This may be vaguely relevant.

Thank you, AaronR and Pierre Normand. (Y)

Ed Feser has a current article From Aristotle to John Searle and Back Again: Formal Causes, Teleology and Computation in Nature.

Deleuze has a wonderful quote regarding Christian philosophy in particular that "it does not produce concepts except through its atheism, through the atheism that it, more than any other religion, secretes." — StreetlightX

I had the idea that the reason why Christianity engenders (which I prefer to 'secretes') atheism, is because of the compulsory nature of belief that it requires. Right from the outset of the early Church Councils, which thrashed out the Nicene Creed and the other articles, there was an emphasis on what belief is required of the professing Christian. 'Heresy' is derived from the greek word for 'choosing' or 'making a choice', the implication being that it is wrong to even have a view about what one ought to believe. As is well-known, the suppression or persecution of heresies gave rise to many of the darkest chapters in Christian history (not least the destruction of the Cathars).

Recall also that many of the mystics fell foul of the authorities because they threatened the undermine the requirement for submission to the Church hierarchy; that was the specific error that Eckhardt was censured for. 'No-one comes to the Father but by Me' was taken to mean 'other than by the Church'; and anything that threatened that was to be destroyed (which underlay a good deal of the violence of the Wars of Religion.) I think this 'with us or against us' attitude is the main driver of secularism and conscientious atheism that developed in and after the European Enlightenment, as a reaction to, and a kind of 'shadow' of, the ruthless orthodoxy of earlier Christianity.

Interesting theory. In regards to how Christianity engenders atheism, I would qualify this and say that it engenders reactionary atheism. To get as far away from religion as possible by denying the existence of the most central doctrine of (most) religions. It's not based on perfectly rational inquiry, but more on skepticism motivated by social and political concerns. It's telling that modern atheists often try to appear suave and rebellious - they clearly aren't just responding to a philosophical view but are actively trying to separate themselves from what they see to be an oppressive and backwards aspect of society.

Of course a lot of philosophical debates are really just masked politics. For example, the problem of universals is irrelevant to those who aren't specifically interested in it, unless of course someone claims things have essential universal properties that influence moral reasoning. Then you get thoroughly-nominalistic positions that are really implausible and aren't motivated by plausibility but simply a rejection of what is seen as the inevitable consequence of the acceptance of the alternative.

I had the idea that the reason why Christianity engenders (which I prefer to 'secretes') atheism, is because of the compulsory nature of belief that it requires. Right from the outset of the early Church Councils, which thrashed out the Nicene Creed and the other articles, there was an emphasis on what belief is required of the professing Christian. — Wayfarer

I think you're right to hit on belief as the hinge upon which this turns, and I think indeed it's a matter of 'practice' which is at stake here. The context of that Deleuze quote on the secretion of atheism in fact comes from a discussion of belief, specifically that of Kierkegaard and Pascal, each of whom transpose belief from the transcendent to the immanent:

"We have seen this in Pascal or Kierkegaard: perhaps belief becomes a genuine concept only when it is made into belief in this world and is connected rather than being projected. ... Kierkegaard leaps outside the plane [of immanence], but what is "restored" to him in this suspension, this halted movement, is the fiancee or the lost son, it is existence on the plane of immanence. Kierkegaard does not hesitate to say so: a little "resignation" will be enough for what belongs to transcendence, but immanence must also be restored. Pascal wagers on the transcendent existence of God, but the stake, that on which one bets, is the immanent existence of the one who believes that God exists. Only that existence is able to cover the plane of immanence ...whereas the existence of the one who does not believe that God exists falls into the negative." (Deleuze, What Is Philosophy?)

This is further connected to the soteriological element of Christianity, it's messianic core which aims at a restored future only if driven by the present. In other words there is a very specific temporarily that is proper to Christianity which always always brings it's belief back to bear on the present. Giorgio Agamben has written quite eloquently on this, especially with respect to the question of 'choice': "Contrary to the contemporary eschatological interpretation, it should not be forgotten that the time of the messiah cannot be, for Paul, a future time. The expression he uses to refer to this time is always ho nyn kairos, 'now time'. As he writes in the Second Letter to the Corinthians, "Idou nyn, behold, now is the time to gather, behold the day of salvation" (2 Cor. 6.2; 231) ... Living in this time, experiencing this time, is thus not something that the Church can choose, or choose not, to do. It is only in this time that there is a Church at all.

....[T]he Church can be a living institution only on the condition that it maintains an immediate
relation to its end. And - a point which we would do well not to forget - according to Christian theology there is only one legal institution which knows neither interruption nor end: hell." (Agamben, The Chruch and the Kingdom - note that Agamben rather sneakily gave this speech in the presence of the bishop of Paris at Notre-Dame, the whole thing being a rather pointed critique of the Church's currently existing institutional practices). All of this serves to continually make Christianity 'world-directed' rather that 'Heaven-directed' as it were (think here too of Weber's The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism). Or in Deleuze's words, "when we take pride in encountering the transcendent within immanence, all we do is recharge the plane of immanence with immanence itself".

Transcendence is immanently thought and can have, for us, only immanent significance. This much seems obvious. But it cannot be thought as immanence without losing all sense.

Thanks, very interesting insights. Must look into Agamben.

The other historical factor which I think is directly relevant to the waning and, now, the resurgence of scholastic philosophy, is the 'rise of nominalism' thesis which has been laid out by a couple of very influential books, notably Michael Allen Gillespie's recent The Theological Origins of Modernity.

Gillespie traces the conflict between the nominalists and scholastics back to the re-discovery of Aristotelean philosophy by the schools, on the one side, and the radical views of William of Ockham, and others, on the other, inspired (perhaps paradoxically) by St Francis of Assisi.

God, they purported, is omnipotent, bound by no law or determination. Creation is an act of sheer grace, comprehensible only through revelation. Ockham’s concern was that the Universals would only restrain God’s omnipotence. There is not even a universal called “man;” in reality there are only unique individuals. Only God is necessary, while everything else is contingent on His will. What is good is good only because He wills it because He can even recreate the world, damn the saints, or save the sinners if He wants.

Lasting consequences sprang from another of Ockham’s crucial ideas: little or nothing can be known about God besides what He has revealed in the Scripture, while in regard to the natural world investigation and hypothesis are the main methods of inquiry, for the reality of universals or of the rational structure of the world is denied. God is not understood or influenced by human beings even in respect to their own salvation. The spiritual and intellectual consequences of this revolution led, according to Gillespie, to a sense of arbitrariness and perplexity in view of the irrational structure of the world. Man discovers himself as just another being in an infinite universe with no natural law to discover or follow and with no certain path to salvation.'

Review by Alin Vara

Gillespie contrasts this attitude with the inherenently teleological view of scholasticism, which, following the Greek intuition, emphasises the familial resemblance, as it were, between human rationality and the divine Logos:

Christian faith offered itself as the way—a way of life and a way of knowing—indeed, a way of life because it is a way of knowing, a kind of insight, theoretical and practical, into the intelligible order of things. Faith and theology will necessarily appear markedly different in a world which cannot even conceive of what it would be to desire or possess an architectonic and life-transforming wisdom. Just as forms and their active power secured intrinsic connections between causes and their effects, between agents and ends, and between mind and reality, so they also secured intrinsic connections between what the mind grasps by reason and what the mind grasps by faith.

Ockham, the father of nominalism, is indeed a crucial figure in the history of the separation of faith and reason, not because he denied that there was truth, even truth about God, but because he deprived us of the classical means of accounting for the unity of truth, including of truth about God.

What's Wrong with Ockham?

This can possibly also be traced back to a deep tension in Christianity itself between the Biblical sense of an inherently super-rational nature of revelation and that of Greek rationalism and Platonist mysticism, with which it became fused very early in the Christian era (this tension being preserved in such sayings as scripture being 'foolishness to the Greeks' and the rhetorical question 'what does Jerusalem have to do with Athens?')

But even more to the point, the medieval nominalists (Ockham, Bacon, et al) were really the precursors of the later empiricists and indeed crucial figures in the development of science; and among the consequences, was the denial of universals ( or of what was then 'scholastic realism') which ultimately entailed the dissolution of metaphysics proper (also discussed in Richard Weaver's influential 1948 book 'Ideas Have Consequences'.)

Which is why, I think, Scholasticism is making a comeback - because medieval nominalism and the mechanistic views of early modern philosophy have been shown to be metaphysically threadbare.

But even more to the point, the medieval nominalists (Ockham, Bacon, et al) were really the precursors of the later empiricists and indeed crucial figures in the development of science; and among the consequences, was the denial of universals ( or of what was then 'scholastic realism') which ultimately entailed the dissolution of metaphysics proper (also discussed in Richard Weaver's influential 1948 book 'Ideas Have Consequences'.)

Which is why, I think, Scholasticism is making a comeback - because medieval nominalism and the mechanistic views of early modern philosophy have been shown to be metaphysically threadbare.

I agree with this, with the caveat that Ockham's nominalism remains committed to a substance-accident model of being which, for all his radicalism, nonetheless places him firmly within the ambit of Aristotelianism. The failure of nominalism - which is ultimately a radicalization, and not a break from Scholastic tradition - ought to speak to a rejection of that model tout court, rather than a swing from one of it's poles to the other.

And in a real way, this is what is happening: the rediscovery of universals is taking place on grounds other than those of the scholastics, such that one can speak - in a way that would have been anathema to medieval thinkers - of emergent universalities, or universals which are results of processes which subsequently have retroactive effects on those processes ('top-down causation'). Not a simple return to universals but a total rethinking of them is at stake in the apparent 'return'.

Right! Hence the 'neo-' in neo-scholasticism.

1. Hylomorphic dualism provides an interesting and worthy counterpoint to the dichotomous substance dualism that undergirds the dialectic of modern philosophy since Descartes and Locke. Subdues the modern tension between realism and idealism by more-or-less eliminating the underlying cause of that tension. — Aaron R

I do not think that it is correct to exclude Aristotle from substance dualism. In his Categories he clearly defines primary and secondary substance, primary substance being material substance, and secondary substance formal. Material substance he implies, substantiates, or grounds, the logical system. But in his metaphysics, when he seeks to substantiate being itself, he turns to formal substance.

So I don't see the support for your claim that hylomorphism eliminates substance dualism, as the underlying cause of tension. If anything, the Aristotelian principles of hylomorphism, which were introduced into Christianity by the Scholastics, only produced ambiguity. There was ambiguity with respect to how the logical forms of Aristotle were to be related to the immaterial Forms of Neo-Platonism. This was at the heart of the nominalist/realist debate.

I had the idea that the reason why Christianity engenders (which I prefer to 'secretes') atheism, is because of the compulsory nature of belief that it requires. Right from the outset of the early Church Councils, which thrashed out the Nicene Creed and the other articles, there was an emphasis on what belief is required of the professing Christian. 'Heresy' is derived from the greek word for 'choosing' or 'making a choice', the implication being that it is wrong to even have a view about what one ought to believe. As is well-known, the suppression or persecution of heresies gave rise to many of the darkest chapters in Christian history (not least the destruction of the Cathars). — Wayfarer

When discussing "choice" with respect to the theological principles of a religion, one should keep in mind the evolutionary stages of a religion. In its early days, a religion such as Christianity, must be adapted, to encourage individuals to choose that religion, in order that it may grow. A young religion trying to establish itself, has no real intrinsic power to encourage people to join, except to appear desirable. So it must encourage freedom of choice. Early fathers of Christianity, such as Augustine, display much freedom to choose metaphysical principles, and profess the intrinsic truth of free will. Even if a particular religion, as it grows, adopts certain principles to distinguish heresy, as in your example of the Nicene Creed, that religion must be very careful if it attempts to enforce any such contracts of belief.

In early medieval times, one would accuse another's beliefs as heresy, in debate, but there was very little means or desire to enforce punishment. This would be far too divisive. What came about in Christianity, in later medieval times, with the advent of Scholasticism, and the crusades, was a large influx of written materials, derived from various different places around the world. This presented a wide range of beliefs to choose from. The leaders of the Church saw the need to enforce laws of heresy, which led to the Inquisition.

But what I believe is that there is a fundamental difference here between early times and later times, with respect to the Church's attitude toward choice. In early times it encouraged freedom of choice, as a fundamental principle, with an attitude of tolerance toward different beliefs. But as it gained power, it ignored this principle completely, and turned its actions right around, in a hypocritical way, attempting to enforce belief in a way which cannot be successful. It is this hypocritical action which engenders atheism, because it cannot overcome the fundamental freedom of choice.

Many of the medieval European philosophers were first-rate thinkers, in my opinion, e.g. Abelard, Anselm, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Aquinas. I think it would do them an injustice to say that their work was solely in the service of the Church (which wasn't exactly unified in doctrine at the time, in any case). But I think we have to recognize that the reintroduction of Aristotle in Europe in the 12th century had a staggering impact on the learned monks and the universities of the time. They found his work so compelling, so persuasive, that he became known as "The Philosopher"--quite simply, the best authority on most any subject, since he, the Relentless Categorizer, wrote on most anything he could while he could.

As a result I think regard for him was so high and extensive at that time that it was thought important to harmonize his work with the essential doctrines of the Church and justify those doctrines based on the authoritative opinions of The Philosopher. I think there was a real effort to do so, by Aquinas and others. To that extent, it might be said that Scholasticism in its incorporation of Aristotle had as one of its concerns the use of his thought and his way of thinking to buttress Church doctrine.

I do not think that it is correct to exclude Aristotle from substance dualism. In his Categories he clearly defines primary and secondary substance, primary substance being material substance, and secondary substance formal. Material substance he implies, substantiates, or grounds, the logical system. But in his metaphysics, when he seeks to substantiate being itself, he turns to formal substance. — MU

I’m not sure I’d agree. My understanding is that Aristotle ultimately argues that substance is the unity of matter and form or, more generally, of dunamis and energeia. This unity is the necessary and sufficient condition of being. In that sense hylomorphism fundamentally differs from modern substance dualism, which explicitly dichotomizes thought and extension into mutually exclusive categories of being. In the modern approach a thinking substance can exist entirely apart from extended substance and vice versa.

THE CRITICAL PROBLEM
The 'critical problem' with past philosophies and past philosophers is 'VERIFIED KNOWLEDGE'. In the past, philosophers had little to work with, so they had to make a lot of GUESSES concerning reality, which have almost invariably turned out to be wrong (which can be expected, reality being as complicated as it is, and guesses without verified knowledge being so open-ended, limited only by one's imagination).

FOOLISH FADS
So any 'return' to past philosophies will be a foolish fad, even if an academic foolish fad (academia not being immune to foolish fads).

Please forgive the delay in my reply.

Not at all. It is, as I've said, an observation - a casual opinion, no more emotionally charged than my observation-based opinion that all live animals with hearts also have kidneys. I would happily (nay, eagerly!) adjust either opinion based on new data. — andrewk

I don't necessarily disagree with your claim that people often form beliefs on the basis of aesthetic judgments or emotional valence. However, this is hardly limited to philosophy: even areas of inquiry which are amenable to empirical investigation such as anthropogenic climate change, vaccine safety, and evolution are filled with politically-, emotionally-, and even religiously-charged overtones among their proponents and detractors. However, no one can reasonably claim that, in such disputes, no side is more rational than the other.

My point is that you are here also making a meta-philosophical claim, i.e. that no philosophical position can be said to be more rational than any other. By your own criteria, this position has no greater claim to rationality than its contrary, i.e. that certain philosophical positions are more rational than others.

Perhaps such a datum is available in relation to your statement that you consider panpsychism irrational, despite not seeing any obvious inconsistencies in it. Can you help me expand my horizons by explaining on what basis you consider it less rational than some alternative philosophy of consciousness?

Panpsychism is absurd in attributing mentation to the most basic, non-living elements of the universe. It makes a hash of our understanding of the natural history of intelligence, our knowledge of the sort of systems in which mentation undeniably arises, is wholly unsupported by empirical evidence, and is more of an admission of defeat in understanding consciousness rather than being a serious position in its own right (a discussion for another thread perhaps).

I’m not sure I’d agree. My understanding is that Aristotle ultimately argues that substance is the unity of matter and form or, more generally, of dunamis and energeia. This unity is the necessary and sufficient condition of being. In that sense hylomorphism fundamentally differs from modern substance dualism, which explicitly dichotomizes thought and extension into mutually exclusive categories of being. In the modern approach a thinking substance can exist entirely apart from extended substance and vice versa. — Aaron R

Well, I think that "substance" was proper to Aristotle's logic, the categories, while the unity of matter and form was proper to his physics. Now we could say that physical objects, as a unity of matter and form, are primary substance, but we still have to consider secondary substance, which is more like the simple essence of a thing, form without the matter. Then in his metaphysics, when he seeks the nature of being itself, he finds that there must be a formal essence which underlies the material existence of a thing. That is to say that for every existing thing, there is a reason why it exists as the thing which it is, and this causes it to be the thing that it is. This formal essence therefore must be prior to the material existence of the thing.

So we clearly have a substance dualism here, though it is more complex than the simple representation of thinking substance and extended substance. It is more like "secondary substance" as the formal essence of a thing, and "primary substance" as a unity of matter and form.


I very much agree with that, and it's pretty much the same thing which I said earlier.