De Broglie surely would have taken issue with this point of view. In fact he did. As did Bohm and a plethora of others. What is philosophy without an examination of all available knowledge and points of view?

... and we need to go back to the start.

I am going to offer an argument against Cartesian dualism. The argument goes as follows:

(1) If dualism is true, then mind is not spatio-temporal, and body is spatio-temporal.
(2) If mind is not spatio-temporal, and body is spatio-temporal, then mind and body cannot interact.
(3) Mind and body can interact.
Therefore, (4) dualism is not true.

This argument is modus tollens. — quine

Dualism is the doctrine that there are two sorts of things: mental and physical. Neither can be reduced to the other.

Further, it's not like "I have a left hand and a right hand, they are distinct yet they interact". The mental and physical are completely distinct, while hands have much in common.

Consequently if we were to show that the mental and physical do have something in common - Quantum Weirdness or whatever - what you have shown is that dualism is wrong, that there is only really one thing, Quantum Weirdness.

That is, any post here that has argued that there is some compatibility between the mental and the physical has inadvertently argued against dualism.

The underlying problem with many discussion of 'substance dualism' is in the interpretation of what early modern philosophers (Liebniz, Spinoza, Descartes) meant by 'substance'. I think there is a discussion of this in Husserl's 'Crisis of the European Sciences' where he says Descartes correctly identified the pivotal importance of the ego (caution: not in the Freudian sense) but then misconstrued it in a naturalistic fashion as an objective 'substance' in the modern sense (see here) which has lead to no end of confusion in the centuries since.

There's a good IETP article on 17th Century Theories of Substance, which shows that the idea of 'substance' is not any kind of 'stuff or thing', but in terms of 'the subject of any predicate' - modes inhere in substances - 'a door is the subject in which the mode of rectangularity inheres'. Furthermore a substance is real in proportion to its proximity to the First Cause, i.e. the divine intellect or author of creation. From that it follows that there are degrees of reality:

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.

The discussion in this thread about 'what mind can do', attempts to depict 'mind' in the naturalistic fashion as 'a force' that interacts in the same way that other physical things do. And that's because the cultural background against which the discussion is being had, has changed so completely since Descartes' time. I think a great deal of what (for instance) Gilbert Ryle wrote about Descartes, doesn't really come to terms with that. It is because of the loss of the 'vertical dimension' or the hierarchical nature of reality, which is preserved in Descartes but which has since been lost. So the discussion of 'mind' is like a discussion of a three-dimensional object, in terms of two dimensions.

A different view of dualism that overcomes the historical difficulties of dualism. It requires a totally different v way of looking at Matter and Memory:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bergson/

"Since its publication in 1896, Matter and Memory has attracted considerable attention (see, for example, Deleuze 1956). In the Preface that he wrote in 1910, Bergson says that Matter and Memory “is frankly dualistic,” since it “affirms both the reality of matter and the reality of spirit” (Matter and Memory, p. 9). However, he is quick to warn us that the aim of the book is really “to overcome the theoretical difficulties which have always beset dualism” (ibid.). In the history of philosophy, these theoretical difficulties have generally arisen from a view of external perception, which always seems to result in an opposition between representation and matter. Thus, Bergson's theory of “pure perception,” laid out in the first chapter of Matter and Memory aims to show that — beyond both realism and idealism — our knowledge of things, in its pure state, takes place within the things it represents."

The last sentence is critical to the new understanding.

Tell me TGW, can you conceive of two objects occupying the same position in space at one and the same time? No. — Agustino

Yes.

No, things which have a different nature cannot interact. — Agustino

Well, that's obviously false. Feet and stones have different natures, yet a foot can kick a stone.

Further, it's not like "I have a left hand and a right hand, they are distinct yet they interact". The mental and physical are completely distinct, while hands have much in common. — Banno

Not at all - for example, the mental and physical are both temporal. Descartes says the mind and body are far more closely intertwined than ship and captain.

Descartes says the mind and body are far more closely intertwined than ship and captain. — The Great Whatever

Descartes had a vested interest in downplaying the distinction.

That's not the impression I got from reading Descartes: he emphasizes how extension and thought are distinct essences. Yet distinct things can interact. I don't find that notion incomprehensible at all, but maybe my imagination is just good or something.

The problem is that they are distinct then what is the bridge?

Bergson's approach is to to have mind and matter share temporal time matter being residual. In this way he avoids introducing any need for a bridge.

Language itself is a physical manifestation of the intimate connections between mind and body. Language enables the externalization of thought by use of sound designs which enables others to understand what we are thinking. I think mind/body dualism is a formal distinction (perhaps a necessary one) only, not a substantive distinction. A discursive distinction made possible by language which enables us to treat the mind as if it were separate from the body, while substantively there is no such distinction, mind and body are one.

Are a foot and a rock distinct?

What is the bridge?

Isn't this a problem for physicalists?

The problem is that they are distinct then what is the bridge? — Rich

The bridge is "matter" itself. Physical objects exist as forms, we describe their properties. The human body is such a physical form. We assume that physical objects consist of matter, and the matter substantiates the form that an object has. But physicists have not yet determined "matter".

I would agree that physicalists have the same problem, in that somehow the insubstantial mind must emerge out of the substantial brain.

In terms of the current discussion, a foot and rock would both be considered substantial matter and not requiring a bridge at the overt physical level. Things get much trickier if one had to explain how insubstantial energy fields convert themselves spontaneously into physical matter. No doubt there is much to be disturbed about I'm the typical physicalist's metaphysical model.

As I understand it, the issue that traditional dualists (not Bergson) must grapple with is how does an insubstantial mind (or spirit) grasp the distinct and apart physical. Where does the physical aspect of the mind lie? How does it convert?

Traditional dualism would not say that the soul is insubstantial, because the assumption would be of a substance dualism. What the mind grasps is the form of the object, not the object itself which consists of matter and form. If the form must have matter to exist, then there must be a material element within the mind that grasps the form of the object. Many dualists though, would argue that a form could exist independently of matter, but matter cannot exist without a form.

Then I would say there is still a problem, if the mind at all was involved with the movement of the physical body. If it isn't, then what is providing the impulse. There is also the issue of how does the mind "grasp". How does the physical convert into something that can be grasped by the non-physical. I believe Bergson, as he was extremely well studied and reknown for his understanding of mathematics, biology, psychology, and philosophy, set out in his own metaphysics to address these very issues.

Are a foot and a rock distinct?

What is the bridge?

Isn't this a problem for physicalists?

So, right, as Rich says, the bridge is 'matter.' & my guess is that the intuition the physicalist is trying to express is that both that foot and the rock are made of atoms - and the atoms in the foot, and the atoms in the rock, should they meet, will interact with the same lawful regularity that characterizes any meeting of any atoms, anywhere.

Which is to say, I guess, thinking about it, that this kind of substance monism would be ultimately a kind of physical reductionism.

But then (drawing obviously from an emergentist vein) How do hurricanes and representative democracies interact? Stock markets and Film Festival circuits?

These questions all seem to involve form as much - if not more - than the material. And it's not like the mind is formless. But it still seems another step to then say the mind isn't supervenient on matter, the same matter that anything else, that exists, supervenes on. But maybe that's just because it would make the mind seem too free of limitation, formless.

Just kind of rambling here. I like the conversation so far.

Also: the stuff apo and street are always talking about: 'the epistemic cut', the ability to make distinctions. And the ability to hone in one thing, to pay attention, at the expense of other things. And then, also, fear & desire (as well as repose, discontent etc etc). Those are the big 'mind' things, as I see them. And it seems perfectly sensible to think that the mind, while distinct from matter, interacts with it (through distinguishing, paying attention-to, fearing, desiring.) In fact they seem very importantly bound up, though distinct.

Any philosophical discussion that reaches for QM has gone astray.

It's a good practical rule of thumb, but, then, has any philosophical discussion that's reached for atoms gone astray? How about any that reaches for DNA? Cosmology? Newtonian Law? Geometry?

It's kind of a troubling thing to think about. If some scientific ideas are on the table, but not others, isn't the reason the latter aren't on the table that we amateurs don't know enough to effectively speak about them? But, then, if we disallow the complicated stuff, but still allow the former to figure into our conversations, especially when talking ontology or metaphysics - then we've essentially agreed (implicitly) to do philosophy in a kind of make-believe setting, where we pretend the state of the scientific art is what it was long ago. It's a kind of parlor game. In this sense QM is a kind of 'card' that sophisticated parlor gamers overrule, perhaps justifiably, with a disdain 'card.' These same sophisticated players nevertheless feel free to use other science 'cards' because they know the rules of the game - and the attitudes of the other players - will allow such cards to be played

But if we decide that no scientific stuff is allowed in - we're then committed to an idea of philosophy as utterly independent of scientific findings. Which seems bad.

Which leaves one last sobering option: Only people who truly know QM can do philosophy (and most of them seem not to want to.)

All 3 options suck. But what's the 4th option? (This isn't snide or rhetorical, I think about this often, & I don't have a good answer.)

Where does the physical aspect of the mind lie? — Rich

Mind-body medicine has some interesting clues. Placebo effects, psychosomatic illnesses. There are even cases where physical symptoms manifest as a consequence of psychological causes - what used to be called 'mind over matter'. This book has an anthology of such cases.

Language enables the externalization of thought by use of sound designs which enables others to understand what we are thinking. — Cavacava

Language allows for more than just communication. And I would question the equivocation of language and sound. Written and spoken symbols - words - mean the same thing, even if one is aural, one visual. For that matter, when a sentence is translated into different languages, or even into different systems of representation, then it may retain its meaning, quite independently from the form in which it is represented. (There's your epistemic cut again.) 'Meaning', then, is separable from physical representation, and if the mind is 'that which grasps meaning' then in that sense it also is not explicable in physical terms.

In this sense QM is a kind of 'card' that sophisticated parlor gamers overrule, perhaps justifiably, with a disdain 'card.' — csalisbury

The problem with QM - well, one problem among many - is division amongst the experts : you can find credible advocates for multiple, incommensurable interpretations. You read up on one school of interpretation, only to find that some other school thinks it's completely wrong, and you don't know enough to judge which is the better answer.

Only people who truly know QM can do philosophy — csalisbury

Have a look at this book list.

I think the explanation that what two distinct physical things (e.g. a gluon and a quark) have in common is that they are both physical is quite the cop-out. I can quite equally explain that what two distinct substances (physical and mental) have in common is that they are both real.

Is there something different about saying that a gluon and a quark are both physical, and so can interact, and saying that matter and consciousness are both real, and so can interact?

Yes. — The Great Whatever

... How do you conceive of such a thing? Can a foot and a stone be at the very same point in space at the same time? How is that possible?

Well, that's obviously false. Feet and stones have different natures, yet a foot can kick a stone. — The Great Whatever

No, feet and stones have the same nature in that both are composed of one substance - atoms and void 8-)

I'm still waiting for you to show me a thought kicking a physical stone.

Then I would say there is still a problem, if the mind at all was involved with the movement of the physical body. — Rich

How the non-physical moves the physical is a complex issue, this involves free will, intention, etc.. I believe it can only be understood through a thorough understanding of the nature of time. No one has such an understanding of time. Do you notice that the past is radically different from the future? Think about the future. It is always right in front of you but you cannot see or sense anything in the future. That is because there is no physical existence in the future. The fact that, through a free willing act, the human being can change, or destroy any physical thing within its power, at any random moment of the present, demonstrates that there is no physical existence prior to the present. The continuity of existence at the present, which we take for granted in laws such as Newton's first law of motion, is not necessary. This means that the entire physical world must come into existence at each moment of the present. The soul, having its existence anchored in the non-physical side of the present, has some capacity to control how the physical comes into existence at each moment. Therefore it moves the physical body.

There is also the issue of how does the mind "grasp". How does the physical convert into something that can be grasped by the non-physical. I believe Bergson, as he was extremely well studied and reknown for his understanding of mathematics, biology, psychology, and philosophy, set out in his own metaphysics to — Rich

I am not familiar with Bergson, perhaps you could explain some of his principles. As far as how the mind grasps the physical though, I understand this in traditional Aristotelian terms of matter and form. It is not that the mind converts the physical into something that can be grasped, it is that the physical already exists in such a form. Under Neo-Platonic principles, the Form of any, and every object, must pre-exist that object in time. How I understand this, is that the form of the object, exists in the future of the object, and this determines how the physical object will come into existence at each moment of the present. To change the object is to change its form, such that when it comes into existence at the next moment, it will be different. So the form is fundamentally separable from the physical object, as the existence of the physical object relies on the form, but not vise versa. When the mind grasps the object, it grasps the form of the object. Being a form itself, I believe the soul has the capacity to reproduce aspects of the form of the object, in sensation, or in conceptual structure, without actually altering the object. It is a representation. The material aspect appears to be beyond the grasp of the mind, and this limits our ability to apprehend, and change the world.

In this sense QM is a kind of 'card' that sophisticated parlor gamers overrule, perhaps justifiably, with a disdain 'card.' — csalisbury

QM is the "trump" card. But if we don't like the idea of trump, and think it's a cheat, we can just make rules allowing us to ignore whoever's playing trump.

But then (drawing obviously from an emergentist vein) How do hurricanes and representative democracies interact? Stock markets and Film Festival circuits?

These questions all seem to involve form as much - if not more - than the material. And it's not like the mind is formless. But it still seems another step to then say the mind isn't supervenient on matter, the same matter that anything else, that exists, supervenes on. But maybe that's just because it would make the mind seem too free of limitation, formless. — csalisbury

Isn't dualism simply the assertion that, despite all the things we know that supervene on matter, including film festivals, there is one thing, namely the human mind, that cannot supervene on the physical?

Considering that Life itself is known to supervene on the physical, it seems a bit outrageous to claim that the "mind" of a particular species cannot.

In this sense QM is a kind of 'card' that sophisticated parlor gamers overrule, perhaps justifiably, with a disdain 'card.' — csalisbury

The irony being that, according to quantum mechanics, quantum coherence cannot have any bearing on the operation of the human mind.

The material aspect appears to be beyond the grasp of the mind, and this limits our ability to apprehend, and change the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bergson's metaphysics develops a model that avoids the clumsiness of the above stated view, as does the Bohm Interpretation. Conscious (Mind) and Matter are one and the same, moving in different directions in Duration (real time). One can say that Matter is Mind (Bergson names it the Elan Vital) that is no longer evolving in Time. They are one and the same but in different states. If one wished to be highly precise, there is still a bit of Duration in Matter but it had slowed so drastically that evolution has appeared to stop.

Bergson understood very thoroughly all of the issues with both Dualism and Physicalism and sought to close the gap. In doing so, he amazingly created a model that fortold both holography and quantum physics. An amazing accomplishment which De Broglie wrote about.

Stephen Robbins as a series of videos on Youtube discussing the holographic aspect of Bergson's philosophy though I'm not sure it is easily understood without reading Bergson first.

https://youtu.be/RtuxTXEhj3A

There is also an amazing debate on Amazon where Robbins disects Special and General Relativity and points out how they contradict each other!

https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/R17WTYWUM6881A/ref=cm_cr_dp_d_rvw_btm?ie=UTF8&ASIN=0691173176#wasThisHelpful

The soul, having its existence anchored in the non-physical side of the present, has some capacity to control how the physical comes into existence at each moment. Therefore it moves the physical body. — Metaphysician Undercover

:-}

Right and this soul goes out of the body upon death and into some other realm right? Where was it before birth? Why don't I remember anything?

Conscious (Mind) and Matter are one and the same, moving in different directions in Duration (real time). One can say that Matter is Mind (Bergson names it the Elan Vital) that is no longer evolving in Time. — Rich

I have no problem with this basic principle, that Mind and Matter appear to be the same, because neither philosophy nor physics has been able to determine "mind" or "matter". As undetermined, they appear to be the same. What physics deals with is the various forms which matter takes. It makes assumptions concerning matter but only bases these on the forms of matter. Philosophy deals with logical forms, and only metaphysics speculates about matter itself or mind itself. For all we know, mind and matter could be the very same thing.

However, there is an important difference which Aristotle points to. Matter is understood to be passive, while the soul is an active form. This becomes relevant in the cosmological argument. If we adhere to this difference, it is impossible that they are the same. This is evident from what you say as well. Mind is "evolving in Time" (active), while Matter is not (passive). That one is passive and the other is active makes it impossible that they are one and the same thing.

If one wished to be highly precise, there is still a bit of Duration in Matter but it had slowed so drastically that evolution has appeared to stop. — Rich

This is why matter is unintelligible. What is intelligible is active forms. But matter, to fulfill the assumptions of physics, must be passive, that which is acted upon. When we try to understand matter itself, we get lost in infinities such as "slowed so drastically that evolution has appeared to stop". We cannot use the principles which understand active forms to understand passive matter, because then matter appears as an infinitely slow activity instead of being purely passive. That's why we need dualism.

Right and this soul goes out of the body upon death and into some other realm right? — Agustino

Why "goes out... into some other realm"? It already is in that other realm. That's what dualism's all about. At death it has lost its influence over the material body.

I'm still waiting for you to show me a thought kicking a physical stone. — Agustino

Please don't be dense.