So, a square circle is not currently a thing, because Reason forbids it from being so. But precisely because that is why it is not a thing, Reason and Reason alone has the power to make it a thing and make one. — Bartricks

Obviously, a circle is a geometric figure that has a two-dimensional base. This is also true for a square, which is a geometric figure with the essential property of being square. Now it should be clear that even no god can produce on a two-dimensional surface a geometric figure that is at the same time perfectly circular and flawlessly square.

For geometry has to do primarily with illustrativeness and only secondarily with translatability into mathematical formulas with numbers and equations.

I think what you are saying is that Reason or God, like human beings, is able to entertain a false idea in the mind. An idea that is obviously contradictory. And when you say that God can make a square circle a thing, it means that He can create the idea of a square circle, but not that He can create real one on a two-dimensional surface.

No two different attributes can be the same attribute. No one thing can be two different things at the same time. No x can be not x at the same time. Nothing can sit and stand at the same time etc. These are all clear impossibilities. — Philosopher19

I agree with you, the questions are just how is logic derived and what is its ontological status. I can say that logic can be derived from the things of the world. This would make abstract logic something secondary and the things of the world that can be experienced would be primary. Or the abstract logic is the foundation of reality, thus precedes it ontologically. These are questions, which every form of ontological proof must clarify in advance.

Existence exists everywhere. Thus, existence (or that which is omnipresent), exists necessarily, as opposed to just a hypothetical possibility. This is because existence (that which is omnipresent) encompasses and sustains all realities and worlds. Unicorns and humans don't have the same ontological necessity as the omnipresent or existence. It is that which perfectly exists that is necessarily absolutely real, whereas unicorns do not perfectly exist, so they are not necessarily absolutely real. They are not perfect beings and there is only one perfect being. That being God. — Philosopher19

Maybe you're right about what you've said here. But to me it all sounds very much like pantheism, or at least it could apply to pantheism. I don't think, however, that you want to argue pantheistically, do you?
This is not meant to be an objection, but your model of God is very vague so far, and the name God could possibly be exchanged with the name nature in a Spinozistic way.

So here, existing or existence is still a property (one that only applies to God). — Philosopher19

What do you say to the following example:

A shepherd divides his sheep according to the property of the coat color - black and white. He could separate them according to all kinds of characteristics.

But to divide his sheep according to existing and non-existing ones seems abstruse. Therefore, existence is possibly not a property.

None of this applies to the OP. Both Descartes and Anselm took existing to be a good thing without justifying this move. I do no such thing. I ask what perfectly exists, and I provide the answer, and that answer is God (or a truly perfect existence). — Philosopher19

I will read your blog post in time to understand you better. In addition, I am not a native English speaker, so the discussion is not very easy for me.

Perhaps your version of the ontological proof of God is a successful one. Then you should write a paper and have it published so that it is discussed by the scholars.

Maybe you're right about what you've said here. But to me it all sounds very much like pantheism, or at least it could apply to pantheism. I don't think, however, that you want to argue pantheistically, do you? — spirit-salamander

A non-pantheistic (or non-omnipresent) view of God (the perfect being) is contradictory. So both monotheism and pantheism are true because there is only one existence (God's existence), and it exists everywhere. This is another way of saying the omnipresent sustains all realities and nothing is more real than Him.

What do you say to the following example:

A shepherd divides his sheep according to the property of the coat color - black and white. He could separate them according to all kinds of characteristics.

But to divide his sheep according to existing and non-existing ones seems abstruse. Therefore, existence is possibly not a property. — spirit-salamander

Yes, but it does not alter the fact that there are things that we can describe as not existing (meaning that they do not have the property of existing) and things that are existing (which must mean they have the property of existing as opposed to not having it). An absolute example of something that does not have the property of existing, is a round square. The absolute example of something that has the property of existing, is God. As highlighted in the OP, God's existence is not susceptible to doubt, whereas ours is. Again, the flaws in Descartes' cogito highlight this.

If we don't deal in absolutes, then it is the case that we meaningfully distinguish between things that exist in different ways (the dream exists as a dream, thus, it has the property of existing first, then the property of being a dream), and things that don't exist at all (round squares, or me standing right now when I'm actually sitting right now). We could not do this (distinguishing between things that exist and things that don't) if existing was not a property.

Also, it might be worth noting that whilst the dream exists as the dream, only one thing exists as existence (or the omnipresent). That thing is God. Everything that exists, does so in existence or because of existence. In other words, everything exists, because existence exists. Only existence exists because it itself exists. Only existence is a member of itself as an existent. Only existence is self-existing or not contingent on anything else whilst everything else is contingent on it. This is why God is the first thing that we should be acknowledging as being truly real or truly existing. This is why only God's existing qualifies as existence in an absolute sense. It's not our existence. It's God's, and we sustained by it.

I will read your blog post in time to understand you better. In addition, I am not a native English speaker, so the discussion is not very easy for me.

Perhaps your version of the ontological proof of God is a successful one. Then you should write a paper and have it published so that it is discussed by the scholars. — spirit-salamander

Your write like a native speaker. I could not tell that you were a non-native English speaker.

I am trying to make it mainstream that the rejection of God's existence is absurd/contradictory/unreasonable. Hopefully I will succeed one day. If I do, it will be because it was perfection for me to succeed. If I don't, it will be because it was not perfection for me to succeed. But given all that I have seen a priori and a posteriori, I strongly believe that I will succeed.

No, I'm saying that God can make a square circle. For we suppose such things are impossible because the idea involves a contradiction. But the law of non-contradiction is a law of Reason and thus it is in her gift to change it, to allow exceptions to it, and so on.

There is no non-question begging way of arguing against this claim, for all you're going to be able to do is point out the contradictory nature of the idea in question. Yet that is not in dispute. And nor is it in dispute that the law of non contradiction is true. All we are talking about is what an all powerful being 'can' do. And the answer to that is easy: anything. And what my theory shows is just how that can be: God is Reason and thus God and God alone has the power to rewrite Reason's rules, for Reason's rules express her will.

Your write like a native speaker. I could not tell that you were a non-native English speaker. — Philosopher19

It only seems that way because I use a very good translation program that respects grammar and spelling and syntax.

I am trying to make it mainstream that the rejection of God's existence is absurd/contradictory/unreasonable. Hopefully I will succeed one day. If I do, it will be because it was perfection for me to succeed. — Philosopher19

I wish you much success with it. It is probably very difficult to establish new ideas against the spirit of the times, especially regarding proofs of God. Here is an appropriate quote from a German philosopher, which I have also translated:

"Up to now it has simply not been possible to give a reason for the only being of an object as which there cannot possibly be a more perfect one. Nevertheless, I am afraid, the ontological proof of God, even if such a justification should be found once, will not even convince those who understand it of the existence of God (rationally); they will rather not accept the premises of the justification. The reason for this is: They are not ready, even if they are believers in other respects, to be convinced by a proof, but feel it as an epistemological imposition that one wants to force them "as in the Middle Ages" by rational reasons to acknowledge the existence of God, "as if Kant had never existed". According to their epistemological feeling they assume apriori that the existence of God cannot be proved. What proof - ontological or any other - is supposed to convince them? It could only be one that starts from presuppositions that are absolutely indubitable, and I doubt very much that one can find such presuppositions; for even if the existence of God is an analytic truth, it is certainly not a logical or mathematical one (in the strict sense). For a proof to be convincing, one must give it a chance to be so, and in the foreseeable future one is, in my opinion, not inclined to give proofs for the existence of God a chance. For this to happen, the intellectual-historical situation, as it exists essentially since Kant, would have to change fundamentally.
The epistemological prejudice against proofs of God drives apparently grotesque blossoms: One experiences that the same people, who resist tooth and nail against every presented proof of God, acknowledge without proof with the greatest nonchalance the existence, even the necessary existence of the empty set and other abstract entities. Admittedly, they would not be at a loss for a justification of this behavior: "Abstract entities have a theoretical function; we need them in our theories about the world; God, on the other hand, has none; we do not need him in our theories about the world." Accordingly, the essential step in building receptivity to proofs of God would be to give God back his theoretical functions. To do this, it would have to be shown that the natural sciences, which view the world to the exclusion (not denial!) of the God hypothesis, leave open a number of theoretical questions for which the very God hypothesis would provide a satisfactory answer. The project of metaphysics must, in other words, be approached anew - now equipped with the means of modern logic, the best organon philosophy has ever possessed.
In spite of the intellectual-historical situation, one is gladly and recently increasingly occupied with the proofs of God, above all with the most fascinating among them - the ontological proof of God. For this interest might be decisive that one is led by the proofs of God to a wealth of profound logical, ontological and epistemological problems, while in them at the same time a proposition of highest importance is aimed at; in them "something is at stake"; this results in a certain additional thrill. But a proof of God is probably not seriously considered possible by anyone. Some may have a certain gold-digger or alchemist mentality, which lets them hope to find one day the gold mine, the philosopher's stone, the irrefutable proof for the existence of God; but such hopes are rather kept to themselves - for fear of the laughter of the philosophical guild." (UWE MEIXNER - Der ontologische Gottesbeweis in der Perspektive der Analytischen Philosophie; [The Ontological Proof of God in the Perspective of Analytic Philosophy])

I am also no exception, with me reservations, resistances and prejudices are instinctively given against proofs of God.

No, I'm saying that God can make a square circle. For we suppose such things are impossible because the idea involves a contradiction. But the law of non-contradiction is a law of Reason and thus it is in her gift to change it, to allow exceptions to it, and so on. — Bartricks

In its generality, your thesis seems halfway plausible at first glance. Nevertheless, it should be allowed to ask what this looks like in concrete terms.

When you say that God can make a square circle, the question is what this divine product will end up representing figuratively.

After all, it wouldn't look like that:



square circle

Because then people could also create this geometric shape and give it the name "square circle" or "round square".

I think the law of non-contradiction is a law of intentionality aimed at the other than God. If God cancels this law, he cannot intend anything anymore, not even a circle, let alone a square one.

for all you're going to be able to do is point out the contradictory nature of the idea in question. — Bartricks

The idea of a square circle in God's mind, will have no resemblance for us to our idea of a circle and our idea of a square.

Why should we still give the name "square circle" to the God idea of the square circle. This seems to be absolutely arbitrary. I could also just call it "babig". There is no reason not to do that, on the contrary. It is even more appropriate for us, because for us a square circle has nothing to do with either a square or a circle.

If God makes a square circle, how should it be verified that it is a square circle. It would be only an empty assertion which is based on the very general thesis that God can do everything because he can cancel the logical laws.

To this I believe that geometry has only secondarily something to do with logic. It deals with spatialities. Also a God can produce a two-dimensional line only if he starts from a point and extends this point or draws the line from it.

I am not talking about the abstract idea of a line, but about an ideal extended object.

If you say that God can generate a line without extending a point, I think that is absurd. But you will hopefully agree with me that God cannot create a square circle, which we, as long as we stay on earth, would recognize as such a special circle. God may make everything possible for himself and give all possible names to the results, but in philosophy it is also about the mediation and communicability and demonstrability on behalf of others or towards other minds.

How am I to know that your God is not a deceiver or a conjurer or trickster?

There is no point in trying to understand what sort of a thing a square circle could be.

My position is not that we can conceive of a square circle. We are not omnipotent, after all.

My position is that Reason is not bound by the laws of Reason. And thus Reason is omnipotent and can do anything at all, including all those things that our reason tells us cannot be done.

Like I say, I can see no way to refute my view without simply assuming it is false for the purposes of refuting it - which is to beg the question.

Note as well that I do not deny any of the laws of Reason. I do not deny the law of non-contradiction. And I am every bit as certain as you are that there are no square circles.

But Reason is not bound by the laws of Reason, for they are her laws. And that's why she can do anything, including rendering the law of non-contradiction false.

The law of non-contradiction is true. I am as certain of it as the next person. You won't find a person in the world who is more certain of the truth of the law of non-contradiction than me. I just don't think it is necessarily true.

I think this is a valid argument:

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

But I don't think it has to be. It just is. And so on. (And that's why I can still reason about things - and do. The laws of reason only need to be true in order successfully to guide us, they do not 'have' to be true - that they are actually true is good enough).

God can do anything. And that means there are no necessary truths. There are truths and there are falsehoods. But there are no 'necessary' truths. And we're none the worse for that.

There is no point in trying to understand what sort of a thing a square circle could be. — Bartricks

Why call this thing a "square circle"? And not rather "babig"?

How do I know that God is not caught in self-deception, should He make something like supposedly square circles?

God may say, "I am not because I am all-knowing and all-good," and "I can because I am all-powerful.
To this you could reply, "People talk a lot of hogwash to pass the time".

My position is that Reason is not bound by the laws of Reason. — Bartricks

That's where our positions diverge. Should reason once not be bound by the laws of reason, it would no longer be reason. You seem to assume something that somehow ontologically precedes reason, and yet somehow remains proto-reasonable.

I think the law of non-contradiction is a law of intentionality. When you do something, you intend something according to the law of non-contradiction. This is my premise which is axiomatically opposed to yours.

Like I say, I can see no way to refute my view without simply assuming it is false for the purposes of refuting it - which is to beg the question. — Bartricks

This is because your theory is the total epitome of self-immunization. You either accept it or you don't. But not accepting it does not imply a contradiction.

God can do anything. And that means there are no necessary truths. — Bartricks

Except God Himself as a necessary truth, right?

wish you much success with it. It is probably very difficult to establish new ideas against the spirit of the times, especially regarding proofs of God. Here is an appropriate quote from a German philosopher, which I have also translated: — spirit-salamander

Thank you, and thank you for that which you translated and shared. It was good to read about the writer's interpretation of the attitudes of the western world towards an ontological argument.

I am also no exception, with me reservations, resistances and prejudices are instinctively given against proofs of God. — spirit-salamander

I appreciate the honesty. I lived with the belief that existence is perfect since around 2013. But it wasn't until around 2018 that I really, genuinely, and sincerely committed to this premise. When I did, the empirical evidence for Karma being absolute, full, and extensive, was overwhelming. Again, this was something that I had understood a priori sincere 2013, but did not really empirically embrace because of the way the world looked to me. I thought with all that I hear in the news, there's no way Karma is absolute here. It's probably absolute when Heaven and Hell enter the equation. But my experiences in 2018 and onwards had brought me closer and closer to seeing this clearer posteriori such that I now conclude Karma is absolute. Everyone gets exactly what they truly deserve in this life (and not just in Heaven and Hell).

My point with this is that I discovered whenever I abandoned the a priori because I was to weak to handle the a posteriori (the appearance of things), or because I just had the belief that it can't be this good (because it looked really unlikely from what people would say and the news would report, rather than what I'd actually experience), I felt like I could have received better if I had held onto the a priori better.

My belief is that If you recognise something as being a priori true, then commit to it more strongly than you would commit to anything else. I have come to this belief both from just reflecting on matters of pure reason, and from actual experiences. There is nothing more certain and more reliable than the a priori (or matters of pure reason). It is absolutely the case that one cannot be blamed for refusing to yield to anything other than the a priori, or to their sincerest conception of goodness (though I think the former has more authority than the latter but they lead to the same thing).

Thank you for participating in this discussion. I wish you the all the best for the future.

You seem confused.
No, God is not a necessary truth (that doesn't make sense - propositions are true, not objects). God exists. But he does not exist of necessity. If he did, then he would be incapable of not existing, which is a restriction.

God can do anything. That means he can destroy anything. So nothing exists of necessity. And there are no necessary truths.

Do you think there are necessary truths? If so, what are their truth makers?

Truth is related to propositions in the usual sense, that is true. But truth could also be equated with actuality, reality. That would be a different philosophy.

Necessity for me is a relative, conditional term. The statements "God dictates what is logical and what is not." or "God can do anything." or "God exists" are necessary truths in your system, relative to your system.

No, they are not necessary truths in my 'system'. I have literally just said that there are no necessary truths and explained why.

Truth is a property of propositions.

Now, bearing in mind that I think there are no necessary truths and that the very notion makes no sense, explain to me what the truth maker of a necessarily true proposition is.

explain to me what the truth maker of a necessarily true proposition is. — Bartricks

1 + 1 = 2 is a necessary truth as long as your God wants it to be so.

‘a triangle is a space enclosed by three lines’. The truth maker is the principle of identity.

‘no body is without extension’. The truth maker is the principle of contradiction.

‘no one can accept something as true without knowing why’. The truth maker is the principle of sufficient reason of knowing.

These examples I have from Schopenhauer are necessary truths.

And as long as your God sets the truth makers they remain necessary truths.

how can they be the truthmakers for necessary truths? For either they are just true - in which case the necessity of those necessary truths still needs a truthmaker - or they are necessarily true, in which case you have not provided the truthmaker for the necessary truths either.

God is indeed the arbiter of truth. But there are no necessary truths. You keep asserting that I think they are. Odd. I think there are not. Not hard to understand. There are no necessary truths. And you don't know what one is anyway - no one does. 2 + 2 = 4 is true so long as God asserts it to be; thus it is not necessarily true, but just true.

they are just true - in which case the necessity of those necessary truths still needs a truthmaker — Bartricks

Why? The necessity is obvious. The sentence 'a triangle is a space enclosed by three lines' is a truth that everyone who is not insane will consider necessary. It is enough for the truth maker to be recognized as true for the judgment to be considered necessary. As a definition of necessity I take that of Schopenhauer:

"For necessity has no other genuine and clear sense than the inevitability of the consequent when the ground is posited."

they are necessarily true, in which case you have not provided the truthmaker for the necessary truths either. — Bartricks

That would lead to an infinite regress.

In both cases, either way, your God sets the truth maker. And what God sets as necessary is necessary according to your philosophy. You would agree with me there, wouldn't you?

You will also see a difference between the sentences "All swans are white" and "The bachelor is an unmarried man". The first is not necessary. The distinction is legitimate, even if your god can turn it around at will.

Apart from everything, your God is an identity, right? The logical principle of identity must then be applied to God, right? The world is not God, so the theorem of contradiction can be applied here. If your God is not an entity with identity, then He is at most a relative nothing for us, but probably rather an absolute nothing.

God is indeed the arbiter of truth. — Bartricks

I have always assumed that in your favor.

There are no necessary truths. And you don't know what one is anyway - no one does. 2 + 2 = 4 is true so long as God asserts it to be; thus it is not necessarily true, but just true. — Bartricks

But you will admit that it makes sense to make a distinction even within the framework set by your God between:

necessary truths like:

2 + 2 = 4 — Bartricks

and non-necessary empirical truths like "the universe is expanding".

My starting point is a pragmatically practical sense.

@Bartricks

Since the word "necessary" exists in normal language, you can use it and reinterpret it according to your theology. That is, you can weaken it in its meaning so that you have an unsubstantial "necessary".

With it you can also make differences in your theology, like necessary truths in contrast to contingent truths.

I know, in a strict sense everything is contingent according to your theology.

Moreover, the necessary truths I spoke of are such only in relation to humans, but not in relation to your God.

In relation to your God, everything is contingent. In relation to us, there are both necessary and non-necessary truths.

You agree with me there, don't you?

No, not at all. God determines what is true. And as God can do anything, God has the power to make anything true. Thus, the propositions that are in fact true, are contingently so, not necessarily so.

We do have the word 'necessary'. But it has two quite different meanings. One is metaphysical and makes no real sense at all- you will not be able to say what this kind of necessity is without going in a circle (as you demonstrated when you tried to do so).
The other meaning is the one it has when we typically use it in every day life: it expresses an adamant attitude. It is synonymous with 'must'. It is necessary that you wash your hands before preparing food. That word necessary expresses the importance its utterer attaches to that activity.

You 'must' come over. Again, expressing a strong desire, not describing a metaphysical bond.

There is, then, that which we wish to emphasize, and that which we do not. And words like 'necessary' serve to emphasize importance.

There are things God emphasizes to us. Such as that 2 + 2 = 4 and that no true proposition is also false. And it is those truths that we call necessary. But they are not necessary in any inexplicable metaphysical sense. They are contingent, for all truths are. But the God is emphasizing these truths. And is giving us them independent of experience. But they are not 'necessary' in the philosopher's sense - which is no clear sense at all.