If the USSR won some global economic war it could also claim, as you did, that the US today (in the 'today' where the US is communist) is based on the same damn principles and institutions as the USSR at 'that time' (i.e before the US became communist). 'There was always a firm understanding of what the US would become' the USSR intelligentsia would say, 'there was no other alternative.' — csalisbury

Still don't get it. If the US were communist, then the USSR, upon defeating it, would make it communist? When does the US become communist in this scenario? In any event, using the USSR as an example doesn't work because it lasted less than a century. It meets very easily the criteria for being intolerable.

And I think it would be very hard to argue that the plantation/slave system of the south wasn't a system of property or political rights — csalisbury

On the contrary, I think it would be very easy for him, and anyone, to argue that human beings are not property and that one does not and ought not have the right, political or otherwise, to own them as such.

I'm still reading through essay with a finer tooth comb, but based off what I see:

I do see some issues in regards to slavery and woman's rights, as he mentions. However, I don't think what he refers to as "basic instutions" are things like slavery. It's not what counts as property that is basic, but rather the concept of private property. It's not what Americans would consider conservative economic principles, but rather free market driven economics in general.

I do think there is a problem with not defining "intolerable" with more precision. As Bitter Crank, unenlightened, and others point out, there can be a lot of "people feeling powerless and people making the decision to persist another day, rather than challenge a normally intolerable institution.

Un didn't mean people couldn't do any of those things when he said they were "helpless." He was talking about how people are "helpless" in the face of the freedom of others. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The relevant sense of 'helpless' in my argument is that people are helpless to actually change the basic institution. Because it is only the non-persistence of a basic institution that affects it's so called legitimacy, according to the thesis. Plenty of people have opposed the institution of property in thought, word, and deed. That it persists does not imply acceptance, except the acceptance of the facts s something to be opposed, and the failure to effect change does not imply legitimacy, except the legitimacy of habit. As if we cannot have been getting things fundamentally wrong for thousands of years. Opposition is not proven illegitimate whenever it is ineffective.

The argument about whether slavery or property or the nation state or smallpox is or isn't a basic institution is an irrelevance to my argument, because it arises as a post hoc apologetic to allow change and illegitimacy to have some limited purchase,given the argument of longevity implying acceptance, implying legitimacy. But my argument is that that argument doesn't run for anything at all, not basic institutions, not non- basic institutions, not superficial habits, not natural phenomena, not anything.

There seems to be very little acceptance of Marquez's 'Epistemic' argument for conservatism, and I certainly am completely unpersuaded by it.

What I don't understand is why he thinks a new argument for conservatism is needed. There are plenty of good arguments around for conservatism, going back to Edmund Burke and beyond. That's provided we interpret conservatism as simply meaning 'giving the benefit of the doubt to existing laws, practices and institutions, so that an onus of proof lies on those that wish to have change'.

Etymologically, that's what 'conservative' means. It's only in the bizarre world of US politics that it has come to mean things like wanting to enforce Christian morality on people, denying anthropogenic global warming, opposing immigration and wanting to wind back labour laws and environmental protections.

It's perfectly possible to be a 'conservative' in the etymological or Burkean sense and yet be a pinko, atheist, commie, greenie liberal on the majority of issues of public debate.

Conservatism of that type is simply a practical way of managing public policy. It doesn't need fancy words like Epistemic to justify it.

I can imagine that, living in the world of political philosophy, you have to deal with a lot of people arguing for complete system overhaul. Marquez wants to emphasize a certain aspect of conservative philosophy, the epistemic uncertainty we face in decision making. This essay is mostly meant for an ongoing debate among political philosophers, particularly as an argument against philosophers who want to argue against democratic republics, free market economics, and private property, which I imagine can be quite common in some circles. Based on previous essays I read, most philosophy works are not monumental works like "Justice as Fairness" or "Anarchy, State, and Utopia", but are trying to argue and refine a position in order to make it stronger. I found the essay insightful, though I never read Burke, so maybe it is just treading old ground.

On the contrary, I think it would be very easy for him, and anyone, to argue that human beings are not property and that one does not and ought not have the right, political or otherwise, to own them as such.

Which is precisely to argue that the Southern plantation system was an illegitimate system of property and political rights. & Marquez has some very piquant things to say about legitimacy, if you recall.

Basically, besides the knock-down argument Un already provided, this is the problem with Marquez: So, yes, per @Emptyheady, he's against slavery. Of course. But how does he explain this? He says it's an evil. So, great, people can bring in value systems, independent of the epistemic argument, in order to challenge existing systems - which include systems that, per the epistemic argument, we owe deference to. So - and this is the million dollar question, the one Marquez doesn't (in fact, remaining within his argument, can't) answer: How do we decide when to bring in independent value systems to override the epistemic argument? His argument is structurally blind to this question, and its precisely the answer to this question that lets him passingly say, yes, slavery is bad. That passing dismissal contains within it the reductio ad absurdum of everything else. It's not a surprise he's so quick to pass it by.

Still don't get it. If the US were communist, then the USSR, upon defeating it, would make it communist? When does the US become communist in this scenario? In any event, using the USSR as an example doesn't work because it lasted less than a century. It meets very easily the criteria for being intolerable.

Yeah, I'll eat my words and admit this wasn't a clear illustration A better one would be the US govt and native american tribes.

the one Marquez doesn't (in fact, remaining within his argument, can't) answer: How do we decide when to bring in independent value systems to override the epistemic argument? — csalisbury

Maybe he can't. But we certainly can. I already said I'm not trying to defend his argument per se. I'm only trying to defend him from certain accusations which would be absurd and uncharitable to lay on him.

I've come across an article in the journal of social political philosophy. The argument goes like this:

1. The endurance of basic institutions* is in part a function of their 'factual' legitimacy, i.e., their actual actual acceptance by the population they regulate (in other words, endurance and factual legitimacy are correlated). — Kazuma

Is this definition in common use? To me it seems quite strained.

As if one were to say, the "factual legitimacy" of oppression and coercion consists in the persistence of oppression and coercion. Or, the "factual legitimacy" of an act of aggression consists in the victory of the aggressor.

2. Factual legitimacy is in part a function of how much these institutions avoid producing outcomes that are factually 'intolerable' (and thus not tolerated) for this population. — Kazuma

As if one were to say, the "factual honesty" of a lie is in part a function of how much the lie avoids producing outcomes in which it is considered contrary to a sincere assertion of truth.

3. There is some connection between what the people subject to these institutions consider normatively intolerable and what is actually normatively intolerable (i. e., factual and normative legitimacy are correlated, even if normatively intolerable outcomes are not always widely recognized). — Kazuma

Can you clear up this distinction?

I suppose "normatively intolerable institutions" are institutions said to be intolerable, or institutions that are in fact at odds with current normative limits of tolerance. Norms of tolerance would trigger actual intolerance, radical rejection of actual institutions, when there is a perception that the actual institutions have passed a threshold with respect to those norms. Is that the idea? In that case, it seems something like the perception of legitimacy, or the assessment of current "tolerability", plays an important mediating role between "norms" and "facts" of legitimacy or tolerability.

I wonder. Does it seem more correct to say that there is in fact, in each context, a threshold beyond which conditions become "intolerable", and that to pass this threshold is to impose a new norm of action -- e.g., of active rejection of the status quo? Is it always clear in advance where that threshold stands? Arguably, the location of that threshold is not the sort of thing that is predicted by "norms", but is rather a thing determined by changes in actual circumstances. It seems the norms may shift along with the circumstances.

4. Therefore, actual endurance is evidence that institutions have avoided producing normatively intolerable outcomes in varied circumstances in the past. — Kazuma

A lie's having passed unchallenged is evidence that the lie has avoided producing suspicions of insincerity and falsehood.

The persistence of strangling is evidence that the strangler has avoided producing circumstances that would have led the victim to escape or gain the upper hand....

5. The evidence that long-lasting institutions have avoided producing normatively intolerable outcomes in many kinds of unknown past circumstances is also evidence that they may avoid producing such outcomes in unknown future circumstances.
(X. Marquez, 2015, An Epistemic Argument for Conservativism) — Kazuma

The evidence that lies and strangling have succeeded in the past is evidence that they may succeed in the future.

*basic institutions are those institutions with the broadest scope of regulation (in my view, those could be, for example, capitalism, family etc.) — Kazuma

What does "scope of regulation" mean?

Personally, I find it to be more beneficial for the society to keep the status quo and to only improve on the current institutions, previously described as basic. There should not be a direction for a society, meaning there should be no desire for changes, as those changes are unpredictable and would only lead to creating a new ideology and revolutions. — Kazuma

I'm not sure how this view of yours is connected to the argument you attribute to X. Marquez. However:

Isn't "improving current institutions" one way of "changing the status quo"? Isn't change always change in some "direction"? Isn't a desire for improvement a desire for one sort of change, and a desire for change in a particular "direction"?

Do we have some reason to suppose the consequences of changes involved in "improvements" are more "predictable" than the consequences involved in a "change in direction"?

Is this definition in common use? To me it seems quite strained.

As if one were to say, the "factual legitimacy" of oppression and coercion consists in the persistence of oppression and coercion. Or, the "factual legitimacy" of an act of aggression consists in the victory of the aggressor. — Cabbage Farmer

In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a régime. Whereas "authority" denotes a specific position in an established government, the term "legitimacy" denotes a system of government — wherein "government" denotes "sphere of influence". — wiki

I don't think it makes sense to talk about the "legitimacy of oppression" here.

Legitimacy is an ancient idea. Throughout most of the life of this concept, it has tied government to religion. The oldest known piece of literature is an epic which, like all epics, lays out the legitimacy of the ruling class, that is, explains why they have a divine right to rule.

Legitimacy played an especially poignant role in European history because of the way it could effect military ventures. The soldier needs to believe he's fighting for a legitimate ruler because otherwise he's committing blasphemy (fighting against God's Chosen One.)

This explains how Joan of Arc ended up influencing events in France. She showed up claiming that the French Dauphin was the legitimate King (this had been in question since his parents disowned him). Subsequently the Dauphin-supporters fought more vigorously with the belief that she really was in touch with divine forces.

So you can see how the meaning of the word changes pretty significantly post-Enlightenment. An American in 1810, for instance, may believe that the American government has its anchor in Nature (another word for God), but he doesn't believe the government has divine blessing necessarily.

Post 1870, a lot of Americans would understand legitimacy as having to do with this:

“Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.
But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”
– Gettysburg address

:)

I don't think it makes sense to talk about the "legitimacy of oppression" here. — Mongrel

Neither do I.

Did you not speak in those terms?

Did you not speak in those terms? — Mongrel

In the context you cited, I used those terms to paraphrase a passage supplied by Kazuma, in an attempt to show how "strained" I found the passage.

Consider the original context of the paraphrase:

1. The endurance of basic institutions* is in part a function of their 'factual' legitimacy, i.e., their actual actual acceptance by the population they regulate (in other words, endurance and factual legitimacy are correlated). — Kazuma

Is this definition in common use? To me it seems quite strained.

As if one were to say, the "factual legitimacy" of oppression and coercion consists in the persistence of oppression and coercion. Or, the "factual legitimacy" of an act of aggression consists in the victory of the aggressor. — Cabbage Farmer

I thought the absurdity of the statements in the paraphrase might shed some light on the significance of the original passage (pushing especially on the role of "actual acceptance" in that passage). I continued commenting in this manner with analogies to lying and strangling.

Perhaps that way of proceeding was too flippant or unclear.


I'm confused by talk of "legitimacy" in general, and also by some ways of talking about "rights". "Perception of legitimacy" and "(actual) threshold of tolerability" seem less troublesome.

The line of thinking cited and attributed to Marquez by Kazuma is even harder for me to fathom than most talk about legitimacy. For it seems to characterize "factual legitimacy" as if the fact that a population has not successfully overthrown its government, or not successfully rejected an institution, should be identified with the population's de facto "tolerance" of the government or institution, and "correlated" with the de facto "legitimacy" of the government or institution. This strained alignment of terms is used to support claims about the correlation of "actual endurance" and "normative" principles.

Admittedly, the strengths of the proposed correlations are diluted with phrases like "in part the function of" and "there is some connection"; and it seems the argument aims to establish merely that "actual endurance" provides some evidentiary support, not conclusive support, for claims about a vaguely construed relation between the endurance and "normative legitimacy" of institutions.

I'm inclined to resist the whole line of thinking, despite the mollifying effect of that vagueness.

I thought the absurdity of the statements in the paraphrase might shed some light on the significance of the original passage (pushing especially on the role of "actual acceptance" in that passage). I continued commenting in this manner with analogies to lying and strangling. — Cabbage Farmer

Right. It's just that it's a strawman. That passage was simply saying that institutions that endure have a history of acceptance. Nothing world shattering. In fact the OP isn't so much presenting an argument as simply laying out how conservatives see the world.

Could an institution be oppressive and endure? Couple of answers:

1. For a while, yes. If that's happening it could be because there is no known alternative or people perceive that the alternative isn't something they can choose. But where that's happening the situation is unstable. It's like an ailing machine that will clunk along until some critical point is reached and the machine falls apart.

2. Looking at the question a different way, any institution might occasionally be afflicted by oppressiveness, corruption, immorality... what have you. Yet acceptance exists and that acceptance is real. The reason we might not want to claim that this is false legitimacy is that if we dream of some correction, some alteration, some advancement toward the ideal, those dreams will require some accepted institutions. One would only abandon legitimacy altogether if one is adopting a late-Chomskyesque attitude: that all human civilization is fundamentally evil. I don't know where on the political spectrum that attitude lies, but it's in a zone of complete irrelevance.

I'm inclined to resist the whole line of thinking, despite the mollifying effect of that vagueness. — Cabbage Farmer

That's fine. As I said: it's not saying anything startling, but it's certainly not saying anything ridiculous either. I spent of lot of years thinking about how everything one says and thinks contributes to bigger successes and failures. I think all governments are basically democratic (granted I was camping in the woods at the time.)

In fact the OP isn't so much presenting an argument as simply laying out how conservatives see the world. — Mongrel

Perhaps some conservatives do think along those lines.

If any such advocate understands the significance of the argument in the way that you and I seem to, I might call him a "marketing strategist for the oppressors" instead of a "conservative".

Could an institution be oppressive and endure? Couple of answers:

1. For a while, yes. If that's happening it could be because there is no known alternative or people perceive that the alternative isn't something they can choose — Mongrel

Another option: The people don't perceive themselves as oppressed.

This can mean something like: The proportion of people in the population who consider themselves, or who consider "the people", to be oppressed is insufficient to support a successful rejection of the status quo.

Another option: The people anticipate that the cost of oppression is not high enough to merit the likely costs and risks associated with potential attempts to reject the status quo.

I suppose considerations like these are relevant in assessing "perception of legitimacy" and "de facto threshold of intolerability".

But where that's happening the situation is unstable. It's like an ailing machine that will clunk along until some critical point is reached and the machine falls apart. — Mongrel

I'm not sure this must be the case. It seems perhaps optimistic to say so.

I'd want to add to the scenario something about sufficiently many people being sufficiently dissatisfied with the conditions associated with their oppression. In that case we might do away with concept of oppression in the equation, and just say "when sufficiently many people are sufficiently dissatisfied with the status quo, the people tend to reject the status quo". Now say something about how perception of oppression is one of the things that leads to dissatisfaction; and something about how "dissatisfaction" is a motive, or is correlated with motives, for action.

Then we might say: As increasing dissatisfaction increases the motives for action aimed at rejecting the status quo, the situation tends to be increasingly unstable....

2. Looking at the question a different way, any institution might occasionally be afflicted by oppressiveness, corruption, immorality... what have you. Yet acceptance exists and that acceptance is real. — Mongrel

This is perhaps my biggest problem in the line of thinking attributed by Kazuma to Marquez: What counts as, what is entailed by, what is ruled out by, "actual acceptance"? For if all this phrase means is that the status quo has not been to date successfully rejected, it means hardly anything at all, apart from "endurance". Specifically, do Kazuma or Marquez mean to distinguish "actual acceptance" characterized as endurance (or more specifically as the state of not having been successfully rejected), from "normative acceptance" characterized as expressed acceptance (or perhaps as the absence of expressed rejection)?

Consider a case in which

i) most of the people complain about the status quo, say it's bad, wish things were otherwise, profess a desire for change, profess a willingness to act to reject the status quo if only the costs of such action were not so high, or if only they saw a reliable means to that end; and

ii) many of the people do act, and others have acted, toward that very end with the same express motives, but this activity has not, to date, succeeded in rejecting the status quo.

Is this, according to Kazuma or Marquez, a case in which the status quo is "actually accepted" and "factually tolerated"?

I'm not comfortable calling that a state of de facto "acceptance" or "tolerance". Compare: the "tolerance" of a body gradually poisoned to death by lead or gold. The "threshold of tolerance" beyond which a man at last cries out under the whip.

Of course not all cases are like that one. In some cases there is "real acceptance", as you say. The question is, how do we distinguish the cases, how do we define "actual acceptance"?

The reason we might not want to claim that this is false legitimacy is that if we dream of some correction, some alteration, some advancement toward the ideal, those dreams will require some accepted institutions. — Mongrel

Right. We can't be too idealistic, and aim to reject, instead of improve, each and every imperfect institution.

How does that pragmatism guide us in defining terms like "acceptance", "tolerance", and "legitimacy" in this conversation?

One would only abandon legitimacy altogether if one is adopting a late-Chomskyesque attitude: that all human civilization is fundamentally evil. I don't know where on the political spectrum that attitude lies, but it's in a zone of complete irrelevance. — Mongrel

It's hard for me to imagine what a speaker as sober as Chomsky might mean by a statement like "all civilization is fundamentally evil." Can you expand on this attitude and its place in Chomsky's late thoughts? Is it somehow connected to "anarchosyndicalism" or to "left libertarianism"?

What do you mean by "abandon legitimacy"? The phrase could mean: Abandon talk of legitimacy, for instance if we found the term to be fundamentally redundant or ungrounded; perhaps replacing talk of legitimacy with talk in other terms for about the same purposes. For instance, we might use terms like "justice", "liberty", "consent", "popular sovereignty", "prosperity", "pacificity", "humanity"... to evaluate institutions in ways that align with our current use of the term "legitimacy".

That's fine. As I said: it's not saying anything startling, but it's certainly not saying anything ridiculous either. — Mongrel

I agree that the argument attributed to Marquez by Kazuma is not startling, and that it employs some useful concepts.

I spent of lot of years thinking about how everything one says and thinks contributes to bigger successes and failures. — Mongrel

Do you mean that all the speech and other action of an individual contributes to his future successes and failures?

Or that all the speech and other action of each individual contributes to the future successes and failures of that individual, as well as of the communities in which he participates, including the community we call "humanity" and the community we call "all sentient beings"?

Or something else?

I think all governments are basically democratic (granted I was camping in the woods at the time.) — Mongrel

I'm not sure what it means to say that "all governments are basically democratic".

I'm inclined to agree that popular sovereignty seems essential to human nature and human communities, much as it seems essential to chimpanzee nature and chimpanzee communities. This may cease to be the case given the advance of technology. Consider, for instance, Brzezinski's (often misinterpreted) remark that it's recently become easier to kill than to control a million people.

I'd also agree that there seems to be something like an oscillation between oligarchy and democracy in human communities and societies. Typically monarchy is a form of oligarchy: A king with no supporters is no king at all.

The de facto oscillation between oligarchy and democracy continues in a formal hereditary monarchy, just as it does in a formal electoral democracy.

Right. We can't be too idealistic, and aim to reject, instead of improve, each and every imperfect institution.

How does that pragmatism guide us in defining terms like "acceptance", "tolerance", and "legitimacy" in this conversation? — Cabbage Farmer

It doesn't guide us. For all practical purposes, you have acceptance of the world as it is unless you are actively seeking to change it or you have recently filled your pockets with stones so as to Virginia Woolf yourself into the river.

The way you understand legitimacy is influenced by your metaphysical outlook. Are you a naturalist? A Christian? Are you a naturalist who smuggles in a medieval Christian view from time to time? My little essay on the history of the term was supposed to convey that.

It's hard for me to imagine what a speaker as sober as Chomsky might mean by a statement like "all civilization is fundamentally evil." Can you expand on this attitude and its place in Chomsky's late thoughts? Is it somehow connected to "anarchosyndicalism" or to "left libertarianism"? — Cabbage Farmer

His extreme pessimism comes out when he's asked to explain what positive steps he thinks the world should take.

What do you mean by "abandon legitimacy"? The phrase could mean: Abandon talk of legitimacy, for instance if we found the term to be fundamentally redundant or ungrounded; perhaps replacing talk of legitimacy with talk in other terms for about the same purposes. For instance, we might use terms like "justice", "liberty", "consent", "popular sovereignty", "prosperity", "pacificity", "humanity"... to evaluate institutions in ways that align with our current use of the term "legitimacy". — Cabbage Farmer

Bill says his government has no legitimacy. He is fundamentally rejecting its normative influence. Bill could:

1. Move to Alaska and live off the land. Lots of people do it.
2. Stay and just whine all the time. But in this case, the whining is profoundly pointless because Bill has rejected any possibility of making things better.
3. Get a clue and realize that he does accept the imperfect government that stands over him (atrocities and all). Now pick an atrocity and try to do something to help.

Or that all the speech and other action of each individual contributes to the future successes and failures of that individual, as well as of the communities in which he participates, including the community we call "humanity" and the community we call "all sentient beings"? — Cabbage Farmer

That. Think of Gandhi. We stamp his name on a success that involved the actions of millions of people. Hitler.. same thing except it was a failure.

A king with no supporters is no king at all. — Cabbage Farmer

If you get that, then you have everything you need to get the OP. How do we know whether to support or fight against X? A conservative says that a lot of the work has been done for us by history. The stuff that has survived the last few thousand years has shown itself to be worthy.

There is a fly in the ointment here, but most of the ointment is exceptionally wise. Give the archetypal Conservative his/her due. We wouldn't be here without them.

It doesn't guide us. For all practical purposes, you have acceptance of the world as it is unless you are actively seeking to change it or you have recently filled your pockets with stones so as to Virginia Woolf yourself into the river. — Mongrel

A stark characterization of the options. Accept the world as it is, act to change it, or act to reject it by annihilating oneself.

Is it even possible to live in the world without changing it? It may be there are only two options, not three. Then again, from a broad enough point of view, the last option is only a variation on the middle way.

Perhaps we should say there is only one option. The question is not whether we shall act to change ourselves and the world, but how. For that change is always ongoing.

The way you understand legitimacy is influenced by your metaphysical outlook. Are you a naturalist? A Christian? Are you a naturalist who smuggles in a medieval Christian view from time to time? My little essay on the history of the term was supposed to convey that. — Mongrel

That essay did a fine job of indicating the way in which norms associated with our concept of legitimacy have varied through the ages. But I wonder whether the word "legitimacy", or some very close term in translation, has always been used in every time and place, or if perhaps our concept doesn't necessarily map on to linguistic terms in every culture in the same way. Extending that line toward one extreme, I would suggest that we can employ our general concept of legitimacy to think about the tenure of an alpha male chimp, and his acceptance or rejection by the chimpanzee band he lords over; though of course the chimpanzees have no words at all for this feature of their psychosocial dynamics.

Moreover, I suppose "metaphysical" views are not the only relevant factors that determine differences in conceptions of legitimacy across cultural contexts. We might have similar views about metaphysics, while disagreeing about rights and justice, for instance.

His extreme pessimism comes out when he's asked to explain what positive steps he thinks the world should take. — Mongrel

It's one thing to be pessimistic about the prospects for humanity, and another to make claims like "human civilization is fundamentally evil".

I vaguely recall Vonnegut saying something about having become more pessimistic as he got older. I believe I've become more pessimistic with age, too. It might be there's a decade, or two or three, before the last stage of youthful disillusionment and the onset of full-grown pessimism.

But you know, anything's possible.

Our increasing pessimism could be a symptom of age, or it could be a sign of the times. Our expectations are based on what might turn out to be a short segment of history's whole trajectory.

Bill says his government has no legitimacy. — Mongrel

I'll assume that someone who says "This government has no legitimacy" thinks that in general there's good sense to talk in terms of "legitimacy".

This may skip over the point I was making, which you seem to think you are responding to here, that we could use other language to do the work that some of us allocate to the term "legitimacy".

He is fundamentally rejecting its normative influence. — Mongrel

Do you mean to say that Bill rejects the normative influence of "his government", or the normative influence of the concept of "legitimacy"? In keeping with the assumption I've just noted, I suppose you mean that Bill rejects the normative influence of his government.

What kinds of things have "normative influence"? What do they influence or have influence on?

What does it mean to say "this government has normative influence", and what does it mean to reject that claim?

Do you mean something like: If agent X "rejects the normative influence" of government G, then in X's considered view, the laws of G are not binding for X, have no normative value for X, but figure in X's normative outlook only as facts, such as the fact that X may be more or less likely to be caught and punished if X breaks the so-called laws of G?

Bill could:

1. Move to Alaska and live off the land. Lots of people do it. — Mongrel

Aren't there laws and a government in Alaska?

2. Stay and just whine all the time. But in this case, the whining is profoundly pointless because Bill has rejected any possibility of making things better. — Mongrel

Do you mean to suggest that the only alternatives to "rejecting any possibility of making things better" are indicated in (1) and (3), namely, doing one's best to get off the grid if that's still an option, or agreeing that the status quo "is legitimate" and working to improve it?

I'm not sure I understand the way you've set up the terms here. It seems to me we can deny the "legitimacy" of a government while aiming to change it instead of aiming to overthrow it. On what grounds do you rule out such an alternative?

3. Get a clue and realize that he does accept the imperfect government that stands over him (atrocities and all). Now pick an atrocity and try to do something to help. — Mongrel

What does "accept" mean here?

One might "accept" the fact of a flawed and imperfect electoral democracy, for instance -- accept it as a matter of fact just like gravity or the weather -- while calling it "illegitimate" and acting to reform it, without aiming to overthrow the government or change the constitution, without whining, without succumbing to apathy, and without throwing oneself into a river burdened with stones.

It sounds as if you think we must choose between rebellion, apathy in bad faith, and "acceptance of legitimacy". I'm not sure why.

That. Think of Gandhi. We stamp his name on a success that involved the actions of millions of people. Hitler.. same thing except it was a failure. — Mongrel

I agree it makes sense to say the actions of each individual contribute to future outcomes for that individual and for the communities in which he participates.

Each of us constantly changes himself and the whole world by existing. And it seems each of us has some say over how.

If you get that, then you have everything you need to get the OP. — Mongrel

I have the impression that we read the OP in two different ways.

How do we know whether to support or fight against X? A conservative says that a lot of the work has been done for us by history. The stuff that has survived the last few thousand years has shown itself to be worthy. — Mongrel

Does a conservative say that a look at history will settle the question of whether to "support or fight" any politician, institution, or political view? That seems a tenuous claim, though of course historical understanding helps to inform anyone's outlook along these lines.

Is it everything that "has survived the last few thousand years" that's worthy, or only some of it? How do we know which parts to preserve and which to amend? Is it even possible to maintain "the same" institutions given the inevitability of change in technology, economic activity, culture, and the whole social order? Isn't the attempt to maintain "the same" institutions over different cultural and material circumstances just another way of changing the institutions?

Suppose the antecedents to this society were "influenced by, produced by, and well-suited to their circumstances". That's one respect in which we may want to resemble those antecedents, one proven principle we may want to adopt as our own.

The consistent application of that principle would require that we change our institutions along with our circumstances. A failure to do so would render our present conduct out-of-line with tradition.

There is a fly in the ointment here, but most of the ointment is exceptionally wise. — Mongrel

Perhaps many flies.

Give the archetypal Conservative his/her due. We wouldn't be here without them. — Mongrel

Give everyone his due.

What position do we assign to the archetypal conservative here? If all he has to say is, we shouldn't change too much too fast, I'll sign up right away.

That doesn't tell us anything about what to change and what to conserve.

Then again, from a broad enough point of view, the last option is only a variation on the middle way. — Cabbage Farmer

Does somebody die on the middle way?

But I wonder whether the word "legitimacy", or some very close term in translation, has always been used in every time and place, — Cabbage Farmer

No.

or if perhaps our concept doesn't necessarily map on to linguistic terms in every culture in the same way. — Cabbage Farmer

Good question. How would you put the meaning of legitimacy into your own words?

Does somebody die on the middle way? — Mongrel

Everybody dies along every way.

Good question. How would you put the meaning of legitimacy into your own words? — Mongrel

I'm not sure that putting it into my own words is a way of answering the question I indicated, which was a question about how other people have used the word, or its closest relations in other languages, across various cultural contexts.

As I've suggested, I haven't heard any generally applicable conception of "legitimacy" that I find philosophically satisfying, and I don't have one myself. I find talk in terms of legitimacy to be quite problematic until we take for granted -- for the sake of conversation, or with respect to something like a national constitution -- some more or less arbitrary characterization of the term.


Taken at face value, the word "legitimacy" suggests that something legitimate is something legal, something made or done in accordance with law. But many people seem to use the word to criticize the law itself, or to criticize institutions established, processes effected, or actions undertaken in keeping with the law.

We may distinguish accordingly: Legitimacy according to the law, legitimacy of the law. Legitimacy according to the government; legitimacy of the government. Legitimacy according to current institutions; legitimacy of current institutions.

In each case, judgment concerning the first sort of legitimacy is a technical matter, for lawyers, public advocates, and other special interests to wrangle over; while judgment concerning the second sort of legitimacy seems to implicate a set of norms held apart from the law (from the government, from current institutions), on the basis of which the law (the government, and current institutions) are criticized.

I suppose that superior set of norms may vary from one cultural context and from one critic to the next, but has in each case a moral and political character that may be analyzed or expressed in terms of values and principles of political organization, or of political justice in a broad sense.


If you mean to ask what values and principles of political organization do I personally consider most relevant to judgments about the legitimacy of laws, governments, and institutions, I’ve given some indication already, in this laundry list:

"justice", "liberty", "consent", "popular sovereignty", "prosperity", "pacificity", "humanity" — Cabbage Farmer

and I suppose we could add more terms to the list and discuss the meaning or relevance of any item in the present context.

I'm not sure that putting it into my own words is a way of answering the question I indicated, which was a question about how other people have used the word, or its closest relations in other languages, across various cultural contexts.

As I've suggested, I haven't heard any generally applicable conception of "legitimacy" that I find philosophically satisfying, and I don't have one myself. I find talk in terms of legitimacy to be quite problematic until we take for granted -- for the sake of conversation, or with respect to something like a national constitution -- some more or less arbitrary characterization of the term. — Cabbage Farmer

I'm not really following you at all here. The meaning of "legitimacy," as used in the OP, doesn't seem confusing or arbitrary to me.

Taken at face value, the word "legitimacy" suggests that something legitimate is something legal, something made or done in accordance with law. — Cabbage Farmer

OK. But the OP is about political theory, right? Wouldn't it be appropriate to narrow focus down to what the word means in that context?

If you mean to ask what values and principles of political organization do I personally consider most relevant to judgments about the legitimacy of laws, governments, and institutions, I’ve given some indication already, in this laundry list:

"justice", "liberty", "consent", "popular sovereignty", "prosperity", "pacificity", "humanity"
— Cabbage Farmer

and I suppose we could add more terms to the list and discuss the meaning or relevance of any item in the present context. — Cabbage Farmer

Again... not following this at all. Sorry.

I'm not really following you at all here. The meaning of "legitimacy," as used in the OP, doesn't seem confusing or arbitrary to me. — Mongrel

It seems we may be speaking at cross purposes.

I'm not sure why you keep referring to the OP as if it were an authoritative source on the use of words in this thread and a clear standard by which to limit the scope of discourse in this thread. I don't believe it is either.

What is the meaning of "legitimacy" in the OP, according to you? And why do you say the meaning of the term, as characterized in the OP, is "not arbitrary"?

OK. But the OP is about political theory, right? Wouldn't it be appropriate to narrow focus down to what the word means in that context? — Mongrel

I agree that we're speaking about politics in a broad sense. I don't see how acknowledging this would help us narrow down the meaning of the word "legitimacy" in this conversation any further than we have already narrowed it down.

How would you suggest we narrow it down, in light of our agreement that we're speaking here about politics in a broad sense?

Or is there perhaps some narrower sense of "political theory" that you have in mind, that comes along with a textbook definition of "legitimacy" that is agreed upon by all professionals called "political theorists"?

Again... not following this at all. Sorry. — Mongrel

No need to apologize.

I think you should feel free to interpret the OP as you see fit.

I think you should feel free to interpret the OP as you see fit. — Mongrel

It seems we're agreed on this point, at least.