Do you hold that such a naturalistic explanation must entail a bottom-up explanation from a lower level of, let’s say, bosons? If so, do you hold that this is in principle possible? — Querius

Generally I argue against reductionism and philosophical materialism - so, no.

I can see the sense of methodological naturalism, which amounts to the bracketing out of metaphysical questions as a matter of practical reason. But I think it is often forgotten that this bracketing out has been done, leading to a view that naturalism can be complete, in principle, when in fact it has proceeded by excluding something important in the first place. There is a kind of a cultural amnesia arising from that, in my view, going back to the early modern period, culminating in the kind of scientific naturalism which is nowadays the default worldview of the global intelligentsia.

What does the fact that the universe is ever-changing — cyclic or otherwise — tell us about the nature of immutable laws? — Querius

The cyclic nature of the Universe doesn't really have that much bearing on the idea of the immutability of natural laws. I mean, it's possible to conceive of those laws in such a way that they will hold in any possible worlds, even if in some other respects those worlds are wildly different.

But the general point I am trying to make is that whilst a great deal can be explained on the basis of natural law, the question of 'why there are natural laws' is not one of the things that can be explained! It's really is a meta-physical question, in that it's asking 'why physical laws?' So, questions about the 'order of nature' are of a different kind to questions about 'the nature of order', if you like. And I think that is often neglected.

I think it'd be useful to just drop the term "law". Instead talk about wave/particle behaviour and our descriptions of it. Our descriptions will change if (or when) we observe stuff to behave in a way other than how we describe it to behave. That's pretty straightforward. The real question, then, is whether or not wave/particle behaviour can change. Could it be that electrons behaved differently in the past, or will behave differently in the future, or do behave differently elsewhere in the universe?

The cyclic nature of the Universe doesn't really have that much bearing on the idea of the immutability of natural laws.
— Wayfarer

Does an ever-changing universe (cyclic or progressively expanding) have bearing on the idea that physical processes determine the laws and not vice versa? If the universe is ever-changing, and processes determine the laws, would that not necessarily result in ever-changing laws — contrary to what we find?

I mean, it's possible to conceive of those laws in such a way that they will hold in any possible worlds, even if in some other respects those worlds are wildly different.
— Wayfarer

If those laws are not contingent, but exist necessarily, does that scenario exclude the possibility that those laws are determined bottom-up by physical processes? It seems to me that ‘wildly different’ physical processes cannot produce the same laws.

If all the talk about laws simply comes down to quantum mechanics, then there are no laws, since quantum mechanics limits itself on what it can know and predict. It is merely a probabilistic description of what might happen within a narrowly defined system.

Numbers are not mathematics. They are symbols of an observed multiplicity in space, and yes these symbols have changed over time. Nothing is immutable.

If all the talk about laws simply comes down to quantum mechanics, then there are no laws, since quantum mechanics limits itself on what it can know and predict. It is merely a probabilistic description of what might happen within a narrowly defined system. — Rich

I don't get this. If a physical law just is a description of how things behave then if we have a description of how things behave then we have a physical law. That the description includes "could be this or this" doesn't make it any less a description.

Quantum mechanics is a limited description (it has self imposed limits) on how ca system of particles may behaved depending upon a system being observed. There is no precision and it is very limited in what it can say. It's not a law. It's just a way of viewing quanta for limited purpose - and our understanding changes as our knowledge changes.

However, of the Schrodinger equation, wave-particle duality, and the Uncertainty Principle is all that science has to call a law, then it is important to recognize the limitations of this concept of natural laws.

Quantum mechanics is a limited description (it has self imposed limits) on how ca system of particles may behaved depending upon a system being observed. There is no precision and it is very limited in what it can say. It's not a law. It's just a way of viewing quanta for limited purpose - and our understanding changes as our knowledge changes. — Rich

And what's a law? My suggestion is that a law just is a description. So if there's a description then ipso facto there's a law.

Alternatively, a physical law just is the way things behave. So if there are things that behave then ipso facto there's a law.

Either way, your comment above is the exact sort of thing that can be addressed by dropping the term "law" and just talking about things behaving certain ways and us describing these things and their behaviour. Clearly the term "law" creates problems out of thin air.

If a physical law is just a limited mathematical description of a some limited behavior of matter that is mutable over time then I would prefer to call it a speculative theory of wave fields subject to change.

So your issue here isn't one of metaphysics or ontology or epistemology or anything like that? It's just about the appropriateness of a particular label?

This is exactly why I suggest dropping the label altogether. We end up arguing over nothing.

I agree. Talking about physical laws in some abstract manner serves no purpose. It is easier and more productive to just discuss the specifics that are applicable. No reason to maintain the concept of natural physical laws. It just muddies the water for lack of precision.

I like your circle metaphor. However, how does one get from “unlawfulness” to a (perfect) circle?
Also I don’t see how the circle metaphor elucidates the existence of various fundamental constants, which could have been very different; see the multiverse hypothesis. IOWs in many cases the existence of limits (a la the circle form) is not apparent. — Querius

The perfect circle though cannot be a real, or natural figure, and this is indicated by the irrational nature of pi. So the analogy of spinning a circle is a flawed analogy, because there cannot be a real, perfect circle, spinning in time, in order to fulfil the analogy. The perfect circle can only exist as an ideal. This was Aristotle's mistake, he assumed an eternal circular motion as unmoved mover. But such an unmoved mover would require the real existence of a perfect circle. To fulfill the conditions of eternal circular motion, the circle must be perfect, just like the circle must be perfect to fulfill the conditions of the analogy.

And what's a law? My suggestion is that a law just is a description. So if there's a description then ipso facto there's a law. — Michael

The problem is that the law is a sort of "ideal" description, just like the perfect circle is an ideal. How the ideal relates to what actually exists is another issue altogether.

My suggestion is that a law just is a description. — Michael

That would be the nominalist view; by contrast, a realist would say that a "law of nature" is a real tendency or habit that governs actual things and events, but is not reducible to them. If a law is merely a description, then there is no good reason to think that it would apply to future behavior, since different things and events are involved; yet we make successful predictions all the time, not just in science, but in everyday living.

The perfect circle though cannot be a real, or natural figure, and this is indicated by the irrational nature of pi. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I have noted before, the perfect circle can be real, just not actual. The irrational nature of pi has nothing to do with it - the circumference of a circle is incommensurable with its diameter, which just means that the two cannot be measured by a common unit.

I also said that the law could just be the actual behaviour. What I'm questioning is the notion of the law as some third thing. So it's not that there's gravity, our mathematical model which describes gravity, and a law of gravity. There's just the first two.

So it's not that there's gravity, our mathematical model which describes gravity, and a law of gravity. There's just the first two. — Michael

How are you distinguishing "gravity" from the "law of gravity"?

I'm not, but it seems that others do. I'm questioning this distinction.

To rephrase, what is gravity if not the law of gravity? Are you defining it as the actual behavior, or is it a real tendency or habit that governs that behavior without being reducible to it?

To rephrase, what is gravity if not the law of gravity? Are you defining it as the actual behavior, or is it a real tendency or habit that governs that behavior without being reducible to it? — aletheist

I'd say it's the bending of space-time (or the moving of bodies with mass towards each other as a result; I'm not sure). I don't even know what it would mean to talk about a tendency or habit that governs this behaviour.

Successful, precise predictions never occur. What does occur are useful guesses and approximations. This is why I prefer Sheldrake's preferred use of habit as opposed to law, allowing for approximate repetitive events but not precisely what is predicted. Bergson made a point of nothing ever repeating because what might be is always necessarily different than what was.

Suppose that I am holding a stone. If I were to let go of it, then it would fall to the ground. This proposition is true, regardless of whether I ever actually let go of the stone. It expresses a tendency or habit - a conditional necessity - that really governs the stone's behavior in an inexhaustible continuum of possible cases, so it is not reducible to any actual occurrence or collection thereof.

There is a speculative mathematical description of how gravity behaves which is one thing. However, this description is not gravity. Gravity is something we feel and acts upon objects in all directions and all distances. There is no law of gravity, there are just some tentative equations which may be useful for synchronizing clocks. The non-reciprocity of accelerated bodies in General Relativity appears to be in contraction to the reciprocity of all systems which is the basis of Special Relativity. I do not know if any such requirement in quantum physics which rests on an entirely different foundation.

Without cohesion, we just have useful mathematical equations but certainly no laws.

Successful, precise predictions never occur. — Rich

Who said anything about precision? We make successful predictions all the time, since success does not require absolute precision.

This is why I prefer Sheldrake's preferred use of habit as opposed to law, allowing for approximate repetitive events but not precisely what is predicted. — Rich

I am not familiar with Sheldrake, but Peirce had the same preference; hence my references to "tendency or habit" above. I suspect that it is also why he consistently talked about "generals" rather than "universals" when discussing nominalism vs. realism.

There is a speculative mathematical description of how gravity behaves which is one thing. However, this description is not gravity. Gravity is something we feel and acts upon objects in all directions and all distances. — Rich

I haven't suggested otherwise?

Suppose that I am holding a stone. If I were to let go of it, then it would fall to the ground. This proposition is true, regardless of whether I ever actually let go of the stone. It expresses a tendency or habit - a conditional necessity - that really governs the stone's behavior in an inexhaustible continuum of possible cases, so it is not reducible to any actual occurrence or collection thereof. — aletheist

I don't see how a counterfactual can be considered a physical-law-as-habit. Seems like reifying.

There v is no law of gravity, there are just some tentative equations which may be useful for synchronizing clocks. — Rich

The law of gravity is not the same thing as the mathematical model that we often use to represent it. Again, it is a real tendency or habit that governs actual things and events such that if certain conditions were to obtain, then certain outcomes would follow.

I don't see how a counterfactual can be considered a physical-law-as-habit. — Michael

Do you deny the truth of the proposition, "If I were to let go of a stone, then it would fall to the ground"? If not, how do you explain it? What else would "a physical-law-as-habit" be, if not this kind of conditional necessity?

Do you deny the truth of the proposition, "If I were to let go of a stone, then it would fall to the ground"? If not, how do you explain it? — aletheist

It's true because things in such situations behave in such ways. I don't know why this is supposed to entail laws-as-habits.

What else would "a physical-law-as-habit" be, if not this kind of conditional necessity?

I'm not the one saying that physical laws are habits, so I don't know why you're asking me.

There is a speculative mathematical description of how gravity behaves ....

That would be a description of the law of gravity.

However, this description is not gravity.

Indeed. A description of a thing is not the thing itself.

Gravity is something we feel and affects objects. There v is no law of gravity, there are just some tentative equations which may be useful for synchronizing clocks.

From 'descriptions of the law of gravity are not the real thing’ it does not follow that there is no actual law of gravity.

… we just have useful mathematical equations but certainly no laws.

Useful mathematical equations are not actual laws of nature, but that simple fact does not tell us that there are no laws of nature.