Is the balance in existence really so skewed towards suffering as Schopenhauer claims? — aldreams

Schopenhauer amplifies suffering -- like a caricature-- to make his point. So, it is a skewed view. What he forgets is that humans have the capacity to bend and sway and adapt. We have a natural anti-dote for suffering, this is what Schopenhauer forgets or ignores. Darwin did not become a household name for spewing positive and uplifting notes -- but by pointing out facts of how humans have come a long way. Hope is also not a feel-good mantra. We have hope because there are variables available to us to exploit or take advantage of.

Are the good things in life really as fleeting and inconsequential as he presents them? — aldreams

No. The good things in life can last a lifetime or forever. And they can be meaningful -- we erected civilization and learned compassion.

Could S. be importing his own personal bias and presenting it as objective truth? — aldreams

Yes, he is importing his own bias. But he is not giving a fair account of life. Point-counterpoint is not being exercised here. There is a pessimistic view, then there is maturity.

Even if there is a bias, could there still be value to Schopenhauer's pessimism, for example a pedagogical one? Could his work be an exercise in philosophical education? What kind of education would this be? — aldreams

Yes, as a polemical sociological critique. At least the Cynics understand the method of facts and acceptance of what can be changed and what are beyond our capacity to control. Schopenhauer makes a blanket denouncement of existence. Not the same.

Schopenhauer claims that the capacity for reflective thought amplifies our suffering as compared with the other animals. — aldreams

Sounds like a man who has time on his hands. I used to be a Recon Team Leader in the Marines. One day, sitting around the squad bay, a peer said "I'm bored." I said "When life bores you, risk it." If S has time to sit around and reflect, then he could reflect on something besides suffering. Many an animal has time to reflect, but apparently they don't. Well, S, don't. Quit reflecting, or get out there and live. Experience that which you apparently abhor. The cold, the hunger, the wet. Embrace the suck!

So, it's not the "capacity" for reflective thought that amplifies our suffering. It's what we do with our time, or what we perceive in reflection.

Devil's Advocate here.

We have a natural anti-dote for suffering, this is what Schopenhauer forgets or ignores. — Caldwell

Really, what antidote is that?

:100: :fire: :clap:

I used to be a Recon Team Leader in the Marines. One day, sitting around the squad bay, a peer said "I'm bored." I said "When life bores you, risk it." — James Riley

:strong: :cool:

Amor fati. Live dangerously! ~F.N.

So, it's not the "capacity" for reflective thought that amplifies our suffering. It's what we do with our time, or what we perceive in reflection.

:100: :up:

Really, what antidote is that? — baker

Here's a copy-pasted brief from Grief: A Brief History of Research on How Body, Mind, and Brain Adapt by Mary-Frances O’Connor, PhD:

Important historical developments in bereavement research

Descriptions and theories of what happens in grief have largely come from psychiatry and psychology. From these domains, current grief research relies heavily on attachment theory and cognitive stress theory to understand the process of adapting after the death of a loved one, rather than the outdated and inaccurate five-stage model of grief(3). Acute grief, or the period immediately following a death, is often characterized by a loss of regulation. This can be observed as increased intensity and frequency of sadness, anger and/or anxiety, and also emotional numbness and difficulty concentrating, in addition to dysregulation in sleep and appetite.

There are wide individual differences in the adaptation process, but George Bonanno has demonstrated a small number of trajectories, using prospective data to examine adaptation after a death(4,5). One insight from this work, which disrupted the field of bereavement research, was that the vast majority of individuals are very resilient (approximately 60%). By six months, the resilient group shows no elevation in depressive symptoms or functional impairment. This does not mean that resilient people do not experience the intense short-term pangs of grief, but these emotional waves do not cause functional impairment. The realization that previous theories of grief were largely based on a treatment-seeking population forced the field to reconsider some of its assumptions. Consequently, a very influential model of grief, the dual process model of coping, was adopted to reflect the oscillation that occurs in typical grief(6). In day-to-day life during bereavement, healthy people oscillate between focusing on loss-related stressors (e.g., the pain of living without the person) and restoration-related stressors (e.g., engaging in new roles and identities due to the loss), and at other times are simply engaged in everyday life experience.

Importantly, Bonanno’s research demonstrated that the functioning of a person prior to the death event is also an important aspect of their trajectory of adaptation. ...

There are other examples, but I hope this sampling suffices for now.

Is the balance in existence really so skewed towards suffering as Schopenhauer claims? Are the good things in life really as fleeting and inconsequential as he presents them? Could S. be importing his own personal bias and presenting it as objective truth?

Even if there is a bias, could there still be value to Schopenhauer's pessimism, for example a pedagogical one? Could his work be an exercise in philosophical education? What kind of education would this be?

Schopenhauer claims that the capacity for reflective thought amplifies our suffering as compared with the other animals. He also says that suffering originates in the passage of time. Is there some important connection between time and thinking here that links them both to the reality of suffering? — aldreams

So I am a thorough-going Schopenhaurian here. Probably the only one who identifies so on this forum. So let me give you the minority perspective here...

Schopenhauer saw boredom as a proof of life's vanity. That is to say, boredom would not be a thing; life itself would be its own satisfaction. Dissatisfaction, restlessness, and even the need for goals seem to show the lack of satisfaction we have in the moment, just being. This is why he idealized the ascetic who is working towards existing, but without needing more than that.

Nietzsche's amor fati and eternal return would be hideous to Schopenhauer. Nietzsche is popular because it goes along with the cultural need to keep reproducing itself. In order to have a population accept the slings and sufferings of life, it needs an ethos that essentially says, "Suck it up and keep moving!!!".. A more modern version of it is "Work hard, play hard!!!". Things like this. Culture needs people to take on these memes to keep going despite ennui, anguish, and suffering. I'm not sure, but when I say "culture" here, I don't mean a disembodied entity, but the habits of thought, ingrained (institutional) that get passed down by individuals and broadcast out to many other people (society). Schopenhauer would say that we should see suffering for what it is and not constantly try to overlook it. His solution is seeing everyone as fellow-sufferers and live up to an ascetic ideal. Deny the will which is keeping us thinking there is someone to be, something to do, somewhere to be. It is the complete opposite of almost all cultural needs to keep people needing "memes" of justification for moving forward despite negatives. This is why much of Schopenhauer is reviled and folks like Nietzsche (and to a lesser extent nowadays, Hegel) is praised.

This is why much of Schopenhauer is reviled and folks like Nietzsche (and to a lesser extent nowadays, Hegel) is praised — schopenhauer1

I've no idea who has "reviled" Schop and who, other than mendacious nazis and academic p0m0s, has "praised" Freddy. They're both mostly misunderstood and complementary philosophical projects to one another: metaphysical pessimism (succumbed to by passive nihilism) and cultural pessimism (opposed by active nihilism), respectively – piano concertos, after all, are played best with both hands. Thus, each alone is fiercely one-sided and polemical as @Caldwell points out. I'm grateful to have outgrown their 'quasi-Wagnerian dialectic' years ago and also for their endlessly inspiring, often blackly hilarious, gorgeous writings.

Btw, the less said about Hegel the better (pace Žižek).

metaphysical pessimism (succumbed to by passive nihilism) and cultural pessimism — 180 Proof

It's that right there that I don't agree with. But I generally see more sympathy for Nietzschean "pessimism" (more optimism to me with eternal return) and not much sympathy for Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism.

I'm grateful to have outgrown their 'quasi-Wagnerian dialectic' years ago and also for their endlessly inspiring, often blackly hilarious, gorgeous writings. — 180 Proof

Wagner is (was) a dbag. I believe Schopenhauer didn't like him.. Good judge in that.

Schop proposed ascetic living to cope with the ravages of "the will to live", which amounts to passivity (in N's sense) in the form of, in effect, withdrawal from most of social activities. And by all accounts, before the end, he was immensely pleased that the Maestro was a great admirer of his philosophy (though Schop wasn't much of a fan of the "dbag's" operas).

Schop proposed ascetic living to cope with the ravages of "the will to live", which amounts to passivity (in N's sense) in the form of, in effect, withdrawal from most of social activities. — 180 Proof

Yes, where did I disagree with this based on my last posts?

And by all accounts, before the end, he was immensely pleased that the Maestro was a great admirer of his philosophy (though Schop wasn't much of fan of the "dbag's" operas). — 180 Proof

That's right. He didn't mind the admiration, but still wasn't a fan of his work. Good enough.

Maybe I misunderstood you when you claimed to disagree with what you quoted of me. Clarify, please.

Maybe I misunderstood you when you claimed to disagree with what you quoted of me. Clarify, please. — 180 Proof

That Nietzsche's active nihilism supersedes Schop's metaphysical pessimism or that they are commensurate.

Edit: Meant the opposite.. you seem to be saying Nietzsche overtakes Schop's pessimism. This I disagree with if that's what you are saying.

Well said :up:

You raise good points. Here's my "but": I think some people are predisposed to feel and reflect more than others in the sense that they may feel more intensely or can't stop reflecting. If this is associated with negative events or occurrences, such a person could be in the middle of an oncoming tornado and these tendencies would not go away. Or if they do, it's only for a very short duration.

It's a problem. But, you make a good point.

Or if they do, it's only for a very short duration. — Manuel

:up: There's that Darwin thing. If you lock up in the face of an oncoming tornado, you might get removed from the gene pool. On the other hand, all of us running interference for those who might otherwise get weeded out, will actually add diversity to the pool, and when that one disease comes along, those just might be the genes that save us. Who'd a thunk it? Those traditionally viewed as the weakest might inherit the Earth. Lucky bastids!

Hah. Yeah, that's one way to look at it, and something like that is probably true. I'd be nice for different people to inherent the Earth for a change. Maybe the planet wouldn't be on fire.

Then again, maybe not. :)

How is any of this an "anti-dote for suffering"??

How is any of this an "anti-dote for suffering"?? — baker

I don't know how to answer your question.

I think the 'get over it' attitude towards Schopenhauer thoroughly misunderstands his philosophy. And I think it also misunderstands what Schopenhauer means by 'pessimism'.

Pessimism for Schopenhauer is realisation of the futility of physical existence. But at the same time he sees beyond the merely physical:

To our amazement we suddenly exist, after having for countless millennia not existed; in a short while we will again not exist, also for countless millennia. That cannot be right, says the heart: and even upon the crudest intelligence there must, when it considers such an idea, dawn a presentiment of the ideality of time. This however, together with that of space, is the key to all true metaphysics, because it makes room for a quite different order of things than that of nature. That is why Kant is so great.

From the first second of the two texts. So his is basically a philosophy of redemption, of the 'going beyond' of Buddhism and Hinduism, which likewise start from the observation that everything we know and love in our natural lives is transient and bound to decay. As is well known, Schopenhauer was one of the very first philosophers in the European tradition to engage with Hindu and Buddhist texts. He also saw them as pessimistic philosophies, but I don't think he means by 'pessimism' what we take it to mean in day to day language. He regards the Indian religions as properly 'pessimistic', as distinct from the foolishly optimistic religion of Christianity which seeks not to ameliorate but to rationalise the fact of suffering in theological abstractions in service of the Christian dogma that 'God made the world, and it was good.'

It's said that Schopenhauer was an atheist, but his atheism is different to what is generally understod by it today, because he was not materialist. 'Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system." However he also sharply delineates philosophy and religion: religion is for those who don't seek to know, to understand the causes of suffering, but can take solace in the allegories and myths of religion -'no one who is religious attains to philosophy; he does not need it. No one who really philosophises is religious; he walks without leading-strings, perilously but free'.

between November 1815 and May 1816, as [Schopenhauer] worked his way through the first ten volumes of Asiatick Researches, he came to understand the Indian concept of Maya and “Kant’s ‘phenomenon’ as one and the same thing: this world in which we are living, we ourselves insofar as we belong to it” (HN1 #564 trans. App 2014, 241). One for whom “the veil of Maya has dropped from the eyes … recognizes himself in every being” (HN1 #626 trans. App 2014, 242). This is the state he takes to be denoted by the term Nirvāṇa, whereby one is driven to extreme compassion and empathy out of the realization that “the sufferer and the one who causes suffering are one” (HN1 #626 trans. App 2014, 243). The truth he sees conveyed allegorically is that we are painfully deceived by the apparent nature of phenomena, and overcoming this deception is concurrent with increased degrees of compassion, “the immediate participation, independent of all ulterior considerations, primarily in the suffering of another, and thus in the prevention or elimination of it” (On the Basis of Morality §16, original emphasis).

(Fom'Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion and his Critique of German Idealism' Nicholas R. Linhares.

which amounts to passivity (in N's sense) in the form of, in effect, withdrawal from most of social activities. — 180 Proof

Nietzsche also, by most accounts, withdrew from social activities. Both were elitists enamored with what they saw as their own superiority.

Contra Wayfarer I don't see Schopenhauer's as a philosophy of redemption in any sense that the former would agree with; if existence for him is futile, as Wayfarer asserts, then the only redemption in line with Wayfarer's thinking would be an afterlife, which as far as my reading of his work goes, he never speaks of. If there is redemption in Schopenhauer (and maybe the same goes for Nietzsche) it would be found in the arts, which is a disposition generally incompatible with otherworldly eastern philosophies.

I agree with you they were both superlative writers.

N's prescription for nihilism was not ascetic withdrawal as in Schop's case. N was constantly ill (aggravated by unstable weather & direct sunlight) throughout the decades of his working life so any withdrawal on his part was mostly due to fragile health. By all accounts, on the other hand, Schop's health was robust until the end of his quite leisurely life. N. suffered ill-health (& penury) yet proposed affirming life despite suffering whereas Schop lived comfortably and in good health but proposed denying outlets for the will as much as possible by an asceticism he did not practice. Almost mirror-images.

someone who is oppressed by the burdens of life, who certainly desires life and affirms it, but detests its sufferings and in particular does not want to put up with the difficult lot that has fallen to him any longer: a person like this cannot hope for liberation in death, and cannot save himself through suicide; the temptation of cool, dark Orcus as a haven of peace is just a false illusion. The earth turns from day into night; the individual dies: but the sun itself burns its eternal noontime without pause. For the will to life, life is a certainty: the form of life is the endless present; it does not matter how individuals, appearances of the Idea, come into existence in time and pass away like fleeting dreams. — Schopenhauer, §54 of WWR, Vol I

"So you should view this fleeting world --
A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream,
A flash of lightening in a summer cloud,
A flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream. — Lotus Sutra

Good point about the contrasting statuses of health and attitude between the two! From that perspective they can indeed be seen as mirror opposites.

For the will to life, life is a certainty: the form of life is the endless present; it does not matter how individuals, appearances of the Idea, come into existence in time and pass away like fleeting dreams. — Schopenhauer, §54 of WWR, Vol I

If life is seen as empty and meaningless, then of course it doesn't matter from the "point of view" of life, but it does obviously matter to the individual who sees it that way, and that mattering, unless an afterlife for that individual is posited, will cease when the individual dies, whether by their own hand or any other cause.

As I said, in nothing I have read by or about Schopenhauer have I ever encountered evidence that he believed in any afterlife.

nothing I have read by or about Schopenhauer have I ever encountered evidence that he believed in any afterlife. — Janus

That word only appears on this page in your posts on it.

I have searched for the term in my electronic copy of WWR, and it doesn't seem to appear.

I used the word 'redemption' as an indication that Schopenhauer, despite his pessimism, did not say that there is no end to suffering, or, in positive terms, said that suffering was surmountable, albeit at the cost of complete detachment from Will. According to the SEP entry:

Schopenhauer believes that a person who experiences the truth of human nature from a moral perspective — who appreciates how spatial and temporal forms of knowledge generate a constant passing away, continual suffering, vain striving and inner tension — will be so repulsed by the human condition, and by the pointlessly striving Will of which it is a manifestation, that he or she will lose the desire to affirm the objectified human situation in any of its manifestations. [Note: this attitude is called 'nibbida' in Pali Buddhism]. The result is an attitude of denial towards our will-to-live, that Schopenhauer identifies with an ascetic attitude of renunciation, resignation, and willessness, but also with composure and tranquillity. In a manner reminiscent of traditional Buddhism, he recognizes that life is filled with unavoidable frustration, and acknowledges that the suffering caused by this frustration can itself be reduced by minimizing one’s desires. Moral consciousness and virtue thus give way to the voluntary poverty and chastity of the ascetic. St. Francis of Assisi (WWR, Section 68) and Jesus (WWR, Section 70) subsequently emerge as Schopenhauer’s prototypes for the most enlightened lifestyle, in conjunction with the ascetics from every religious tradition. ....

...the ascetic’s struggle is none other than a supreme struggle against human nature. It is a struggle against the close-to-unavoidable tendency to apply the principle of sufficient reason for the purpose of attaining practical knowledge — an application that, for Schopenhauer, has the repulsive side-effect of creating the illusion, or nightmare, of a world permeated with endless conflict. From a related angle, the ascetic’s struggle is against the forces of violence and evil, that, owing to Schopenhauer’s acceptance and interpretation of Kant’s epistemology, locates these forces significantly within human nature itself. When the ascetic transcends human nature, the ascetic resolves the problem of evil: by removing the individuated and individuating human consciousness from the scene, the entire spatio-temporal situation within which daily violence occurs is removed.

In a way, then, the ascetic consciousness can be said symbolically to return Adam and Eve to Paradise, for it is the very quest for knowledge (i.e., the will to apply the principle of individuation to experience) that the ascetic overcomes. 1

This article says that 'This emphasis upon the ascetic consciousness and its associated detachment and tranquillity introduces some paradox into Schopenhauer’s outlook' - but not for the reason I perceive. I think it's paradoxical because, on the one hand, Schopenhauer is often portrayed as an unsparing critic of religion, but on the other hand, he recognises the ideal of asceticism and in places shows high regard for those exemplars of Christianity (although the Linhares article I mentioned above says that S. had a higher regard for Gnostic than orthodox Christianity, and that he evaluated religions generally in terms of their effectiveness in communicating what for him are the basic realities of existence. That article can be found here.)

In any case, the upshot is that whilst Schopenhauer certainly was a philosophical pessimist, I think he still holds to some version of Kantian idealism, albeit with the many caveats for which he is well-known. Whether this amounts to a 'belief in the afterlife', and indeed whether the Buddhist Nirvāṇa can be conceived in those terms is, I think, a moot point.

Whether this amounts to a 'belief in the afterlife', and indeed whether the Buddhist Nirvāṇa can be conceived in those terms is, I think, a moot point. — Wayfarer

For the individual the prospect of Nirvana must be either some kind of afterlife of bliss or complete extinction, no? If consciousness survives the body, either in reborn form or unborn form, we would call it an after(this)life, wouldn't we. Is there another possibility?

For the individual the prospect of Nirvana must be either some kind of afterlife of bliss or complete extinction, no? — Janus

It's neither:

"But, Master Gotama, the monk whose mind is thus released: Where does he reappear?"

"'Reappear,' Vaccha, doesn't apply."

"In that case, Master Gotama, he does not reappear."

"'Does not reappear,' Vaccha, doesn't apply."

Needless to say it is a deep question; the remainder is given in this text. This is a famous example of the 'middle-way' reasoning, where the answer to a question is neither yes nor no. Possibly because the question is asked, and the answer posed, from different 'frames of reference', to borrow an analogy from modern science. (Incidentally, the perceptive reader will notice a similarity in both spirit and substance between the questions posed in this text, and Kant's 'antinomies of reason'.)

I think on the level of folk religion, Nirvāṇa is equated with 'eternal life in the hereafter' - but I think if the texts are examined, it isn't really that.

You seem to be speaking from the perspective of eternity, or something like that. I was speaking from the perspective of the individual, which is all we really know. Eternal perspectives are inevitably speculative, or even if it were allowed that they might be absolute knowledge for the enlightened (assuming that there are such), nonetheless for the rest of us eternal perspectives cannot be anything but speculative.

In any case I take those kinds of paradoxical exchanges to be aimed at directing the acolyte away from the habit of discursive reasoning, in a way similar to koans. Here we are inevitably doing discursive reasoning, since that is what philosophy has always been about.