We expect that we will expect apples to taste how they usually taste, because we are habituated to think — Amalac

our expectation has nothing to do with laws. Our laws are based on fulfilled expectations, but our expectation in and by itself does not a law make.

Hume would also probably say that our expectations are coincidental, too. Tomorrow you may wake up and expect apples to taste like watermelons.

Hume would also probably say that our expectations are coincidental, too. Tomorrow you may wake up and expect apples to taste like watermelons. — god must be atheist

I'm not sure about that, it seems that if one accepts that the problem of induction also applies to psychology, Hume has no right to say things like these:

Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavoured by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and rendered unavoidable. My intention then in displaying so carefully the arguments of that fantastic sect, is only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures.

Because what he says about “Nature” either assumes the validity of induction when applied to expectations of similar expectations for the future, or is not justified by any reason, having neither certainty nor probability (that is: no reason to think it more likely than its negation), and therefore there is no reason to believe it.

Basically, we can't be sure that our nature will remain constant so as to always make us expect reasonable things. There is no rational justification even for the claim that I will probably not expect apples to taste like watermelons tomorrow.

I'm not sure about that, it seems that if one accepts that the problem of induction also applies to psychology, Hume has no right to say things like these: — Amalac

Hume's world of coincidences, and the world viewed as a series of causations, are both valid, but mutually exclusive. — god must be atheist

I think you can work it out from here.

Hume's world of coincidences, and the world viewed as a series of causations, are both valid, but mutually exclusive. — god must be atheist

Yes, but there are some difficulties for Humean causation. For one, it can't differentiate between a state of affairs which is said to be impossible, and one that just never happens. Take the examples of a perpetual motion machine or accelerating up to the speed of light. Both are ruled out as impossible by physics. Now take a river of soda. There's nothing impossible about it, but probably it will never happen because who is going to bother to make such a thing?

A second difficulty is that it renders all human behavior as coincidental. There's no reason for any of our actions. So why hold people accountable? Why blame them for anything they do?

A third issue is that it collapses the distinction between determinism and indeterminism. We can't say that the wave function evolves deterministically because prior states are conjoined for no reason.

Take the examples of a perpetual motion machine or accelerating up to the speed of light. Both are ruled out as impossible by physics. — Marchesk

The problem of induction goes even further actually: although in the past the laws of physics have not changed, that doesn't justifiy the expectation that they won't change in the future.

So why hold people accountable? Why blame them for anything they do? — Marchesk

Let me turn that around for you: Why should we not hold people accountable? Why should we not blame them for the bad things they do?
I'm playing devil's (Hume's) advocate here.

The problem of induction goes even further actually: although in the past the laws of physics have not changed, that doesn't justifiy the expectation that they won't change in the future. — Amalac

True, so perpetual motion machines and FTL acceleration drives could become possible in the future if there's no reason for the constant conjunction to continue.

Let me turn that around for you: Why should we not hold people accountable? Why should we not blame them for the bad things they do? — Amalac

Because there's no reason for them doing bad things. Same for good things as well. Blame and praise, punishment and reward are pointless. Of course we'll continue to do those because of habit, or will we???

If punishing an evil person is pointless, then choosing not to punish them is just as pointless.

If praising someone who is good is pointless, not praising them is just as pointless.

Of course we'll continue to do those because of habit — Marchesk

That's what I was hinting at, and yes: We can't do anything except believe that, even though we have no reason for doing so (but then again, we don't have any reason not to believe it either).

Still, it's pretty hopeless if Hume is right.

What do you make of the rest of what Russell says then?: — Amalac

Russell seems to assume an externalist, causal conception of empirical knowledge, and then projects that assumption onto Locke and then Hume, for whom this would be a stolen concept, given his stance on causation. But whether or not Russell is right about knowledge, the question here is whether Hume espoused the same view: only then would he be open to the charge in the OP. Hume actually seems to hold an internalist view, at least some of the time, i.e. his account of knowledge refers only to mental states. But Russell may well be right in that looking carefully through his writing, one can catch him out on a contradiction.

I agree that those two premises are not refuted, at least not directly, by the conclusion that we have no knowledge of causality. But as you seem to admit, the conclusion does refute Hume's (apparent?) notion that we can reasonably identify constant conjunction as the source of our belief in causality and our expectations regarding future events. — Noisy Calf

I don't think he claims this to be the logical conclusion of his argument. It is more like, having cleared the ground, he is venturing a plausible hypothesis. As any narrative that describes events and processes, it must rely on causal notions in order to make any sense. But he already admitted that causality is ingrained in our thought process and is indispensable for sense-making.

There's no reason for any of our actions. So why hold people accountable? Why blame them for anything they do? — Marchesk

You raised some excellent points.
1. Impossible vs something never occurring. A thing that never occurs is not a matter of interest. Whether because it's impossible, or just highly improbable.
3. The third issue is already spoken for -- if I understand it clearly -- which is coincidentiality. If a wave form or whatever occurs, it does, not becuase it is caused, either by determinism, or indeterminism. It is of no concern to the Humean world view.
2. Your second point is the most interesting one. I quoted it in the beginning of my post here. The accountability for actions is not there, but it's equally not there in a causational world. A person who commits a crime or other unwanted action, is determined to do so by the causing effects of past events. It is not fair therefore to punish them. Much like in Hume's world. You can't blame anyone for wrongdoing in the causational world, either.

Russell seems to assume an externalist, causal conception of empirical knowledge, and then projects that assumption onto Locke and then Hume, for whom this would be a stolen concept, given his stance on causation. But whether or not Russell is right about knowledge, the question here is whether Hume espoused the same view: only then would he be open to the charge in the OP. Hume actually seems to hold an internalist view, at least some of the time, i.e. his account of knowledge refers only to mental states. — SophistiCat

I think this passage of his Enquiry does seem to show that Hume did not hold an externalist conception of empirical knowledge:

It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.

But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.

119. So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: for that led us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.

By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.

It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. — Hume

By the same token, Hume could admit that he cannot prove that impressions are caused by external objects.

It seems to me Russell's point is that Locke's thesis that all ideas are copied from impressions is implausible if that's the case. That seems kind of unreasonable though: Russell is basically saying that Hume cannot define impressions like that unless he can refute external world scepticism.

Hume admits he cannot do that, and that neither can anyone else (including Russell). Yet that doesn't stop Russell from developing philosophical theories which are only plausible if there is an external world.

So yes, I think you might be right after all.

What is daft is to claim that Hume needs to justify his habits when he's just said there is no justification for them. — unenlightened

... the awkward conclusion that the greatest of modern philosophers completely missed the point of his own problem... — Goodman: Fact Fiction and Forecast, p61

I don't think he claims this to be the logical conclusion of his argument. It is more like, having cleared the ground, he is venturing a plausible hypothesis. As any narrative that describes events and processes, it must rely on causal notions in order to make any sense. But he already admitted that causality is ingrained in our thought process and is indispensable for sense-making. — SophistiCat

I suppose it makes sense that constant-conjunction is only a hypothesis, although I haven't read Hume recently enough to judge whether or not he phrased it as a mere hypothesis. However, the hypothesis seems to entail that causality is real, and if causality is real in psychology, it might as well be real in physics and other realms also. But I guess the point of the constant-conjunction hypothesis might not be to reject the reality of causality. Rather, the point might be to show that, given the inductive manner whereby we arrive at the notion of causality plus the problem of induction, we cannot have certain knowledge regarding the reality of causal relations. But as I've argued elsewhere in this post, I think causal relations are indispensable to the justification of belief and hence to the existence of knowledge. So skepticism regarding causal relations, I've argued, entails skepticism regarding all knowledge i.e. radical skepticism. And I think radical skepticism is a self-defeating position, since if knowledge is probably impossible, then one probably cannot know whether or not knowledge is possible, in which case one is not justified in believing that knowledge is probably impossible. If my arguments are sound, then causal skepticism can be refuted by retorsion.