P1. If all (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance, and a subset of humans value intellectual honesty, then the subset of humans must by default begin from an agnostic position.

P2. All (non-innate) human knowledge begins from a position of uncertainty emerging from ignorance, and a subset of humans value intellectual honesty.

C. Therefore, the subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Thanks for clarifying.

I don't entirely disagree, however it would not be unreasonable to say that certain propositions are easier to be agnostic about - the nature of the claim being less unlikely or fraught. Not all proposition are weighted evenly. Would this same logic strictly apply to any claim that can be made?

As far as reasoning to 'play or not play' a lottery goes, the agnostic does not play because s/he can't decide whether or not its worth the risk, the theist plays because "with g/G everything, including the jackpot, is possible" and the atheist plays because, no matter how improbable, it remains possible to "win" an extraordinary return on a deminimis investment – white swans do happen! :smirk: :up: – otherwise, not winning is an absolute certainty guaranteed by not playing. The agnostic, seems to me in this instance, is the least rational actor. — 180 Proof

I see you've ordered your usual, "confuse the hell out of TheMadFool". :up: :clap: Gimme some time to process this gem of pure logic will ya?

:wink: Gotcha.

Does your argument also support agnosticism in regards to Russell's teapot? — Tom Storm

It supports agnosticism broadly as the default stance with regards to any initial or long-standing inquiry to determine the truth-value of a proposition wherein the truth-value has yet to be determined on the grounds of insufficient evidence. It is true that one will develop certain attitudes or biases one way or another on many issues. For example, I am agnostic in regards to Russell's celestial teapot because, though I do not believe there exists a microscopic teapot between the orbits of Mars and Earth, I cannot justify my believing that there is no teapot is to be true as it rests purely upon my assumptions rather than resting upon much good evidence.

I do not require absolute certainty nor perfect reasoning or direct access to objective reality unconstrained by human sensory perception. I simply require a consistent system of logic resting upon a solid foundation such as an axiom that one must presuppose and that is on the whole uncontroversial (e.g., that there is exists something rather than nothing). I would accept any proposition derived by such axiomatic proof or on the grounds of verifiable empirical evidence (e.g., the moon orbits the earth).

This becomes increasingly difficult with regards to negative claims (e.g., there is no celestial teapot) but I don't see why there is such a fuss about requiring negative claims to shoulder a burden of proof. Because others assert that there is such a God, a celestial teapot, or other such extraordinary claim? Its ridiculous. That which can be asserted without proof can and should be dismissed without proof. This is Hitchens razor. If there is no substantiation, no demonstration, no argument, etc. for a claim, then it is equally unwarranted to consider or appreciate on just those grounds.

To me, the assertion of a claim that is neither axiomatic or derivative from a logical sequence of inferences drawn from such axioms or necessary assumptions, then it is just as meaningless as a contradiction and as compelling as a tautology. Why so many people concern themselves with such is both a mystery and the problem (the latter because your concern extends them a platform and the illusion of a genuine issue).

:up:

There are two ways to address an argument: (1) criticism by analysis and (2) criticism by providing a stronger, alternative / counter argument. I chose (2), others have chosen (1). Yeah, it's your OP, Ct-puppet, but the topic is not about you. — 180 Proof

That is an irrelevant conclusion which is a form of relevance fallacy.

Ignoratio Elenchi, according to Aristotle, is a fallacy that arises from "ignorance of the nature of refutation". To refute an assertion, Aristotle says we must prove its contradictory; the proof, consequently, of a proposition which stood in any other relation than that to the original, would be an ignoratio elenchi. Since Aristotle, the scope of the fallacy has been extended to include all cases of proving the wrong point ... "I am required to prove a certain conclusion; I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it; in that lies the fallacy ... For instance, instead of proving that 'this person has committed an atrocious fraud', you prove that 'this fraud he is accused of is atrocious'"; ... The nature of the fallacy, then, consists in substituting for a certain issue another which is more or less closely related to it and arguing the substituted issue. The fallacy does not take into account whether the arguments do or do not really support the substituted issue, it only calls attention to the fact that they do not constitute proof of the original one… It is a particularly prevalent and subtle fallacy and it assumes a great variety of forms. But whenever it occurs and whatever form it takes, it is brought about by an assumption that leads the person guilty of it to substitute for a definite subject of inquiry another which is in close relation with it. — Arthur Ernest Davies,

You are ignoring refutation and instead offering a conclusion that fails to address the issue in question. I presented you with a proposition. Propositions can only be true or false on this logic. According to the law of excluded middle, "For every proposition, either this proposition or its negation is true," and the law of non-contradiction, "Contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time," thus either the proposition entailed through the logic of my argument is true, or the propositions negation is. Which one is it?

(1) includes "refutation". If (2), then (1) is redundant. Also, false dichotomy, puppet: propositions are true, not true, false or nonsense.

I am not a "veteran logician," and my criticism was not directed at your logic - quite the contrary. The logical structure of a typical philosophical argument is fairly trivial, and that goes for your argument as well. Logical consistency is by far the lowest bar you need to clear; focusing as much attention on it as you do just distracts you from more important things, and for the reader makes it that much more tiring to engage with you. Your reply to me was so pointlessly pedantic, I almost thought you were trolling.

On a side note, if you were to formalize your critique of the second antecedent in the conditional conjuntive statement of P1 of the main argument, which is asserted again in P2, then you would realize flaws in your own reasoning. One, it is in the form of modus ponens which is tautological in nature, so it is actually just a specialized construct of logical syllogism rather than pedanticism on my part. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Whoosh!

Oh well, maybe it's just a phase you have to go through. On the other hand, I saw an earlier thread of yours - it was much better.

Certainty and uncertainty are not binary choices. Nothing is truly certain. Any knowledge you gain from experience may be contradicted by new experience. Any logical, mathematical, and especially philosophical conclusions may be tainted by flaws in the argument you cannot perceive.

Nothing is absolutely certain, and most things are not absolutely uncertain. You can only do your best to accurately assign degrees of certainty to the propositions which are relevant to you.

You have provided no counter argument to my thesis statement (T), "Agnosticism is the most rationally acceptable default position," nor to the conclusion drawn from my main argument (C), "The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position," but rather you conclude (-A) "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' cannot be true," and (-O) that, "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity,' does not obtain."

Those are not are not refutations to either my thesis statement or the concluding proposition in my main argument. Those are obviously the negations of their own respective propositions: (A) "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' is true," and (O) "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity,' obtains." These are, again, obviously not the propositions that I argue for in the OP.

You need to conclude with the negating propositions presented by the OP, (-T), "Agnosticism is NOT the most rationally acceptable default position," or (-C), "[It is NOT the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position," in order to avoid committing a fallacy of relevance as I tried to point out before. An example of what a relevance fallacy looks like and how one may occur can be elucidated within the pattern of the following argument:

Interlocutor 1 asserts proposition (P), "Being agnostic with regards to the truth-value of a proposition, or that propositions negation on the grounds of insufficient information is warranted."

Interlocutor 2 argues against a superficially similar proposition (B) by asserting that propositions negation (-B), "Being agnostic with regards to the truth-value of the proposition (P), 'The Abrahamic God of monotheism exists,' or that propositions negation (-P), 'The Abrahamic God of monotheism DOES NOT exists,' on the grounds of insufficient information, whenever you feel as if there is sufficient information to warrant the propositions negation (-P), is NOT warranted,"
falsely, as if an argument against (B) were an argument against (P).

Lets isolate all the concluding propositions and negations presented by us both so far and include their respective counterparts (opposing propositions and negations):

(T) Agnosticism is the most rationally acceptable default position.

(-T) Agnosticism is NOT the most rationally acceptable default position.

(C) [it is the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position.

(-C) [it is NOT the case that] The subset of humans who value intellectual honesty must by default begin from an agnostic position.

(A) [the proposition] "The Abrahamic Deity exists" is true.

(-A) [the proposition] "The Abrahamic Deity exists" is NOT true.

(O) Agnosticism, with respect to "the existence of the Abrahamic Deity," obtains.

(-O) Agnosticism, with respect to "the existence of the Abrahamic Deity," DOES NOT obtain.

Now, the wording doesn't necessarily have to be identical to these example representations (e.g., (-A) could be written as, "[the proposition] 'The Abrahamic Deity exists' is FALSE," rather than, ". . . NOT true.") but they do however have to retain and not omit relevant context. In other words, we cannot exclude, exchange, or include extra context (e.g., "Agnosticism, with respect to 'the existence of the Abrahamic Deity'. . .") to the proposition in question if we want to provide a refutation of it. By changing the relevant context of a proposition, it is no longer the proposition in which our aim (hopefully) is to represent and subsequently refute. It becomes a type of straw man, essentially - a member of the family of fallacies known as 'relevance fallacies' - and I hope that I have clarified this issue for us, in that regard.

Next, I want to represent your entire (attempted counter) argument and offer my critique as well as raise your attention to any issues of relevant context that I find.

(ax. 1) If theism is cognitive, then its claims (e.g. "the Abrahamic Deity exists") are demonstrably true or not true — (excerpts) QED & Other Stigmata

I briefly mentioned a few things that immediately jumped out at me as being problematic with this conditional statement. First, it is not 'axiomatic' as implied by (ax. 1), because an axiom is "an unprovable statement generally held as a first principle which is granted as true because it is self-evident. The statement, "A whole is greater than it's parts," for example, is an axiom. The argument to substantiate this claim also serves to expose an error in reasoning, which is a good segue into my second issue.

Second, it is not self-evidently true that if a thing is "cognitive" (capable of being reduced to empirical factual knowledge) that the thing must be "demonstrably true or not true" (a demonstrable fact or quality which can be shown to be true or not true). For example, the number of birds in the sky at precisely this moment is a cognitive quantification (i.e., it is simple arithmetic), however it is not demonstrable. There surely is some number of birds in the sky at a given moment in time, but that number cannot be demonstrably shown to be true, and it would be irrational to say that because the total number of birds in the sky is something that can be known, yet isn't, and thus cannot be demonstrated or proved, that therefore there is no such number of birds in the sky at a given moment.

Third, notice all of the context added and omitted. I am arguing for a broad and universal applicability for agnosticism which includes all contexts and varies between subject to subject, agent to agent, and the information available to both. For example, it would be rational to be agnostic regarding the existence of the sun if you spent the entirety of your life underground without any information about it. When you include specific context by using terms such as 'theism,' 'Abrahamic Deity,' and the concept of 'existence' you take away from the broad universal scope and narrow it down to one that is specific and particular.

(ax. 2) If theism is noncognitive, then its claims (e.g. "the Abrahamic Deity exists") are mere poetry (i.e. figures of speech). [from ax. 1] — (excerpts) QED & Other Stigmata

First, besides the aforementioned added context, just because something is "noncognitive" (incapable of being reduced to empirical factual knowledge) doesn't mean that it is "mere poetry" (i.e., figures of speech). I understand that poetry is an expression of emotions and feelings that doesn't render empirical factual knowledge, but neither does motivational speeches. Motivational speeches are not poetry. There are also forms of cognitive poetry. Second, if you are not using these terms literally, then you are using them rhetorically (which is hilarious given the context of this critique).

(prop. 1) Any claim that "the Abrahamic Deity exists" entails that nature is "supernatural", or that its otherwise law-like regularities are arbitrarily, purposefully, changed (suspended). [from ax. 1] — (excerpts) QED & Other Stigmata

Not necessarily, it is to claim that there is a metaphysical realm which has extra-spatial and extra-temporal dimensions. Both this proposition and its negation are well beyond our capacity to suppose or even ask well formed questions of so to begin to generalize. This is essentially an argument from ignorance. Just because there is an absence of evidence does not mean there is evidence of absence. Aphorism aside, that is a legitimate refutation.

I think I'll stop here before this starts to resemble a textbook rather than a critique.

I find the OP both unsound & irrelevant to the question of 'theism's truth-value'. But okay, you disagree with my argument; third-parties, I suspect, are more able to disinterestedly assess the relative merits of our divergent positions than either of us can, Ct-p. I've no interest in persuading you or anyone of anything (that's sophistry), just in presenting reasons as needed for supporting the positions I take on a given topic where a position of mine differs from someone else's (in this case, yours). If my reasons are faulty, fallacious, incoherent, irrelevant, unsound, etc, then so be the dispassionate "guilty" (invalid) verdict of the jury.

I've no interest in persuading you or anyone of anything (that's sophistry) — 180 Proof

:fire:

To
. . .know of the improbability. . .
— TheMadFool
of a proposition is to admit uncertainty and thus take an agnostic position.

I find theology uninteresting, I reference agnosticism in a much broader scope. I am almost entirely uninterested in whether or not there is a god. Would you care to challenge the argument? — Cartesian trigger-puppets

There are two ways of looking at possibility and they are,

1. Nonmathematically: Suppose I roll a die that has two 6's instead of one 6 like standard issue dice. It's possible to get either, say, a 1 or a 6. That's all we can know without math and if you were asked to bet in a game that depends on rolling a 1 or a 6, you wouldn't be able to make a decision because all you know is that both 1 and 6 are possible

2. Mathematically (Probability math): The probability of getting a 6 is 2/6 = 1/3. The probability of getting a 1 is 1/6. We know 1/3 > 1/6 i.e. the odds of rolling a 6 is greater than that of rolling a 1. Imagine now that you're asked to play a game of chance based on whether you roll a 1 or a 6. Since you now know getting a 6 is more likely than getting a 1, you can make a sound decision how to best spend your money, assuming gambling is a good way to spend your money.


Note: Once you know or can find out the mathematical probability of an event X, it would be unwise/irrational for you to act in ways that ignore that piece of information.

We know that God is possible according to agnostics but "what is the mathematical probability that God exists?" is the question whose answer can help us make the best possible decision in re adopting theism or atheism.

However, it's one thing to say the issue can be put to rest with a calculation and another to actually calculate it. I'm going to respond to this with the standard reply of a British railway information officer when asked for information, "well, don't ask me!"

Make what you want of what I said. Sorry, I've reached the perimeter of what I know think I know.

Improbable events occur everyday. Black & white swans. Only naive idiots are agnostic about them and don't take care (vide Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Daniel Kahneman, et al). As I've pointed out previously, the question is whether theism is true or not true (and N O T "whether or not (which g/G?!) exists")?

I can't think (failure of imagination?) of what better evidence there could be of the "supernatural" than the natural world itself which is purportedly affected by a "deity"; such affects cannot, even in principle, be explained as natural occurrences or explained away as misrecognitions / frauds, but only accounted for as uniquely inexplicable exceptions to, or arbitrary violations of, (at least known) natural laws – that is, "divine fiats" as "revealed" in sacred scriptures as signs ("miracles") of a theistic (e.g. "Abrahamic") deity. Theism cannot be true without such truth-making evidence, can it? And lacking evidence in the natural world entailed by theism, (1) this entails that theism is untrue and, (2) therefore, that agnosticism does not obtain.

If my reasoning is wrong, show me, Fool. :nerd:

the question is whether theism is true or not true (and N O T "whether or not (which g/G?!) exists")? — 180 Proof

This appears self-contradictory. Theism is true iff G/g exists and false iff G/g doesn't exist. It doesn't seem possible to separate them in any meaningful way to allow duscussion of one independent of the other. If my track record is any indication of my having got this right, I'd tell myself, "try again."

I can't think (failure of imagination?) of what better evidence there could be of the "supernatural" than the natural world itself which is purportedly affected by a "deity"; such affects cannot, even in principle, be explained as natural occurrences or explained away as misrecognitions / frauds, but only accounted for as uniquely inexplicable exceptions to, or arbitrary violations of, (at least known) natural laws – that is, "divine fiats" as "revealed" in sacred scriptures as signs ("miracles") of a theistic (e.g. "Abrahamic") deity. Theism cannot be true without such truth-making evidence, can it? And lacking evidence in the natural world entailed by theism, (1) this entails that theism is untrue and, (2) therefore, that agnosticism does not obtain. — 180 Proof

This has left me scratching my head for a long time. There seems to be two, what appears to be, mutually incompatible standpoints on the matter of the so-called natural order (the laws of the universe) vis-à-vis alleged miracles.

On the one hand, we have religious scientists, one being Isaac Newton, who were/are of the opinion that all they were/are doing amounted to deciphering God's will by discovering how the natural order was effected (the laws of nature).

On the other hand, there are non-scientists but of the faith who are not in the least bit impressed by the natural order and have gone on record demanding only suspensions/violations of the natural order [miracles] as sufficient warrant to infer a deity.

What's up with that?

Theism is true iff G/g exists and false iff G/g doesn't exist. — TheMadFool

Yeah, but which g/G? Truisms but red herrings. The "divine predicates" ("revealed" in sacred scriptures) entail claims about the world which can be investigated and falsified. This approach digs down to the bedrock issue of what you can know about the / any theistic deity at issue. Where theism is noncognitive, g/G need not exist in order to warrant 'belief in g/G' (vide Don Cupitt, Paul Tillich, Ludwig Feuerbach, Immanuel Kant, et al).

The rest of your post ... :roll:

Yeah, but which g/G? Truisms but red herrings. The "divine predicates" ("revealed" in sacred scriptures) entail claims about the world which can be investigated and falsified Where theism is noncognitive, g/G need not exist to warrant belief in g/G. (vide Don Cupitt, Paul Tillich, Ludwig Feuerbach, Immanuel Kant, et al).

The rest of your post ... :roll: — 180 Proof

Excellent! So, you're saying there are 3 things at play:

1. G/g exists/not
2. Belief in G/g [Theism/atheism]
3. Claims about the world that can be verified/disconfirmed, allowing us to make a rational decision regarding theism/atheism.

3 has a direct bearing on 2 because 2 is ultimately a claim to knowledge and thus needs justification (3). It feels almost like you want to draw attention to the epistemological aspectz (belief, justification) and away from the metaphysical ones (G/g exists/not) of religion. Am I right?

Falsification, not justification. Epistemic warrant, not ontological fiat. A-gnosis denotes without-knowledge and not without-existence. "Atheism" is not in question, it's only a possible conclusion (the correct one in my view) inferred from determining that 'theism is not true' as I've already suggested.

Again:
• theism – claims about creator-intervener g/G are true
• atheism – theism is not true
• agnosticism – theism can be shown to be equally true and not true (but not 'cannot be shown to be true or not true' because the impossibility to show that 'theism is true', given the ubiquitous scope of so many scriptural claims, is indistinguishable from, in fact, showing that 'theism is untrue')

If theism is realist-cognitive (makes truth-claims) and using the natural world (searching for truth-makers), I/we can show that theism is untrue and, therefore, (theistic) agnosticism is unwarranted, incoherent, does not obtain.

I find the OP both unsound & irrelevant to the question of 'theism's truth-value'. — 180 Proof

It is. It also is with regards to the question of 'pepperoni lovers' or 'triple pepperoni' pizza's taste-value; or with regards to the question of the tooth fairy's tooth-value; or with regards to the question of 'Michael Shermer's woo-value. . . .Or with regards to the question of why would you make such a vacuous statement? The OP is only sound & relevant to the question of whether or not agnosticism is the most rational default position - as that is the only thing the OP claims to be.

But okay, you disagree with my argument; third-parties, I suspect, are more able to disinterestedly assess the relative merits of our divergent positions than either of us can, Ct-p. — 180 Proof

Hold on. Your argument does not stand divergent to mine if you are attacking theism or agnosticism in a very specific context wherein sufficient grounds warrant a negative claim and thus an atheistic position. You have not rejected a single premise of my argument. I proposed a deductively valid argument and in order for the argument to not go through a premise must be rejected.

I repeat. You have not rejected a single premise of my argument. I proposed a deductively valid argument and in order for the argument to not go through a premise must be rejected.

Third parties whom are competent in logic and argumentation could perhaps offer insights one way or another. However, I have demonstrated that your arguments miss the point entirely and this is obviously the case because you do not reach an opposing proposition of either my concluding statement nor my thesis statement, but rather the opposing statements to propositions that are not found within the OP, that I do not particularly hold or find tenable, and that fail to address a single premise of my argument.

For example, If I argue that "(P1) Noodles is a cat. (P2) Not all cats are black. Therefore, (C) Noodles may not be black. And you respond with (P1) If Noodles was instead a raven, then she would be black because all ravens are black. (P2) Noodles is actually a raven. Therefore, (C) Noodles is actually black because all ravens are black.

It is painfully obvious that the proposition "Noodles MUST be black because all ravens are black," is not opposing the statement of "Noodles may NOT be black because not all cats are black." These propositions require their respective negations (e.g., "Noodles actually is NOT black," and "Noodles MAY be black.")

I've no interest in persuading you or anyone of anything (that's sophistry), just in presenting reasons as needed for supporting the positions I take on a given topic where a position of mine differs from someone else's (in this case, yours). If my reasons are faulty, fallacious, incoherent, irrelevant, unsound, etc, then so be the dispassionate "guilty" (invalid) verdict of the jury. — 180 Proof

Then why present an argument? Why engage in philosophy? And how is persuasion sophistic? And why do you appeal to the "verdict of the jury"? Do you have interests in persuading them? If not, then why are you presenting reasons as needed for supporting the positions you take?

Do you realize that both of our arguments are mutually compatible with one another? It is possible to be agnostic by default with regards to a good many propositions, and yet at the same time be atheistic with regards to the Abrahamic God of monotheism? If this is the case, then how in the [....] are your arguments a refutation of mine?

If I say "the sun goes around the earth" and you say "the earth goes around the sun", we then have offered alternative models of this solar system without directly addressing the premises of each others' conjectures. We, along with others, compare and contrast the outputs of these models as we / others abductively reason. Vide Peirce et al.

No real need to have a debate about semantics, but if what you call atheism means gnostic atheism and what you call agnosticism means uncertainty without coming to any conclusion, then when I say agnostic atheism, I mean uncertainty with a lack of belief. If you take agnosticism to mean agnostic atheism then we agree. Can you clarify your stance on agnostic atheism?

Secondly, can you define "God"? I feel the problem in this debate is how vague the actual claim is.

one merriam-webster defines "God" as:
the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness who is worshipped (as in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism) as creator and ruler of the universe

It seems the only thing people actually agree on when it comes to the claim of theists on "God" is that he's an intangible, invisible, undetectable being that we barely know anything about and exists.

What he can or can't do is debated by theists, his qualities are debated, what he has done is debated, disproving any of these claims is insufficient for proving God doesn't exist.

It is true that we can't disprove the existence of God but that we're uncertain about a claim which is foolproof against being proven false is pretty unavoidable. It is fundamentally meaningless to point out that a claim which is foolproof against being proven false hasn't been proven false. It means nothing. What matters is how we deal with the situation - what matters is belief. That is why agnostic atheism is a meaningful position and agnosticism isn't. The default position should be a lack of belief, do you disagree?

We know that God is possible according to agnostics but "what is the mathematical probability that God exists?" is the question whose answer can help us make the best possible decision in re adopting theism or atheism. — TheMadFool

I wouldn't say possible, though that is technically true, it is a bit deceiving too. Agnosticism, in the context of the existence of God or gods, is generally not aiming to retain the possibility that God or gods exist, but rather lacks sufficient grounds to warrant a negative claim to the existence of God or gods.

You are asking me what the mathematical probability is that God exists without defining the term in question. The term "God" is one of the most ambiguous terms there are and thus I would first need your definition (which will almost certainly need to be analyzed down and recasted once full clarification is satisfied (why I have such little interest in this tedious task). I will need to know your interpretation of relevant scriptures and doctrines, your personal interpretation, all universal qualities that I can render from you, etc.

After possibly quite a bit of work I can usually piece together a concept of God (or whatever other deity that you are arguing for) by constantly drawing information from you with clarification as to what this information means to you. Once I have a sufficient set of information which has been satisfactorily clarified by you and of which contains either a (less so compelling) physical impossibility (e.g., that the universe was created in less than 10,000 years ago) or a (more so compelling) logical impossibility (i.e., logical contradiction) (e.g., that God is omnipotent, omni-benevolent, and omniscient - in combination to you granting the existence of 'evil' and providing a typical theistic definition therein), then I move from my prior, default agnostic position to an atheistic position regarding your particular model of a god or deity.

I most often remain undecided but also largely confused as to what my interlocutor was trying to describe to me, but often enough I do reach a threshold and advance from agnosticism with regards to a specific interaction with a particular person. When this does happen it has always been a shift towards atheism and never towards theism, though I have heard quite coherent and rational arguments that are necessary for such a logical pathway, it seems many and quite extraordinary leaps are taken of which I cannot reasonably follow.

Yes, I agree. Those are two legitimate opposing propositions too.

If I say "the sun goes around the earth" and you say "the earth goes around the sun", — 180 Proof

These can be formalized into propositions and their negations.

(S) It is the case that the sun goes around the earth.
(-S) It is NOT the case that the sun goes around the earth.

(E) It is the case that the earth goes around the sun.
(-E) It is NOT the case that the earth goes around the sun.

What seems to be the problem here is that whenever you hear someone claim that "God exists" your assume to understand the term 'God' whereas I have no freaking idea and must go on a hermeneutic (literal, moral, allegorical, and anagogical) adventure with my interlocutor until sufficient information is extracted and clarified so that I may advance from my initial default agnostic position and (at least every time so far) shift epistemologically towards an atheistic position regarding the particular theistic concept of a specific individual theist.

Does this bridge any gaps for us?

I don't know. What I do know is that g/G is never the issue but rather the sets of claims attributed to g/G. Theism is one such set. If theism – its set of claims, or what we say about g/G / scriptures purportedly "reveal" – is not true, then there is no rational warrant for 'belief in g/G' or 'belief that g/G exists'. I don't spin anybody's prayer wheels trying to sort out whether or not some arbitrarily underdetermined "mystery" exists. Theism, however, indisputably exists; and its truth-value is, for me, the only question worth addressing regarding g/G.

No real need to have a debate about semantics, but if what you call atheism means gnostic atheism and what you call agnosticism means uncertainty without coming to any conclusion, then when I say agnostic atheism, I mean uncertainty with a lack of belief. If you take agnosticism to mean agnostic atheism then we agree. Can you clarify your stance on agnostic atheism? — Judaka

Sure. I just tire of this discussion (of agnosticism) being chained to the rocks of theism and atheism. This is because I view the dichotomy on the whole utterly uninteresting and endlessly exhausting. I also do not take pleasure in attacking sacrosanct beliefs held not rationally in hopes of constructing an accurate personal epistemology, but emotionally in hopes of constructing a sustainable niche in reality wherein maximal psychological comfort can be achieved.

I definite agnosticism (with perhaps a bit too many idiosyncrasies) as, "an epistemological position of an initial default or of a forthcoming retraction wherein a reasonable suspension of judgment is warranted on the grounds of an apparent lack of good independent evidential support for a hypothesis or proposition."

Hypotheses measure probability in terms such as: impossible, unlikely, possible, even chance, likely and certain probabilities; whereas propositions measure truth-value in terms of true or false. Hypotheses are sufficient in supporting either a positive (P is the case) or negative (Not P- is the case) belief but since it factors epistemic and logical possibilities, it falls short of the standard of knowledge as a justified true-belief.

Propositions are primary truth bearers insofar as their references (relationship between a symbol that signifies a thing) accurately capture the obtaining state of affairs of their referents (the thing signified). A proposition maps language to thought, concepts or representations in each agent's mind transmitting cognitive meaning between a sender and a recipient. However, a true proposition must be justified and the justification of a proposition consists in appealing to something independent of the subject - the World.

So, in terms of epistemic justification, our language, thoughts, and concepts must be grounded in the objects, entities, or things empirically substantiated or logically instantiated as a referent component of the obtaining states of affairs. Under certain circumstances in which the available evidence no better supports a proposition (P) than it supports it's logically incompatible negating proposition (-P), one ought to suspend judgement between both propositions (P) and (-P).

Agnostic atheism is an epistemological position that is both atheistic (because it is to withhold belief in the existence of God or gods) and agnostic (because it is to claim that the existence of God or gods is either unknowable or not known as a fact). This is a fine position, I just don't like the further restrictive denotations alongside the already problematic theistic connotations.

I don't have a particular definition of God or of gods. I have a basic ambiguous conception of God that is unique to me and my life's experiences. Some may define God as "the universe." Some as "all of existence," or "the entirety of the reality itself." These can hardly be argued against since it is essentially a semantic issue. Others define God as "A Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness," which can be clarified and revealed as a logical contradiction.

I hope that helped.