting that such a person can elaborate extremely interesting and insightful epistemological and metaphysical philosophies because of his conclusions about the origin of existence. Yet one can reject his conclusions while accepting his other arguments. But he would not have elaborated this arguments absent his nihilism. It's very strange.

Maybe there are optimistic AN perspectives in that, one can be an optimist about the future while thinking that not being born would have been better. Maybe.

Let´s assume there is entity called God. God created the world. God created also two billion human beings to live in the place called Hell. Living in Hell is living in extremely miserable place forever.

Let´s assume there is an alternative option. God didn´t exist. There was a world. And there were no people or place called Hell.

Are you saying that both scenarios are analogous?
The world without people suffering was not better world than the Hell?
— Antinatalist

Yes, that's right.

It's just nonsensical to say the alternative would be 'better'. 'Better' is judgement, a state, of a human mind, without the human mind to contain the judgement it simply can't exist. It has no mind-independent existence such that it would still be 'better' even if there were no person to hold that thought. 'Better' in whose opinion?
— Isaac — Antinatalist

Let´s call the Hell scenario as Scenario A, and let´s call the alternative option, where nobody exist, as Scenario B.

You say it is nonsensical to say the alternative would be "better".

Let´s assume that in Scenario B comes a time, when Hell simple disappears, and also all people in it (so the Hell wasn´t eternal after all). But one bystander remains alive. His life is mixture of joy, despair, pleasure, some pain - but nothing like Hell. Some midlife crisis etc. now and then. Some rainbows to look for.

According to your logic, this one bystander makes the Scenario B better than the Scenario A.

And when this bystander dies, according to your logic, we cannot make separation for these Scenarios.
We could not say the Scenario B is better than A, vica versa.

To live between ("the best" & "second best") extremes :point:

Maybe there are optimistic AN perspectives in that, one can be an optimist about the future while thinking that not being born would have been better. Maybe. — Manuel

Maybe so, but I agree with Camus:

Real generosity towards the future lies in giving all to the present.

There are no optimists (or pessimists) in foxholes; only the courageous survive and thrive from the struggle.

One must imagine Sisyphus happy.

Amor fati.

I'll put it here too since you seem to want to espouse it in both threads. — Isaac

Honestly, this is the fuckn shit that makes me not want to answer you. Do not "throw sand in my face" before you make your argument. Just make your argument. How many times do I have to tell you about etiquette. I made a whole thread on insults if you want to use it for reference. This is on here because I saw someone else wanted to open this thread and of course I am interested in the topic. Stop being so aggro bro ;).

Conception is unique - it's not like throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm because there are no 'people' whose will we can consider prior to birth (even a few months after birth there's not a sufficiently complex will for such a consideration), so contrary to what you say it is not the inevitable conclusion for people who do not like throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm. Such people may well hate throwing people into a game you can only escape with self-harm with a vengeance, but still consider the unique situation of having a child to be morally acceptable. — Isaac

Right, and my point is that its seeming uniqueness, is not different. It is another case, just with a time displacement from conception to birth or whatever other place you want to consider "valid" (consciousness, self-consciousness, etc.). It doesn't change anything because of the displacement.

There are no other circumstances where the person who would experience that which we expect for them does not exist to be asked (or have their will considered) in our lives. Birth is the only one. So we have no intuition on the matter other than the one we use for birth, and that is 99.999999% in agreement that it's morally acceptable. — Isaac

I mean, I can then make a case that because this is so unique, it defies things like, "waking up the lifeguard to save the drowning child" because in this case the person is absolutely being used for X reason and never for its own sake being that it doesn't exist yet. Thus the suffering is completely unnecessary for that person, and there isn't even a greater harm for that person being ameliorated for a lesser harm. Again, completely causing conditions for unnecessary suffering upon that person born.

It's simply not dire or exigent enough for natalists (or conscientious antinatalists) to advocate wholesale human extinction. — 180 Proof

As you know, I am not advocating for wholesale human extinction other than people choosing not to procreate. We may be closer then.. I would say it's "anatinatalism at the margins". Once you get to the "World-Exploder" things like that, it is not antinatalism proper, if you ask me- it's some form of radical negative utilitarianism or some other broader philosophy. It certainly doesn't take into account the dignity of the individual person as I am trying to defend.

Therefore there could be values without the valuer.
— Antinatalist

Lots of things could be. The important question is whether they need be, how useful it is to assume they are, what problems arise if we do etc.

So with values (without a valuer) - what advantage does seeing things that way give us? If it does give advantages, what are the disadvantages and are they sufficiently outweighed? Where would the values reside and what form would they take? If a value can exist without a valuer, then what happens when the values we know exist with a valuer contradict them?

I can see more problems than are worth it with a dualistic realm of 'values', but if you've got a good defence of the concept I'd like to hear it. — Isaac

That is very complex case.

"It is logically absurd that a part – private life – is important and meaningful, but the whole – life in its entirety – is insignificant and dispensable." (Pentti Linkola) 


The fact that private life is important and meaningful, which is also my point of view, is a state of affairs (or, to be more precise, the state of affairs affecting as the viewpoint of a certain creature), which is in relation to a state of affairs within another sphere of life. Regarding these values as ”good” is in some cases of course rational, but not unambiguously logical as such.
I want to point out here that I see value in life myself. It is also the case that life contains indirectly valuable things whose value is based on their instrumental value for life - if there were no life, there would be no need for these indirectly valuable things. One could even argue that life in general has value over non-life. Rational reasoning does not give any support to this argument. Anyone, who sees a contradiction in my position, correct me.
I want to emphasize, that I am antinatalist, not pro-mortalist. I´m not advocating terminate the life, which already exists.

A Linkola-spirited argument to this could be: "Only what is can have value. Non-life cannot have value." A possible response could be: "Maybe so, but similarly only what is can have non-value." And I mean this so, that suffering, which would be too well-known for too many, will appear at least in some cases as anti-value, very negative and sometimes as extremely bad things. Something to really avoid.

However, I accept a point of view that for some human being life could be better option than non-being. At least theoretically. But we could never reach any kind of certainty at any case, any circumstances, any place that life is better for any unborn, potential person. 

Finally, nobody will absolutely (in word´s purest meaning) know is it better for human being born to this world or not. However, we know that if child will born to this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard. And we also know that we make the decision for her/his life, the unborn child not having any kind of veto-prevention to ignition of her/his life, which she/he only has to live.
These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not creating human life to this world.

It's interesting that such a person can elaborate extremely interesting and insightful epistemological and metaphysical philosophies because of his conclusions about the origin of existence. Yet one can reject his conclusions while accepting his other arguments. But he would not have elaborated this arguments absent his nihilism. It's very strange.

Maybe there are optimistic AN perspectives in that, one can be an optimist about the future while thinking that not being born would have been better. Maybe. — Manuel

Cool insights. One can have two ideas in one's head at the same time. I bet you you can find some happy-go-lucky philosophical pessimists. Not all PPs are necessarily dispositional pessimists too.

Yeah, this is true. Camus point is rather fair concerning the present.

On the Sisyphus front, if it were for a few years sure but I mean, for all eternity rolling a up a rock. Damn. :meh:

Edit:

or conscientious antinatalists — 180 Proof

Nice story btw you linked in the previous post.

I did have a brief question, what do you mean here by "conscientious antinatalist"?

Cool insights. One can have two ideas in one's head at the same time. I bet you you can find some happy-go-lucky philosophical pessimists. Not all PPs are necessarily dispositional pessimists too. — schopenhauer1

Not an insight, just a comment, would like to find an example of such a person. I was referring mostly to Mainländer.

But sure. One can also agree with Gramsci too in "Pessimism of the intellect. Optimism of the will." Or anything else.