So, why is it that people multiple entities beyond their necessity and say that all actions need to be related to some desire or disposition for us to be able to act? Such a statement cannot be established as a relation of ideas, nor a matter of fact. — Marty
Tis not contrary to reason to imagine us being motivated by reason alone, or, if you like, to be motivated for good reasons!
So, why is it that people multiple entities beyond their necessity and say that all actions need to be related to some desire or disposition for us to be able to act? Such a statement cannot be established as a relation of ideas, nor a matter of fact. Obviously, there is no logical necessity to talk of actions without desires, and no inductive statement can show us its necessity. It can presumably show us that some motivations are like that, but the way some people act is as if it's all of our motivations.
So, why do people do this? It seems completely more parsimonious to think we act for good reasons, simplicter. That, in some rare cases, a person can act such and such a way despite them not wanting to (by some prior disposition or prior desire). When these good reasons are divorced from our desires, we can begin ethics properly.
Always perplexes me why people want to add something more to the picture. — Marty
I'm not really sure how that article proves that all of our decisions require prior desires/ some prior disposition or emotive backing. I'm also apprehensive of any identity claim in neuroscience. — Marty
I'm not sure what you mean by "determining the truth of this system." And why that has to be done after the fact. If I'm acting based on ethical reasons, then the good will enables me to act on those reasons. Why should we smuggle in a motivated reason retroactively? It seems perfectly fine to imagine that I help someone out who I dislike, and after doing it, I feel unpleasant because I just didn't like them. There could be no possible prior incentive to help the person outside of my ethical vocation. And that may have been enough to act.
I'm also not sure why I'd reduce human agency to causal explanations alone. — Marty
The studies of decision-making in neurological patients who can no longer process emotional information normally suggest that people make judgments not only by evaluating the consequences and their probability of occurring, but also and even sometimes primarily at a gut or emotional level
All it shows is that sometimes we use emotions to make judgements. That's not controverisal. — Marty
I think another conclusion you can reach is that empirical evidence underdetermines our actions, and empirical evidence can never give us justification for how to reason correctly about ethics. — Marty
Where does it say that in the article? — Marty
An affect isn't the explanation for our action, just a consequence. — Marty
Most of it. In my experience people are basically always motivated by emotion. They can act for good reasons, in a space of reasons - but that's only if that space already aligns with their emotions. I think people - like me, often, for example- tend to 'zoom in' into the space of reasons, and pretend it's sufficient in-and-of-itself, when they're trying to disavow their emotions. Especially if they're unpleasant emotions which don't sync up with one's idea of oneself.I don't think I'm quite following which part you've disagreed with. — Marty
They can act for good reasons, in a space of reasons - but that's only if that space already aligns with their emotions.
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