I don't think there's much point in debating this question, since there has never been a unified concept of "materialism." — SophistiCat
This sounds very confused. A field is not a state of matter like solid or liquid. Fields in physics are mathematical models used to describe... physical stuff (let's not get hung up on what "matter" is), in whatever state it may be. Saying that a field is a state of matter is like saying that engineering is a type of car. — SophistiCat
Looks like you pulled this quote out of context and misunderstood its meaning, which is precisely the opposite of the point you were trying to make. — SophistiCat
I can only assume that you think Strawson is not committed to attributing conscious states to everything. Okay. Why not? — Bartricks
Again, consciousness can't emerge - Strawson doesn't think so. So it is not - not - like liquidity.
So consciousness must be present - fully present - in the building blocks. If it is not fully present in the building blocks, then we have something coming out that wasn't put it. — Bartricks
The premise you've added to get to the conclusion is that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object. — Bartricks
Both of these "appears" may be in fact be mere appearances.my mind does not appear to be material, yet does appear causally to interact with things quite dissimilar to it - a — Bartricks
and even if it were true, the fact my mind appears immaterial not material would mean you should conclude that the sensible world is mental, not that the mental is material. — Bartricks
Marc Lange's book is very readable and he tries to make it clear that physical fields must be real things or entities rather than merely a calculational device. — spirit-salamander
Well, fields can move particles, again provided that fields are real things, which I assume. — spirit-salamander
This is the context. I think you can leave the passage I quoted in isolation without the context. — spirit-salamander
it's hard to make sense of the idea of experience arising out of a combination of non-conscious stuff. — Manuel
it's hard to make sense of the idea of consciousness arising out of a combination of non-experiential stuff.
it's hard to make sense of the idea of experience arising out of a combination of non-experiential stuff.
it's hard to make sense of the idea of consciousness arising out of a combination of non-conscious stuff.
If it is not emergent, then we can use it to model what Strawson is saying, yes? If it is emergent, then we can't and it would constitute a counterexample. Agree? — Bartricks
THe building blocks are not 'a bit shaped'. They're shaped. They'd need to be othewise we'd have the emergence of shape, which would be an emergence every bit as radical as that of consciousness. — Bartricks
Although it isn't. (See liquidity.) — bongo fury
The point for him is that his materialism says that the nature of reality is physical, whatever its nature may ultimately be. — Manuel
The linguistic distinction between alive and dead could prove to be questionable. Things are rather neither alive nor dead. — spirit-salamander
To your second sentence: I think that panpsychism need not be associated with vitalism. It is only about the sober and neutral attribution of conscious experience to material entities. — spirit-salamander
The word "life" cleaves reality so that some things fall on one side, some things on another. — hypericin
Why should I favor "the physical world is mental, and only appears physical" over "the mental world is physical, and only appears mental"? — hypericin
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