What do you mean by “perfectly existing”? — Amalac

Do you agree with the following:

To be an imaginary human, is to exist an imaginary human?
To be a human on planet earth, it to exist as a human on planet earth?

Do you agree that to be imperfect as a triangle, is to exist imperfectly as a triangle?
Do you agree that to be imperfect as a being/existent, is to exist imperfectly as a being/existent?

Note that you cannot say to be a square-circle, is to exist as a square-circle. Such a thing is impossible. Absurdities and contradictions exist, but what they describe (round squares) does not. By definition that which is contradictory is absurd or not true of existence.

If you want to be absolute with your semantics, then the following is true:

Triangle = that which has three sides with its interior angles totalling 180 degrees.
Perfection = that which is perfect. The perfect being. That which perfectly exists.

It is not us who exist. We are sustained by existence (or that which completely/truly/perfectly/indubitably exists). We can doubt ourselves as being/existing perfectly, but we cannot doubt existence as being/existing perfectly.

If you don’t want to be absolute with your semantics, then the following is true:

An imperfect triangle is a triangle, it’s just not a perfect triangle. You cannot doubt the latter's triangularity.
A human is still a being, it’s just not a perfect being. You cannot doubt the latter's being/existence.
A contradiction is still a being/existent, it's just not a perfect being/existent. You cannot doubt the latter's being/existence.

Simply repeating the error of treating existence as a first-order predicate doesn't address my objection.

It's a common objection; from Kant, who is certainly not my favourite philosopher; and via Frege to Russell and Lewis.

It's your topic - I assume you are familiar with this objection?

To be an imaginary human, is to exist an imaginary human? — Philosopher19

So, perhaps you are hinting at Alexius Meinong's distinction between existence and being (I'm going to charitably assume that), in that case I'd say a human that is merely imagined has being, but does not exist. If that's what you mean then yes, I agree.

To be a human on planet earth, it to exist as a human on planet earth? — Philosopher19

Yes, that's another way of saying the same thing.

Do you agree that to be imperfect as a triangle, is to exist imperfectly as a triangle? — Philosopher19

Things with imperfect triangular shapes exist.
Even if triangles existed outside our minds, as platonists hold, they would be ideal triangles, not imperfect ones.

Do you agree that to be imperfect as a being/existent, is to exist imperfectly as a being/existent? — Philosopher19

Once again, if you are following Meinong, all you are saying is that unicorns have being but don't have existence, since they only exist in the mind, whereas I have existence since I exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind.

Note that you cannot say to be a square-circle, is to exist as a square-circle. Such a thing is impossible. Absurdities and contradictions exist, but what they describe (round squares) does not. By definition that which is contradictory is absurd or not true of existence. — Philosopher19

They have “being” in Meinong's terminology, yes (though this is a little more dubious).

Perfection = that which is perfect. The perfect being. That which perfectly exists. — Philosopher19

No, you are now equivocating “is” as a copula and “is” as a synonym of “exists”.

Yes, and I believe I addressed it.

Yes, and I believe I addressed it. — Philosopher19

Where? I went looking and could not see mention of predication. You did say:

Triangularity and existence/being/existing are both meaningful, and I believe I have been sincere to those semantics. — Philosopher19

...which seems to me to conflate the first order "triangles have three sides " with the second order "triangles exist".

Help me out here.

in that case I'd say a human that is merely imagined has being, but does not exist. — Amalac

How is that not contradictory?

Does a Sherlock Holmes exist on this planet? Unknown (very unlikely).
Does a Sherlock Holmes at least exist as a character (perhaps in a story)? Yes.

Is Sherlock Holmes an imperfect being/existent? Yes.

Once again, if you are following Meinong, all you are saying is that unicorns have being but don't have existence, since they only exist in the mind, whereas I have existence since I exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind. — Amalac

If we take the absolute approach (no degrees), then no, you don't have existence. Descartes' I think therefore I am established that something indubitably exists. It did not establish that that thing was him. (Hence why I have titled this thread God as the true cogito).

If we take the non-absolute approach (varying degrees), then imperfect triangles and perfect triangles are both triangles. But perfect triangles are maximally triangular. They cannot be any more perfect or complete in terms of triangularity. Here you do not reject the triangularity of any triangle.

Imperfect beings (Sherlock and Biden included) and God are both beings. But only God cannot be any more complete/perfect as a being. Here, you do not reject the existence of any meaningful thing/existent/being.

...which seems to me to conflate the first order "triangles have three sides " with the second order "triangles exist". — Banno

Either we take an absolute approach with regards to existence, or we take a non-absolute approach. If we do the former, then only one thing truly exists: God (see the OP for this). If we do the latter, then any given meaningful thing exists (including Sherlock Holmes and unicorns). This is a predicate of all meaningful things because we can compare them to absurdities such as round-squares. Whilst absurd concepts exist, what they describe does not exist. On the other hand, meaningful concepts exist (as well as what they describe).

To say "existence is not a predicate" is to say what is contradictory. It implies that the semantic "existence" does not say anything about a particular concept. The concept of "round-square" is absurd. Why is it absurd? Because round-squares do not exist (or are not true of existence depending on how you want to word it). They do not take the predicate of existing in existence or being related or tied to existence.

How is that not contradictory? — Philosopher19

There's nothing contradictory about it (though the way Meinong expressed his ideas is peculiar).

But since it seems like that's not what you are talking about, I'm going to translate it so as to make it clearer: What we are interested in here is existence outside the mind, right? So in that sense, a merely imaginary man does not exist, and neither does a unicorn.

And it seems you are again confusing “is” as a copula with “is” as a synonym for “exists”: when saying “Sherlock Holmes is an imaginary character” that does not imply that one assumes that Sherlock Holmes exists in the same way I do.

Does a Sherlock Holmes at least exist as a character (perhaps in a story)? Yes. — Philosopher19

When most people talk about existence, it is usually implied that it is “outside the mind”. At any rate, Sherlock Holmes certainly does not exist in the same sense in which I exist.

If we take the absolute approach (no degrees), then no, you don't have existence. — Philosopher19

If we use Meinong's terminology, then yes, I do have existence. If you are not using that terminology, then clearly you are assuming here that existence is a predicate (“I have/ don't have existence”) and can therefore be refuted by Kant's objection.

All that “I have existence” (in Meinong's sense) means is that I exist, nothing more and nothing less. No degrees of existence involved here.

Descartes' I think therefore I am established that something indubitably exists. — Philosopher19

It established that thoughts exist (meaning: “there are thoughts” or “thinking is happening”), not that God exists.

But only God cannot be any more complete/perfect as a being. — Philosopher19

There are only 2 degrees of existence according to this “approach”: existing in the mind, and existing outside the mind, there is no other level of “perfection of existence”. So if God exists outside the mind, then God's existence is more “perfect” than the existence of a unicorn because unicorns don't exist outside the mind, but his existence is not more “perfect” than mine because I too exist outside the mind.

Plus:

No, you are now equivocating “is” as a copula and “is” as a synonym of “exists”. — Amalac

To say "existence is not a predicate" is to say what is contradictory. — Philosopher19

I said it is not a first-order predicate - you know, it's second order, predicating over other predicates, like in predicate calculus. No contradiction - standard practice since at least Frege.

The concept of "round-square" is absurd. Why is it absurd? Because round-squares do not exist... — Philosopher19

SO things are absurd because they do not exist? But that's not right, since three-dollar notes do not exist, but are surely not absurd.

Much better to suppose that the notion of a round-square is a contradiction, and hence cannot exist. that is, the revers of your proposal - round square do not exists because they are absurd.

That way we can have things that are not contradictions but nevertheless do not exist.

SO again, existence is a second-order predicate, but you treat it as a first-order predicate.

(oh - and that first paragraph - what was that about? was it intended for @Amalac?)

It seems that the flaws of the argument in the OP are somewhat similar (I say this being very charitable of course) to those explained in this more interesting 9 minute video

There's nothing contradictory about it (though the way Meinong expressed his ideas is peculiar) — Amalac

So you say:

I'd say a human that is merely imagined has being, but does not exist.

Going by the non-absolute standard:

You're saying the imagined human does not exist. Which means that the human I just imagined now does not exist as the human I just imagined now. Do you see the contradiction? If I imagined a unicorn, then the unicorn I imagined existed when I successfully imagined it. For you to say "no, that unicorn did not exist" is for you to say that there did not exist a unicorn that I imagined (which is contradictory given that I successfully imagined one).

What we are interested in here is existence outside the mind, right? — Amalac

I am interested in having a semantically consistent belief system or philosophical theory. Either one takes the absolute approach (only God truly/indubitably exists), or the non-absolute approach (many things exist). If I've understood you right, you seem to have opted for the latter, but somehow rejected God's necessary existence in the process, whilst acknowledging your own being as amounting to existence, or meaningfully/semantically qualifying as existence. This is the equivalent of accepting an imperfect triangle's triangularity, yet rejecting a perfect triangle's triangularity. Such a move is contradictory (semantically inconsistent).

If Descartes' cogito showed us anything, it's that we cannot be certain of our own existence. But reason/semantics dictate that we cannot reject the existence of existence. So whilst we recognise that we can doubt our own being-ness, we cannot doubt the being-ness or existence of that which perfectly exists. Semantics dictate that this is God (as demonstrated in the OP).

I believe the link in the OP illustrates this truth further with greater depth and breadth.

The mind is not independent of existence (or that which perfectly exists). The semantics that the mind has access to mean what they mean and they should be treated as such. That which perfectly exists, should be treated as that which perfectly exists. To say a perfect being/existence does not exist or is not real or the reality, is to contradict the semantics that the mind is aware of.

If we use Meinong's terminology, then yes, I do have existence. If you are not using that terminology, then clearly you are assuming here that existence is a predicate (“I have/ don't have existence”) and can therefore be refuted by Kant's objection. — Amalac

No it can't. If you can't meaningfully distinguish between a perfect being or existence and an imperfect being or existence, then you could say "existence is not a predicate". But you cannot do this.

That which is perfectly triangular is triangular.
That which is perfectly existing, is existing.

In the above two sentences, both existing and triangular are predicates. That which perfectly exists, and that which is perfectly triangular are both objectively meaningful.

SO things are absurd because they do not exist? But that's not right, since three-dollar notes do not exist, but are surely not absurd. — Banno

Three dollar notes exist (not in your mind or my mind because we (or our minds) are not the sustainers of an infinite number of semantics or hypothetical possibilities. God is. We just have access to these semantics or hypothetical possibilities that existence (God) sustains or grants us access to, kind of like a computer having access to the internet, yet not being the sustainer of all the files available on the internet). Three dollar notes are hypothetically possible, which means they exist as hypothetical possibilities in existence). They do not physically (by our standards of physical) exist in the America of our what we call our waking reality or timeline or universe as far as I am aware. Round squares do not exist at all. Finally, existence/God is omnipresent. He sustains all realities/possibilities. His non-existence is as contradictory as a triangle's two-sidedness. He is necessarily at least as real as us (just a a perfect triangle is necessarily at least as triangular as an imperfect triangle), because that which perfectly exists (the omnipresent) is necessarily at least as real as us. We cannot say reality exists independently of existence (and only God can meaningfully/semantically qualify for the semantic of existence in an indubitable or absolute sense).

That way we can have things that are not contradictions but nevertheless do not exist. — Banno

That leads to contradictions when you take the non-absolute approach (many things exist). It will not lead to contradictions when you take the absolute approach (only that which perfectly exists, actually exists. That being God).

Three dollar notes exist — Philosopher19

Perhaps you meant that they are possible.

But you haven't addressed the criticism from Kant, you've gone off on a tangent instead. Your notion of existence is at odds with the whole of mathematical logic.

If x is not omnipotent and omnipresent, then x is not a perfect being (or perfectly existing), because better being/existents than it can be conceived of. — Philosopher19

There may be a view that being omniscient and/or omnipotent is not a feature of the perfect being. We, humans, assume that; but it can't be proven, therefore it is not a matter of truth, but a matter of human opinion acquired by human intuition.

Only one thing is truly existing — Philosopher19

Where did you get that? It's simply not true. You certainly exist; I certainly exist; we are one and the same? Then how come we disagree?

Do you accept that an omnipotent being can make anything perfect if he so wishes? If so, then you acknowledge that a perfect being, qua perfect, does not 'have'to have any particular attribute. And thus you cannot, from God's perfection, conclude that God exists.

One can make the point another way. God does not have to be perfect. For the concept of God is the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. Whether having those properties makes one perfect is a matter an omnipotent being would have control over - and so it would be beyond a reasonable doubt that they would be - but still, it would remain possible for God to be God and not be perfect and for a perfect being not to be God, and thus once more you cannot get from a perfect being's existence to God's existence.

Do you accept that an omnipotent being does not exist of necessity, but contingently? Reflection on the concept of omnipotence reveals this - for being able to do anything includes being able to destroy oneself - and so someone who denies it is not really thinking of God.

But if you acknowledge that God exists contingently, then it is hard to see how you can get from the concept of God to his reality.

God's omnipotence is going to block your path everytime. For in effect ontological arguments are attempts to show that God 'must' exist. But that is to suppose that reality forces existence upon God - that there is some supreme law of laws that determines his existence and that you are trying to uncover - which of course it does not do, for the order of dependence is the other way around. God does not 'have' to do anything, as reflection on the concept reveals. And there is no law that God is subject to. All laws are subject to God, not God to them. And thus understanding God means understanding the hopelessness of trying to show otherwise.

Ontological arguments are not doomed to fail in all cases, or indeed any case but God's (ironically). We are not omnipotent and so that is why we can conclude that we ourselves 'must' exist if we have the idea of ourselves (and thus that the idea of one's self is one that we can conclude has something answering to it). But even the cogito fails in God's case. That is, there is one being who does not have to conclude he exists if he has the idea of himself: God. For once more, God can do anything. And so though you and I must conclude we exist if we think of our selves, God does not have to.

Perhaps you meant that they are possible.

But you haven't addressed the criticism from Kant, you've gone off on a tangent instead. Your notion of existence is at odds with the whole of mathematical logic. — Banno

I think I have addressed Kant. Again, what I am proposing is not what Descartes proposed.

I make a distinction between that which perfectly/truly exists and that which does not. Descartes did not do this. Descartes just assumed that it's better to exist. The first time I saw Descartes' ontological argument, I got could see something, but I could also see that his argument was not right. I liked his cosmological argument much more and I cannot believe how lazy western philosophers were in addressing that argument.

Given a truly perfect existence, it's better to not exist if one is evil because perfection entails that evil really suffers. But given our lack of omnipotence, it's not us who decide who lives and who dies and who dreams of what and who suffers what nightmare.

Also, if you are interested, have a look at my reply to Amalac here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/545714

or follow the link in the OP for a greater illustration of what it is to indubitably/truly exist.

if x is possible, then x exists as a hypothetical possibility. if x is perfect, then x exists perfectly. One cannot doubt the existence of that which perfectly exists. One cannot doubt that existence encompasses/sustains all realities (if we are to differentiate between realities). One cannot say x is independent of existence when x is not an absurdity (like a married-bachelor).

There may be a view that being omniscient and/or omnipotent is not a feature of the perfect being. — god must be atheist

If x is not omnipotent and omniscient, then x is not truly free. Nor is he able to ensure that everyone gets what they truly deserve. If x is not omnipotence and omniscient, then a truly perfect existence is impossible.

There is no way you can describe x as being really perfect without describing it as being really/truly omnipotent and omniscient. There is no way you can describe x as being a really perfect existence, without x being completely real. Real good is better than imaginary good. And imaginary evil is better than real evil (unless of course, one is evil. Only evil/irrational people would say real evil is better than imaginary evil. In that sense, real evil is better for evil/irrational people, because that is what they have sought. And even if they have not sought it, it is what they deserve.

My focus here is on what is rational and what is irrational. What is semantically consistent, and what is semantically inconsistent.

Where did you get that? It's simply not true. You certainly exist; I certainly exist; we are one and the same? Then how come we disagree? — god must be atheist

I get your instincts on this. But do you agree that it is not us who instantiate existence (as in do you agree that we are not our own sustainers and that we are contingent on a self sustaining thing/being/existent?). And do you agree that we can doubt ourselves as being who we think we are (we cannot say with certainty that our world is truly real. We cannot say with certainty we are who we think we are).

Consider following the link in the OP. Alternatively, look at the problems with Descartes' cogito (though I advise the former). At the very best, you can say that both you and I (whatever or whoever we may be) belong to that which perfectly/indubitably exists. You cannot doubt that the existence of that which perfectly exists (just as you cannot doubt that the triangularity of that which is perfectly triangular).

We do not instantiate existence (contrary to mainstream solipsism), and when we take an absolute approach, we are not that which indubitably exists (contrary to Descartes' cogito).

God does not have to be perfect. — Bartricks

If x is not perfect, then x is not the true/real God. You cannot be lacking in might and call yourself THE God. x might call himself a god if he thinks he is the most powerful person on the plant, but x would not be the true God because he lacks power.

God is that which no greater than in being/existence/existing can be conceived of (not unlike how a perfect triangle is that which no greater in triangularity than can be conceived of)

You have just ignored entirely the argument I gave.

Answer the question: can an omnipotent being make anything perfect?

God cannot create himself. God cannot create an omnipotent being. God cannot create a round-square or a married-bachelor.

Omnipotence = being able to do all that is doable

Creating round-squares, or creating God is not something that is doable, therefore, it is irrelevant to omnipotence.

If x is not omnipotent and omniscient, then x is not truly free. Nor is he able to ensure that everyone gets what they truly deserve. — Philosopher19

Who decides what everyone truly deserves? A perfect decision maker. The perfect decision maker also makes the rules of how to decide things.

In this sense there is a system which is governed by a director, who makes up the rules, and expects compliance with the rules. However, if you yank this decision maker out of his position, and put in his place a different decision maker, who has different criteria and rules for what's expected and how to reward the achievers, then you have a different system which is equally as perfect, except it's different. It's not different from the first one in perfection, but the rules and the system of rewards are different.

And let's say our system is perfect: let's assume that given how it operates, the rewards are given to the best possibility of the perfect giver and judge.

But if you introduce a different judge with a different set of expectations and a different set of rewards, you may have an equally perfect system, and the two can't battle it out.

Yet in your definition perfection is that which is the greatest. Well, given two or more equally great systems, neither or none of them are greater than the others.

You are confused. You do not understand omnipotence and thus do not grasp the concept of God.
God can do anything. A being who can create himself is more powerful than one who can't. So you are profoundly confused if you identify omnipotence with the latter and not the former.

Omnipotence = being able to do all that is doable — Philosopher19

Is it doable to move any amount of weight? Yes.

Is it doable to create a weight that is so heavy that it's not movable? Yes.

So if the perfect thing can move the weight, he fails in the doable creation.

So if the perfect thing cannot move the weight, he fails omnipotence in the doable action of moving the weight.

Omnipotence in and by itself is a construct that is self-contradictory, therefore impossible.

This precision-truth renders this of your claims false, since one of the criteria can never be attained:

If x is not omnipotent and omniscient, then x is not truly free. Nor is he able to ensure that everyone gets what they truly deserve. If x is not omnipotence and omniscient, then a truly perfect existence is impossible. — Philosopher19

I just showed you that your thing you call god is not perfect, because he is not omnipotent; and as he is not omnipotent, he is not perfect, because the perfect existence is impossible.

But wait! You defined "perfect" as the "greatest of which none is better." So if god can't have omnipotence, and nobody else can either, then god can still be the best and greatest than which none is better.

So you are back in square one, if you only would be willing to throw out the "omnipotent" bit.

Yet in your definition perfection is that which is the greatest. Well, given two or more equally great systems, neither or none of them are greater than the others. — god must be atheist

You cannot have more than one perfect being because you cannot have more than one omnipresent being.

You are confused. You do not understand omnipotence and thus do not grasp the concept of God.
God can do anything. A being who can create himself is more powerful than one who can't. So you are profoundly confused if you identify omnipotence with the latter and not the former. — Bartricks

I think you fail to treat contradictions as contradictions, and as a result of this, you present contradictory objections as though they are non-contradictory objections.

I suggest you consider the following:

http://philosophyneedsgods.com/2020/08/12/the-first-item-of-knowledge/

Is it doable to move any amount of weight? Yes.

Is it doable to create a weight that is so heavy that it's not movable? Yes. — god must be atheist

Yes, but only for non-God beings.

Any weight that any non-God being can lift, God can lift that weight plus more. So God can create a rock so heavy that you cannot lift, but neither you nor God can create a rock so heavy that He cannot lift. A rock so heavy that God cannot lift is as absurd as an omnipresent rock. Here's a passage from one of my posts:

Omnipotence = being able to do all that is doable (completely perfect/absolute power/freedom). That which is Omnipotent cannot be expected to "create a round square" because creating a round square cannot be classified as a doable thing. Since it is not a doable thing, it is irrelevant to Omnipotence. For something to be meaningfully classed as being doable (and therefore expected of an Omnipotent being to be able to do), it must at least be meaningful (semantically consistent). If one absurdly insists that an Omnipotent being should be able to do absurd things like create something from nothing, or create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift, or move forwards and backwards at the same time, then the absurd answer of "yes he can", can be given. Maintaining such absurd standards, one can then go on to insist that they have made sense of "an Omnipresent rock", "a rock so heavy that an Omnipotent/Omnipresent being cannot lift", "round squares", "1 + 1 = 3" etc. and then use them in "rational" discourse as though they are meaningful objections.

Link:

http://philosophyneedsgods.com/2021/04/03/why-it-is-impossible-for-gods-attributes-to-be-contradictory/

No, you don't understand omnipotence. An omnipotent being is not bound by the law of non-contradiction - they are the author of it! Thus they can do anything. That doesn't mean they've done anything at all. The law of non-contradiction is true. It just doesn't have to be.

Anyway, you're profoundly confused about the nature of omnipotence and your proof of God does not work for reasons I have already explained to you.

You cannot have more than one perfect being because you cannot have more than one omnipresent being. — Philosopher19

Since when? This you declare categorically, without any proof or attempt at it.

Omnipotence = being able to do all that is doable (completely perfect/absolute power/freedom). — Philosopher19

But an omnipotent being can make a non-doable into a doable. Otherwise he or she is not omnipotent. An omnipotent can do a round square, easily.

You grossly underestimate the quality of omnipotence, my dear friend.