I want to talk about the “consciousness” people talk about when they discuss “The hard problem of consciousness.”

It’s an ambiguous term, says Chalmers. This is before he sprinkled in a little experience, feelings, and quality to make it worse. But it becomes more and more apparent that the “consciousness” he speaks of is the organism itself. So when he says “It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience”, he is descending into tautology.

Except that it's not. I've tried to be clear. I want to talk about the meaning of "consciousness" in the sense it is used when one says "the hard problem of consciousness." — T Clark

Except that the whole OP, fascinating as it is, is not clear at all.

The thread title is: 'What does ''consciousness'' mean ?'.
This is a general question. It is a more holistic question. And one that attracts many ways of looking.
Never mind 'consciousness', the meaning of 'meaning' is itself ambiguous.

I don’t mind discussing other meanings or shades of meaning, but generally only with the goal of addressing ambiguity. — T Clark

That is exactly what @Banno kicked off with his cryptic and 'absurd' comment.
Its quirky creativity drew me in until my last response:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/532625

It would be nice if the people starting those discussions would be clear about these kinds of issues. That's not likely to happen. I mostly started this post to clarify in my own mind what I mean when I use these words. — T Clark

If there is confusion in any thread as to the use of the word 'consciousness', then it is probably best addressed by questioning the author at that specific moment.

'It would be nice if...'
People could be less 'triggered' by and hostile to others who look at issues from a different angle. That there is relevance there, even if it might seem that it doesn't 'respect' the OP.

"Consciousness" does not only mean an experience, but that's the aspect of the word I want to examine in this thread. — T Clark

And this is why I started this discussion, to help give us common language to discuss this issue. — T Clark

:smile:

Self-awareness becomes redundant it is specifies an innate distinction between self and other, an innate awareness of selfhood in this sense. An ameba will hold awareness of this distinction, but we do not say it is self-aware. Lesser vertebrates can become unconscious—e.g., due to sedatives—but when conscious we likewise don’t consider them self-aware in the senses defined in the OP. Defining consciousness by self-awareness, as self-awareness was specified in the OP, constrains “consciousness” strictly to critters that can not only conceptualize information but, additionally, can conceptualize information about (and thereby hold abstract knowledge of) their personal innate awareness of their own selfhood via which other is discerned — javra

I think you're getting to the heart of it. I actually like "self-awareness" more than "consciousness" to describe the phenomena we're talking about, but "consciousness" is the word used most often by others. People don't talk about the hard problem of self-awareness. I wonder if they did it would help get rid of some of the confusion and disagreement.

So, in equating consciousness to self-awareness, one would be forced to state that human infants hold no consciousness. This being something I’m personally very adverse to doing. If, however, consciousness is equated to awareness, then human infants and lesser animals can all be conscious (again, in contrast to being unconscious). But, in so defining, then unicellular organisms can then be deemed conscious as well, since they hold awareness of things, including of that which is other relative to themselves—and, hence, of themselves relative to that which is other. — javra

Human infants are clearly sentient. They have experiences. They have attention and awareness. It is my understanding that young infants have to learn the difference between what is part of them and what is outside. Wouldn't that mean they are not conscious, again, in the sense we are talking about it. As for other animals, as you move down it becomes more and more questionable that what we see is consciousness. In what sense do bacteria have experiences. It's not clear to me they are aware.

Strict materialists often make the argument that we are essentially machines, that there is very little authentic base for awareness or mind or consciousness (some of this is based on study of brain functions). But thinking of machines, say cars, do they ever wonder if they are basically machines? If we are, we are quite a peculiar kind of machines with tendency to self-doubt and capability for ferocious arguments whether we actually are "just" machines. This would seem somewhat strange behaviour for a car or a hairdryer etc. — hwyl

I don't see that a materialist viewpoint can not be used to address questions of consciousness and self-awareness. We are just machines that manufacture self-awareness. That self-awareness is actually a byproduct we use to achieve our true goal - to manufacturer copies of ourselves.

Not to be glib, but in a word or so, consciousness is a mystery. You know kinda like God, cosmology, mathematics, music, and whole host of other things found in living structures. — 3017amen

I don't think it is a mystery. I think most of the confusion comes from a lack of imagination. People can't help but think that consciousness is something special and that we need to identify special sources for it.

It’s an ambiguous term, says Chalmers. This is before he sprinkled in a little experience, feelings, and quality to make it worse. But it becomes more and more apparent that the “consciousness” he speaks of is the organism itself. So when he says “It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience”, he is descending into tautology. — NOS4A2

I haven't read Chalmer's paper. I need to do that.

think most of the confusion comes from a lack of imagination. People can't help but think that consciousness is something special and that we need to identify special sources for it. — T Clark

What does that mean?


Alternatively, I agree, logically it's as straightforward as consciousness, subconsciousness, and unconsciousness all tangled up in a big gooey ball of warm evolutionary soup :joke:

But seriously, you're really not "special", hence no soup for you !

Rather than address specific comments, I'll just say this - the meanings of consciousness @Banno is talking about are not those I intended to discuss in this thread. Here are the meanings Banno identified:

1 aware of and responding to one's surroundings: although I was in pain, I was conscious.

2 having knowledge of something: we are conscious of the extent of the problem.
• [in combination] concerned with or worried about a particular matter: they were growing increasingly security-conscious.

3 (of an action or feeling) deliberate and intentional: a conscious effort to walk properly.
• (of the mind or a thought) directly perceptible to and under the control of the person concerned: when you go to sleep it is only the conscious mind which shuts down.

Again, these meanings are not those this thread were intended to discuss. You say it isn't clear, although no one except Banno and you have had any trouble understanding. Now it should be clear.

Just tripped across an article in "Discover" - "Can Plants Feel Pain?" Thought people might be interested. Here's a link.

https://www.discovermagazine.com/planet-earth/can-plants-feel-pain

I actually like "self-awareness" more than "consciousness" to describe the phenomena we're talking about, but "consciousness" is the word used most often by others. People don't talk about the hard problem of self-awareness. — T Clark

But isn't the problem with self-awareness that it goes a step beyond experience ("mere" consciousness)? We cannot know at all, but let me articulate an intuition:

Take an animal, maybe a bat, maybe a lizard. They likely have experience, they are aware of things in the world: prey, food, shelter and the like. I am skeptical that such creatures would have "self awareness" as opposed to awareness.

What is added by self-awareness that is absent in experience? The apparent fact that one is aware that it is oneself that is having the experience, not another person nor another creature.

Like almost any other aspect of nature, experience is very multifaceted and rich. I think that you are correct in that what's causing most of these discussions is self awareness: "I know that I am staring at a screen", "I know that WWII ended in 1945", "I know that song".

If I can't separate experience from me, how could it arise as a question?

It is my understanding that young infants have to learn the difference between what is part of them and what is outside. Wouldn't that mean they are not conscious, again, in the sense we are talking about it. — T Clark

Well, yes, an infant would not hold abstracted ideas regarding their innate awareness of self via which other is discerned. And if that is how one chooses to understand what "consciousness" refers to then infants hold no consciousness.

This specified notion of consciousness is to me however very biased toward cognitively healthy adult humans as holding a metaphysically unique status. Something that goes against the grain with me. E.g.: an adult with extreme forms of mental retardation would then also hold no consciousness.

For one thing, I believe there are gradations of awareness; even when one focuses on consciousness as self-awareness, there are gradations of this among adult humans and over time in any individual adult human. On average, contemplation of the self gives greater self-awareness than does watching a movie. These gradations would hold to minimal extents even for infants. Despite an infant not having language to specify concepts of self, it does hold innate and nonverbal notions of "mine", as in what we linguistically address as my thirst, my pleasure or pain, my affinity to familiar voices, and so forth--this even if its associating these personal states of self to stimuli takes time. And, in so doing, I offer that an infant holds an ingrained awareness of self, hence a degree of self-awareness without which it (the infant) would literally perish. But if language use is considered an all-important item for consciousness, any such perspective would be mute. (side note: interesting how in English infants, lesser animals, and divine beings such as angels are termed "it" rather than "he/she", the latter being reserved only for those with whom one can linguistically converse. This isn't so, at the very least, in the Romanian language.)

Maybe more to the point, if an infant can be unconscious it would be wrong to uphold that it is not (i.e., un-) conscious when it is not unconscious. On a technical level, so affirming to me seems to be a logical contradiction.

Also, if consciousness is the holding of abstracted ideas regarding one's innate awareness of self via which other is discerned, what can be said to engage in this abstracting prior to the abstraction taking hold? I'm thinking that consciousness engages in such abstracting to begin with, but I'm open to different views.

But isn't the problem with self-awareness that it goes a step beyond experience ("mere" consciousness)? — Manuel

There has been a fair amount of work in recent years on what has been called a pre-reflective form of minimal self-awareness. Dan Zahavi has made this his central focus, but there is growing concensus that all experience presupposes some primitive sense of self. Infants have been shown to differentiate self from others.

Dan Zahavi has made this his central focus, but there is growing concensus that all experience presupposes some primitive sense of self. Infants have been shown to differentiate self from others. — Joshs

His work is very interesting.

It makes sense, but a primitive sense of self would seem to be weaker (by definition) than a robust sense of self, as is the case of people. I think that what matters in the case of experience is being able to separate the knower from the known, in a way that one can even pose these questions.

Otherwise, although there may be a very primitive self idea, I don't see how awareness itself becomes a problem for such creatures, as opposed to a matter of survival.

But I could be way off...

We know that we have some kind of knowledge, and this fact is puzzling, why do we have this thing, experience? I doubt animals get near that, as it would also require language and much else, which is not to deny in the least the amazing capacities animals have in there own right.

We know that we have some kind of knowledge, and this fact is puzzling, why do we have this thing, experience? I doubt animals get near that, as it would also require language and much else, which is not to deny in the least the amazing capacities animals have in there own right. — Manuel

I don’t agree with Zahavi’s version of a pre-reflective self-awareness. He calls it ‘for-meness’ and deems it a self-identify of self , an ongoing feeling that accompanies all my intentional experiences. So I sense the coldness of the refrigerator and I ask sense how it feels for me. To me the issue of a sense of self isn’t a pure self-identity separate from but accompanying all my experiences of objects. I think it has to do with the relative integrity and internal coherence of my moment to moment changes in experience. In other words , self is a structural feature of the relation between my anticipative projecting and the objects that occur into that anticipation.
I think this is relevant not just for humans but other animals too. It deals with the issue of functional autonomy of a self-organizing system. A functionally autonomous cognizer is governed by internal norms which pre-select how it perceives its environment. I think the at normative projecting gives the experienced its sense of a relative self identity over time.

these meanings are not those this thread were intended to discuss. — T Clark

Well, I think they actually are; but given that it is your thread and you are so adamant, i'll let it go for now.

I've considerable sympathy for the method you wish to use, it being not dissimilar to that of J. L. Austin.

So I'll make a different contribution, perhaps as partial recompense, by referring to https://www.etymonline.com/

c. 1600, "knowing, privy to" (poetic), from Latin conscius "knowing, aware," from conscire "be (mutually) aware," from assimilated form of com "with," or "thoroughly" (see con-) + scire "to know" (see science). The Latin word probably is a loan-translation of Greek syneidos.

"to know with".

We get a similar analysis, of course, for conscience (n.):

The sense of "knowing or perceiving within oneself, sensible inwardly, aware" is from 1630s, perhaps a shortening of conscious to oneself (1620s).

So the term carried with it a mutuality.

Consciousness is not private.

To me the issue of a sense of self isn’t a pure self-identity separate from but accompanying all my experiences of objects. I think it has to do with the relative integrity and internal coherence of my moment to moment changes in experience. In other words , self is a structural feature of the relation between my anticipative projecting and the objects that occur into that anticipation. — Joshs

Sure. But do you think that in, for example, seeing your hand and recognizing it as such, as belonging to you would be somewhat similar in the case of an animal with one of its limbs? The recognizing the limb as a part of you?

I don't know. But I intuit a difference. I admit, it could be way off.

I think the at normative projecting gives the experienced its sense of a relative self identity over time. — Joshs

Perhaps. The issue for this thread would be, do you think animals recognize experience as an issue for them or would they take it as a given that is nothing that raises "reflection" in such an animal?

It is my understanding that young infants have to learn the difference between what is part of them and what is outside. — T Clark

“...this traditional hypothesis which takes
the infant’s experience to be initially impersonal and anonymous has been rejected
unequivocally by dominant positions in contemporary developmental psychology. On the basis of numerous experimental data it is now assumed that the infant already from birth begins to experience itself, and that it never passes through a period of total self/other nondifferentiation. As both Stern, Neisser and Butterworth have argued, there is no symbiotic-like phase, and thereexists no systematic and pervasive confusion between the child’s experience of self and other, nor between the child’s experience of the other and of the world.” Dan Zahavi

Consciousness is not private. — Banno

What does that mean?

Something like we don't have our own thoughts, feelings and sensations if they're not expressible to other people?

The issue for this thread would be, do you think animals recognize experience as an issue for them or would they take it as a given that is nothing that raises "reflection" in such an animal? — Manuel

I’m not sure if ‘recognizing experience as an issue’ is a thing. That is , some special capacity of thought above and beyond good old fashion reflection. I do think higher animals reflect, so I don’t think however you want to characterize what it is people
do when they reflect on experience as their own belongs to some special capacity only humans posses. We’ve been down this anthrocentric road before. It wasn’t long ago that supposedly only humans had emotions, language, culture, cognition or tool use.
We now are beginning to learn that other animals have all kinds of complex cognitive abilities, including self-recognition and empathy.

Yeah, no doubt there's a lot to learn about animals.

I have some big doubts, even if I grant your point about anthropomorphism. I think there are aspects of human beings which belong to us alone such as creativity, language (human language is unique compared to animals communication), aesthetics, etc.

But on some aspects such as ethics, perception and intelligence, we may be less special than we think.

In any case point registered.

Somethings lie that.

So I'll make a different contribution, perhaps as partial recompense, by referring to https://www.etymonline.com/

c. 1600, "knowing, privy to" (poetic), from Latin conscius "knowing, aware," from conscire "be (mutually) aware," from assimilated form of com "with," or "thoroughly" (see con-) + scire "to know" (see science). The Latin word probably is a loan-translation of Greek syneidos.

"to know with". — Banno

Interesting website.
This refers to the word 'conscious'. Why did you choose 'to know with' rather than ' to be thoroughly aware' ?

So, to add on the - ness of it all, from the same website:

- ness

word-forming element denoting action, quality, or state, attached to an adjective or past participle to form an abstract noun, from Old English -nes(s), from Proto-Germanic *in-assu- (cognates: Old Saxon -nissi, Middle Dutch -nisse, Dutch -nis, Old High German -nissa, German -nis, Gothic -inassus), from *-in-, originally belonging to the noun stem, + *-assu-, abstract noun suffix, probably from the same root as Latin -tudo (see -tude).

From this, 'consciousness' :
'an action, quality or state' related to:
'knowing with, mutually or thoroughly'
or
'being aware with, mutually or thoroughly'
or
'being privy to'

I am not sure if this helps in any way.
It raises more questions...
What is it we are aware with or of ?

In any case, it reminds me why with regards to 'consciousness' and brain states, I think neuroscience is more useful than this kind of philosophical dancing in the dark.
Fascinating as it all is...

Why did you choose 'to know with' rather than ' to be thoroughly aware' ? — Amity

In order to bring out the aspect of mutuality, mentioned in the text.

The example from first aid shows that consciousness is something we see in others. I think it inherently interactive - mutual. The tendency in some is to treat it as a private phenomena, with talk of "what it is like...", qualia and such. The entomology shows this to be a recent rendering.

See also

awareness (n.)
"state of being aware," 1828, from aware + -ness. Earlier was awaredom (1752).

aware (adj.)
late Old English gewær "watchful, vigilant," from Proto-Germanic *ga-waraz (source also of Old Saxon giwar, Middle Dutch gheware, Old High German giwar, German gewahr), from *ga-, intensive prefix, + *waraz "wary, cautious," from PIE root *wer- (3) "perceive, watch out for."

and

*wer- (3)
Proto-Indo-European root meaning "perceive, watch out for."
It forms all or part of: Arcturus; avant-garde; award; aware; beware; Edward; ephor; garderobe; guard; hardware; irreverence; lord; panorama; pylorus; rearward; regard; revere; reverence; reverend; reward; software; steward; vanguard; ward; warden; warder; wardrobe; ware (n.) "manufactured goods, goods for sale;" ware (v.) "to take heed of, beware;" warehouse; wary.
It is the hypothetical source of/evidence for its existence is provided by: Latin vereri "to observe with awe, revere, respect, fear;" Greek ouros "a guard, watchman," horan "to see;" Hittite werite- "to see;" Old English weard "a guarding, protection; watchman, sentry, keeper."

So awareness is a word more suited to private issues.

I think we see it others because we recognize it in ourselves. If we didn't we wouldn't be able to recognize it in others. The idea is that person is like-me, because s/he is doing things I would do if I were in that situation.

In any case, I agree with Russell when he argues that our most intimate acquaintance with things consist of our own percepts followed by the percepts of other people and finally to theories of the world, in that order. In short, I don't think that communication is essential to private life.

But the etymology you present is quite interesting. The word "consciousness", according to Udo Thiel, was first given philosophical use by Ralph Cudworth. He clearly thought we had private experience. But that's besides the point.

The example from first aid shows that consciousness is something we see in others. I think it inherently interactive - mutual. — Banno

I think it is also something we see in ourselves; 'thoroughly' would bring out this aspect.
The First Aid course example was broad. It included all the aspects.
At a minimum 3 people are involved: the trainer, the trainee and the person being treated. Knowledge, awareness and experience - a holistic view.
The meanings as outlined in the OP can be seen in each individual and their interaction.

I don't think it is a mystery. I think most of the confusion comes from a lack of imagination. People can't help but think that consciousness is something special and that we need to identify special sources for it. — T Clark

It sometimes seem to me that trying to parse the idea of consciousness is like trying to understand what Spinoza meant by God.

...it... — Manuel

Consciousness?

Like any word, we learn to use it by using it; we develop an understanding of its use by making use of it.

It's not as if a baby knows what consciousness is, and learns to use the word to refer to what they already have in mind. Rather, they learn what consciousness is as they learn to use the word.

Edit: That bit seems important, so I'm bolding it, so as it gets noticed.

We use consciousness before saying anything. Learning consciousness is akin to saying that we learn how to grow legs or learn how to digest food.

A child may be living with non-human animals and will be conscious, though doubtless it will be somewhat restricted compared to human being than speaks.

One thing is understanding, another is having. Or so it seems to me.

It's quite late here, so if you don't mind, we can continue whenever you want. Maybe I learn more about consciousness, no doubt. :cool:

On the other hand...

Here is a consciousness.

And yet, it's a certainty :grimace: