The essential problem of universals is that we experience a world of particulars, yet our language is full of properties, relations, and kinds. That's because we also experience similarities among the particulars, allowing us to generate taxonomies, distill patterns, create models, and so on. If there were no similarities, we could not universalize. — Marchesk
What needs to be explained is the similarities between particulars. Universals play this role well, but they do so at the cost of being strange and hard to accommodate, particularly in their more extreme forms.
If we wish to keep universals out of our ontology, then particulars must fill the role that universals play in our language. We should be able to replace all talk of universals with particulars, and leave nothing out. So particulars must be able to explain the similarities we notice amongst them.
Noting that we can categorize particulars because we're able to assign predicates to them is to entirely miss the point. We already knew that. That's where the problem begins.
Because to express it this way would be to tendentiously make it appear that the properties of neutrinos are entirely constructed by us. — John
I don't understand the problem. You say that "we experience a world of particulars" but also that "we ... experience similarities". So if particulars aren't problematic then why are similarities? We experience them both. — Michael
How are they hard to accommodate? We describe the structure and behaviour of two particular things using (more or less) the same sentence. What's strange about this? — Michael
Perhaps; if you wish to keep universals our of our ontology. But why do you wish to do this? What, exactly, is the problem with saying that we use the single word "triangle" to describe the shape of two different particular things? — Michael
I would dispute this. A trope theorist would argue that the attributes that are shared are actually just particulars that are part of a set. — darthbarracuda
To put the problem as simply as possible, particulars are particulars because they are unique. And yet these unique particulars seem to have attributes which are not unique. It is those non-unique attributes which permits us to generalize. What needs explaining is how unique particulars appear to have non-unique features. — Marchesk
There are no non-unique features. Any feature of a state of existence, by definition, is of that state only, including in instances where a feature is similar to what is found in some other particular. — TheWillowOfDarkness
We experience similarities among particulars. How is that? What is going on? — Marchesk
For one thing, that universals are not bound to any single location.
And finally, that universals are not epistemic.
We experience particulars, not the universals themselves.
You're the one who has been challenging realism about universals in this thread, which would mean to keep them out of one's ontology.
But earlier you said that we experience similarities and that universals are similarities. Therefore we experience universals. — Michael
Well, that's not true. We do know about universals. — Michael
I don't know what you mean by this. Just that two particulars in different locations each behave in the same way? Yes. But, again, what's strange about this? — Michael
Well, no, because I reject realist ontology. If, however, you want a realist ontology, and if universals are inconsistent with a realist ontology, and if universals are apparent, then clearly realist ontology fails. — Michael
You seem to be working on the premise that it's less problematic for each individual particular to behave in its own unique manner. But what warrants this premise? — Michael
No, it's rather that there is something else called a universal by which the two particulars share properties or relations. — Marchesk
It's that we universalize over all potential particulars to say things like gravity is inversely proportional to distance squared for all objects having mass. But of course we don't experience all matter, so how are we able to do that?
And yet we have a great deal of confidence that certain properties make an apple an apple, which differentiate it from non-apples.
Maybe there are other options, but the point is they exist somewhere outside of our thoughts and language.
But just as we don't then conclude that universities aren't real we shouldn't then conclude that universals aren't real. — Michael
What you should ask is "is X a real universal?" And if X is something that many particulars have in common then X is a real universal. It is an empirical fact that many particulars have things in common (shape, size, colour, etc.) and so it is an empirical fact that these things (shape, size, colour, etc.) are real universals. — Michael
This sounds like essentialism, and as I argued here, essentialism doesn't really work. — Michael
I don't understand. We do it by doing it. We say "gravity is inversely proportional to distance squared for all objects having mass" and then if this statement successfully describes (and predicts) every experiment then we say that it is true. — Michael
Yes, but it's saying more than that. It's saying that it's true for the entire cosmos, which is impossible to test. We have an expectation that when we come across new stars or galaxies, the same principle will apply. That's what makes it universal.
We say that it's true for the entire cosmos, and if it successfully describes and predicts all relevant phenomena then it is and if it doesn't then it isn't. — Michael
It's not a problem if one accepts the reality of universals. It is if one doesn't. Then you need to account for laws of nature some other way. — Marchesk
Then accept the reality of universals. Many particulars really do have things in common. It's empirically evident. X and Y are both (correctly) described as having a negative charge or being circle. It's still not clear to my what the problem is. — Michael
Yes, but it's saying more than that. It's saying that it's true for the entire cosmos, which is impossible to test. We have an expectation that when we come across new stars or galaxies, the same principle will apply. That's what makes it universal. — Marchesk
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