In my own terms, following on what you wrote and contra Wayfarer's anti-modern polemical definition: naturalism, since antiquity, denotes describing or explaining some aspect of nature only in terms of (an)other aspect(s) of nature. — 180 Proof

And what the ancients saw, was that man is different to other things 'in nature' because man alone can ask the question as to what it means, what it is, and so on. That opened the door to the insight into the ground or first cause in order to ameliorate ('salve') the existential angst that accompanies the unique predicament of being an animal that can contemplate its own demise. So modern naturalism is an attempt to flee that (often subliminal) awareness which is preserved in the various spiritual and philosophical traditions which are designated by yourself as 'woo'. :wink: But at least I hope after 10 years (or more) of head-banging on this idea, we can now at least agree to disagree.

naturalism, since antiquity, denotes describing or explaining some aspect of nature only in terms of (an)other aspect(s) of nature. — 180 Proof

Sometimes you get a whole aspect of the world in the compass of a nutshell, a piece of wisdom small enough to pocket and carry always, or perhaps engraved on a harpoon or a penny and hung 'round the neck on a leather cord. And credit to the man who got it there. TPF at its best.

*

@tim wood

A question I have asked before: a stick of dynamite explodes: what caused it to explode?
— tim wood

That it was lit. That the chemical compounds which comprise dynamite explode when lit. — Wayfarer

It is reasonable also to say that the need to remove an obstacle to make way for a road was a cause. An answer to the question why was called a cause.

Maybe I'm not understanding the language, or context is omitted, but pretty clearly for the Greeks what ought to be was manifestly not in nature. — tim wood

For the Greeks nature had a telos or end or purpose. This was based on the observed order of the universe. It was not random but ordered and purposeful. The ability of the intelligence of man to understand the intelligible order led to the idea that the order itself was intelligent. Intelligence works toward some end or purpose, and so, nature must have some end or purpose. I am not defending that idea, just trying to explain it.

And what the ancients saw, was that man is different to other things 'in nature' because man alone can ask the question as to what it means, what it is, and so on. — Wayfarer

And, as with very much else about nature, many ancients who believed that man was "different" had no idea what they were talking about – what some of them "saw" was just mistaken and self-flattering (i.e. inconsistently they assumed some "appearances" were true or real while for (religious reasons) denied others) – and those like e.g. Laozi and Epicurus "saw" humans, more or less, as wholly natural beings.

We can agree to disagree, Wayf, we've done it before, but I see no reason we can't continue to criticize and object to each others' errors where we see fit to do so respectively even without directly addressing one another. The 'naturalism / supernaturalism (i.e. materialist / idealist) dialectic' goes on with & without us, no?

:fire:

[deleted]

what the object of that quest was - the attainment of certain knowledge of the real. — Wayfarer

I think this project is haunted by an inescapable ambiguity, as argued for by an army of philosophers who I think have made a strong case. Is this a not 'a closer walk with God'?' I like applying thy incarnation myth/metaphor to the march of humanist thought. 'Atheistic' humanism incorporates the incarnation myth, lives it. We're already 'God,' as much as I think we can have, as much as I think we need, down here, tho (felix culpa) not in a finished state, not dead.

I can't help but take the bait sometimes. Mainly because I'm incredulous that they are taken seriously. — Wayfarer

:up:

I just get bored. Sometimes I get mad, but there's more to the world than brain-talk.

Because, as I tried to show, the original conception of 'reason' was far more encompassing than it's modern use as 'an instrument'. It encompassed 'reason' in the grand sweep of things, 'the reason things exist', anchored against a metaphysic which saw reason as something that animated the Universe. — Wayfarer

Sounds something like the idea of "the great chain of Being." Such a view may make reason stronger than in it really is, in the sense that we, as human beings, are probably the only creature that use reasons to make sense of the world. I think we use it intermittently.

Then there's something to be said about intuition too when it comes to epistemology. But that's quite hard to speak about sensibly. But we use it all the time.

many ancients who believed that man was "different" had no idea what they were talking about — 180 Proof

We can agree to disagree, Wayf, we've done it before, but I see no reason we both cannot continue to criticize and object to each others' errors where we see fit to do so — 180 Proof

Sure. But an assertion is not reasoned argument. Neither are claims that the ancients must have it wrong on account of their being ancient. There is a very obvious empirical difference between humans and other animals, which was no less clear in ancient Athens than it is in the modern world: humans are born into a state of self-awareness. They 'bear the burden of selfhood.' They are the 'rational animal' and rationality is a difference that makes a difference. Think of the origin of the Greek philosophical tradition - the breakthrough into being able to discern 'the reason for things', the universal order. It must have been intoxicating. With it comes the hope for something beyond this perishable frame. It's not hard to envisage for those who see an order 'written in the stars'.

Socrates was sentenced to death for atheism. But Socrates was not atheist as we know it, he says in Phaedo he is assured of the immortality of the soul. Was he right? I can't say that I know. I'm one of the characters in the dialogues standing on the sidelines with doubts and questions, but I'm not going to dismiss it.

The ability of the intelligence of man to understand the intelligible order led to the idea that the order itself was intelligent. Intelligence works toward some end or purpose, and so, nature must have some end or purpose. I am not defending that idea, just trying to explain it. — Fooloso4

:up:

what the object of that quest was - the attainment of certain knowledge of the real.
— Wayfarer

I think this project is haunted by an inescapable ambiguity, as argued for by an army of philosophers who I think have made a strong case. — j0e

Yes, but look at the OP. It is concerned with fundamental epistemology, what it means 'to know'. It's a heavy topic! The OP is admirably modest in acknowledging that it only ventures an 'unsatisfactory and partial' answer. Well and good and all credit where due. But, I'm saying, with respect to the subject of the thread, the origin was with Greek philosophy, and specifically the Parmenides, and that those were the terms in which the question of 'the nature of knowledge' was framed - the quest for sure knowledge of the real; the Greek equivalent of the Sanskrit 'Vidya', which carries existential implications that mere 'knowledge' does not.

Parmenides and Plato set the bar very high for what constitutes knowledge. In the Theatetus, many of the proferred answers to the question of knowledge - justified true belief, and so on - end in aporia, un-answered questions, puzzlement and hesitation. Have those problems been solved since? Is it the case that 2,500 intervening years have yielded great progress in addressing those doubts? Very difficult questions, and I'm not going to rush in with an answer. But I think the idea that 'modern science' has, or even can, address, let alone 'solve', those questions, is misplaced. Which is no slight on science. Consider what is involved - they are not questions for science. They are questions we have to grapple with 'alone with the alone'.

(I got that expensive textbook I mentioned - Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin, philosophical commentary on quantum physics. So far, so good - he is wishing to situate the Bohr Einstein debate against the background of Western philosophy with specific reference to Alfred North Whitehead and the Platonist tradition. Not far into it yet but am going to give it a lot of attention. Highly congenial and definitely a legitimate author, not a quantum charlatan.)

Sounds something like the idea of "the great chain of Being." — Manuel

I think the loss of that idea was the loss of something significant. Put it another way: there are degrees of reality, such that what is more real, is also more worthy of being known. It jars with modern philosophy. That's because the idea of 'degrees of reality' was lost from medieval times. It is still retained in 17th C philosophy:

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.

Here you can trace the idea of 'the unconditioned', where 'the unconditioned' is 'the source of being' (the To Hen of Plotinus) which emanates or cascades 'downward' to the phenomenal realm; what is 'nearer to it' is more real; hence 'intellect' is more real than the corporeal. That intuition is what has been jettisoned in the transition to modernity, where the idea of 'degrees of being' has been abandoned.

Put it another way: there are degrees of reality, such that what is more real, is also more worthy of being known. It jars with modern philosophy. That's because the idea of 'degrees of reality' was lost from medieval times. — Wayfarer

Yes. I read a metaphysical project by one philosopher recently who speaks in similar terms. But she speaks about it in relation to fiction, not among different objects or things in the world. It makes sense to speak of having more or less reasons for believing in something and it would appear that having less assumptions when considering something might be an indication of its impact to you.

In this sense, It makes more sense to me think of different aspects of reality as opposed to saying something is more real than some other thing.

Having said this, I would agree that consciousness is the thing with which we are most acquainted with and thus must be the most "concretely" realized aspect of nature. Beyond that, it's less clear to me to speak about some thing being "more real" than another, with the exception of the mentioned example of fiction.

But I think the idea that 'modern science' has, or even can, address, let alone 'solve', those questions, is misplaced. Which is no slight on science. Consider what is involved - they are not questions for science. They are questions we have to grapple with 'alone with the alone'. — Wayfarer

I think (roughly) that only scientism thinks science can replace philosophy, and that philosophy has made genuine progress, at the cost perhaps of mystical charge in Parmenides' fragments.

I do see a problem in alone with the alone. Language is fundamentally social. 'Knowledge' has something like a continuum of appropriate uses which are generally out of the control of any individual. Subcultures can of course extend or change usage so that 'knowledge' is something like a metaphor for an ineffable 'insight.' But even here the word has a use. Members can discuss what 'knowledge' is/means and how to figure out who has it. As I see it, the truly alone person is beyond language, beyond argument, beyond epistemology --and not really a person anymore but either a superhuman or an animal (beast or god.)

the Greek equivalent of the Sanskrit 'Vidya', which carries existential implications that mere 'knowledge' does not. — Wayfarer

You may underestimate how well that is understood. For some the problem is the obvious religious 'charge' here, not because religion is universally dis-valued but rather because of the perceived likelihood of bias. One might even imagine rationality as a negotiation between clashing spiritualities. On my view, the generation of myths for coping is spontaneous. I do not use 'myths' pejoratively here. They are to philosophy what models are to science (they are fundamental metaphors that control, often tacitly, the approach to less fundamental myths/metaphors.) For instance, we had/have the myth of the given (Sellars). We had/have the myth/metaphor of cognition as a mirror of nature, or as a lens through which 'raw' reality passes before it gets to us. Let's not forget that story about the ghost in the machine either.

The issue is their 'reasonable' collision and whether or not a consensus is even sought.

It makes more sense to me think of different aspects of reality as opposed to saying something is more real than some other thing. — Manuel

:up:

I think (roughly) that only scientism thinks science can replace philosophy, and that philosophy has made genuine progress, at the cost perhaps of mystical charge in Parmenides' fragments. — j0e

Well, yeah. I used to talk to a Buddhist who thought the 'four elements' physics was the real deal, 'ancient knowledge'. That's not me. I believe in science, progress, liberal democracy, and the rest. I'm vaccinated against COVID and thankful for it. But a miserable modern citizen's woes are not that different from a miserable ancient Greek citizen's woes, in some fundamental way, even if the circumstances are unarguably vastly different. As for the Alone with the Alone, that was a reference to Plotinus - a shorthand way of trying to communicate the idea that regardless of your circumstances, be at peace with the world. And that is elusive. As for 'knowledge' - what I meant was that the OP is concerned with justification and validation. Plainly, again, we have considerably greater knowledge than the ancients did. But the OP makes this a charge against them - that with their philosophy 'no science is possible'. So we have to sacrifice their wisdom for our progress, so to speak. I'm taking issue with that. We know a lot of things, and many of them very reliable - how to vaccinate against covid, being one, which is an amazing feat - but the connotation of 'vidya', truly seeing, knowing the real, is not encompassed by that.

a shorthand way of trying to communicate the idea that regardless of your circumstances, be at peace with the world. And that is elusive. — Wayfarer

While I suspect that tranquility can never be completely independent of circumstances (food poisoning, torture, and so on), I very much respect it as an ideal to strive toward. For those in good health and not in immediate danger, it's perhaps envy, resentment, and dread that especially threaten such tranquility. I remember some great passages in Plotinus, so I dig some up here.

The soul that beholds beauty becomes beautiful.

We are not separated from spirit, we are in it.

God is not external to anyone, but is present with all things, though they are ignorant that He is so.

Life is the flight of the alone to the alone. — Plotinus

I can (creatively mis-)read this in terms of the incarnation theme I mentioned earlier. If 'God' is a still-developing being who articulates himself thru and only thru and in mortals, then 'His' medium or mother is materiality, our flesh, of course, but especially the breath of the sign, as opposed to the 'ideality' of its form, not substance. For this enformed breath is the medium of our (God's) self- knowledge and self-enlargement. The flight from the Alone to the Alone is (in this reading) the journey from 'God' back to 'God,' from implicit membership in a divinized, liberated human community to explicit membership. This journey would occur historically (for the culture/species as a whole) and individually (as a person lets go the attachments/alienations that obscure this participation.) This is how I read the denial of our separation. 'Alone' works for 'God' because it's only the whole of reality that's not dependent: 'the finite has no genuine being.' You can probably smell the Hegel in this. I actually found a quote that I put in the Saussure thread. Plotinus discusses meaningful sound, the (ideal) form (not substance) that makes air significant. I think we are both interested in 'form' and the realm of the intelligible or significant. For me we already 'swim' in it, 'are' it, and simply make it more explicit through linguistics, philosophy, music (thinking vocals especially), and so on. We strive so that we can see beauty and so be beautiful (noble, tranquil), beyond resentment-envy-dread --as often and as intensely as we can manage such a delicate operation.

:pray:

Sure. But an assertion is not reasoned argument. — Wayfarer

We agree again. So stop making them.

Neither are claims that the ancients must have it wrong on account of their being ancient.

I never asserted or implied "the ancients must have it wrong on account of their being ancient". Please stop asserting your strawmen, Wayf.

There is a very obvious empirical difference between humans and other animals, which was no less clear in ancient Athens than it is in the modern world: humans are born into a state of self-awareness. They 'bear the burden of selfhood.' They are the 'rational animal' and rationality is a difference that makes a difference.

Those are anthropocentric evaluations, no doubt, self-serving and biased in our favor and against – separating us in part or wholly from – the rest of the natural order. Cultural anthropology has documented this cognitive phenomenon for centuries 'recorded' in many indigenous trditions and literate cultures outside of – far older than 5-6 century BCE Grrece – in most places around the globe. The Greeks were not unique in this blinkered speciest view.

Think of the origin of the Greek philosophical tradition - the breakthrough into being able to discern 'the reason for things', the universal order. It must have been intoxicating. With it comes the hope for something beyond this perishable frame. It's not hard to envisage for those who see an order 'written in the stars'.

Rationalized religion had replaced mythopoetic religion. I'm sure throwing-up in their own mouths all of the perennial Mysteries they knew was so "intoxicating" that they had to scribble it all down ... even though most of their learned scrolls were assessed to be more valuable to posterity as fuel to start cooking fires than as revelatory scripts.

Socrates was sentenced to death for atheism. But Socrates was not atheist as we know it, he says in Phaedo he is assured of the immortality of the soul. Was he right? I can't say that I know. I'm one of the characters in the dialogues standing on the sidelines with doubts and questions, but I'm not going to dismiss it.

And neither will I. (Remember, Wayf, I'm also an Epicurean ... and, as a Spinozist, I'm quite grateful for all I've been able to learn from Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus, Heraclitus, Democritus, Dionysus of Sinope, Seneca, Epictetus, Lucretius et al, so don't misread my critiques as 'Anti-Ancient Modernism').

I never asserted or implied "the ancients must have it wrong on account of their being ancient". — 180 Proof

Oh. I took that as the implication of:

And, as with very much else about nature, many ancients who believed that man was "different" had no idea what they were talking about — 180 Proof

Those are anthropocentric evaluations, no doubt, self-serving and biased in our favor and against – separating us in part or wholly from – the rest of the natural order. — 180 Proof

Humans speak, create civilisations, make tools. That is not 'anthropomorphism', it's a simple fact. Even your much-vaunted 'scientific objectivity' is grounded in the perspective that only a human mind can bring to the Universe, as has been made abundantly clear by quantum physics. Maybe we're not freakish consequences of a random process, but the means by which the Universe arrives at self-knowledge. Maybe that's among the intuitions the ancestors arrived at.

Special pleading in favor of mystifying (cryptic) intuitions, in effect, contra the mediocrity principle, natural selection, cognitive neuroscience, etc. Gotcha, Wayf. :ok: :sweat:

Humans speak, create civilisations, make tools. — Wayfarer

And no non-human animals do?

Perhaps this a clue to the rest of your thinking - is that how it works?

You can probably smell the Hegel in this. — j0e

Ah, the distinctive smell of Hegel! How can one ignore it?

I've probably come to late to this thread and may have nothing to add--I've only just smelled the Hegel--but would say, if I understand you correctly, that it also seems similar in some respects to ancient Stoicism (which has no smell), if by "breath" you mean something similar to the Stoic pneuma. But for them the deity was immanent, pneuma being a very fine kind of material, representing the generative and intelligent aspect of Nature. I've always found an immanent deity more acceptable than a transcendent one, but that may not be what you intend.

pneuma being a very fine kind of material, representing the generative and intelligent aspect of Nature. — Ciceronianus the White

Basically I was describing humanism in terms of the incarnation myth. Metaphorically we are 'God' in the process of getting himself born. Or, 'we' (an ideal we) are universal rationality making itself explicit to itself as such. I don't think of some otherworldly substance, & for me incarnation gestures toward the move from transcendence-as-alienation toward immanence-as-homecoming. I like the feel of the stoics. I think their close (humanist cosmopolitans?) .I am lately fired up about Saussure's emphasis that the social fact (Durkheim) of language (AKA geist) involves 'form not substance.' He sees thoughtstuff and soundstuff as two 'postulated' continua that are 'sliced up' simultaneously by systems of semantically interdependent signs. 'Transcendence' is the impossible idea of concept without soundbody. 'Immanence' is recognizing what was thought to be transcendent as a 'form' that cannot be isolated from its 'flesh' (the breath or the ink in which we signal.)

Basically I was describing humanism in terms of the incarnation myth. — j0e

I'll interject that near as I can tell seeking God always ends up with us. In terms of God, we're always the only being behind the curtain. Or Pogo (paraphrasing)), "We have met him and he is us!" So it's not incarnation so much as a matter of being and becoming.

And while primitive thinking may have understandably personified God, then forgetting they made Him, transferring the error to us, there seems little justification for any reasonable modern one of us to persist in the error. And it's no small error, But rather a mistake that permeates, as even this thread evinces, almost everything that most people do.

While the remainder believe we're fundamentally animals, and we ought not to concern ourselves with whatever can't be picked up, touched, smelled, etc. No possibility of error there.

You said Socrates wasn't an atheist because he believed in immortality. Yet you like Buddhism? Western religious people don't really understand was atheism means from what I can tell

While the remainder believe we're fundamentally animals, and we ought not to concern ourselves with whatever can't be picked up, touched, smelled, etc. No possibility of error there. — Wayfarer

I am not aware of anyone who thinks as this suggests - unless it's you. All evidence points to our being the only God we'll ever find or know, the good news being that we are always already underway in that progress. I might even aver that the greatest obstacle to achieving that goal is the people who insist on looking for God where he clearly is not. Supernaturalism - by any name - is simply tragedy writ large.

I have been perusing a rather good article on Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion, from which this nugget:

no one who is religious attains to philosophy; he does not need it. No one who really philosophises is religious; he walks without leading-strings, perilously but free.

I'm inclined to agree with that. Looking at my own case, I rejected religion (i.e. confirmation) but sought enlightenment (mainly through Eastern religions). But as life went on, that search also seemed to evoke religious kinds of sentiments. However, my judgement tells me, those are what Eastern teachings call samskara, ingrained habits of thought or conditioned reponses. Also that I subconsciously attach Christian tropes to Eastern symbols. I recognise that they are flaws on my part.

However, that said, I reject atheist philosophy (as a philosophy, not as a personal conviction. which is completely a matter for each individual). Schopenhauer is said to be atheist, but his atheism is modulated by the recognition that religion is necessary:

Religion is the metaphysics of the people, which by all means they must keep … Just as there is popular poetry, popular wisdom in proverbs, so too there must be popular metaphysics; for mankind requires most certainly an interpretation of life, and it must be in keeping with its power of comprehension.

And also by his belief that religions, generally - not just Christianity - represent philosophically profound truths in an allegorical way.

In accordance with his approach, it's possible that I too would be considered atheist by many believers. In any case, reading this paper on Schopenhauer has made me more aware of some defects in my own understanding, which I have to beware of.

I am not aware of anyone who thinks as this suggests - unless it's you. — tim wood

It was a comment on the above exchange:

There is a very obvious empirical difference between humans and other animals, which was no less clear in ancient Athens than it is in the modern world: humans are born into a state of self-awareness. They 'bear the burden of selfhood.'

Those are anthropocentric evaluations, no doubt, self-serving and biased in our favor and against – separating us in part or wholly from – the rest of the natural order. ....The Greeks were not unique in this blinkered speciest view. — 180 Proof

So, I'm 'speciest'. (I'd rather be spiciest, but I'll settle.)

Yet you like Buddhism? Western religious people don't really understand was atheism means from what I can tell — Gregory

Buddhism is not theistic in the Western sense, but it's not atheist in the modern sense. In the Buddha's day there were philosophers called carvaka who were strict materialists, just like today's. The Buddha rejects materialism because it implies that there is no continuity of karma, that at death, there are no consequences of actions in life. Anyway there's a thread on Buddhism, this conversation ought to move to there.

I'll interject that near as I can tell seeking God always ends up with us. In terms of God, we're always the only being behind the curtain. — tim wood

That's exactly how I see it, agreeing with Feuerbach that God is a projection of human virtues.

"We have met him and he is us!" So it's not incarnation so much as a matter of being and becoming. — tim wood

You mention becoming. Becoming what? What is the goal? Is it to become the being what we (implicitly) already are? I think talk about 'God' was talk about us all along. For context, I've been an atheist so long that I don't get the heebie geebies when handling the Christian tradition (not meant to suggest that you do.) An issue that interest me is the 'religious' charge of the concept of rationality itself, which functions as a sort of 'Holy Spirit' that is ideally universally accept as that which determines the real (whether and how it is real.) The philosopher is one for whom only the rational is real, and who would transform the real into that which is rational.

Taken as an intelligible (geistig) or an abstract being, that is, regarded neither as human nor as sensuous, but rather as one that is an object for and accessible only to reason or intelligence, God qua God is nothing but the essence of reason itself. But, basing themselves rather on imagination, ordinary theology and Theism regard him as an independent being existing separately from reason. Under these circumstances, it is an inner, a sacred necessity that the essence of reason as distinguished from reason itself be at last identified with it and the divine being thus be apprehended, realized, as the essence of reason. It is on this necessity that the great historical significance of speculative philosophy rests.The proof of the proposition that the divine essence is the essence of reason or intelligence lies in the fact that the determinations or qualities of God, in so far as they are rational or intelligible and not determinations of sensuousness or imagination, are, in fact, qualities of reason.

“God is the infinite being or the being without any limitations whatsoever.” But what cannot be a limit or boundary on God can also not be a limit or boundary on reason. If, for example, God is elevated above all limitations of sensuousness, so, too, is reason. He who cannot conceive of any entity except as sensuous, that is, he whose reason is limited by sensuousness, can only have a God who is limited by sensuousness. Reason, which conceives God as an infinite being, conceives, in point of fact, its own infinity in God. What is divine to reason is also truly rational to it, or in other words, it is a being that perfectly corresponds to and satisfies it. That, however, in which a being finds satisfaction, is nothing but the being in which it encounters itself as its own object.He who finds satisfaction in a philosopher is himself of a philosophical nature. That he is of this nature is precisely what he and others encounter in this satisfaction. — Feuerbach

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/future/future0.htm

And while primitive thinking may have understandably personified God, then forgetting they made Him, transferring the error to us, there seems little justification for any reasonable modern one of us to persist in the error. — tim wood

Personally I agree that primitive notions of God should be abandoned by 'reasonable' people. You also mention modern. This is the historical becoming element, which acknowledges the march of reason, or its descent from the non-human into contingency and flesh. It's a sin against the 'holy spirit' of rationality to be stuck at a previous phase of the incarnation (how I'd fit in w/ the above.)

It's a delicate operation tho to tease out exactly what this or that individual means by 'God.' For me it's one of the great words in English, to be handled with caution but not simply thrown away (else the return of the repressed, etc.) I'm for the continual reinterpretation of what often only seems to be the rearview, inasmuch as it seems relevant. (The future has primacy for us, and talk of the past is really talk about the future, just as talk about gods is really talk about us.)

My point was that how religious people think materialism must be like is kinda a myth. Materialists and religious people usually experience life the same. They just don't *like*how each other verbalize their "beliefs"

And also by his belief that religions, generally - not just Christianity - represent philosophically profound truths in an allegorical way. — Wayfarer

This is something he shares with his hated Hegel. As I read them, myths are a 'lower' intensity but still significant form of an insight that philosophers can and perhaps ought to enjoy in the nudity of the concept.

On the 'we're just animals' them, I think S takes an intermediate position. 'Yeah, we're animals, but we have concepts/language.'

The only essential distinction between the human race and animals, which from time immemorial has been attributed to a special cognitive faculty peculiar to mankind, called Reason, is based upon the fact that man owns a class of representations which is not shared by any animal. These are conceptions, therefore abstract, as opposed to intuitive, representations, from which they are nevertheless derived. — Schop

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50966/50966-h/50966-h.htm

Another paragraph from the Schopenhauer essay:

Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161).

Which is what I meant when I said:

what the ancients saw, was that man is different to other things 'in nature' because man alone can ask the question as to what it means, what it is, and so on. — Wayfarer

it continues:

Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.

Materialists and religious people usually experience life the same. — Gregory

I sincerely doubt that. Consider Durkheim's concept of 'anomie', that individuals suffer from a loss of the sense of their place in the world or meaning in the Cosmos. Weber's 'disenchanted universe'. the sense of alienation that results from it. It's obviously a hard question to empirically examine, but the sense of being part of the order of nature, surely must provide a greater sense of security than the belief that life is a fluke and humans are accidents. But, I don't want to use 'materialists' as a pejorative regarding people - it's a tendency in culture, not a personal fault.

Something he shares with his hated Hegel. — j0e

Yes, but he criticizes Hegel and Schelling for accepting the 'optimistic' view of Christianity while pretending to be philosophers. He says Schelling ripped off Jacob Boehme without acknowledgement and without really understanding Boehme's mystical realisations. This essay says he anticipates Heidegger's criticisms of 'ontotheology'. (The essay also says that he says Kant's 'phenomena' and Advaita Hinduism's 'maya' mean exactly the same.)

(Gotta bail, have a hotel booked with dear one, promissed her I'd lay off talking to my invisible friends for the duration, back in a couple of days.)