Heidegger is often accused of smothering ideas in an excess of his own language. But I found him sometimes pretty illuminating by use of etymology, though I confess I needed a good teacher or the resources I found on the Web. Here for instance is a commentary on 'causa' and its origin in the Greek 'aition' (http://www.english.hawaii.edu/criticalink/heidegger/guide2.html) - which has stuck with me. That's from Questions re Technology. 'Being and Time' devotes some effort to trying to retrieve Aristotelian concepts from the mud that has stuck to them over the millennia.

Cool.. thanks mcdoodle!

That link makes a fascinating mash-up with Genealogy of Morals. Heidegger was familiar with Nietzsche, wasn't he?

I suppose that etymology can be of use if you are interested in the history of ideas, and in particular in exegesis of old philosophers, which is what much of academic philosophy seems to be about.

Heidegger was familiar with Nietzsche, wasn't he? — Mongrel

Heidegger wrote a four volume treatise on Nietzsche.

https://www.amazon.com/Nietzsche-Vols-Knowledge-Metaphysics-Nihilism/dp/0060637943/ref=pd_bxgy_14_img_2?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=5PAVDVVXKY69QV5BG674

I find etymology useful for breaking the sedimented semantic resonance of words. Or rather, etymology shakes things up a bit, allows us to recognize the mobile and historical character of meanings and concepts. Not just the 'history of ideas' but the 'practice of ideas' can always find use for a bit of etymology.

After presenting a theory partially based on etymology, Nietzshe asks this question. He wants some academic scrutiny of his own method. — Mongrel

In what way was Nietzsche's theory "based on etymology"?

Was it his “theory” that was based on etymology, or only his interpretations of philosophical texts, or merely his own use of words and phrases?

What do you think? Can you give an example of proper use of etymology in philosophy? If not, anywhere? — Mongrel

A primary use of etymology in philosophy, or in any linguistic enterprise, is as a supplementary convention by which to guide the use of language: for instance, in selecting among words with nearly the same meaning in current usage, or in seeking a good fit for an unsatisfying or incomplete phrase.

Since some speakers, including many expert composers of philosophical texts through the ages, have aimed to align ordinary or technical speech with etymology, another use is as a guide in the interpretation of the speech of such speakers.

That exegetical task is complicated by the fact that different speakers, especially those from different times and places, may have disparate etymological resources at their disposal -- a difficulty a philologist like Nietzsche might hope to resolve.

A third use of etymology, as a sort of artist's heuristic: Take your own speech, or another's, and examine it etymologically, either a whole passage or just the most interesting turns of phrase. Let the results of the investigation stir up your thoughts, as prompts for further speaking.

I suppose some philosophers make such exercises more explicit in their writing than others.

I suppose that etymology can be of use if you are interested in the history of ideas, and in particular in exegesis of old philosophers, which is what much of academic philosophy seems to be about. — SophistiCat

The obvious question would be: how do you know you're examining the history of ideas and not just projecting your own ideas onto history?

Heidegger wrote a four volume treatise on Nietzsche.

https://www.amazon.com/Nietzsche-Vols-Knowledge-Metaphysics-Nihilism/dp/0060637943/ref=pd_bxgy_14_img_2?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=5PAVDVVXKY69QV5BG674 — John

Have you read it? I think I'd like to.

I find etymology useful for breaking the sedimented semantic resonance of words. — StreetlightX

Could you give an example?

In what way was Nietzsche's theory "based on etymology"?

Was it his “theory” that was based on etymology, or only his interpretations of philosophical texts, or merely his own use of words and phrases? — Cabbage Farmer

N's theory relates morality to selfhood and the experience of time. His approach is kind of mechanical. 'How would we breed an animal that is capable of making a promise?' My thoughts on the whole things are a little nebulous at the moment. In some ways it's similar to conclusions I came to myself. Maybe I'll make a thread aimed at sorting it out.

Etymology is not the single primary foundation of any of it. He uses it to give weight to (or sort of demand consideration of) a story that starts with a mindless human beast who eventually becomes trapped in a moral straight-jacket. So it's all about will (no surprise there.)

That exegetical task is complicated by the fact that different speakers, especially those from different times and places, may have disparate etymological resources at their disposal -- a difficulty a philologist like Nietzsche might hope to resolve. — Cabbage Farmer

Could you expand on that?

Have you read it? I think I'd like to. — Mongrel

I have it, have had it for years, found it for cheap in a secondhand book shop, have not gotten around to reading it. I have come across references to it at various times in my reading. Apparently Heidegger's take on Nietzsche is not at all in accordance with any conventional Nietzsche scholarship. Surprise, surprise!

So, it probably would be a very interesting read. As you say, I think I'd like to read it, but I would have to displace a couple of other projected items from the list, and change the general direction of my recent reading in order to do so. One thing though; I doubt that H focuses on the moral dimension of N's philosophy, or rather, the dimension of N's philosophy that deals with morals.
;)

That's cool. I'm not interested in a conventional understanding of N anyway. There's a fair amount of overlap between my own view and his. It was just bizarre that I read the Heidegger stuff mcdoodle pointed toward (which focused on causation as responsibility (with a mention of logos... stuff I was familiar with from OWA) and as I continued my N reading, it started with:

"This is simply the long history of the origin of responsibility."

I read the commentary that linked, and found it very interesting, especially the contention that Heidegger rejected the idea that Aristotle entertained any notion of "efficient cause" in the kind of sense that modern science and philosophy do.

This makes sense to me, because my understanding is that Heidegger thinks the scientific view of the world (as it exemplifies presence at hand) is secondary to, and parasitic upon the primary human mode of dealing with the world as ready to hand. In keeping with this primary orientation, ontology becomes secondary to, and derivative of, phenomenology. This seems to go entirely against the objectifying tendency of the modern philosophical tradition. I understand Nietzsche (insofar as I understand him adequately at all) as an extremely ambivalent figure in relation to this modernist objectifying orientation. But I haven't read Nietzsche much in a very long time.

In any case this question of objectification has been very much in my thoughts and what much of my recent reading has been concerned with, so Heidegger's Nietzsche may not turn out to go against its general direction, after all.

Heidegger was very big on etymology; and he has been heavily criticized for that, where the claim is that arguments based on etymology are somewhat vacuous. I am not convinced this is right; it seems to me (in my relative ignorance) that etymological discovery (as a pivotal part of philology) may sometimes be the only clue as to how, for example, the ancients actually understood the contextuality of their ideas. And since ideas obviously evolve, then ancient understandings should be related to modern understandings. The perennial problem of interpretation is shown in the example given in the commentary, though, that the Greek word for 'cause' carries the sense of 'responsibility' rather than the more modern sense of "effecting"; how are the Greek senses of "effecting' and 'responsibility' related to our own senses of those words?

In any case this question of objectification has been very much in my thoughts and what much of my recent reading has been concerned with, so Heidegger's Nietzsche may not turn out to go against its general direction, after all. — John

It came home to me a while back. I was looking at a tree trunk (the way we artist-types would). I moved around the tree watching the light change. I realized that there's nothing in my visual field that forms the basis of I'm looking at a tree. The tree is an idea. To use Heidi's etymology, it's the subjectum, which is from the Greek word that meant core. The core is projected out.

I guess there is something sort of existential about N (that's similar to Kierkegaard). Imagine that we're sitting in the audience of a play and we see two actors discussing an event, but we realize that their experiences are directly in conflict. Duck-rabbit. I really hadn't thought about using that stuff in Geneology of Morals...

That sounds like a real good experience! I agree with you the tree is an idea. I've also thought this in relation to what is often referred to as the "empirical object". I have wondered what the empirical object is. Is it the sum of all and any experiences of it? No, it can't be that because it cannot be exhausted by that. So in a way I have concluded that the empirical object is a formal identity only, kind of the knowable identity of the noumenon.

As you say, there is something existentially 'duck/rabbit' about this situation. I can't be of much help when it comes to thinking about how that might relate to Genealogy of Morals, though...

Etymology is critical in communication, so it not only applies to philosophy, but to any verbal communication. If two people do not have the same definitions of words, then the words will be a poor vehicle for communication. For example, if one person calls a hammer a nail and a nail a hammer, and you ask that person for a hammer, you will receive a nail, and your verbal communication will have failed your intent. Better to use body language in that case!

Etymology is not the single primary foundation of any of it. He uses it to give weight to (or sort of demand consideration of) a story that starts with a mindless human beast who eventually becomes trapped in a moral straight-jacket. So it's all about will (no surprise there.) — Mongrel

Is that technique similar to the "third use of etymology" I mentioned?

A third use of etymology, as a sort of artist's heuristic: Take your own speech, or another's, and examine it etymologically, either a whole passage or just the most interesting turns of phrase. Let the results of the investigation stir up your thoughts, as prompts for further speaking. — Cabbage Farmer

I meant to allude to the way that some authors, including Nietzsche and Heidegger as I recall, make etymological considerations an explicit feature of their discourse.

It's one thing to draw out a line of thinking along explicitly etymological lines; another to lean on that etymology as a justification for any set of claims in that line of thinking. An etymology might motivate certain thoughts without being intended as a justification for those thoughts; and might "justify" the use of certain words in a particular turn of phrase without being intended as a justification for any claim expressed in terms of that phrase.

Could you expand on that? — Mongrel

The etymology of a word or phrase is not something we observe like a sunset or solve like an algebra problem. It's something traced or reconstructed by scholars, or by less studious readers, through some record of linguistic activity.

Views on the "true sense" or origins of a word or phrase vary across cultural contexts. So we should not expect the views of Nietzsche on the etymology of any term to coincide with the views of the experts who update our dictionaries in light of recent scholarship, or to coincide with the views of Heidegger, Aristotle, or Anaximander.

Sounds interesting. Thanks!