Let's contrast taste with morality. That you do not eat onions is perhaps a preference you would not insist applies to everyone. That folk should not lie is presumably a preference that you and I would insist applies to everyone. That is, one of the characteristics of moral statements is that they are not only about how the speaker should act, but how everyone, in comparable circumstances, should act.

Does that mesh with your view? — Banno

I think there is some miscommunication here. I was talking about how our language has evolved over time and it seems possible that it has been structured in such a way that emotive responses, value judgements, and our moral sense of right and wrong are expressed in ways that seem to be descriptive, objective, or universal when they are much more evaluative, subjective, or particular. Statements such as those which contain aesthetic or normative evaluations (e.g., "sunsets are the most beautiful" or "healthcare should be free") are grammatically constructed in the form of a universal descriptive statements that purport to be reporting something objective and true for every predicate variable within a domain (that every object 'x' has the property of 'y') when it is actually expressing a particular evaluative statement that is referring to something subjective and true only relative to the individual subject indexed to the statement.

If we make a universal descriptive statement such as "All liquid water is wet," we are making a statement that is expressing a fact that all objects "liquid water" have a particular property "being wet." The statement purports to report the state of affairs with an accurate account of the way things exist in the world. This means that the truthbearing statement "All liquid water is wet," has truthmaking relationship to water insofar as the statement is true if and only if liquid water exists and has the property of being wet.

To answer your questions, I think honesty is almost always more likely to produce favorable results in many of today's societies. However, there are many instances where lying is the right thing to do consequentially speaking. For example, if you had a friend over to your house and then a deranged man with a gun knocks on your door. He tells you that he is searching for your friend so that he can kill him and asks you if you know where he could be. Would not lying here be the generally moral thing to do?

I understand that moral statements are structured and generally understood to be objective, universal statements. But how are they true? What truth making relations do they share with the world? What fact or truth does the truth bearing statement "Stealing is wrong" purport to represent in the world? What grounds such a claim? What makes lying bad even if we disagree with the evaluation?

Well explained - I understand, and have great sympathy for the Anscombe/Wittgenstein view you are explaining. See the thread Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy".

However I also have sympathy for the views of Austin, who pointed out that:

Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marketing, in the lifetimes of many generation; these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of thee survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon-the most favoured alternative method.

So when we notice that

our language has evolved over time and it seems possible that it has been structured in such a way that emotive responses, value judgements, and our moral sense of right and wrong are expressed in ways that seem to be descriptive, objective, or universal when they are much more evaluative, subjective, or particular — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I'm incline to ask why this should be. Anscombe would have us, at least on a direct reading, think that it is a result of adopting Christianity. There may be something in that.

Running parallel to this is the argument that moral statements do not fit a correspondence account of truth; that there are no facts that can make such statements true. You presented this view in terms of the Tractatus in a previous post. You wrote:

Possible facts and negative fact are not contingent upon the existence of a corresponding thing, object, or entity as a condition to be factual, but the truth (in the absolute sense) is. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I'm of the opinion that there is no adequate analysis of what that correspondence consists in. See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#9.2 (I'm less convinced by the slingshot argument).

I much prefer T-sentences as a model for truth, and hence take truth as pretty much redundant. That is, when one say that it is true that water is made of hydrogen and oxygen, one is saying no more than that water is made of hydrogen and oxygen. Nothing substantive has been gained by the inclusion of "it's true that..."

(It is the case that saying "It is true that..." adds a semantic force to the utterance: "the cat is on the mat" is weaker than "It is true that the cat is on the mat"; however, both sentences are true in exactly the same circumstances)

Let's look int that a bit further. The utterance "the cat is on the mat" will be true just in the case that the cat is one the mat. Perhaps we have an extensional account on the right of this T-sentence, so that our acceptance of it is fairly direct - it will be true if the cat is in the relation of "being on" to the mat. But it is not clear that all T-sentences are extensional in this way.

Let's consider a T-sentence with a moral content: It is true that "One ought not lie" if and only if one ought not lie. While I admit that one cannot provide an extensional account of the item on the right of the T-sentence, nevertheless the structure of the sentence sets out the truth conditions for the statement "One ought not lie".

Circling back, I don't see any direct contradiction between this account of truth - which after all says very little - and the Anscombe/Wittgenstein view expressed above.

Which is to say little more than that our emotive responses, value judgements, and our moral sense of right and wrong may be readily expressed in ways that are amenable to being true or false.

This is part of a puzzle I have been working on for over thirty years, of reconciling Davidson's semantic theory of meaning with Wittgenstein. Doubtless much of this remains muddled, but the problem is with analysing that muddle.

The upshot is that I need a better account before I would willingly deny the that moral statements are truth apt.

Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, William James, Moore, Hume, Mill, etc, all subscribed to a correspondence account of truth
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

I very much doubt that. — Wayfarer

From the SEP:

The correspondence theory is often traced back to Aristotle’s well-known definition of truth (Metaphysics 1011b25): “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”—but virtually identical formulations can be found in Plato (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b).

Authors of the modern period generally convey the impression that the correspondence theory of truth is far too obvious to merit much, or any, discussion. Brief statements of some version or other can be found in almost all major writers; see e.g.: Descartes 1639, ATII 597; Spinoza, Ethics, axiom vi; Locke, Essay, 4.5.1; Leibniz, New Essays, 4.5.2; Hume, Treatise, 3.1.1; and Kant 1787, B82. Berkeley, who does not seem to offer any account of truth, is a potentially significant exception.

. . .moderns generally subscribe to a representational theory of the mind (the theory of ideas), they would seem to be ultimately committed to spelling out relations like correspondence or conformity in terms of a psycho-semantic representation relation holding between ideas, or sentential sequences of ideas (Locke’s “mental propositions”), and appropriate portions of reality, thereby effecting a merger between metaphysical and semantic versions of the correspondence theory.

The now classical formulation of a fact-based correspondence theory was foreshadowed by Hume (Treatise, 3.1.1) and Mill (Logic, 1.5.1). It appears in its canonical form early in the 20th century in Moore (1910-11, chap. 15) and Russell: “Thus a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact” (1912, p. 129; cf. also his 1905, 1906, 1910, and 1913).

Even philosophers whose overall views may well lead one to expect otherwise tend to agree. Kant: “The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of [a cognition] with its object, is assumed as granted” (1787, B82). William James: “Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their ‘agreement’, as falsity means their disagreement, with ‘reality’” (1907, p. 96). — Marian David

Aristotle could be interpreted in Metaphysics as prescribing to a primitive correspondence truth by stating that the world provides "what is" or "what is not," and the true propositions or concepts corresponds to the facts provided by the world.

Plato distinguished between believing and knowing as justified, true belief insomuch as he argued that there were objective truths and that they could be known, thus simply believing that 'p' is true cannot by itself be a justification. Plato views of justified knowledge holds three necessary and sufficient conditions: (1) a proposition must form into a belief; (2) a proposition must be true; and (3) a proposition must have good grounds to justify forming a belief.

Plato, on the premise that truth is objective, argued that in order to justify knowledge of true propositions they must be about real things.

René Descartes (1596–1650) ". . .the word truth, in the strict sense, denotes the conformity of thought with its object" (p. 65).

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) "A true idea must agree with its object" (p. 410).

John Locke (1632–1704) ". . .tacit supposition of their conformity to" [their object] (p. 514). The truth to an idea is "conformable to some real existence" (Locke, p. 515).

David Hume (1711–1776) "Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas, consider'd as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence" (p. 448).

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) "The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed; but one demands to know what is the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition" (p. 197).

If you want me to dig up the remainder, let me know.

Well stated. But, as I said, I think it's really a vernacular expression and not a theory as such. We can always say of some statement, 'that doesn't correspond to the facts' but it's a vernacular or metaphorical expression. I don't think it's a 'theory of truth'.

Plato, on the premise that truth is objective, argued thar in order to justify knowledge of true propositions they must be about real things. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I can't see anything that supports that in the SEP article. Are there real things in Plato's philosophy? I would have thought that 'things' were only real insofar as they were instantiations of ideas. (See entry on Aquinas below).

I'm of the opinion that there is no adequate analysis of what that correspondence consists in. — Banno

Indeed.

According to this theory (correspondence), truth consists in the agreement of our thought with reality. This view ... seems to conform rather closely to our ordinary common sense usage when we speak of truth. The flaws in the definition arise when we ask what is meant by "agreement" or "correspondence" of ideas and objects, beliefs and facts, thought and reality. In order to test the truth of an idea or belief we must presumably compare it with the reality in some sense.

1. In order to make the comparison, we must know what it is that we are comparing, namely, the belief on the one hand and the reality on the other. But if we already know the reality, why do we need to make a comparison? And if we don't know the reality, how can we make a comparison?

2. The making of the comparison is itself a fact about which we have a belief. We have to believe that the belief about the comparison is true. How do we know that our belief in this agreement is "true"? This leads to an infinite regress, leaving us with no assurance of true belief. — Randall, J. & Buchler, J. Philosophy: An Introduction. p133

Although it seems ... obvious to say, "Truth is correspondence of thought (belief, proposition) to what is actually the case", such an assertion nevertheless involves a metaphysical assumption - that there is a fact, object, or state of affairs, independent of our knowledge to which our knowledge corresponds.

"How, on your principles, could you know you have a true proposition?" ... or ... "How can you use your definition of truth, it being the correspondence between a judgment and its object, as a criterion of truth? How can you know when such correspondence actually holds?"

I cannot step outside my mind to compare a thought in it with something outside it. — Beck, L.W. & Holmes, R.L., Philosophic Inquiry, p130.

Does a true proposition correspond to a fact in the way that the color sample on the color chart corresponds to the color of the paint on the wall? No, there is certainly no resemblance between a proposition and a state-of-affairs. .

. . . it is not clear that we meet any facts in experience. We meet people, stars, chairs, and other objects, but not facts or states of affairs. And if this is so, and the objection is cogent, it tells against all correspondence theories of truth. — Hospers, J. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, p116.

I find Aquinas' objection particularly interesting:

All cognition takes place through assimilation.But there is no assimilation possible between the mind and material things, because likeness depends on sameness of quality. However, the qualities of material things are bodily accidents which cannot exist in the mind. Therefore, the mind cannot know material things. — Aquinas, Thomas, Truth, Vol. II, Qs. 10, Article 4.

I think the implication of this is that material things are by their nature or in their own right unintelligible, that their intelligibility is owed to their being of a intelligible form or type.

There's also the Kant quote that I mentioned previously.

Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only by cognising it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object”. — Kant, 1801. The Jasche Logic, in Lectures on Logic

I think the implication of this is that material things are by their nature or in their own right unintelligible, that their intelligibility is owed to their being of a intelligible form or type. — Wayfarer

I can't go along with that. The fact is I know for sure I am typing this on my laptop while sitting on my armchair with the cat besides me. Any philosophical claim that things are unintelligible is simply cause for dismissing that philosophy.

Fair enough but note that is my gloss you're dismissing.

Sure. Isn't

For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object — Kant, 1801. The Jasche Logic, in Lectures on Logic

Stove's Gem?

How about the other quotes? They were a response to something I had said about correspondence a while back, so I kept them in my scrapbook. They seem sound to me.

We only ever have our beliefs, so we can never have the truth? The conclusion doesn't quite follow; at least some of our beliefs are true.

I can't see anything that supports that in the SEP article. Are there real things in Plato's philosophy? I would have thought that 'things' were only real insofar as they were instantiations of ideas. (See entry on Aquinas below). — Wayfarer

Plato, Cratylus, section 385b2–387c5. Truth and Falsity in Names 385b2 - d1 I'm sure you are familiar with regardless of whether or not you have read Cratylus in it's entirety, since it seems to be one of the most discussed passage in the whole dialogue.

SOCRATES: But if neither is right, if it isn’t the case that everything always has every attribute simultaneously or that each thing has a being or essence privately for each person, then it is clear that things have some fixed being or essence of their own. They are not in relation to us and are not made to fluctuate by how they appear to us. They are by themselves, in relation to their own being or essence, which is theirs by nature.

HERMOGENES: I agree, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And if things are of such a nature, doesn’t the same hold of actions performed in relation to them? Or aren’t actions included in some one class of the things that are?

HERMOGENES: Of course they are.

SOCRATES: So an action’s performance accords with the action’s own nature, and not with what we believe. Suppose, for example, that we undertake to cut something. If we make the cut in whatever way we choose and with whatever tool we choose, we will not succeed in cutting. But if in each case we choose to cut in accord with the nature of cutting and being cut and with the natural tool for cutting, we’ll succeed and cut correctly. If we try to cut contrary to nature, however, we’ll be in error and accomplish nothing.

HERMOGENES: That’s my view, at least.

SOCRATES: So, again, if we undertake to burn something, our burning mustn’t accord with every belief but with the correct one—that is to say, with the one that tells us how that thing burns and is burned naturally,
and what the natural tool for burning it is?

HERMOGENES: That’s right.

SOCRATES: And the same holds of all other actions?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now isn’t speaking or saying one sort of action?

HERMOGENES: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then will someone speak correctly if he speaks in whatever way he believes he should speak? Or isn’t it rather the case that he will accomplish something and succeed in speaking if he says things in the natural way to say them, in the natural way for them to be said, and with the natural tool for saying them? But if he speaks in any other way he will be in error and accomplish nothing?

HERMOGENES: I believe so.

SOCRATES: Tell me this. Is there something you call speaking the truth and something you call speaking a falsehood?

HERMOGENES: Indeed, there is.

SOCRATES: Then some statements are true, while others are false?

HERMOGENES: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And those that say of the things that are that they are, are true, while those that say of the things that are that they are not, are false?

HERMOGENES: Yes — Plato

Semantically speaking, a noun can be described either as a word that stands for the name of something, or as a referential linguistic term wherein the meaning of the word just is the thing it refers to. They can be either vocalized or inscribed signs that indicate something in relation to the being of a certain object. Names are the agents or subjects of an action or predication, signified by actions and verbs which are performed by a subject or agent.

Names, more broadly, are therefore signs. They are the instruments of inscription or vocalization that signify a thing through a reflection or a reproduction of it's image. A name is a linguistic term that takes the shape of an individual's image, thus revealing their being and give the indication of various things that exist.

Plato, Euthydemus, section 283e7-284c6

Why Ctesippus, said Euthydemus, do you think it possible to tell lies?

Good heavens yes, he said, I should be raving if I didn’t.

When one speaks the thing one is talking about, or when one does not speak it?

When one speaks it, he said.

So that if he speaks this thing, he speaks no other one of things that are except the very one he speaks?

Of course, said Ctesippus.

And the thing he speaks is one of those that are, distinct from the rest?

Certainly.

Then the person speaking that thing speaks what is, he said.

Yes.

But surely the person who speaks what is and things that are speaks the truth – so that Dionysodorus, if he speaks things that are, speaks the truth and tells no
lies about you.

Yes, said Ctesippus, but a person who speaks these things, Euthydemus, does not speak things that are.

And Euthydemus said, But the things that are not surely [are not], no?

No, they [are not].

Then there is nowhere that the things that are not are?

Nowhere.

Then there is no possibility that any person whatsoever could do anything to the things that are not so as to make them be when they are nowhere?

It seems unlikely to me, Ctesippus said.

Well then, when the orators speak to the people, do they do nothing?

No, they do something, he said.

Then if they do something, they also make something?

Yes.

Speaking, then, is doing and making?

He agreed.

Then nobody speaks things that are not, since he would then be making something, and you have admitted that no one is capable of making something that is not. So according to your own statement, nobody tells lies. — Plato

Also, for additional insight into Plato's late ontology and philosophy of language, see Plato's account for false judgment with the example statements: Theaetetus sits – Theaetetus flies.

Plato, Sophist, section 256e-263d; or 263B4 f.-263 B11 f. in the chapter "True and False: 262E–263D" In: "Being and Not-Being." Seligman P. (1974)

“Theaetetus sits” (a) The true statement says things that are, as they are about you [i.e. about Theaetetus] (263 B4 f). “Theaetetus flies”

(b) The false statement says things different from the things that are (263 B7).

(c) Accordingly it says things that are not as things that are (263 B9).

(d) But things that are different from things that are about you (263 Bn).

(e) For we said that about everything there are many things that are and also many that are-not (263 B11 f). — Seligman P.

Thanks, very carefully argued and stated. I will certainly think that over. I think the passage in the middle about the meaning of nouns and names is rather different in spirit from the quoted passages. Still, well said, I will have to think about all of this some more.

To suffer is also to desire help to reduce my suffering; but there are only other sufferers who can offer, and effectuate, (some) help. This desire, or need, for help, however, implicitly promises to help others to reduce their suffering. This promise is natally prior to reciprocity, contract, cooperation, etc; it's implicit, fundamental, and inheres in each of us being individual members of the same species with the same functional defects (re: physical & psychological homeostasis) which if neglected or harmed render an individual dysfunctioning or worse (P. Foot, M. Nussbaum, A. Sen). Suffering signals the need for help; other sufferers either keep the promise implicit in their own need for help or they break the promise. A promise is an IS that entails an OUGHT, no? A moral fact that warrants a moral claim? So it seems reasonable to say the "furniture of the (our) world" does contain moral facts: suffering sapients. :mask:

:point:

Our ancestors must have had nascent empathy to even start on this journey - how else can one raise young? And I would have thought that in tribal living being able to support each other would have strengthened survival chances. Reciprocal altruism is just as likely to have emerged ... — Tom Storm

Yes, h. sapiens is an eusocial primate species, which, I think, grounds our 'moral instincts (tendencies)' in our socio-biology and develops, or becomes more nuanced, as our social ecologies become more complex and accelerated.

I recently went to church, Tom, on your "ancestral empathy" sermon here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/519871 (with additional articles linked)

Are there moral facts? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes. Moral facts are, in effect, truth-makers / warrants for moral claims.

If there are moral facts, how can we know them?

We know moral facts by the specific moral claims for help which they warrant. A moral claim is objective (i.e. subject/pov-invariant) in so far as it is manifested by the in situ-probability that neglecting natural (species) functional defects (e.g. hunger, fear, trust) of an individual will increase and/or prolong gratuitous / net harm to, or dysfunction of, that individual's defects (e.g. starvation, terror, distrust). When it occurs, the harm caused or contributed to by neglecting a fellow human being's natural (species) functional defects is the moral fact of the matter; and, is therefore, an Is that entails what one Ought Not to do.

NB: By neglecting I understand one dehumanizing (i.e. alienating) oneself in so far as one neglects the (in situ-probable) harm & suffering of others.

I'm asking for an example of an objective moral fact. This would be a moral statement (e.g., genocide is wrong) that is true independent of us. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

You are conflating statements with facts. Why? (The map =/= territory.) I don't think "moral statements" – normativity – when I say 'moral claim'. What am I missing by deviating from the specious ontic premises of (e.g.) "error theory"?

Do you have such an example.

A barefoot little girl cries alone at night on an empty street. Her distress, loneliness & defenselessness constitute a moral claim for help. That those abject conditions can increase and/or be prolonged by neglecting to help her is a moral fact recognized by SEEING (I. Murdoch, E. Levinas, P. Foot) oneself, or anyone else one cares about, in that little girl's "shoes".

It's the action that counts in moral issues, as you say; It's unclear how truth relates to actions. — Banno

E.g. Peirce & Dewey ...

I wonder how you interpret these passages, then. — Wayfarer

(re: TLP, 6.41-6.421) :up:

It is for them that psychiatry is a cure. — Wayfarer

Psychiatry has, since various drugs have come to market, become the business of prescribing those drugs. The talking cure that psychiatry was supposed to be was a notorious non-success, even as it burnished its reputation and theories with self-congratulation. If you were being ironic, excellent joke!

Psychiatry not to be confused with psychoanalysis, which is something else.

Being interested in what truth is, a long time ago I bought a big book - with no pictures whatsoever - that I thought would tell me. After some 350 pages of different theories and mind-numbing hair-splitting, it concluded that sometimes truth was this, or that, or something else, but no one theory or definition covered it. Anyone wishing to share something like my experience can do so here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/

So I have evolved to this: a proposition Pn is true (Tn) if it has a quality Qn (that makes it true). And that's it and all that it ever can be, for truth. What is n? Well, n is at least a family and no one thing at all, though there are usually family resemblances. Truth, then, is just an abstract term that collects all those Qns.

It's akin to asking what makes a good basketball player, or football or baseball player. There are likely shared general characteristics, but on the floor or the field, it comes down to positions.

Or, how do I know P is T? One tool alone doesn't do it, so I have a tool box with lots of tools.

I think the passage in the middle about the meaning of nouns and names is rather different in spirit from the quoted passages. — Wayfarer

Yes, I have a proclivity for thinking and subsequently speaking in tangents, and the passage you are referring to here, I can now see with hindsight is rife with my own idiosyncrasies. I believe that I was attempting to conjecture, as Plato likewise may have, was a relationship between meaning and form in the natural development of language.

Semantic and syntactic development seemed to be, at least for ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato, a tool for identifying the relationships of things, and for recognizing what things make up the differences between statements that are true from statements which are false through advances in dialectic. Syntactic analysis of propositional structures, propositional types, and propositional forms were a means towards an ends: how to draw valid inferences from propositions.

Semantic analysis of symbolic forms and structures of propositions (the semantic description and relations of the content of a clause) expressed as a declarative sentence works by isolating the lexical item with relevant semantic content featured in the denotation. This would include the meaning of the term with those of related words. This would be identified by Plato (Sophist 26le–263) as two phonic signs as referrents for the essence of things: (1) the grammatical subject 'onoma' (name, noun, or noun phrase); and (2) the grammatical predication 'rhēma' (attribute, verb, action).

The 'rhēma' denotes action; those who perform actions are signified by onomata. This referrent combination of 'onoma' and 'rhēma' completes the 'logos' (sentence, proposition, statement, utterance). The logos is a part of the argument named in the 'onoma' about which something is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be.

In other words, the subject or agent is the corresponding referrent indexed to the predicated event in which I have postulated a causal relationship between the two in an attempt to explain the form/meaning correlation in terms of causal relations. We tend to neglect to separate the form from the meanings of the grammatical subject referrents, rather we generally associate their meaning with the predicated denotation (the action referring to something by means of a symbol) wherein the form and the meaning is combined in an arbitrary correlation.

If the correlation between syntax and semantic content of referrent subjects and predicates is arbitrary, then there cannot be any causal relationship between form and meaning, whereas if we isolate the referrents and associate the relationship between form and meaning contained by the entire set of objects or concepts to which the referrent subject of the predicate, truth making relations can derive from the subject if postulated as a 'thing' or a 'being'.

Truth making relations combine symbolic forms with the referrent meanings of words which derives an emergent 'being' between a symbolic form and the 'things' they
denote. This is highly dependent upon my own idiosyncratic interpretation of Plato's treatment of the problem of universals and abstract entities throughout Cratylus and is admittedly tangential to the point you originally called into question regarding whether or not the state of affairs include existent 'things' on Plato's ontology.

In traditional moral systems, it was assumed that one was subject to judgement by God, or would endure the consequences of their karma in future lives. In the absence of those regulatory systems, the question has no clear answer, as is exemplified by the diversity of responses in this thread. — Wayfarer

This seems to indicate that issues of morality can, to begin with, be meaningfully discussed only in the context of such a moral regulatory system as religion. This points in the direction of moral relativism / moral contextualism. And that answering a question like "Is X moral?" is the same kind of question as "What are the attributes of God?" -- in the sense that like the second question, the first one as well can only be answered with a reference to a particular religious doctrine, but that beyond that, it does not apply.
Whence the idea that morality can be conceived of without reference to religion ...

But moral judgements are first and foremost about meaning, in terms of what the facts imply for me and for other subjects. — Wayfarer

Such an approach becomes questionable when it comes to people who have been stigmatized or ostracized by a society.

How does a stigmatized or ostracized person make moral judgments? They don't have a meaningful and valuable reference group anymore.

That moral judgement requires something more than quantitative analysis? — Wayfarer

Such as gut feeling?

Why shouldn't different propositions have different ways of being found true or false? — Banno

Such as might makes right?
Morality is written by winners?
Truth is written by winners?
Moral propositions are to be found true or false in accordance with a particular religion?
Gut feelings?

We should make a list of categories:
1. Propositions whose truth or falsity is determined by gut feeling
2. Propositions whose truth or falsity is determined by consensus
3. Propositions whose truth or falsity is determined by examining empirical evidence
etc.
Now we just need to decide which proposition belongs to which category (and why ...).

(Which brings us to the theory of pramanas, means of knowledge.)

E.g. Peirce & Dewey ... — 180 Proof

If utilitarian theories of truth do not work for basic statements, then its unlikely they can be made to work for morality.

The curious thing is, you already understand truth. You know what it is. You know the Big Book was not much good because it didn't match what you know.

"P" is true IFF P, where "P" is a sentence spoken of and P is a sentence used.

That's as much as you might have.

And notice that nothing in the T-sentence diminishes from its applicability to moral statements.

AT least do yourself the service of responding to what I wrote, rather than making stuff up.

I suspect we agree, but on different horses. I hold a P to be T IFF there is a bespoke and particular quality Q that makes it T. (My abilities to use Q to recognize T a whole other topic.) Thus T, if it is (a) T, is not otherwise especially restrictive. Which means I completely agree with the proposition that moral propositions can indeed be true.

Can Q be generalized? It seems to me the more generalized, the less specifically applicable. Or, the more generalized, the less of a Q.

Test: P = Vanilla ice cream tastes good with a splash of spirits. Is it true? One Q could be Q = tastes good to me. Or, Q = tastes good to someone. And so forth.

For me, then, any and every T(P) or claim of T(P) implies the existence of a necessary Q by which standard T(P) can be known as such. Without an accounting as needed of the Qs, talk about the T of Ps becomes a Monty Python routine.

By far the best way to eat vanilla icecream is with a dash of balsamic vinegar.

I urge you not to judge this in advance, but to try it for yourself. I contend that it will bring you great pleasure.

Half a T must, ipso facto, half not P. Eric would be proud.

No, I don't think there is a generalisation beyond the T-sentence; I suspect such a thing must be a nonsense - how could we set out the truth of a theory of truth, after all? All it could do is talk about itself.

All it could do is talk about itself. — Banno

Or at levels of abstraction that remove it from that. And it seems not too difficult to talk about what truth is not.

A bit like talking about how a gasoline engine works. It can be informative in a general and abstract way, even if it will not ever move the car a single inch. And then one gets into truths about generalities. Messy, and it will not ever clean up. Vinegar, eh? I will try it, though at the moment not the opportunity. And you may hear from me when I do.

Moral facts are, in effect, truth-makers / warrants for moral claims. — 180 Proof

Just to be clear, are you making the universal conjunctive statement, "All moral facts "A" are (assuming "/" is a logical or grammatical conjunction) logically equivalent to truth-makers "B" and warrants "C" for moral claims? If so, then both terms of the statement: All moral facts "A" are truth-makers of moral claims "B" and warrants of moral claims "C", have existential import.

("A") All moral facts
All terms "moral facts" are in equivalence with
the terms of ("B") and of ("C"), wherein the terms:
("B") Truth-makers of moral claims; and
("C") Warrants of moral claims.

There is ambiguity whether or not such universal statements of the form: All "A" are "B" and "C" can be considered true, false (or, perhaps meaningless) if there are no instances "B's" and/or "C's". When considered as false in any such cases, then the statement All "A" are "B" and "C" has existential import with respect to "A". And, the statement becomes further problematic insomuch as even the major term "A" in having no clear instantiation as a fact.

I suppose the only solution would be to request further information from you. What are ("B") Truth-makers of moral claims; and ("C") warrants of moral claims, on your view? And, how do they instantiate ("A") as represented by an actual example? If these terms are abstract concepts, then could you provide the set in which such terms can be instantiated? And, furthermore, could you elucidate as to just how the entities contained by the set of abstract concepts share the qualifying properties to such a degree to be categorized within the domain of facts?

I'm asking for an example of an objective moral fact. This would be a moral statement (e.g., genocide is wrong) that is true independent of us.
— Cartesian trigger-puppets

You are conflating statements with facts. Why? — 180 Proof

Forgive my ambiguity, I'm asking for an example of an objective moral fact, as in a truth-making instantiation of the states of affairs, or the fact of the world to which the truth or factuality of a moral statement (such as "genocide is wrong") obtaines. If for everything identified as 'genocide' ('A') has the property of 'being wrong' ('B'), then what is the objective fact, or truth-making entity ('B') of which instantiates the the truth-bearing representation of the moral statement ('A' is 'B')? The truth-making relationship between ('A' is 'B') is 'x' (that all things identified as 'genocide' has the property of 'being wrong') which makes the proposition 'y' (or 'A' is 'B') true iff 'y' is true because 'x' exists.

I don't think "moral statements" – normativity – when I say 'moral claim'. What am I missing by deviating from the specious ontic premises of (e.g.) "error theory"? — 180 Proof

If so, then when you or an interlocutor make a moral claim, do you consider the statement that you or your interlocutor has stated to be truth-apt? If yes, then do you find the truth values of all moral statements to be false? Whether moral claims are meaningless statements, or if they are truth-apt but such that their truth-aptness will never obtain, thus rendering all such utterances false or meaningless by default, would not either derivative truth value (universally false or meaningless) deny such claims as statements of fact?

Do you have such an example?

A barefoot little girl cries alone at night on an empty street. Her distress, loneliness & defenselessness constitute a moral claim for help. That those abject conditions can increase and/or be prolonged by neglecting to help her is a moral fact recognized by SEEING (I. Murdoch, E. Levinas, P. Foot) oneself, or anyone else one cares about, in that little girl's "shoes". — 180 Proof

Is not stating her "....distress, loneliness & defenselessness..." simply begging the question by presupposing terms embedded with evaluative denotation? And, by "constitute" do you mean signify? As in, a signal transmitting meaningful information via a message? A sign or signal contains, as with any unit of language, either truth-bearing, or meaningless information potentially encoded by senders as a representation, that once decoded by receivers holds a correspondence with the objects, things, or entities that exist in reality. Why load adjectives such as "abject" upon the conditions of which are under evaluatative investigation?

The rhetorical devices and explicit denotation of normative language only serves to obfuscate such metaethical investigations by embedding a presupposed evaluation into the premises that assumes the evaluation of the conclusion. This serves as a quintessential example for how our biased human tendencies to linguistically romanticize the values we have preferences for, on the one hand, while denigrating the values we have preferences against, on the other.

A moral fact instantiated by our perceptions of (a particular) emotionally charged reaction to an event, or as a result, a prolonged desire to alter the way the world is? I share and applaud your sentiments, alas we yet have no grounds to warrant such sentiment as factual. I understand that (for most) sentient recognition, followed (for many) subsequently by an empathetic relatability and (for few) a sufficient altruistic motivation to offer up the sacrifice of ones own self-interests required to do something about a scenario. There simply has been no justification provided here. Just, and as with myself, predispositions and normative biases.

That says nothing about pramat(ic)ist 'theories of truth'.

...then I'll add that they don't work.

Care to tell me why? A very brief sketch, for instance, of where e.g. Peirce or Dewey goes wrong in your estimation will do.

Maybe someone can help. I once came across an essay by a highly regarded philosopher about, if I remember correctly, why it is wrong a bake a child in the oven. The point was that we all recognize this as wrong but moral arguments as to why it is wrong fail.

Simply that what is useful need not be true. Truth and utility are distinct.

Okay. I understand pramat(ic)ism as saying something other than "equating utility with truth". Rather: truths are useful to seekers to the degree the methods or practices for warranting them habitualize us to seek them – a virtuous cycle / positive feedback loop. Expressed differently in Peirce and Dewey, IIRC, a concept of (the) pragmatics of inquiry. 'Truth-seeking', in other words – not truth per se – 'is useful for forming adaptive habits', that is, shaping character (à la aretē). Not a stretch by my lights