Well then, forgo theology. God couldn't care less, as in Job's final chapter He doesn't have to justify His acts to us. Our mental tools are only of and for this world. He made them, supposedly. Don't try and use these tools on Him.

That's only pointing to more conceptual confusion. I think we can confidently conclude from human experience since Plato that not all pious person is just, and that not all just person is pious. — Olivier5

If there is no definition of terms from the start, then there will be confusion and no debate, for sure.

That's why I said that the terms involved may be interpreted in many different ways.

I for one, was using the dictionary definition. On that definition, it doesn't make sense to say that the Gods don't love what they themselves sanction.

What are you on about? Virtue ethics is a normative theory. One of many. It's a 'normative' theory. That means it is a theory about how we ought to behave and what has value (a theory, in other words, about what's right and what's good). Utilitarianism is another; Deontology another; pluralism another.

Divine command theory is not normative. It is a metaethical theory - so a theory about what rightness and goodness are in themselves, as opposed to what has them.

The Euthyphro is supposed - but doesn't- to challenge the credibility of divine command theory.

He made them, supposedly. Don't try and use these tools on Him. — Olivier5

He did make them, but he gives humans the freedom to use them as they think best. And some humans get it wrong. Most of us though, have a pretty accurate conception of what constitutes right and wrong.

If you are suggesting that we cannot provide reasonable answers to what God does or allows to happen, then I agree. — Fooloso4

That's why you can't prove your point and why it's pointless to try especially since many have tried before you and failed.

Most of us though, have a pretty accurate conception of what constitutes right and wrong. — Apollodorus

So what is the right thing to do about global warming?

By Socrates' argument and your own example we can say what it is not. — Fooloso4

How does Socrates warrant us to say what it isn't? The Euthyphro dilemma doesn't.

We ran into this same problem with infinite regression. You thought that if a statement can be seen to be associated with an infinite regress, it must be false. That's not how truth works.

Or do you think God or the gods love what is wrong? — Fooloso4

Zeus was a serial rapist. God puts people in hell. Of course divinities can love what's wrong. For Greeks, female divinities would tend to prompt you toward evil, but not always.

And you are wrong. You are confusing apples and oranges. Divine command theory is a theory about what morality is made of. It's the theory that it is made of a god's attitudes and commands. It is not a theory about the content of those attitudes and commands. Thus it is consistent with any normative theory. One can be a DCT virtue ethicist, a DCT utilitarian, a DCT deontologist - you name it.

This is not to deny that the truth of DCT may operate to make some normative theories more likely true than others. The point is that DCT is a different kind of theory to virtue ethics. It's why Ethics - the study of morality - is divided into these two areas of inquiry: normative ethics and metaethics. Rival views to DCT would be metaethical naturalism; non-naturalism; non-cognitivism. Not virtue ethics

So what is the right thing to do about global warming? — Olivier5

I said "most of us have a pretty accurate conception of what constitutes right and wrong" in terms of our personal conduct in society.

I haven't studied global warming but I'd venture to say that communism does not seem likely to be the solution.

IOW, you don't know and you don't care. Après moi le déluge. Such an attitude is irresponsible and therefore unjust. According to papa Francesco, it is also impious.

Wrong. I do care. I do my best to save energy, recycle stuff, don't smoke, etc. And I vote for politicians I think are serious about finding real solutions.

Anyway, have a nice day. And enjoy your drink.

I had hoped that the straight-thinkers might be dissuaded from posting by binding the discussion to the dialogue, and indeed for a few pages they were. But they are back, muddying the topic with a flood of sludge, apparently in a game of posts-most-wins. Yawn.

Trying to return to my line of thought, pulling a few gems from the muck, I asked

is stuff good because it is loved by god, or is it loved by god because it is good? — Banno

And the reply was

The answer is both/ and not either/or. — Janus

Roughly speaking Janus seems to think that because what is beloved by god is what is good, because the two are extensionally equivalent, the dichotomy dissolves. But I think this a slight treatment of the dialogue. It wraps the discussion in comforting bandages of abstraction. That same problem applies to 's cited argument.

Hence the importance of:

The central question of the dialogue is about men not gods. — Fooloso4

as well as

what does Craig's identity (God himself = the paradigm of goodness) mean for people doing the right thing — jorndoe

The dialogue ends in aporia. The considerations of the straight-thinkers have been shown to be irrelevant, indeed antithetical, to the task at hand: defending Socrates against the charge of impiety.

The lesson is the poverty of the self- righteous conviction of the straight-thinker.

Fair enough. Point is, not all seemingly pious folks care much for what amounts to a pretty big challenge to civilization as we know it.

In that case they probably aren't pious by the dictionary definition I provided. But putting a 21st-century spin on a work by Plato isn't exactly a solution either.

The dialogue ends in aporia. — Banno

And it seems so does the thread.

It is not so simple. It is not a matter of ethical principles but of whether particular acts are just or unjust. In a healthy society it is not enough that a sufficient number, (what number?),do something in order for it to be permissible. If we agree that murder is wrong, are we then wrong or is it both right and wrong if some group shouts "death to the infidels" and starts killing people? They consider themselves to be pious followers doing the will of their god, for which they will be rewarded. — Fooloso4

That's a strawman argument; no religions today (except some radical, politically motivated sects, proclaim "death to the infidels" and almost all moderate people, both religious and non-religious, think that is wrong. It is in the name of nationalism (in the context of war or conflict between nations), not in the context of religion, that the most people would think murder is acceptable.

no religions today (except some radical, politically motivated sects, proclaim "death to the infidels" and almost all moderate people, both religious and non-religious, think that is wrong. — Janus

Correct. Most murders seem to be motivated by personal conflicts. Nothing to do with religion whatsoever.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-deaths-usa-idUSTRE64C53R20100513

And the reply was

The answer is both/ and not either/or. — Janus


Roughly speaking Janus seems to think that because what is beloved by god is what is good, because the two are extensionally equivalent, the dichotomy dissolves. But I think this a slight treatment of the dialogue. It wraps the discussion in comforting bandages of abstraction — Banno

Roughly speaking this objection is nebulous and unargued. Can't you do better than that?

In any case mine is not an objection to the argument in the Euthyphro, but to its incoherent co-option by modern anti-theists.

Roughly speaking this objection is nebulous and unargued. Can't you do better than that? — Janus

I did:

The dialogue ends in aporia. The considerations of the straight-thinkers have been shown to be irrelevant, indeed antithetical, to the task at hand: defending Socrates against the charge of impiety. — Banno

That is the equivalence of the Will of God and the Good doesn't tell us what to do, and so is useless.

the task at hand: defending Socrates against the charge of impiety. — Banno

This is a rather cold case, and one could argue that Socrates himself didn't do such a great job at this task.

Euthyphro's basic reasoning could be summarized as follows:

1. There are gods
2. The gods are just and always do and want just things
3. If I fear the gods, and do just things, the gods will love me (because 2) and help me
4. Zeus killed his father
5. Therefore killing one's father is pious and just.
6. therefore, from 3 and 5, I am justified in killing my father.

Socrates attacks 2 with some success: several gods sometimes want different things. Gods are not consistent in what they want. He also attacks 3 as transactional, and doubt that any real commerce can exist between the gods and us (see the Book of Job for a biblical parallel).

In the final chapter, he implies that all these arguments above are mere pretense, that Euthyphro wants to kill his father, a crime under any latitude, and that he is simply chosing from the long list of crimes attributed to the gods one that will help him justify his shameful intention.

"Zeus did it too!". With that kind of argument, one could rape quite a few virgins and still feel pious.

Socrates himself didn't do such a great job at this task. — Olivier5

That made me laugh.

It is the will of gods, not the will of God in the Euthyphro; and that's why the argument doesn't work in the monotheistic context. The argument relies on the possibility of disagreement amongst the gods, and their human-like fallibility.

That made me laugh. — Banno

As soon as your "arguments" are cogently challenged you lose interest and resort to pomposity. That is so disingenuous!

defending Socrates against the charge of impiety. — Banno

He was impious.

Perhaps Banno is just upset that his plan, for which he hired Fooloso4, hasn't quite worked out as planned.

Perhaps indeed!

and that he is simply chosing from the long list of crimes attributed to the gods one that will help him justify his shameful intention. — Olivier5

And thus the dialogue points to the hypocrisy of the kind of "pious" folks who can justify pretty much anything by reference to theology, mythology or scripture. The kind of people who uses pious rhetoric to justify killing their father.

The kind of people who uses pious rhetoric to justify killing their father. — Olivier5

Yes, but that doesn't say anything about true piety and the truly pious.

I mean, he was indeed impious. The final chapter reads as: "unfortunately I'm still not convinced about this piety business".

That's a strawman argument; no religions today (except some radical, politically motivated sects, proclaim "death to the infidels" and almost all moderate people, both religious and non-religious, think that is wrong. — Janus

It is not a strawman, it is an extreme example of why piety must be tempered. In fact, it often has been, but not as the result of piety.