I know. But we're here speaking only of substance dualism, not whether physicalism is true (to claim that if the former is false, then the latter must be true would seem a false dilemma).I don't think so. As I said, the interaction problem is not the only problem. Dualists are dualists because they believe that there are problems that a physicalist account of consciousness cannot resolve. That a physicalist account of consciousness can resolve the interaction problem by avoiding it entirely doesn't help it avoid the problems that dualists claim it does have. — Michael
I know. But we're here speaking only of substance dualism, not whether physicalism is true (to claim that if the former if false, then the latter must be true would seem a false dilemma).
And my question could be applied to any metaphysical thesis (or even any philosophical thesis whatsoever, I suppose). If a thesis has a central, potentially fatal problem, which hundreds of years of theorizing have failed to resolve, does that lead to a justifiably diminished confidence that said thesis is correct (or whatever passes for "correct" with regard to philosophical theses)? — Arkady
Speaking as a physics layman, my understanding is that theorists have been struggling to reconcile QM and relativity, as the theories work well in their own domains, but break down into nonsense when one attempts to integrate the theories (something about crazy infinities popping up all over the place, I think). Given this failure of reconciliation, would it not follow that at least one of theories (QM or relativity) are false? — Arkady
Of these three propositions (3) would seem to be on the most secure footing, and is therefore the least likely to be false. — Arkady
And my question could be applied to any metaphysical thesis (or even any philosophical thesis whatsoever, I suppose). If a thesis has a central, potentially fatal problem, which hundreds of years of theorizing have failed to resolve, does that lead to a justifiably diminished confidence that said thesis is correct (or whatever passes for "correct" with regard to philosophical theses)? — Arkady
(1) the mind is res cogitans.
(2) the body is res extensa.
(3) mind and body interact.
So what is the argument? In what way is the interaction between the mental and physical mysterious, that interaction between physical objects already is not? What provision can you make for one that will not carry over to the other? — The Great Whatever
The total mind-body problem, at least as I was taught, contains four premises:
(1) the mind is res cogitans (immaterial).
(2) the body is res extensa (material).
(3) mind and body interact.
(4) res cogitans and res extensa cannot interact.
Dualists deny premise four. — Chany
However, I generally do not like arguments that revolve around relatively new physics concepts given that, as Arkady mentioned, we know that our current understandings of modern physics, quantum mechanics included, do not mesh together and are currently incomplete. Yes, there may be some interpretations that allow for immaterial causes to influence material causes, but unless we have reason to believe those interpretations over others, I do not see the point here. — Chany
I find arguments directly confronting dualism that amount to "your metaphysics are weird and has mysterious elements" to be poor. — Chany
there is no good reason to reject dualism as a metaphysics — Metaphysician Undercover
we can move toward assessing the benefits which dualism offers. These include a rational approach to the existence of freewill, intention, and human creativity, as well as an empirical approach to the nature of time, the past being distinctly different from the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, it is clear how two material things can interact, in fact just as clear as how two ideal things can interact. They can interact because they are one substance. If a basketball is made of atoms, and a a football is also made of atoms, then they can interact, if they collide, by virtue of the simple fact that they cannot share the same position in space, so when they come in contact with each other, something must happen.the question of how something material and something non-material can possibly interact seems to presuppose that it is clear how two material things interact. — The Great Whatever
Hence because they are pre-theoretically obvious and abundant, we adopt a one substance view with two parallel attributes...because then we can do the same with physical and mental activity, the correlations between which are even pre-theoretically obvious and abundant. — The Great Whatever
Nevertheless, I think dualism has a big problem indeed. If we say mind is not anywhere in space and yet it is obviously temporal then why we don't hear each other's thoughts? That is what bothers me. If the thought occur at the same time then what makes us not here all the thoughts? — Veronika Pugach
Well, it is clear how two material things can interact, in fact just as clear as how two ideal things can interact — Agustino
If a basketball is made of atoms, and a a football is also made of atoms, then they can interact, if they collide, by virtue of the simple fact that they cannot share the same position in space — Agustino
Dualism is fucked up precisely because it cannot account for correlation - it creates two separate realms, which aren't even correlated to begin with! — Agustino
They don't. They're merely correlated with one another. The ideal is parallel to the material.It is not any more clear than how a material and 'ideal' thing can interact (although 'ideal' is a poor descriptor for the mental in Descartes' view). — The Great Whatever
Tell me TGW, can you conceive of two objects occupying the same position in space at one and the same time? No.OK, why can't they, and how do you know that? If you know it by experience, then we also know about physical-mental correlations and their effects on one another from experience. — The Great Whatever
Which is stupid. If they interact, they could really affect each other, but they don't. They're merely correlated with each other - two attributes of the same substance. Serotonin in the brain is correlated to a feeling of happiness, just as a feeling of happiness is correlated to serotonin in the brain. One doesn't "cause" another.But this is just false. Obviously the dualist thinks the two realms interact in systematic ways – hence interactionist dualism. — The Great Whatever
No, things which have a different nature cannot interact. A thought cannot kick a stone.Just because two things are distinct doesn't mean they can't interact: if that were true, distinct physical things couldn't interact either. — The Great Whatever
So a particle is literarily in the same spatial position as the other? Isn't it around the same vague (in QM) position? That's entirely different from what I said.As far as I'm aware, particles interact only when they do occupy the same space.
It's only identical fermions that can't occupy the same space. — Michael
So a particle is literarily in the same spatial position as the other? Isn't it around the same vague (in QM) position? That's entirely different from what I said. — Agustino
That's because it is both wave and particle... and it's not the only interpretation of QM. Pilot wave theories also exist for example.I believe this "vague" position is all the position particles have. It's not that they "really" have a non-vague position but we're just incapable of determining it. So to occupy the same "vague" position is to occupy the same space. — Michael
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