What would be constant here? what would be using "What it is like to be RogueAI" in the same way as you did before? How was "What it is like to be RogueAI" used in the first place?

There can be no such continuity here. — Banno

Are you familiar with the Buddhist concept of anatta?

An ontological distinction means there’s a difference in kind. But these distinctions were discarded along with many other elements of Aristotelianism by modern science, which tends to try and explain everything in terms of matter-energy. Nagel elaborates his point in more detail in his 2012 book Mind and Cosmos where he says that:

The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. — Wayfarer

To me, the difference at hand is about actually eating an apple, and describing/analyzing/explaining the eating of an apple.

Which is better, more relevant? To eat an apple, or to describe/analyze/explain the eating of an apple?

Any account of consciousness has to account for its moral implications. — baker

Yes, what you quote there is true. That was a problem for Cartesians who by today's standards would be considered quite monstruos. Animal rights, though still having ways to go, have improved drastically. It's a major topic of concern now with criminal liabilities, back then, it was not too important.

But today, I think the issue can be put forth without much controversy, bats should not be made to suffer needlessly.

But I think this is true even if "what it's likeness" arguments don't follow, that is, they can't be stated properly. Even if there is no such thing as "what it's like to be a bat", I think it makes sense to treat them decently.

Or would you say what it's like arguments are necessary here?

Or would you say what it's like arguments are necessary here? — Manuel

I am afraid that they are.

In the absence of a binding system of morality, concepts such as "consciousness" have to carry the moral load.

SO you are proposing a transcendental argument along the lines of "we need a moral compass, therefore there must be something it is like to be a bat"?

Needs detail.

In the absence of a binding system of morality, concepts such as "consciousness" have to carry the moral load. — baker

Sure, consciousness is an absolutely crucial aspect to moral considerations.

I don't think this applies to "what it's likeness" though. Or at least, I'm not seeing the connection.

Needs detail. — Banno

Why are you copying my argument? :cool:

Oh, Baker had mentioned me a few times in the last few posts - forgive me.

Na man, I'm kidding! :rofl: :razz:

I know.

Baker is shifting ground from the OP. That's fine, so long as we mark the change explicitly.

Yeah. Well, can't this topic come under the cover of, say, "what's it like to be in pain"? As in, we have an idea of what such a state consists of, therefore we might want to avoid doing that to bats.

Or something like that.

Sure. My point here was about the specific argument in the OP, and the error of "there is something it is like to be a bat".

A taking for granted of another being's identity, ie. that is has an identity, that it is an entity with some permanent characteristics, that there is a continuity to it. One such is taken for granted, it makes sense to talk of "what it's like to be a bat". — baker

It's not clear what is going on here. What does it mean to say a bat has an identity? That the bat knows who it is? That Baker knows it is a bat? What is it you think is taken for granted?

But moreover, is this the right argument if what we are after is a justification for moral reasoning? Suppose the bat does not have an identity - that that make it OK to inflict pain on it? If identity is attributed, then can't it be attributed to a tree or a rock? So do they have moral standing because they have an identity?

To me, the difference at hand is about actually eating an apple, and describing/analyzing/explaining the eating of an apple.

Which is better, more relevant? To eat an apple, or to describe/analyze/explain the eating of an apple? — baker

I think you've failed to see the point. An 'ontological distinction' means 'a difference in kind'. I'm saying, there are differences in kind between mineral, organic, sentient and rational beings. In old-school philosophical parlance, they're different substances. Whereas the general consensus is, I believe, that there is only one substance, that being matter (now, matter~energy) and that organic, sentient, and rational beings are simply permutations of this single substance. That is what I'm calling into question.

What does it mean to say a bat has an identity? That the bat knows who it is? That Baker knows it is a bat? What is it you think is taken for granted? — Banno

Salient points, and look how long this conversation has gone on. On the other hand, knowing what it is like to be be another human is another matter. We can imagine ourselves being someone else, at least to a certain degree. As we read along a first person narrative in a novel we do just that if the author is skilled enough. But to come awake as another is a different ball game entirely.

I get the impression that many if not most posters on this forum have little to say of their own experiences apart from those arising from studying philosophy. I've wondered, Do the philosophically inclined have fewer dimensions to their lives than normal? I would enjoy reading of interests that are either separate from or overlap philosophy that have meanings to posters lives. Maybe another topic, one that might go to Lounge.

I've mentioned an experience I had after several years of practicing Castaneda's Art of Dreaming in which I came partially awake as another person - someone living in a cottage in Ireland - with an entirely different feeling of personhood. Had the spell lasted more than scant seconds I've wondered if memories of that being would have come forth. What indeed does it mean to be who we are?

To me, the difference at hand is about actually eating an apple, and describing/analyzing/explaining the eating of an apple. — baker

But there's more here, since there are those who would distinguish between actually eating an apple and having the experience of eating an apple; presumably with the first being objective and the second subjective.

...there is only one substance... — Wayfarer

Are we doing physics? Then it makes sense to talk about matter and energy and particles and so on; but i don't think there is much mention of "substance" in either cosmology or quantum physics. Or are we doing theory of action, in which case we might talk of intention and agency, and make no mention of substance. Or are we talking about phenomenology, in which case presumably we would talk about appearances, and perhaps substance would make an appearance there.

But I see no reason to think of substance as worth discussing in any and all conversations.

On the other hand, knowing what it is like to be be another human is another matter. — jgill

Oh, indeed; and here is the odd thing about the what-it-is-like conversation: if the bat argument is to reach its conclusion, we cannot know what it is like to be a bat... and yet here it is clear that we can know something about what it is like to be someone else.

So which is it?

But I see no reason to think of substance as worth discussing in any and all conversations. — Banno

We're doing philosophy. I'm interested in ontological distinctions.

Sure. So am I. If we are going to do this well, we should keep one eye on what it is we are doing with the terms we use- like substance. So where does substance fit, in the distinction being made? When we look to see the difference in substance between a rock and a person, we should keep one eye on what that word is doing.

What is it doing?

I agree, and often spell out, that the philosophical use of the term 'substance' is problematical, because of it's conflation with the every day sense of 'substance' as 'a material with uniform properties'. The reason I brought it up in this context, is that it harks back to the original categories of philosophy in respect of what kinds of beings there are. The term in Greek philosophy was ouisia, which is nearer in meaning to 'being' or perhaps 'subject' (as in 'subject of experience'.)

So what the term calls attention to is the difference in kind between various sorts of beings - of, if you like, to enable the differentiation of beings and things. As I said earlier in this thread, what I think Nagel is trying to elucidate in his 'something it is like', is actually, simply, 'being'. Bats and humans are beings, and as such are subjects of experience. Stones are not beings, but things, and there's a fundamental distinction of kind between things and beings - one which, I propose, is often overlooked, forgotten or denied in modern philosophy.

Experience is a subjective thing. — RogueAI

As I'm using the term, experience is "practical contact with and observation of facts or events".

Kicking a football around with my kids is an experience. So is watching a sunset. These experiences are interactions between myself and (other entities in) the world, not events in a private Cartesian theater.

When you unpack "1. A bat experiences the world when it uses echolocation.", you're saying there's an experiencer (the bat), and it has experiences. — RogueAI

That's right. Like a human being, a bat is a living organism that has the ability to perceive and interact with its environment (albeit with differing sense modalities).

Those experiences are therefore the bat's subjective experiences. — RogueAI

Not if subjective means "in the mind" as opposed to "in the world" which in this context is a Cartesian distinction, not an ordinary or natural distinction. As I'm using the term, an experience is an interaction by a perceiving creature with things in the world.

If you're not a dualist, and you believe experiences are real, how are they real? — RogueAI

People ordinarily regard what they do and see as the primary candidates for what is real. For example, I'm sitting at my computer, thinking about your comments and typing a reply. That's my current experience.

Not if subjective means "in the mind" as opposed to "in the world" which in this context is a Cartesian distinction, not an ordinary or natural distinction.

You don't believe experiences happen in the mind? If not, then where? In the world? If so, then specifically where in the world do experiences (or experiencing, if you prefer) happen? The brain?

A male experiences life missing the female experience(which leads me to believe male/female genders are outdated, requiring a new gender system).

To not know what it's like to be male/female means we have to span at least two lives to get complete data; male and female hearts may vary, calling for a new gender with a fuller heart.

This case I think applies to the topic at hand, it's one of my thinking topics at the moment.

Life is this universe is restricted somewhat; you can't alternate between characters. Some answers are hidden from us, lucky it's only temporary.

You don't believe experiences happen in the mind? If not, then where? In the world? If so, then specifically where in the world do experiences (or experiencing, if you prefer) happen? The brain? — RogueAI

No, not in the brain. Where do I kick around a football with my kids? In the park, or my backyard. People (or bats) have experiences, not brains or minds. From Smit and Hacker:

Suppose that I see a red tomato, do I then experience a red tomato in my brain? Is this experience a neural state of my brain? Saying so is incoherent, for there is no such thing as experiencing a red tomato in my brain. It does not make sense to answer the question where I experience the red tomato by saying: ‘Here’, while pointing to my head (as opposed to pointing at the fruit in the garden). Similarly, it can not be said that the hippocampus is the locus of remembering, for an answer to the question ‘Where and when did you remember that …?’ is given by saying: ‘While I was in the library’; not by saying: ‘In my hippocampus; where else?’. — Seven Misconceptions About the Mereological Fallacy: A Compilation for the Perplexed - Harry Smit & Peter M. S. Hacker, 2013

It's not clear what is going on here. What does it mean to say a bat has an identity? That the bat knows who it is? That Baker knows it is a bat? What is it you think is taken for granted? — Banno

The being.

Suppose the bat does not have an identity - that that make it OK to inflict pain on it?

This is moot, because if one assumes that something doesn't have an identity, then one also assumes that it doesn't/cannot feel pain to begin with.
When you chop would, you don't think "Oh, I'm inflicting pain on this log of wood". It simply doesn't occur to you that a log of wood could feel pain. Descartes thought that animals were much like logs of wood in this regard.

And this assumption about the lack of an identity or a diminished or damaged identity is the justification that people give for slitting throats, throwing stones at, hitting with sticks, and so on.

For example, a commandment says "Thou shalt not kill", but people who profess to abide by said commandment may see no problem in slitting the throats of cows or burning alive the members of another tribe. Because for them, "Thou shalt not kill" only has meaning in reference to (valued) members of their own tribe, while every other being is deemed necessarily lesser (and thus, it's not actually possible to commit a crime against it, even if one were to slit its thorat).

If identity is attributed, then can't it be attributed to a tree or a rock?

Of course. Consider, for example, works of art or craftsmanship, or even just ordinary cars: these things have an identity attributed to them, with a unique serial number. And while there are generally not assumed to be able to feel pain, there is a big issue when it comes to damaging them.

There's a big difference between breaking rocks at a quarry and hitting the Great Star of Africa with a hammer.

So do they have moral standing because they have an identity?

Without an identity, they wouldn't be eligible for moral standing.

I think you've failed to see the point. — Wayfarer

I was refering to this:

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. — Wayfarer

An 'ontological distinction' means 'a difference in kind'. I'm saying, there are differences in kind between mineral, organic, sentient and rational beings. In old-school philosophical parlance, they're different substances. Whereas the general consensus is, I believe, that there is only one substance, that being matter (now, matter~energy) and that organic, sentient, and rational beings are simply permutations of this single substance. That is what I'm calling into question.

Sure.
What do you think are the moral implications or the implications for a theory of morality for each of the views?

It seems to me that the reason we have an ontology, the reason why we list "what is there", is because this has bearing on how we relate to that which is there and how we justify our actions toward it.

Sure. Well, the very worst thing about modern philosophy is NOT differentiating beings from things. Objectification, in other words. Daniel Dennett is its poster-boy, but it’s a very widespread failing in modern philosophy. The whole meaning of materialism is that there’s no essential difference between people and things.

Daniel Dennett is its poster-boy, but it’s a very widespread failing in modern philosophy. — Wayfarer

Ugh. Him and the Churchlands and even much worse, Rosenberg. Total lunacy.

I mean, if you want to deny conscious experience, fine. But then just study the brain or something. Why bother speaking about "there seems to be qualia" be there isn't any. It's quite amazing to believe that we are Zombies and not people.

It’s entailed by the philosophy, though. We actually owe all those people, for making explicit the absurd consequences of philosophical materialism. I mean, they might be decent people and even committed to liberal values, as I’m sure Daniel Dennett is, but there’s no real warrant for that in their philosophy.

Sure. Dennett is a decent liberal, so far as I know. He's also quite entertaining in the examples he gives. His is a materialism of a certain strain, which we have no reason to believe is true. Galen Strawson calls himself a materialist too, but he's probably Dennett's fiercest critic.

Yes, it's good to be exposed to such views, I agree. But after that, at least to me, that type of thinking is just very boring. You get rid of consciousness, or claim to anyway. Fine. Now what? Why bother with anything in philosophy outside ethics perhaps? And even here, as you say, ethics would also be problematic. It's all just chemicals anyway.

But philosophy of mind is interesting.