Hmm, It makes more sense that the fundamental substance, matter, can be construed in various forms; just as a log decomposes and changes from a brittle structure to a goopy mess but loses none of its matter.

So properties are not like stickers that are applied to an object, properties are the way matter is acting. A yellow pencil does not have the property of yellow, rather, it is acting in such a way that it exemplifies yellow. Maybe universals represent all that is physically possible, that is, all the different forms that matter can be construed. In which case they would exist in the same way the laws of logic exist, out of abstraction. But I don't think there's some kind of mystical inventory that has all these universals floating around somewhere in abstracta, that reeks of pseudoscientific superstitious nonsense.

Also, I dislike the trend in metaphysics that distinguishes objects as entities in themselves. This makes absolutely no sense to me. I suppose this means I am a mereological nihilist.

Would science have to be wrong about electrons? It would seem to me that if electrons count as a universal, and universals do not exist, then electrons do not exist -- and so saying that the propositions of science are wrong about electrons isn't correct. Rather, this particular proposition isn't about an entity, but it could still be correct.


EDIT:
My inclination would be to say that science does not require universals to exist. But, perhaps, if we believe that science is a good basis for ontology, then science strongly suggests that universals do exist. But if we do not believe that science is a good basis for ontology then there isn't as much at conflict between a denial of universals and the requirements of science to be, well, science.

But I don't think there's some kind of mystical inventory that has all these universals floating around somewhere in abstracta, that reeks of pseudoscientific superstitious nonsense. — darthbarracuda

It is a problematic notion, but the alternative is to explain all our universalizing in terms of particulars only. Because if the particulars can't do the job, then that means the abstracta is necessary, somehow.

aybe universals represent all that is physically possible, that is, all the different forms that matter can be construed. In which case they would exist in the same way the laws of logic exist, out of abstraction. — darthbarracuda

That sounds promising.

My inclination would be to say that science does not require universals to exist. But, perhaps, if we believe that science is a good basis for ontology, then science strongly suggests that universals do exist. — Moliere

Okay, I can agree with this. Can we then say that science requires the utilization of universal concepts to build its theories? Now If science isn't a good basis for ontology, the question becomes could scientific theories in principle be replaced by just talk of particulars? Or perhaps in that case, science is just a useful tool, and not an accurate model of reality.

But on a scientific realist account, electrons, spacetime and energy all exist, and that's strongly suggestive of universals existing.

If it helps, I'm sympathetic to Aristotle's hylomorphism.

Can we then say that science requires the utilization of universal concepts to build its theories? — Marchesk

I don't know if we can because I don't know what a universal concept is. I would agree that scientific theories aim at what is general rather than particular. But aiming at generalities doesn't necessitate universals -- such as a really existing red to which all red particulars correspond, or a universal number "1" to which all particular uses of "1" corresponds [or whatever relation we might posit], even if said universals are merely conceptual. I don't believe that one must be committed one way or the other with said beliefs in order for science to still "hold together" coherently and rationally.

It seems to me that if we are scientific realists then, yes, science strongly suggests universals exist. But if not, then not -- but I don't think that the answer to such a question could be decided via science -- science, itself, does not suggest one or the other. Rather, we believe one or the other, and it is in light of said beliefs about scientific realism/anti-realism which strongly suggests universals existing or not existing (or, perhaps, existing, but not due to science)

Though perhaps I don't quite grasp what is meant by "universal", here -- a bit of a curious word, yes? My understanding of "universal", with respect to the distinction between universal-particular, is that universals really exist and particulars are derivative or somehow participate or are related to this universal. But one might also say "universal" to mean "always applies", but then it seems to me that we're not talking about the problem of universals as much as we're talking about the "All" operator.

It does seem that scientific method needs some universalising terms, whatever you call them. 'Tropes' seems to be in fashion. You have to be able to 'quantify over particulars', it seems, or how will you be able to talk about regularities at all?

It is of course something of an oddity that scientific terms can shift in meaning quite a lot over time. 'Electron' is not what it was in Rutherford's day. 'Gene' is quite a different thing from when Dawkins wrote 'The selfish gene'. 'Species' is quite an uncertain beast. But perhaps that's my own hobby-horse and not this thread's :)

t is of course something of an oddity that scientific terms can shift in meaning quite a lot over time. 'Electron' is not what it was in Rutherford's day. 'Gene' is quite a different thing from when Dawkins wrote 'The selfish gene'. 'Species' is quite an uncertain beast. But perhaps that's my own hobby-horse and not this thread's — mcdoodle

There is that. I recall reading where some physicists have speculated that the fundamental constants vary over time. But I don't know if there is any empirical evidence for this so far.

Just a thought.

Are universals metaphors with particulars as their metonymic counterpart. Perhaps they can be thought that way linguistically.

Not entirely sure what you are suggesting. Perhaps metalinguistic nominalism?

Lakoff and Johnson would say so. In their Philosophy in the Flesh book, they traced Plato's forms to utilization of the kind metaphor. I don't think they gave his work the proper treatment, as they were in kind of a rush to characterize all of western philosophy as being built on top of various metaphors.

The question is whether making universals out to be metaphors dispenses with the issue, and what sort of implications that has for scientific theories. Is GR with it's curved spacetime metaphorical? They seemed to think so.

Just a thought. Not ontological DB, and yes probably like Plato's Forms. (off topic. It is amazing how much is said about Plato's form theory even though Plato in the course of his 35 dialogues had very little to say about it.)

The question is whether making universals out to be metaphors dispenses with the issue, and what sort of implications that has for scientific theories. Is GR with it's curved spacetime metaphorical? They seemed to think so — Marchesk

Heh. Perhaps I am contradicting what I was saying before, but I wouldn't say that metaphors dispense with universals per se -- especially since what seems to be at issue is whether science implies universals. I would say that the question of scientific realism differs from the question of universals, unless one is a scientific realist.

But one could be a realist or an anti-realist of various stripes without this being at issue at all. Yes?