I have a question. You interpret database normalization as "a process wherein redundancy, inconsistency and generally artificiality are eliminated from database design." But, in fact, data is in a much more natural state in its un-normalized form and normalization actually represents the imposition of a constraint of artificial abstraction (for reasons of computational flexibility, granted). In actual application, de-normalized materialized views restructure that data in the most naturally useful ways.

So I guess I'm questioning your interpretation and approach using the analogy or model of normalization?

Thanks for taking a look Pantagruel. Fair question/comment. In the context of database normalization, yes, I suppose you might be able to say data is non-normalized in its natural state. I’m not really basing my theory on a comparison to database normalization however, just giving credit where credit is due (since that’s how I thought of the idea).

Thanks for taking a look Pantagruel. Fair question/comment. In the context of database normalization, yes, I suppose you might be able to say data is non-normalized in its natural state. I’m not really basing my theory on a comparison to database normalization however, just giving credit where credit is due (since that’s how I thought of the idea).

Interesting read. I notice
there is brief mention of a handful of philosophers. I mention this because whenever a philosopher offers a hermetically sealed set of concepts with its own idiosyncratic jargon there is the risk that they are reinventing the wheel without realizing it. That’s why bringing in the larger community of philosophers and situating your thinking in relation to theirs is helpful to your readers. It lets us know who you have read and who you haven’t, and how you interpret their ideas with respect to your own. As it stands I’m left to surmise that your thinking has resonances with Wittgenstein , Peirce and perhaps Levinas. You may want to elaborate on your reference to a God’s eye view of absolute
truth.

Ok, but it does coincide with your theory that there could be a "complete agreement on matters sufficiently abstract that they remain insulated from the particulars of specific belief systems." The fact is, abstraction is just another kind of specific belief system, and one which seems to me to have the shortcoming of artificiality, per the example of database normalization. I think I take the opposite approach, that of establishing a bridge or common ground between different belief systems. There may be as many different belief systems as there are thinking beings.

Thanks very much, Joshs. I’m actually not very familiar with Levinas, although I just read up on him a bit and I can see why you might think we share some ideas. But yes, I’ve always really connected with Wittgenstein, both the earlier and the later. And Peirce has been an influence as well.

For what it’s worth, I’m also interested in anyone’s answer to the stated question as well, generally.

Pamtagruel, a big part of the takeaway of my philosophy is that what is natural and what is artificial is contextual, and the direction of that contextuality ultimately hinges on rational hope vs. cynicism. In the hopeful sense, I believe abstraction is entirely natural in the human mind in the absence of constraints and interference. And in either case, abstraction is not in itself a specific belief system—that idea seems confused to me. I absolutely agree with you about building bridges and establishing common ground—however, the infrastructure required to do this is exactly the abstract and the general. In this way, I believe, we both in fact value abstraction and generality in this sense, and therefore agree.

Belief in the importance of abstraction/generality is a belief of a higher logical order, and therefore by nature it assists in building bridges between beliefs of lower logical orders.

Belief in the importance of abstraction/generality is a belief of a higher logical order, and therefore by nature it assists in building bridges between beliefs of lower logical orders. — Adam Hilstad

And I would counter with a quote from the final sentence of the book I just finished now by Max Scheler, in the final essay on "Idealism and Realism." He is discussing the illusion that there is some kind of "lawful formal-mechanical structure" that is independent of the vital life-projects of a living being:

"It is only if we are not conscious of the artificial abstraction from the existential relativity of this structure to life and of life, in turn, to spirit, that the illusion is created that this structure is valid for the absolute reality of the world."

There isn't any way to completely abstract from the lived-experience of the life-project, which is fundamental; more fundamental than the notion of some abstract objective reality, which is an illusion. If there is a higher logical order, it is being created through moral action, I would say. In which case, belief-systems and life-projects are indispensable.

Scheler's project of "essential intuition" (his version of the phenomenological reduction) does involve abstracting from all "vital projects" of life in order to intuit the essence of the real. Perhaps that is the bridge. but this essential intuition is personal, not communicative. I believe in the context of communication, we are thrust back into the realm of the project of coordinating belief systems (discourse theory, deliberative democracy, Parsons, Habermas, etc.)

This is an interesting philosophy. I haven’t read all of it yet, but at this point I’d agree with Pantagruel, in that un-normalised seems to me a more natural state, with abstraction being limited by artificiality.

"It is only if we are not conscious of the artificial abstraction from the existential relativity of this structure to life and of life, in turn, to spirit, that the illusion is created that this structure is valid for the absolute reality of the world."

There isn't any way to completely abstract from the lived-experience of the life-project, which is fundamental; more fundamental than the notion of some abstract objective reality, which is an illusion. If there is a higher logical order, it is being created through moral action, I would say. In which case, belief-systems and life-projects are indispensable. — Pantagruel

This, I think, highlights the same issue I have noticed with Adam’s philosophy so far - the assumption that an abstraction is absolute. Perhaps a natural, un-normalised state of understanding may be the key to examining this...

There isn't any way to completely abstract from the lived-experience of the life-project, which is fundamental; more fundamental than the notion of some abstract objective reality, which is an illusion. If there is a higher logical order, it is being created through moral action, I would say. In which case, belief-systems and life-projects are indispensable.

I feel as though you’re manufacturing disagreement where there is none. I will say, that there isn’t any way to completely abstract experience is an assumption, as is saying that abstract reality is an illusion (although objectivity is admittedly always tentative). I completely however agree that higher logical order is created through moral action—that is the whole gist of my philosophy. And yes, in that sense I completely agree that belief systems and life projects are important.

Hi Possibility, thanks for the comment. In my mind, the idea that the non-normalized is more natural, at least in the context of human understanding, is a product of irrational cynicism. Once the process of normalization is truly catalyzed, it becomes entirely natural.

In my mind, the idea that the non-normalized is more natural, at least in the context of human understanding, is a product of irrational cynicism. Once the process of normalization is truly catalyzed, it becomes entirely natural. — Adam Hilstad

I am still reading, and I think I follow what you’re saying - under your qualification of ‘human understanding’. I’m not suggesting that the non-normalised is particularly natural for humans, but that it points to a more universally natural perspective from which we can critically examine and refine our reasoning and conceptual structures. I think Kant’s notion of the ‘aesthetic idea’ and the fourth moment takes us into this space, at least.

As for your label of irrational cynicism, I had to laugh. Being accused of ‘cynicism’ is a new experience for me. I don’t think we are naturally motivated as humans by rationality, and I think you do recognise this. Your use of metaphorical terms such as ‘hope’, ‘faith’, ‘intuition’ and ‘love’ suggest that there is more work to do here in understanding the process from idea to action, that’s all.

I’m not saying I have answers - just drawing attention to an area where I think most ‘worthwhile’ philosophical systems continue to fall down. We’re reluctant to transcend this normalised conception of ‘human understanding’ without grounding the process in an assumption of ‘correct’ logic, and I think it’s holding us back from our capacity to restructure and improve it based on a less anthropomorphic idea of ‘natural’.

Thanks for reading, Possibility. I actually disagree, in that I believe it is irrationally cynical to deny that we are naturally motivated by rationality. Additionally, the terms ‘hope’, ‘faith’, ‘intuition’ and ‘love’ are used here as technical terms used solely to define a certain mechanics of mentality.

I feel as though you’re manufacturing disagreement where there is none. I will say, that there isn’t any way to completely abstract experience is an assumption, as is saying that abstract reality is an illusion (although objectivity is admittedly always tentative). I completely however agree that higher logical order is created through moral action—that is the whole gist of my philosophy. And yes, in that sense I completely agree that belief systems and life projects are important. — Adam Hilstad

Don't get me wrong, your style is clear, and I see lots of excellent assumptions. "Meaning, in an important sense, is always determined by what an expression ought to mean. Meaning is ethical." I think this is insightful. "If we don’t make some effort to understand that with which we disagree, then who will?" This reminds me of Habermas. But the way you wrap it in this overarching concept of normalization seems overly-analytical.

"Normalization may also be understood as the continuous, iterative neutralization of artificiality within the understanding."

This seems artificial; understanding is natural, we make it artificial, when we over-analyze, and forget that it is an ongoing balanced project of analysis and synthesis, often occurring at an intuitive level. That said, I admire an ambitious system and it may work well for those with more of a taste for analyticity; I'm more of a holistic thinker.

Thanks Pantagruel. I suppose I believe that we are truly rational animals. I believe Aristotle was right about that. I believe that the ideas that “people are stupid”, or that “people don’t think” are truisms, and greatly obscure progress in the world.

Thanks Pantagruel. I suppose I believe that we are truly rational animals. — Adam Hilstad

I believe that rationality is a capacity. But as thinking beings, we also have another capacity for self-deception. This is where philosophy (for me) really gets challenging, both as a personal and a social project....

Cheers! :)

I believe that rationality is a capacity. But as thinking beings, we also have another capacity for self-deception. This is where philosophy (for me) really gets challenging, both as a personal and a social project.... — Pantagruel

:up:

Very true.