I was just trying to establish what that purpose might be, if there was something being specifically sought in this revisit to a classic. — DingoJones

In my opinion it is important to revisit the classics, they inform the whole of philosophy that follows. But the thread was started because Banno asked me to in response to the thread "Belief in god is necessary for being good" which veered widely off course of its original topic.

...a teacher guy... — DingoJones

It's too ingrained for me to easily move past it. Just asking "What do you mean by..." in a discussion of Socratic method rings all sorts of alarm bells.

But my answer to "What do you mean by piety", as for all such questions, will be that it doesn't have an essence that can be expounded in a paragraph, and that instead one must look to what is being done with it; hence my advice:

Then watch. Or read the texts provided and question. — Banno

...stands.

Much better. Thanks.

...and yet in the process you and I have concluded that what is pious and what is beloved of god are distinct. Are we justified in this, if the end is inconclusive? — Banno

I think the conclusion is justified. What remains inconclusive is what piety is.

I prefer the Socratic approach: the good is what we seek. It puts the question of the good in human terms.

As do I; it remains to be seen if there is some interesting special pleading on behalf of the monotheists.

Anticipating @Janus' argument, if god is omnibenevolent, then he cannot will anything that is not good; hence the good and the will of god coincide.

Ok, thats fair enough.
The point raised with Fool was that I already know the 101 understanding of it that the video shows.
I think if you want to explore a classic like this you have to come at it differently, otherwise its not exploring its just repeating it.
So when I asked about the term I was attempting to start a discussion wherein we go after the “essence” that cannot be expounded in a paragraph. I just prefer to get parameters good and clear first so we don’t waste our time discussing something with different understandings of the words most important to that discussion. Watching the video isnt going to do that, starting a dialogue does so thats what I tried to do.

Cool.

The angle I wanted to explore is the application to monotheism. Hence the questions to Janus.

I think the idea is that omniscience grants certain knowledge, thus a certainty of what is good and this is what merges good and god in the way Janus mentioned. I don’t really buy into any “omni” based arguments myself. Theoretical concepts at best, hardly the basis from which to draw conclusions about anything.

I don’t really buy into any “omni” based arguments myself. — DingoJones

A reasonable approach. It's a classic case of concepts being employed beyond their remit.

So, if we accept that there is a god who is all good, such a god can only will what is good; and if one ought do what is good, then (substituting) we ought do what god wills.

A cogent argument?

I'm guessing the ideas were probably introduced when the Nicene Creed was instituted, but I haven't investigated that, so I could be wrong.

It is hard to square the notions of omnipotence and omnibenevolence with what God is reported in the Old Testament to have done, and with the sacrifice of his Son, but nonetheless the ideas are not logically contradictory.

I'd like to see how this connection works. Can you fill in the gaps? — Banno

If God loves only the good, and God as creator and sustainer of all things determines what is good, then there is no contradiction that I can detect. Do you see a contradiction there?

Id call it internally consistent, but not a very good argument based on its premises. I don’t think being “all good” is coherent for example, I have never heard a satisfying explanation of what that would even mean.
Also it starts with the acceptance that a god exists, which I do not accept.
So not cogent I’d say, in that any argument that relies on such baseless premises is not very close convincing.

So the question is, is stuff good because it is loved by god, or is it loved by god because it is good?

I don’t think being “all good” is coherent for example, — DingoJones

An intuition with which I might sometimes agree; I'm not convinced that "...is good" works a predicate, at least not in the way "...is round" does. But there is much work to be done here, too.

SO you would say the argument is valid, but relies on a false premise - that there is a god - and so is not cogent.

So, if we accept that there is a god who is all good, such a god can only will what is good; and if one ought do what is good, then (substituting) we ought do what god wills. — Banno

This was what medieval people believed. It creates an identity problem. If you're good in thought and deed, then everything you do is the will of God. So you're like a puppet.

The only way to demonstrate a will of your own is to sin. In this setting the Devil becomes the primal separation from God: defiance.

This influenced the way warlords behaved. To maintain the allegiance of their soldiers, they needed to present themselves as being on God's side. If the soldiers came to doubt that, they would see themselves as being in a state of defiance, so they might flee instead of fighting.

This was what medieval people believed. — frank

Not all of them.

There' another question here; since I can do evil, I can do something that god cannot do. So I am in at least one way more able than god.

So the question is, is stuff good because it is loved by god, or is it loved by god because it is good? — Banno

That's definitely the question.

I wonder - if all that is good emanates from god's nature then what is meant to be the case when a person does good? Is this a person simply embodying God's nature in some way, or are they making their own good? If it is their own good then God would love it because it is good?

since I can do evil, I can do something that god cannot do. So I am in at least one way more able than god. — Banno

It would seem so. Is this because god is unable to do what he doesn't 'want' to do or is it because god's nature makes it impossible for him to do evil? Would the logic underpinning this mean that if god did evil (by our standards) - a human race destroying flood, for instance, it becomes good?

This was what medieval people believed. — frank


Not all of them. — Banno

I think pretty much everybody did.

The angle I wanted to explore is the application to monotheism. Hence the questions to Janus. — Banno

I am intending to read it thoroughly now this thread has started, but by way of preamble: one thing I think ought to be stated is that, I think, God doesn’t appear explicitly in this dialogue. The Greek Gods obviously do - and one of the main sources of argument is the way they can differ amongst themselves. But, obviously, the ‘One God’ cannot differ with other gods, because there are no other Gods. I’m saying that, just to be wary of automatically equating ‘the Gods’ with ‘the one God’. Of course it is true that in the early part of the Christian Era, the Greek-speaking theologians found ways to ‘Christianise’ the whole Platonic corpus - hence the designation of Plato and Socrates as ‘Christian before Christ’. But that introduces theological and philosophical undertones that might not be really there but which nevertheless influence the interpretation of this dialogue. (Although I also recognise that the ‘Euthyphro Dilemma’ is a frequent topic of discussion in philosophical theology however in these cases, the reading is ‘adjusted’ to allow for the discussion of the ‘one God’.)

Abelard seems not to have so thought; contradicted by Bernard at the Council of Sens 0f 1140. But this is a side issue of little interest.

Christianity inherited several distinct ideas about goodness: Jewish, Persian, Roman, and Platonic.

And then there's Augustine: 'love and do what you will.'

It's a pretty diverse and complex worldview.

An intuition with which I might sometimes agree; I'm not convinced that "...is good" works a predicate, at least not in the way "...is round" does. But there is much work to be done here, too. — Banno

The “all” is important too, “all good” implies only one pathway to good and a single conclusion at the end of that pathway. I think there are many good ways to get to the good and more than one good to be gotten to in each instance. (Good in the moral sense).

SO you would say the argument is valid, but relies on a false premise - that there is a god - and so is not cogent. — Banno

False premise (god), a problematic phrasing (“all good”)and it gets circular if “ought” is a reference to what is good. There is morevI think but those are the main cogency lacking factors imo.

The answer is both/ and not either/or.

Going back to your question about piety and justice, in connection with religion, I think that being pious became separate from justice in Western thought gradually. However, they are probably interconnected in foundation at some point, especially in ancient philosophy, like Plato, and 'Euthypro'.

I think that happened because there was a lot of focus on whether God exists, and I it is likely that Nietzsche's philosophy and influence lead to a belief if there is no God morality was not important.That is because he developed both the idea that 'God was dead' and of going 'Beyond Good and Evil'. However, there have been thinkers who thought that being good was not dependent on belief in God, especially the movement of secular humanism. If one only believes that being a good person is important because one is being supervised, or overseen, by God that is a fear based morality. As far as I can see goodness and justice are more important to some extent in a secular context. This is because this world of the here and now is the focus, rather than upon another reality of an afterlife, and of punishment or reward of heaven or hell.

Please refrain from the gratuitous ad hominem commentary. — Valentinus

Maybe you can tell me where the "ad hominem" is, because I don't see any?

The basic idea is that God is omnipotent from where it may be inferred that he is omniscient. However, God doesn't need to be omnibenevolent.

The concept of “omnipotent” (παντοκράτωρ pantokrator or παντοδύναμος pantodynamos) was certainly in use in antiquity. "Jupiter omnipotens" is used by Virgil and "omnipotent God" occurs both in the OT and NT texts:

"When the Hebrew Bible was translated into Greek as the Septuagint, Pantokrator was used both for YHWH Sabaoth "Lord of Hosts"[2] and for El Shaddai "God Almighty".[3] In the New Testament, Pantokrator is used once by Paul (2 Cor 6:18) and nine times in the Book of Revelation: 1:8, 4:8, 11:17, 15:3, 16:7, 16:14, 19:6, 19:15, and 21:22. "

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christ_Pantocrator

"Omnibenevolence" is often misconstrued and used by atheists or anti-theists to demonstrate alleged "contradictions" in the concept of God. It is conveniently forgotten that there are many different definitions of "God" - and of "omnibenevolence".

God is good in himself. But that doesn't mean that he is under obligation to be good to people in exactly the way or ways people want him to be, as that would be absurd.

is stuff good because it is loved by god — Banno

Something is good if it is willed/loved by any agent, from that agent's point of view, god or not. Counterexamples welcome.

In all this talk about God and the powers that we have attributed to him, the problem of the Euthyphro has been lost. Whether it is one God, many gods, or no gods we remain human beings. What is at issue is what we do and why. Appeals to God or gods are problematic.

The central question of the dialogue is about men not gods. What should guide Euthyphro’s actions, and how are we to judge Socrates’? Is piety simply a matter of doing what we are told a god or gods want from us, or is it part of the larger question of the just, noble, and good? Although it may seem that with monotheism there is no problem of conflict between gods; but the problem remains with the conflicting claims, laws, interpretations, and practices of the monotheistic religions.

Is piety simply a matter of doing what we are told a god or gods want from us, or is it part of the larger question of the just, noble, and good? — Fooloso4

If Justice is taken to be a Goddess (Dike), then in following justice we are doing what is commanded by Justice.

Likewise, if the Good is taken to be a higher, quasi-divine entity (to Agathon), then in following good we are doing what is commanded by the Good.

We can't escape the fact that we are following a higher principle that is above us. All we can do is claim that that principle is not a personal God, and others may disagree resulting in a never-ending and pretty pointless debate.

In the final analysis it is a matter of personal choice as to which way we want to look at it. It simply can't be settled through logic or philosophy.