Socrates wraps up his defense by saying:

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier. (69 b-c)

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage.

Cebes breaks in:

Socrates, the rest seems to me to be beautifully put, but what you say about the soul induces a lot of distrust in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she is free of the body, is no longer anywhere, and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being dies; and that as soon as she’s free of the body and departs, then, scattered like breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. Of course, if she could be somewhere, herself by herself, collected together and freed from those evils you went through just now, there'd be a great hope - a beautiful hope - that what you say, Socrates, is true. But this point that the soil is when the human being dies and holds onto both some power and thoughtfulness - probably stands in need of more than a little persuasive talk and assurance.(70a)

Cebes hopefulness amounts to saying that if what Socrates says, that the soul is somewhere herself by herself, is true then is true. Cebes states it in such a way that the latter follows as a conclusion from the former, but both state the same thing.

Socrates responds:

What you say is true, Cebes, but now what should we do? Or do you want us to tell a more thorough story about these things to see whether what we’re saying is likely or not?” (70a-b)

Socrates proposes telling a more thorough story in order to see if the stories he has told are likely or not. He shifts from Cebes ‘true’ to ‘likely’. He proposes to “investigate it in some such was as this”. (70c)

… do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an
ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead; yet if this is so, if living people are born again from those who have died, surely our souls would have to exist in that world? Because they could hardly be born again, if they didn't exist; so it would be sufficient evidence for the truth of these claims, if it really became plain that living people are born from the dead and from nowhere else; but if that isn't so, some other argument would be needed.' (70c-d)

But, of course, some other argument is needed. The living come from the living. The argument that life comes from death requires a soul that does not come to be or die. Now perhaps a soul separate from the senses, a priori, might think that the living come from the dead, but our experience informs us that we are born of living parents.

Socrates now shifts from living things to beauty and ugly, just and unjust, larger and smaller. It should be noted that he mentions justice and beauty but not the good. According to the argument, doing good would result in doing bad. (70e)

In the Republic Socrates says that the Good: "provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one who knows". It is "the cause of the knowledge and truth". Further, "existence and being" are the result of the Good. (508e - 509b)

The argument from opposites concludes with the claim that this movement must be circular:

And similarly, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake in life were to die, but when they'd died, the dead remained in that form, and didn't come back to life, wouldn't it be quite inevitable that everything would ultimately be dead, and nothing would live? Because if the living things came to be from the other things, but the living things were to die, what could possibly prevent everything from being completely spent in being dead?' (72 b-d)

Perhaps Cebes is persuaded by this, but it assumes what is still to be proven, the continuation of the soul in death, and ignores the obvious fact of generation of life from the living.

'Yes, and besides, Socrates,' Cebes replied, 'there's also that argument you're always putting forward, that our learning is actually nothing but recollection; according to that too, if it's true, what we are now reminded of we must have learned at some former time. But that would be impossible, unless our souls existed somewhere before being born in this human form; so in this way too, it appears that the soul is something deathless.' (72e-73a)

Two points to be noted here. Socrates just went through this long argument from opposites, how life comes from death, but if the soul is deathless then it could not come to be or become again from its opposite.

Second, note the qualification: “if it is true”. Simmias does not share Cebes enthusiasm. He does not place his hope in the possibility that it might be true. He wants to be reminded of the demonstrations that it is true. There is a play here between recollection and remembering.

'One beautiful argument,' said Cebes, 'is that when people are questioned, and if the questions are well put, they state the truth about everything for themselves-and yet unless knowledge and a correct account were present within them, they'd be unable to do this; thus, if one takes them to diagrams or anything else of that sort, one has there the plainest evidence that this is so.' (73b)

He is referring to the demonstration in the Meno where a slave without any education is able to solve a complex geometric problem. Cebes mentions but seems to fail to recognize the importance of Socrates’ “well put” questions. Without them the slave would have never “recollected” the solution. The irony here should not go unnoticed. An overarching question of the dialogue is about teaching and learning. Socrates teaches him how to solve the problem and yet claims it was recollection. This is not the place to get into it, but the difference between Meno’s problem, teaching virtue to someone like Meno who is lacking in virtue and teaching someone geometry is very different. There is a sense in which virtue must already be in the soul if one is ever to be virtuous, but it is not evident that the same holds for mathematical knowledge.

Socrates breaks in:

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded". Actually, from the way Cebes set about stating it, I do almost recall it and am nearly
convinced; but I'd like, none the less, to hear now how you set about stating it yourself.'

'I'll put it this way. We agree, I take it, that if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.'

'Certainly.'

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something. In the example given recollection is independent of stories of death. Socrates now shifts from things perceived to “the equal itself”. (74a).

'But still, it is from those equals, different as they are from that equal, that you have thought of and got the knowledge of it?' (74c)

It is through the combination of sense and thought that we perceive that things are equal. That this is either based on or leads to recollection of “the equal itself” is questionable.

'Then we must previously have known the equal, before that time when we first, on seeing the equals, thought that all of them were striving to be like the equal but fell short of it. (75a)

All that is necessary to see how implausible this is is to consider how we learned what it means for things to be equal. But Socrates’ concern is not simply with the equal:

Because our present argument concerns the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and just and holy, no less than the equal; in fact, as I say, it concerns everything on which we set this seal, "what it is", in the questions we ask and in the answers we give. (75d)

Can the earlier argument for opposites be reconciled with “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself”? What each is itself does not allow for its opposite.

As Socrates wraps up this argument we should not overlook a difficulty that is introduced but only developed later:

Just as sure as these beings are, so also our soul is (76e)

The problem is that “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself” are each one and distinct from things we call beautiful, good, and just. If the soul is in the same way they are then “the soul itself” exists, and my soul and your soul are like the things that are beautiful, good, and just, things that admit of their opposite. Things that come to be and pass away.

I am not going to allow you to dictate how I will proceed in this thread. I will follow Plato's lead, attending to what is said and done in the the dialogue in the order it occurs. It is only once we have seen the whole that we can see how everything fits together, with each part serving its purpose. — Fooloso4

You can proceed any way you wish. I don't care and I'm not stopping you. I'm simply pointing out that there are major inconsistencies in your statements.

Like all other philosophers, Plato naturally preferred to convey his teachings orally, from master to disciple as had always been the practice. Hence he was reportedly reluctant to write down anything. Whatever he did write down is obviously incomplete and ambiguous and may be interpreted in many different ways.

There is, however, a scholarly consensus as to the core teachings that can be extracted from the available texts. You seem to deny both the scholarly consensus and the Platonic tradition itself.

If your claim that "He teaches those who are thoughtful and perspicacious enough how to philosophize. To the careful reader he does not provide answers, although there are plenty of things he says that can be latched onto as answers", then you can read into the dialogues anything you like and you don't need a discussion.

Since you have already decided to reject both the Platonic tradition and the scholarly consensus, the conclusions cannot be anything but your personal opinion, in which case you might as well state from the beginning what that opinion is.

There is, however, a scholarly consensus as to the core teachings that can be extracted from the available texts. — Apollodorus

That makes the whole discussion kind of pointless, doesn't it? — Apollodorus

I must intervene here because quite simply you are spoiling the thread with your focus on @Fooloso4.
It is not the case that the discussion is pointless. Perhaps it is to you but not to me, or anyone else who simply wants to read Plato's Phaedo.

Even if there is a degree of scholarly consensus, that is beside the point as far as I am concerned.
I am here to read and think for myself first and foremost. Then to write and exchange thoughts about the extract in question.
As mentioned previously, I had wanted to do this without recourse to secondary sources.
A change for me.
However, given the turn of events, I looked up one of the SEP entries concerning Plato.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/

what we often receive from Plato is a few key ideas together with a series of suggestions and problems about how those ideas are to be interrogated and deployed.

Readers of a Platonic dialogue are drawn into thinking for themselves about the issues raised, if they are to learn what the dialogue itself might be thought to say about them. Many of his works therefore give their readers a strong sense of philosophy as a living and unfinished subject (perhaps one that can never be completed) to which they themselves will have to contribute.

All of Plato's works are in some way meant to leave further work for their readers, but among the ones that most conspicuously fall into this category are: Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, and Parmenides. — SEP article on Plato

[my bolds]

I will follow Plato's lead, attending to what is said and done in the the dialogue in the order it occurs. It is only once we have seen the whole that we can see how everything fits together, with each part serving its purpose. — Fooloso4

@Fooloso4 has patiently explained his approach a few times now.
It works for me and, hopefully, for others reading along.
Please respect the spirit, allow a 'thinking for ourselves' without any further side-tracking, thanks.

Plato naturally preferred to convey his teachings orally — Apollodorus

We know nothing of his oral teachings. I asked you to provide authentication of any oral teaching. You could not.

You seem to deny both the scholarly consensus and the Platonic tradition itself. — Apollodorus

I deny that there is a scholarly consensus. The fact that you think there is shows that you really do not know what is going on today.

There has been an important reappraisal in the way the dialogues are read. Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen, Thomas Pangle, and Seth Benardete, and their students, including Charles Griswold, Rhonna Burger, David Roochnik, Laurence Lampert , and many others.

then you can read into the dialogues anything you like and you don't need a discussion. — Apollodorus

It is evident that you have not been reading what I have written and have not checked it against the text. You have not made even one specific textual comment on anything I have said. Show me where what I have said cannot be confirmed by the text. I asked you to provide textual evidence for your claim but you have not been able to. Instead of point to Plato's texts you cast about elsewhere.

Thank you.

Many Platonists today look to Plato for religious and quasi-religious answers,often of the Christian variety.

Indeed, Apollodorus comments on the proceedings are unhelpful and unwelcome.

I deny that there is a scholarly consensus. — Fooloso4

This pleases me immensely; A consensus would make this thread mere scholasticism.

That's Aristotle, not Plato...

I think part of the attraction to Plato is the lack of interpretative consensus. Each year, after all this time, hundreds of books and articles are published on Plato. One would think that if a consensus existed none of that would be necessary.

There is a sense in which virtue must already be in the soul if one is ever to be virtuous, but it is not evident that the same holds for mathematical knowledge. — Fooloso4

An interesting wedge...

I have long found the discussion of recollection unconvincing; but this shows how it might have seemed plausible to our Greek companions.

I think part of the attraction to Plato is the lack of interpretative consensus. — Fooloso4

Of course.

There is an obvious methodological error in

if you do want to have a discussion of Plato then it would be helpful to state what you think Plato's core teaching are or are not, and then adduce evidence for or against as the case may be. — Apollodorus

I am not surprised to see this in Apollodorus, having observed a habit of first forming a conclusion and then looking for the arguments that might support it.

I asked you to provide textual evidence for your claim but you have not been able to. — Fooloso4

Of course I have. I said:

"The individual nous is in turn illumined by the Cosmic Nous or Divine Mind. So, there is a continuum extending from Ultimate Reality all the way down to the lowest levels of experience or existence"

To which you said:

"In which of the dialogues does Plato say this?"

Wayfarer already answered that. It isn't my fault that you don't read other people's posts. But here is the text from The Republic 509D-513E if you insist:

"And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind [...]

And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence [...]

You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not generation?[...]

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power."

After which he introduces the line that divides the phenomenal from the noumenal or the physical from the spiritual as I pointed out in my earlier post which you also chose to ignore.

What the text is saying is that above the phenomenal world or world of appearances is the intelligible or noumenal world which is illumined by the Good (ton Agathon). The Good is also the source of all ideas that constitute the intelligible world, copies of which make up the phenomenal world. In other words, the whole of existence, including soul, originates in the Good and is bathed in its light just as the physical world is bathed in the light of the sun.

Very simple, really. I don't know on what basis you are denying it. You may have a reason but you refuse to tell us what it is.

He's not going to stop. We'll have to ask fdrake to help.

We could try appealing to his better nature...
@Apollodorus?

Your objections having been duly noted, please allow the thread to continue without obtrusive interjection.

I've already stated a few times I'm not stopping anyone and I don't care. If you're saying I'm not allowed to respond to posts on this thread, that's fine. Keep your thread. I don't need it.

The problem is that “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself” are each one and distinct from things we call beautiful, good, and just. If the soul is in the same way they are then “the soul itself” exists, and my soul and your soul are like the things that are beautiful, good, and just, things that admit of their opposite. Things that come to be and pass away. — Fooloso4

Gotta love a cliffhanger...

I'm not stopping anyone — Apollodorus

Yeah, you are. I'd like a clear run at the dialogue; your interjections detract from that for me. It seems I am not the only one who thinks so. By all means, start another thread, or wait until we complete the reading; but this is a thread specifically set up to work through the text under @Fooloso4's tutelage.

Let it be.

I don't care — Apollodorus

Obviously disingenuous, since you continue to post.

I find it odd that Cebes seems convinced by the argument at (72 b-d).

My inclination is to say that learning the use of words such as "equal" is exactly learning the concept of equality. On this account there is nothing more to understanding what it is for two things to be equal than to be able to use the word "equal" with success.

For Plato, and others, there is a something more... a reification fo the use of "equal"; making it a thing and necessitating that being able to use the word requires familiarity with that thing.

I hadn't appreciated the similarities between Plato's recollections and, say, Kant's synthetic a priori.

SO we have here the beginnings of a tradition that runs right through to Chomsky's universal grammar.

I am not surprised to see this in Apollodorus, having observed a habit of first forming a conclusion and then looking for the arguments that might support it. — Banno

The same occurred to me but decided not to give him something else to turn into an extended rant about Marxism and liberals.

My inclination is to say that learning the use of words such as "equal" is exactly learning the concept of equality. — Banno

Not arguing with you here, just asking, if you were to teach a child the use of of "equal", how would you do that?

Would you show them two equal sized objects? Something like that? Hope that they get it and are able to abstract from what you show them?

Endpoint being: inquiry may involve examples. An example is not a reification of anything.

Then we could talk about Meno's Paradox, when Fooloso4 is ready.

Understood. Standing down.

"The same" rather than "equal"... the process would be one of drawing attention to what is the same - both are red; despite their being quite different shapes. Both are heavy, despite being made of very different things. So the process is not recollection, but recognising and copying a pattern in the use of a word.

Wayfarer already answered that. It isn't my fault that you don't read other people's posts. — Apollodorus

Actually I read it. And I responded. It is your fault for not reading other people's posts.

The Republic 509D-513E — Apollodorus

This does not support your claim of a Cosmic Mind

This does not support your claim of a Cosmic Mind — Fooloso4

Oooo I can't resist...

If one assumes a cosmic mind, anything might count as evidence for it.

Gotta love a cliffhanger... — Banno

I would throw in some sex but Socrates already said the philosopher has not interest. Although, as I mentioned, at seventy years old he had a young son.

The same" rather than "equal"... the process would be one of drawing attention to what is the same - — Banno

I thought you were teaching them "equal"

Mmmm. Young men tend not to be my fancy, being basically CIS hetro.

IS it that different that the process is dissimilar?

k
IS it that different that the process is dissimilar? — Banno

I guess I'm just wondering why you changed it from equal to same.

I find it odd that Cebes seems convinced by the argument at (72 b-d). — Banno

I will be addressing his eagerness to agree in my next section. As I see it, it has little or nothing to do with the strength of the argument.

A teacher chunks the lesson - building on previous understanding. Learn how to use "red" and "Heavy", then "the same", then "equal".

SO force of habit.