Is it true that you ought not kill? — Banno

I don't know what it means for "I ought not kill" to be true or false, so I can't answer that question.

When push comes to shove, of course you do, but in a forum thread you can say pretty well whatever you like. — Wayfarer

No, I don't know what it means. I know of no criteria by which to determine the truth or falsity of it, and so how can I know what it means for it to be true or false?

That's an interesting piece of biography about you. Other folk understand that one ought not kill.

But of course, you are probably manifesting rhetorical posturing rather than sociopathy.

I don't know what it means for "I ought not kill" to be true or false, so I can't answer that question. — Michael

Psychopaths feel no compunction about killing and it is known that psychopathology is common in society. So, have you considered the possibility that you’re a psychopath?

But of course, you are probably manifesting rhetorical posturing rather than sociopathy. — Banno

But of course, you are probably manifesting rhetorical posturing rather than sociopathy. — Banno

I am engaging in philosophical examination of ordinary claims, not rhetorical posturing. If I am to understand what it means for a statement to be true or false – whether that statement be "a cat is on the mat", "2 + 2 = 5", or "we ought not kill" – then I must be able to recognise its truth conditions. There is empirical evidence to verify or falsify "a cat is on the mat"; there are mathematical principles to verify or falsify "2 + 2 = 5"; but there is nothing I know of to verify or falsify "we ought not kill."

have you considered the possibility that you’re a psychopath? — Wayfarer

Or he's an atheist. We all know that if there is no God, anything is permitted.

Psychopaths feel no compunction about killing and it is known that psychopathology is common in society. So, have you considered the possibility that you’re a psychopath? — Wayfarer

I'm not a psychopath. I sympathise and empathise with the feelings of others. I have a negative visceral reaction to the idea of killing.

What does that have to do with "we ought not kill" being true or false?

That moral judgement requires something more than quantitative analysis? That the scope of what is moral is broader than what can be expressed in quantitative propositions?

"a cat is on the mat" — Michael

What exactly are the truth conditions for this being true?

Following a rule to ensure survival isn't the same as the proposition "we ought not kill" being true -- or is it? When we say that "we ought not kill" is true, are we just saying that we choose not to kill as it's in our best interests not to? I don't think that's what the moral realist means. — Michael

Well, I'm not saying it's necessarily what a moral realist means. But from an epistemological position, it seems equivalent. A naive realist says the proposition "the cat is on the mat" is true if it corresponds with the objective reality of a cat on the mat. That's the ontological position. Unless you follow a divine command theory of morality, it's obvious that a similar ontological position is impossible for morality. What's the point of even debating something as obviously nonsensical as "objective morality" in an ontological sense?

But from an epistemological perspective, the naive realist does not simply compare two states given to him. The statement would instead look more like this (heavily simplified): "the cat is on the mat is true if the cat being on the mat is a predictive theory that explains all currently available evidence". This is implicitly goal oriented.

The scientific method isn't "true" in the sense that we're using the word "true". We're using it in the sense of the truth-aptness of a proposition. — Michael

You're right, that was mistaken.

When I asked how to show that an ethical system is true or false I am asking how to verify or falsify the claims "we ought act only according to that maxim whereby we can will that it should become a universal law" or "we ought maximize happiness and well-being." — Michael

I don't think the categorical imperative would be truth-apt in the same way the scientific method isn't truth apt. It's the method by which we verify or falsify a statement.

What exactly are the truth conditions for this being true? — Banno

A particular kind of physical object standing in a particular kind of spatial relationship to another particular kind of physical object. I can recognise the occurrence of this state of affairs and so know what to look for to verify or falsify the claim.

What do you look for to verify or falsify the claim "we ought not kill"? Is there an empirical difference between it being true and it being false? Or is it like a mathematical statement such as "2 + 2 = 4" where it follows from first principles (and if so, what are the first principle from which "we ought not kill" is derived).

‘I know it’s there, because I saw it’. That is a statement of fact. But moral judgements arise from an assessment of meaning. Positivism and its cognates try to tie everything back to observed particularities or at least general laws which can be validated by observation of facts. But moral judgements are first and foremost about meaning, in terms of what the facts imply for me and for other subjects. Which is much more difficult than delegating the whole issue to ‘observable facts.’

A particular kind of physical object standing in a particular kind of spatial relationship to another particular kind of physical object. I can recognise the occurrence of this state of affairs and so know what to look for to verify or falsify the claim. — Michael

See the way you slid from the truth conditions to the justification for your belief?

So, set out exactly what the truth conditions are for "a cat is on the mat"... what particular kinds of physical object, what relationship.

You can do it - it's philosophy, it's easy.

See the way you slid from the truth conditions to the justification for your belief? — Banno

I didn't. The truth condition is the physical state of the world, and this truth condition is recognisable by the use of our senses. If you tell me that the cat is on the mat, I know what to look for and am (usually) capable of doing so -- and even if I'm incapable of verifying or falsifying your claim, I nonetheless know what the truth conditions are and how to recognize them, and so know what it means for the statement to be true or false, even if I don't know whether or not it is true. And the same for a claim such as "2 + 2 = 4". I know how to count to verify or falsify your claim.

There's nothing I know of to verify or falsify the claim that we ought not kill. I don't understand what its truth conditions are, let alone how to go about showing that they do or do not obtain. So I don't know what it means to be true or false. What difference does it make if "we ought not kill" is true or false? Is a world where it's true distinguishable from a world where it's false? A world where a cat is on the mat is distinguishable from a world where a cat is not on the mat after all. Or in the case of rule-following, a world where pawns can move backwards in chess is distinguishable from a world where they can't.

But as you seem to know what it means for "we ought not kill" to be true, and seem to believe that it is true, can you tell me the steps you took to come to that conclusion? Is there something in the world I need to look for? Something I can see or feel or touch? Or is it derivable from some first principles, like with mathematical equations?

I didn't. The truth condition is the physical state of the world, — Michael

SO - what physical state will that be?

Let me help you out: "a cat is on the mat" will be true if and only if a cat is on the mat.

Do you agree? If not, then exactly what physical state is it you are looking for?

Oh, and while we are here, what is the physical state that is the truth condition for 2+2=4?

The truth condition is the physical state of the world, and this truth condition is recognisable by the use of our senses — Michael

You think? Philosophy actually questions that.

Let me help you out: "a cat is on the mat" will be true if and only if a cat is on the mat.

Do you agree? If not, then exactly what physical state is it you are looking for? — Banno

Yes, I agree. The cat being on the mat is a recognisable physical state, and as such I know the difference between that physical state obtaining (the cat being on the mat) and it not obtaining (the cat not being on the mat); there is an empirical difference between a world where it obtains and a world where it doesn't. And it is only because of this that I know what it means for the cat to be on the mat and for the cat to not be on the mat.

But as far as I'm aware that we ought not kill isn't a recognisable physical state. I don't know the difference between it being true that we ought not kill and it being false that we ought not kill, and so I don't know know what it means for "we ought not kill" to be true or false.

And the same for a claim such as "2 + 2 = 4". I know how to count to verify or falsify your claim. — Michael

That's not a recognisable physical state though, is it.

SO its not just recognisable physical states that are the truth conditions for propositions, other things can be the truth conditions.

So the truth conditions for "a cat is on the mat" are the cat being on the mat.

The truth conditions for "1+1=2" are that 1+1 is 2.

But you baulk at the truth conditions for "it's bad to molest children" being that it is bad to molest children?

Tell me, do you love your mother?

SO, is it truth that you love your mother?

What are the truth conditions for that?

See the way you slid from the truth conditions to the justification for your belief?
— Banno

I didn't. — Michael

Yeah, you did. That's ok, though. Let me show you.

A particular kind of physical object standing in a particular kind of spatial relationship to another particular kind of physical object. I can recognise the occurrence of this state of affairs and so know what to look for to verify or falsify the claim. — Michael

See how the first sentence starts to set out the truth conditions - it elliptically refers to the cat being on the mat using "particular kind of physical objects".

Now look at the second sentence. It sets out what it is you recognise in order to support the proposition that a cat is on the mat; that you justify your believe by making an observation.

But making an observation is not why you believe that 1+1=2; nor is it how you know that you love dear old mum. Different propositions have different justifications.

That's not a recognisable physical state though, is it. — Banno

I didn't say that only recognisable physical states are relevant. I also talked about deriving from first principles, which is what we do with maths. There is a step-by-step method to show the result of adding two plus two, and I can do that to verify or falsify your claim that "2 + 2 = 4". It is only by knowing how to verify or falsify the claim -- knowing how to count -- that I know what it means for "2 + 2 = 4" to be true or false.

But as far as I'm aware that we ought not kill isn't derivable from first principles. I don't know the difference between it being true that we ought not kill and it being false that we ought not kill, and so I don't know know what it means for "we ought not kill" to be true or false.

I've been answering your questions. You haven't yet answered mine. What have you done to verify or falsify the claim that we ought not kill?

But you baulk at the truth conditions for "it's bad to molest children" being that it is bad to molest children?

It's certainly cruel and harmful to molest children. There are recognisable truth conditions to verify such a claim. And if by "bad" you mean something like "cruel" or "harmful" then I agree. But if the claim that something is bad is the claim that we ought not do that something then I don't know what you mean, as I don't know what the truth conditions for obligation are.

With all this new armament of analysis, let's go back to your first comment:

Is there empirical evidence that we ought not lie? Can we derive from first principles that we ought not kill? Do we even understand what it means for a moral proposition to be true if we can't even conceive of what would verify or falsify it? — Michael

Sure, there is no empirical evidence that one ought not lie. Nor is it derived from first principles. But why should we suppose that these two exhaust all the possibilities? Why shouldn't different propositions have different ways of being found true or false?

And again, I think you do know what it means when someone say "you ought not kill", wether you can cite the truth conditions or not.

Same.

Sure, there is no empirical evidence that one ought not lie. Nor is it derived from first principles. But why should we suppose that these two exhaust all the possibilities? Why shouldn't different propositions have different ways of being found true or false? — Banno

They're the only two way that I know of. And it's because I don't know of any other way that I don't know how to verify or falsify moral claims and so don't know what it means for moral claims to be true or false.

But as you are suggesting that there could be different ways of being found true or false, and as you seem to know what it means for "we ought not kill" to be true (and believe it to be true), then what have you done to verify the claim that we ought not kill?

They're the only two way that I know of. — Michael

So is that you live your mum determined by empirical evidence or deduction from first principles?

What about that your left foot is in pain - empirical evidence? Well, it's not verifiable by anyone except you, so calling it empirical would be a stretch.

Helsinki is the capital of Sweden.

If n is any integer, then either n is even or n is odd.

Killing is wrong. (Except maybe in certain individual or collective cases of self-defence or prevention of even worse outcomes, based on certain criteria as defined in the AppendIixes I-XXXIX.)

It appears to me that it is several categories easier to refute or verify the factual truth of the first and second sentences. The last one will lead to near infinite complications and qualifications - almost as it would not be a hugely factual statement about the nature of our experience of the world.(Obviously there can be many other definitions of a "moral fact" but none appear very useful or very "fact like".)

And again, I think you do know what it means when someone say "you ought not kill", wether you can cite the truth conditions or not. — Banno

I know what it means, I just don't know what it means for it to be true. I don't believe that it's truth-apt, despite its grammar. It's meaning (in the sense of its use) is as the imperative "don't kill". The speaker may also intend for it to be truth-apt, believing that it has truth conditions, but I don't know what such truth conditions would be.

I'm partial to Anscombe's analysis: "[the] word 'ought'… a word of mere mesmeric force.… a word retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept at all."

I'm partial to Anscombe's analysis: "[the] word 'ought'… a word of mere mesmeric force.… a word retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept at all." — Michael

Now that's much better.

And I'm partially incline to agree. Recall Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy".

But I will baulk at not assigning truth values to moral statements. It's true that one ought keep one's promises, that one ought not kill, and so on.

Oh fercrissakes!!! For any private moral consideration whatsoever, if the state of it is supposed, the conditions for the state of it is necessarily presupposed, and propositions with respect to those conditions, are irrelevant. Only syllogistic propositions or mathematical formulae have truth value; moral inclinations are neither, hence do not.

“Is it true you ought not to kill that guy?”
“Hmmm...lemme think. I ought not to kill that guy, so you want to know if it’s true I ought not to kill that guy? What kinda stupid question is that, anyway? I ought not, but it might be not true I ought not? If it’s not true I ought not, how in the HELL did I come up with ought not in the first place? And if that fool did dirty to my daughter, even if I ought not kill him, I might just do it anyway. So it turns out that dumbass question is moot no matter the consequence of the inclination behind it; I ought not kill the guy whether I let him go with a stern talking-to, or put him in the ground.

....Yeah, and besides all that, considering the contrary, if it is the case that I ought to kill that guy, then it must be the case that I ought possibly to kill any guy, from which follows possibly I ought to kill every guy, which makes me wonder....how lucky are you to be here asking me stupid questions?

....Maybe I was wrong in coming up with ought not.”

(Sigh)
————

But as far as I'm aware that we ought not kill isn't a recognisable physical state — Michael

Correct. Hence, the contingency of a mere “ought, rather than the universality intrinsic to empirical conditions.

Truth seems to necessitate existence-conditions upon statements whereby the truth of a statement is contingent upon existing; whereas facts can obtain their truth-making relations with a statement whether or not the facts exist. Facts can be a thing that exists in the world, such as an object; or, on the other hand, facts can exist in a subset of possible worlds, such as an abstract entity.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

Interesting. I tend to define the two terms more or less the opposite way. — Echarmion

I may very well have it backwards. I picture truth both in an absolute sense that corresponds with the necessary state of existence of a metaphysical simple (a whole with no proper component parts), and in a relative sense that corresponds with a subset of contingent states of existence (a mereological whole with remaining proper component parts).

The former including the totality of all things that must necessarily exist. Everything. All past, present, and future events occurring throughout the universe, multiverse, and the metaphysical beyond (beyond, beyond physical reality). Every arrangement of quantum states within every quantum system throughout every physical locality across every Planck length and over the duration of every Planck time from every observational reference frame (on the assumption that these units represent the state of affairs of actual physical objects existing in spacetime), encompassing therein every existing thing, object, or entity.

Truth in this absolute sense would be an atemporal, aspatial, acausal view of an atomic or simple object with no further composition of proper parts. It is the arrangement of such simples that give rise to the substances, properties, relations, states of affairs and events of the world.

In short, truth can only be a combination of simple objects, things, or entities that actually exist in a particular state of affairs in the world, whereas facts are both such truths of the world and of all the possible states of affairs these simples could form into in every possible world of reality. A compositional whole can only be true relative to the specific arrangements of its parts.

For example, a molecule of water is the state of affairs regarding a specific arrangements of hydrogen and oxygen atoms (H2o). There are many other possible worlds wherein the arrangements of oxygen and hydrogen atoms could of organized differently
than they did in our own. This would make the true atomic state of water in our world, the actual world we live in, just one possible world of many other possible worlds.

This doesn't mean that an infinite range of possible atomic states of water truly exist. Truth, in an absolute sense, must necessarily correspond with the state of affairs of the world it exists in. It must either be the case or not be the case and thus be a binary value of either "true" or "false", however there are possible facts that do not necessarily have to represent the state of affairs in order to obtain a truth value. Possible facts were postulated by Wittgenstein within the metaphysics of the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein statements in the Tractatus:

2 What is the case — a fact — is the existence of states of affairs.

2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects
(things).

2.0122 Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with
states of affairs, a form of dependence.

2.02 Objects are simple.

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.

2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.

2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).

2.024 Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

2.03 In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.

3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. — Wittgenstein

If a fact is the existence of states of affairs which are the arrangements of objects in relation between parts to whole, then facts are both the actual and possible state of affairs between complexes of objects formed by the changing configurations of simple objects. Simple objects are physical simples arranged in various spatial patterns that complex objects themselves are composed of.

Furthermore, without simple objects there would be no substance to the world and we would not be able to form representations of it. This is because complex objects do not exist but rather they are a particular configuration of interacting simples that do exist. We represent the world through propositions and these propositions are only meaningful if the object they purport to represent actually exists. There are macroscopic objects which we generally agree with whatever symbolic meaning we place upon it. However, these objects cannot be represented as being truths because their existence is dependent upon the configuration of their proper parts that come in and go out of existence. For example, when does a sculptors clay become the statue? It really never has a definite composition to represent the totality of its constituent stare of affairs. Thus it is only a possible fact that the clay is indeed a statue.

In a world without substance propositions would depend on each other for truth value and such is only a particular configuration of possible states of affairs. What is more, if only complex objects existed, the truth value of propositions would dependent upon the arrangement of propositions proper parts at a point in time and location in space.

It is a possible fact that H3o2 is the correct arrangement of atomic states that form water. This is a possible fact because it is a fact that water has an arranged atomic state including a quantity of oxygen and hydrogen atoms and H3o2 is an arranged atomic state of a quantity of oxygen and hydrogen atoms. It is also a negative fact that the arranged atomic state of oxygen and hydrogen atoms that form water is not H3o2.

Possible facts and negative fact are not contingent upon the existence of a corresponding thing, object, or entity as a condition to be factual, but the truth (in the absolute sense) is. Thus, the truth of a water molecule is relative because of its dependence upon a particular arrangement of its parts. Therefore, an absolute truth must be of a whole independent of compositional parts. An absolute truth must be an particular configuration of existing mereological simples.

Whereas the latter relative truth would be any truth derivative from the absolute ontology. Any subsequent system of ontologies, whether previously categorized or yet uncategorized, dividing the totality of all existing entities from a universal whole into a mereological sum of particular parts.

Facts, on the other hand, I don't view as things that exist necessarily but rather as the possible or actual (counter factual) state of affairs. In other words, facts can actually exist, possibly exist, and not exist at all. Things can exist or not exist (e.g., imaginary things ). Objects can exist or not exist. But facts, such as the fact that the moon is not cheese cannot also be true because there is no corresponding relationship to an entity that exists. A non-cheese moon does not exist and cannot be referenced for truth.

Bertrand Russell once said:

I want you to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or the sun. Socrates himself does not render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like ‘Socrates.’ . . .We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a ‘fact. — Bertrand Russell