That is also true. But even so, that there is a situation where everybody totally agrees about ethical values (maybe there is also scientific empirical study that proves that all humankind agree with about every ethical value) it does not tell about values as such.

There could be naturalistic fallacy. Everybody could agree with the values, but that doesn´t prove them right. — Antinatalist

If every human agreed about a moral value, how could it be wrong? Values are just human values; my values are right according to me, but may be wrong according to others; and in such cases there is no clear right and wrong.

Take sex before marriage as an example; it is simply a matter of opinion as to whether it is right or wrong, that means it is right to leave it to the individual, and wrong to claim to univeralise it, since there is no universal agreement.

But if everybody agrees to a moral value then it cannot be wrong by definition. It could become wrong, though, if general opinion swung the other way, and everyone came to disagree with it.

Couldn’t another option be that values are simply not truth-apt? Saying something is true because everyone agrees is just an appeal to popularity.

I didn't say values are true or false, but rather right or wrong. What other criteria for the rightness or wrongness of values could there be than human opinion or some criteria of usefulness or desideratum?

I didn't say values are true or false, but rather right or wrong. — Janus

What’s the difference? Doesn’t “right/wrong” depend on “true/false?” If you answer “4” to the question “what is 2+2,” it is right because it is true, right? So if valuing life is right, wouldn’t that have to mean that it’s true that we should value life?

What other criteria for the rightness or wrongness of values could there be than human opinion or some criteria of usefulness? — Janus

None, but that is precisely why they’re not truth-apt. They’re merely opinions, regardless of how many people agree/disagree.

What’s the difference? Doesn’t “right/wrong” depend on “true/false?” If you answer “4” to the question “what is 2+2,” it is right because it is true, right? So if valuing life is right, wouldn’t that have to mean that it’s true that we should value life? — Pinprick

We are discussing moral values, not arithmetic.To say that a value is right for a person is not necessarily to say it is true for that person; the person could be mistaken. This is because values come down to opinion. Note, I'm not saying there is any absolute right or wrong, in the way we might think there is an absolute truth or falsity.

So, I am agreeing they're not truth apt, but pointing out that truth and correctness in this context don't equate.

To say that a value is right for a person is not necessarily to say it is true for that person; the person could be mistaken. — Janus

Do you mean a value could be right, yet false?

Note, I'm not saying there is any absolute right or wrong, in the way we might think there is an absolute truth or falsity. — Janus

This..

But if everybody agrees to a moral value then it cannot be wrong by definition. — Janus

seems to claim that if everyone agreed, then the value would be right in an absolute sense.

This is because values come down to opinion. — Janus

What I’m not getting is how opinions can be right/wrong? Especially if you’re not counting their truth value as criteria to judge them as such. For example, I value life, which is to say that it’s my opinion that life is valuable. Is this value/opinion right or wrong, and how can you tell?

seems to claim that if everyone agreed, then the value would be right in an absolute sense. — Pinprick

Not at all; I'm only saying that it would be right in the sense that everyone agrees with it, and that there could be no more encompassing criterion for its rightness.

Oh, ok. I think I see what you were meaning. I was just confused. Carry on.

:ok:

That is also true. But even so, that there is a situation where everybody totally agrees about ethical values (maybe there is also scientific empirical study that proves that all humankind agree with about every ethical value) it does not tell about values as such.

There could be naturalistic fallacy. Everybody could agree with the values, but that doesn´t prove them right.
— Antinatalist

If every human agreed about a moral value, how could it be wrong? Values are just human values; my values are right according to me, but may be wrong according to others; and in such cases there is no clear right and wrong.

Take sex before marriage as an example; it is simply a matter of opinion as to whether it is right or wrong, that means it is right to leave it to the individual, and wrong to claim to univeralise it, since there is no universal agreement.

But if everybody agrees to a moral value then it cannot be wrong by definition. It could become wrong, though, if general opinion swung the other way, and everyone came to disagree with it. — Janus

I think about an option, when people don´t know what is best for them.
For example, everybody can think that mass suicide is best for everybody and for whole humankind.
And same time is possible that is not the best possible option for humankind.
I, personally, don´t make evaluation is mass suicide the best option for humankind, or is it not. My point of view is irrelevant, in this particular question.


Also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-question_argument

For example, everybody can think that mass suicide is best for everybody and for whole humankind.
And same time is possible that is not the best possible option for humankind. — Antinatalist

The reality, though, is that only a vanishingly small percentage of humankind thinks that; so I'm not sure what your point is. If everyone felt life was not worth living, just as if an individual feels life is not worth living (after long and hard consideration, mind, not impulsively) then would not suicide be best for them in either case?

I have never thought much of Moore's argument in any case. "moral properties" do not have to be identical to "natural properties" in order to be plausibly thought to be justified by them.

For example, everybody can think that mass suicide is best for everybody and for whole humankind.
And same time is possible that is not the best possible option for humankind.
— Antinatalist
— Janus

The reality, though, is that only a vanishingly small percentage of humankind thinks that; so I'm not sure what your point is. If everyone felt life was not worth living, just as if an individual feels life is not worth living (after long and hard consideration, mind, not impulsively) then would not suicide be best for them in either case? — Janus

I think, that if there is situation, when everybody thinks that suicide is good option, it still is not necessarily good option.

There´s some religious cults, with manipulative leaders, who could get everyone think that mass suicide is best way to go higher place, Heaven. And maybe it is not.

And there could be also be that kind of situation in the future, that all the people in the world belongs to this kind of cult. There could be post-nuclear war situation etc. Perhaps that will not happen in billion years, but I think it is still possible.

There´s some religious cults, with manipulative leaders, who could get everyone think that mass suicide is best way to go higher place, Heaven. And maybe it is not. — Antinatalist

Manipulative leaders might get some small, credulous percentage of the populace to think it is a good idea to commit suicide, but even then not by convincing them that life is not worth living, but by means of some beguiling promise of salvation.

In a post-apocalyptic world, if conditions were horrible enough, then all the remaining people may indeed think life is not worth living, and they wouldn't need any manipulative leader to convince them of that. But even in such a situation, I think it is likely that many people would still want to continue living. Never underestimate the human spirit.

There´s some religious cults, with manipulative leaders, who could get everyone think that mass suicide is best way to go higher place, Heaven. And maybe it is not.
— Antinatalist

Manipulative leaders might get some small, credulous percentage of the populace to think it is a good idea to commit suicide, but even then not by convincing them that life is not worth living, but by means of some beguiling promise of salvation.

In a post-apocalyptic world, if conditions were horrible enough, then all the remaining people may indeed think life is not worth living, and they wouldn't need any manipulative leader to convince them of that. But even in such a situation, I think it is likely that many people would still want to continue living. Never underestimate the human spirit. — Janus

Mix those two things together, religious suicidal cult and post-nuclear war situation.
It is at least possible that everyone agrees on mass suicide. And it is possible, that this mass suicide is not the best option.

But I was thinking more of G.E. Moore´s views on the topic.

Sure it's logically possible, but seems to me extremely unlikely. I'm not seeing the relevance of Moore's views.

↪Antinatalist Sure it's logically possible, but seems to me extremely unlikely. I'm not seeing the relevance of Moore's views. — Janus

"The open-question argument claims that any attempt to identify morality with some set of observable, natural properties will always be liable to an open question, and that if this is true, then moral facts cannot be reduced to natural properties and that therefore ethical naturalism is false. Put another way, Moore is saying that any attempt to define good in terms of a natural property fails because such definitions can be transformed into closed questions (the subject and predicate being conceptually identical, that is, the two terms mean the same thing); however, all purported naturalistic definitions of good are transformable into open questions, for it can still be questioned whether good is the same thing as pleasure, etc. Shortly before (in section §11), Moore had said if good is defined as pleasure, or any other natural property, "good" may be substituted for "pleasure", or that other property, anywhere where it occurs. However, "pleasure is good" is a meaningful, informative statement; but "good is good" (after making the substitution) is an uninformative tautology."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-question_argument

Perhaps you missed this then:

I have never thought much of Moore's argument in any case. "moral properties" do not have to be identical to "natural properties" in order to be plausibly thought to be justified by them. — Janus

In any case you still haven't explained what you think the relevance of the Open Question Argument to what we have been discussing is.

Perhaps you missed this then:

I have never thought much of Moore's argument in any case. "moral properties" do not have to be identical to "natural properties" in order to be plausibly thought to be justified by them.
— Janus

In any case you still haven't explained what you think the relevance of the Open Question Argument to what we have been discussing is. — Janus

I think that the relevance is in the question is that we define as a "good" really "good". We have values, but we don´t know is it good that we have those values. According to Moore, we could never know.

As I already said the only guide is opinion. If everybody thinks a particular thing is good or bad, what better guide could there be? As an example it is reasonable to think murder is bad because just about everyone would likely agree that it's bad.

It is also reasonable to think that what undermines social relations, trust and security, which child abuse, murder, rape and theft, among other things do, is bad. It is natural for those kinds of acts to undermine social relations. In fact it seems impossible to imagine how it could be otherwise, and so that would be an example of the existence of a natural state of affairs justifying belief in the moral reprehensibility of certain acts.

↪Antinatalist As I already said the only guide is opinion. If everybody thinks a particular thing is good or bad, what better guide could there be? As an example it is reasonable to think murder is bad because just about everyone would likely agree that it's bad.

It is also reasonable to think that what undermines social relations, trust and security, which child abuse, murder, rape and theft, among other things do, is bad. It is natural for those kinds of acts to undermine social relations. In fact it seems impossible to imagine how it could be otherwise, and so that would be an example of the existence of a natural state of affairs justifying belief in the moral reprehensibility of certain acts. — Janus

If something is natural - or unnatural also - it doesn´t yet tell a thing about its valueness/antivalueness. But I agree, human mind has its limits, but that is all we got. And we have to get along with it.

I think you're missing the point. If it is natural for humans generally to value or disvalue particular things then that fact does tell about their value; there is only human value (for us; other animals may value different things). What other value, apart from the value of valuers do you imagine might exist?

↪Antinatalist I think you're missing the point. If it is natural for humans generally to value or disvalue particular things then that fact does tell about their value; there is only human value (for us; other animals may value different things). What other value, apart from the value of valuers do you imagine might exist? — Janus

There could be some options.

Some religious people would say, that there is some divine, supermundane values. As an atheist I don´t personally believe in them, but I accept the possibility that values like that could exist.

And like you said, other animals may value different things.

I´ve said this before, but I want to underline the fact that there could be some things that humans don´t value - or they don´t value them enough - but they should. There could be things that are good for people, but they don´t recognize them.

There could be things that are good for people, but they don´t recognize them. — Antinatalist

I don't deny that in relation to health. but in relation to morals I think we've had plenty of time to figure out the broad picture in relation to most human acts. There won't be any controversy about the morality of murder, rape, child-abuse, theft etc. Suicide is still being worked out. There are likely some things in relation to which consensus will never be reached.

As for command theory, that is a matter for the religious; in any case the religiously conceived morality of acts like murder, rape and so on agree with the secular; at least I can't think of any exceptions. Of course there will be disagreements when it comes to the subtle details involved in considering the morality of minor acts like sex before marriage, masturbation, gay relations and so on. People with different starting premises will never agree on those issues.

There could be things that are good for people, but they don´t recognize them.
— Antinatalist

I don't deny that in relation to health. but in relation to morals I think we've had plenty of time to figure out the broad picture in relation to most human acts. There won't be any controversy about the morality of murder, rape, child-abuse, theft etc. Suicide is still being worked out. There are likely some things in relation to which consensus will never be reached.

As for command theory, that is a matter for the religious; in any case the religiously conceived morality of acts like murder, rape and so on agree with the secular; at least I can't think of any exceptions. Of course there will be disagreements when it comes to the subtle details involved in considering the morality of minor acts like sex before marriage, masturbation, gay relations and so on. People with different starting premises will never agree on those issues. — Janus

Some religious movements believe that even masturbation is wrong (like you mentioned). And Catholics don´t accept contraception, but often Catholic Church understate the child abuse that Catholic priests have done.

Moore had said if good is defined as pleasure, or any other natural property, "good" may be substituted for "pleasure", or that other property, anywhere where it occurs. However, "pleasure is good" is a meaningful, informative statement; — Antinatalist

I don't think 'pleasure is good' is informative to any being that has experienced pleasure. I think it's something every being that has experienced pleasure knows to be true, even if they don't have language in which to express it. My dog knows pleasure is good. He also knows pain is bad, which is why he cringes if he thinks I'm going to hit him. (I never do, but he's a rescue, and I think he probably had a bad start in life.)

Moore got it wrong, I think.

What other value, apart from the value of valuers do you imagine might exist? — Janus

I think nature comes with some built-in values.

Why do we think it is wrong to be cruel to animals? Presumably because it causes the animals pain. We know from our own experience that pain is bad, and we think it is generally wrong to do things that have bad results. That pain is bad is a fact of nature. It is also a value judgment, which shows that there is not such an absolute break between fact and value as some philosophers have claimed.

Moore had said if good is defined as pleasure, or any other natural property, "good" may be substituted for "pleasure", or that other property, anywhere where it occurs. However, "pleasure is good" is a meaningful, informative statement;
— Antinatalist
— Herg

I don't think 'pleasure is good' is informative to any being that has experienced pleasure. — Herg

I think I understand your point of view. But I also think that "pleasure is good" is a meaningful, informative statement, while it is even a truism perhaps to all beings at the same time. So It could be true or even truism for every being, but I don´t think that was Moore´s point. I think Moore´s point of view is more metaphysical or ontological, we have statements like "pleasure is good" and at the same time we would never know what is "good" for sure.

I think Moore´s point of view is more metaphysical or ontological, we have statements like "pleasure is good" and at the same time we would never know what is "good" for sure. — Antinatalist

I suppose another way of putting that would be to say that Moore thought we can't know what 'good' refers to - what property it denotes. But it seems to me that we can't decide that issue until we have worked out what the word 'good' actually means, i.e. what function it performs in ordinary discourse. R.M.Hare, whose lectures I attended long ago when life was simpler and we all had more and longer hair (well, I did), reformulated Moore's open question and thought that in so doing he had made it unanswerable (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2252015?seq=1).

However, Hare's argument only succeeds if we agree with Hare on two points: that descriptions can never also be evaluations, and that the sole function of the word 'good' is to commend. The first of these is what we are trying to establish, so Hare's argument begs the question; and I think 'good' does more than just commend. When we say 'that was a good dinner', I think we are not just commending the dinner, we are also saying something about it, i.e. we are attributing to it some property. It would be closer to the truth if we said that we are claiming that the dinner was commendable, i.e. deserved to be commended (and of course we would then be commending the dinner by implication). However, I would want to cast the linguistic net somewhat wider, and point out (a) that commending is an activity which displays a positive attitude to something, and (b) that there are several other activities which display positive attitudes, such as approving, desiring, seeking out, etc.. It seems to me that 'good' gestures to all of these kinds of activities without specifically selecting any one of them; so I would claim that when we say 'that was a good dinner', what we actually mean is 'that dinner was such as to merit a positive attitude or activity', where the set of available positive attitudes and activities includes approval, commendation, desire, seeking out, etc..

Having established that, the next question is: is there something in nature that intrinsically has this property? I think pleasure does. By 'pleasure' I mean, strictly speaking, pleasantness. Many things can have the property of pleasantness, but it is the property of pleasantness that I think has the property of meriting a positive attitude, rather than the thing that is pleasant. So, for example, I find Beethoven's 6th Symphony pleasant, but it is the pleasantness of my experience in listening to it that has the property of meriting a positive attitude, not the symphony itself. Making someone who doesn't like Beethoven listen to the 6th Symphony would not result, for them, in an experience that merited commendation or desire or seeking out; but if I could give them my experience of listening to the 6th Symphony, then their experience, like mine, would merit those attitudes and activities.

So I think Moore had it all wrong. My metaphysical and ontological thesis about 'good' would be that pleasantness is good, and unpleasantness is bad, and therefore we do not have to look to non-natural properties (whatever they may be) to find what 'good refers to or denotes'; what it denotes is the meriting of positive attitudes and activities that is a property of the pleasantness of our own, entirely natural, experiences.

I think Moore´s point of view is more metaphysical or ontological, we have statements like "pleasure is good" and at the same time we would never know what is "good" for sure.
— Antinatalist
I suppose another way of putting that would be to say that Moore thought we can't know what 'good' refers to - what property it denotes. But it seems to me that we can't decide that issue until we have worked out what the word 'good' actually means, i.e. what function it performs in ordinary discourse. R.M.Hare, whose lectures I attended long ago when life was simpler and we all had more and longer hair (well, I did), reformulated Moore's open question and thought that in so doing he had made it unanswerable (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2252015?seq=1).

However, Hare's argument only succeeds if we agree with Hare on two points: that descriptions can never also be evaluations, and that the sole function of the word 'good' is to commend. The first of these is what we are trying to establish, so Hare's argument begs the question; and I think 'good' does more than just commend. When we say 'that was a good dinner', I think we are not just commending the dinner, we are also saying something about it, i.e. we are attributing to it some property. It would be closer to the truth if we said that we are claiming that the dinner was commendable, i.e. deserved to be commended (and of course we would then be commending the dinner by implication). However, I would want to cast the linguistic net somewhat wider, and point out (a) that commending is an activity which displays a positive attitude to something, and (b) that there are several other activities which display positive attitudes, such as approving, desiring, seeking out, etc.. It seems to me that 'good' gestures to all of these kinds of activities without specifically selecting any one of them; so I would claim that when we say 'that was a good dinner', what we actually mean is 'that dinner was such as to merit a positive attitude or activity', where the set of available positive attitudes and activities includes approval, commendation, desire, seeking out, etc..

Having established that, the next question is: is there something in nature that intrinsically has this property? I think pleasure does. By 'pleasure' I mean, strictly speaking, pleasantness. Many things can have the property of pleasantness, but it is the property of pleasantness that I think has the property of meriting a positive attitude, rather than the thing that is pleasant. So, for example, I find Beethoven's 6th Symphony pleasant, but it is the pleasantness of my experience in listening to it that has the property of meriting a positive attitude, not the symphony itself. Making someone who doesn't like Beethoven listen to the 6th Symphony would not result, for them, in an experience that merited commendation or desire or seeking out; but if I could give them my experience of listening to the 6th Symphony, then their experience, like mine, would merit those attitudes and activities.

So I think Moore had it all wrong. My metaphysical and ontological thesis about 'good' would be that pleasantness is good, and unpleasantness is bad, and therefore we do not have to look to non-natural properties (whatever they may be) to find what 'good refers to or denotes'; what it denotes is the meriting of positive attitudes and activities that is a property of the pleasantness of our own, entirely natural, experiences. — Herg

I want to agree with you, but I think you are making a naturalistic fallacy.
I also want to say I value pleasure as a good thing, but if we look just what is pleasurable and always favor that kind of experiences, acts etc. we are coming to unbearable problems. Somebody could have pleasure, when she/he is torturing someone else. I don´t regard that kind of a pleasure as good.
So, when valuing pleasure I think is important what kind of circumstances it occurs.

Georg Henrik von Wright has written on "goodness", on the deontology of goodness (The Varieties of Goodness, 1963). For example, when the chair is considered as a good chair, it have to had certain features (some would say it has to be good to sit on - of course that criteria is also arguable, but that is not the point). But maybe this is a sidetrack.

I want to agree with you, but I think you are making a naturalistic fallacy. — Antinatalist

It would help if you would explain why you think that. I've been careful to defend my view against Moore and Hare, so what now is your objection? Or, if you don't think I've successfully defended myself against them, can you say why?

I also want to say I value pleasure as a good thing, but if we look just what is pleasurable and always favor that kind of experiences, acts etc. we are coming to unbearable problems.

I haven't claimed that pleasure is the whole of ethics. I'm simply claiming that it's a fact that pleasure is good.

Somebody could have pleasure, when she/he is torturing someone else. I don´t regard that kind of a pleasure as good.
So, when valuing pleasure I think is important what kind of circumstances it occurs.

I find it hard to believe that the pleasure of the torturer could be so great that it would outweigh the pain of the tortured, so I think a simple utilitarian-style pleasure/pain calculus can deal quite easily with this objection.