@Banno, what do you think?

displaying the behaviorism of pragmatism and psychologism of the latter Wittgenstein. — Shawn

He wasnt strictly speaking a behaviorist though.

From Wittgenstein’s biography:


Those problems centred on the issue between those who assert and those who deny the existence of mental processes. Wittgenstein wanted to do neither; he wanted to show that both sides of the issue rest on a mistaken analogy:

“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise? - The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them - we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a defmite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) - And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them.“

Cheers.

Superficially pragmatism and the later Wittgenstein take the same view of meaning. Pragmatism says the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or its possible causes and effects. Wittgenstein says that to understand language we ought forget about meaning and look at what is being done in our actual use of words. It's a subtle, but profound, difference.

The difference might be most clearly seen in the attitude each take towards truth. Pragmatists generally reject the notion of truth outright and talk in terms of improved utility over time asymptotically approaching something that they deny exists. Witti would instead look with great care at the places in which the word is used and craft a description fo the way of life in which it is involved. So a pragmatists will try to ignore truth while Witti makes truth, belief, certainty and such central concerns.

On a side note, I'm puzzled by your use of "intensional" in the title - intensional as opposed to extensional; not intentional as opposed to accidental. Seems to me that pragmatism rests on extensional results rather than intensional results; is your point that pragmatism denies the intensional?

What do any of you think about pragmatism as the consequences of the meaning of a sentence. — Shawn

Analyzing what we’re trying to do by saying things is the right way to analyze speech.

One thing we might be trying to do is to convey some state of mind from us to someone else, either just to show our own state of mind or to evoke a state of mind in them.

And states of mind can best be analyzed by their role in our functionality: what difference does being in this or that state of mind make on how we behave in response to what experiences?

One thing we might be trying to do is to convey some state of mind from us to someone else, — Pfhorrest

There's so much here that is questionable.

What sort of thing is a state of mind? We use the term, say, when someone is furious or inconsolable; "they are incapable of rational thought while in that state of mind". Here is it something transitory, to be overcome. But in the hands of a philosopher it becomes reified, the hard-edged, solid way that things are inside one's thinking; a thing to be conveyed from one mind to another, as if language were no more than a system of roads along which we might transfer and trade the commodities of our intellect.

So often philosophy proceeds by taking the wrong picture and building from it a prison.

Pragmatism seems to be a rather simple and yet powerful technique to trim the tree of philosophy down, specifically the branch of metaphysics. Given any single philosophical claim, if the practical consequences are the same irrespective of whether that claim is true or false, we can safely ignore it.

This might be relevant :point: Noble Silence

What sort of thing is a state of mind? — Banno

states of mind can best be analyzed by their role in our functionality: what difference does being in this or that state of mind make on how we behave in response to what experiences? — Pfhorrest

They can be more or less transitory or long lasting, or different along a bunch of other dimensions too.

as if language were no more than a system of roads along which we might transfer and trade the commodities of our intellect. — Banno

One thing we might be trying to do is to convey some state of mind — Pfhorrest

There are other things we could be doing too.

One thing we might be trying to do is to convey some state of mind
— Pfhorrest

There are other things we could be doing too. — Pfhorrest

But the image is of a state of mind being moved form one head to another.

And as soon as you say it you know its wrong.

It looks like a verbal question. You could treat meaning that way – but I suspect it wouldn't capture many of the things we mean with the ordinary notion, so why bother?

But the image is of a state of mind being moved form one head to another.

And as soon as you say it you know its wrong. — Banno

The image is a figurative one, I think obviously so, since our minds are not directly connected. And with it interpreted so, I see nothing so obviously wrong with it.

Right now I’m touching little images on a screen with the understanding that through a very complicated process you will see similar images appear on another screen arranged in the order that I touched them and that by looking at and interpreting them through another complex process you will hopefully come to comprehend something of what is going on in my mind — how I am inclined to behave in what pattern of response to what experiences — and, hopefully still, that will instigate a process in your own mind by which eventually similar things will be going on in yours as are going on in mine as I write this — that you will become inclined to behave in a similar pattern of response to similar experiences. I.e. you will understand and agree with me.

Pragmatism says the meaning of a sentence is to be defined by reference to the actions to which asserting it would lead, or its possible causes and effects. Wittgenstein says that to understand language we ought forget about meaning and look at what is being done in our actual use of words. It's a subtle, but profound, difference — Banno

The difference, as I see it, is abound with the charges of psychologism of the latter Wittgenstein, whereas in another thread I raised the point that the norms of everyday life or the behavior of an individual accounts for the results of the use of words. This difference, as you point out, is a point in question for me.

Pragmatists generally reject the notion of truth outright and talk in terms of improved utility over time asymptotically approaching something that they deny exists. — Banno

Is this just a trend in behavior or again a established norm?

On a side note, I'm puzzled by your use of "intensional" in the title - intensional as opposed to extensional; not intentional as opposed to accidental. Seems to me that pragmatism rests on extensional results rather than intensional results; is your point that pragmatism denies the intensional? — Banno

I fixed it. It's now "intentional".

The image is a figurative one, — Pfhorrest

Oh, indeed. And the figure is wrong. Describing it in more detail doesn't help. Nothing - no thing - has been moved from one mind to another. Rather we engage in a join act of creation. You are not encoding something that I decode; rather it is a join performance.

And this distinction is directly relevant to the OP. The notion of language use as intersubjective transfer is deeply ingrained into pragmatism. It is locked in the mistaken Cartesian dualism of internal mind and external world. Better to take on a perspective of language use as building stuff with other people.

Charged of psychologism contrast with charges of behaviourism. He can't consistently do both; and I think we ought grant him the benefit of the doubt that he was at leat trying to be consistent.

Truth and Pragmatism have a poor relationship. Pragmatists generally would like to do without it, leaving them in the precarious position of advocating a doctrine that on its own account is not true.

I'm not sure "intensional" wasn't right.

Better to take on a perspective of language use as building stuff with other people. — Banno

That is definitely a thing we can do with language.

But how would you construe one person making an assertion to another person as “building something together”?

Unless what they’re building together is something in the mind of the listener (which doesn’t imply any Cartesian dualism: the mind of the listener consists of the function and hence structure of their brain), and it’s only the speaker who is speaking language in his act of building it, whereas the listener’s act of construction consists of interpreting and evaluating the language spoken by the speaker.

Which is another way of phrasing what I just said before.

On a side note, I'm puzzled by your use of "intensional" in the title - intensional as opposed to extensional; not intentional as opposed to accidental. Seems to me that pragmatism rests on extensional results rather than intensional results; is your point that pragmatism denies the intensional? — Banno

I don't know if you know Ramsey sentences well; but, he does make an important distinction between these things you mention.

I got the article here:

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/04/the-man-who-thought-too-fast

But how would you construe one person making an assertion to another person as “building something together”? — Pfhorrest

Well, you might agree that at least you and I are building a thread. Perhaps even a conversation? An argument? And these things we might be doing have the advantage of being extensional, in contrast to "something in the mind of the listener". Others may join us, if they so choose.

And this is not based on an active speaker and passive listener, on a transfer of information; nor on a notion of meaning as a subjective, indeed private entity.

Well, you might agree that at least you and I are building a thread. Perhaps even a conversation? An argument? — Banno

Sure, because this is an interactive medium where we are each saying things back and forth and they accumulate into a larger discourse like that.

But is a posted sign or a public announcement over loudspeaker meaningless because there is no opportunity to talk back?

And this is not based ... on a transfer of information — Banno

Would you deny that any information has been transferred? (Assuming copying is included within transfer). Do you not hope that I will learn something you already knew through this conversation? Are you just “painting words on this thread” so to speak, alongside me, in a collaborative art project, without any intention to influence my ways of thinking?

nor on a notion of meaning as a subjective, indeed private entity. — Banno

Do you deny that speakers of the nominally same language can mean different things by the same public symbols of the language, or take the same symbols to mean different things? (See “God” on this forum for example). Everyone is trying to use a public meaning, sure, but it’s not the case that there is a single universally publicly agreed upon meaning, and someone’s intended or taken meaning might be idiosyncratic only to themselves.

Would you deny that any information has been transferred? — Pfhorrest

No, there is information being exchanged. But that's a relatively small part of the interaction. The learning has perhaps more import. What is certain is that the meaning of this conversation, as such, is not restricted to the mere transfer of information, as might be implied if language is seen as mere conveying some state of mind from one person to someone else.

But is a posted sign or a public announcement over loudspeaker meaningless because there is no opportunity to talk back? — Pfhorrest

An odd retort. as is

Do you deny that speakers of the nominally same language can mean different things by the same public symbols of the language, or take the same symbols to mean different things? — Pfhorrest

If the meaning of a word is best replaced by an examination of use, then of course there is no single publicly agreed upon meaning.

if language is seen as mere conveying some state of mind from one person to someone else. — Banno

I did only say that that is one (implicitly among other) things that language can do. You seemed to be denying that that is a thing language is ever used for. But now you’re saying that it is happening here after all, and only denying that it is ALL that is happening here... which was never my claim, so I think we have no real disagreement.

But is a posted sign or a public announcement over loudspeaker meaningless because there is no opportunity to talk back?
— Pfhorrest
An odd retort. — Banno

You gave a thing built by mutual two-way communication as an example of building something giving the meaning of language, so I wanted to check that against the case where there is only one direction of communication to see how your account of building something works there.

If the meaning of a word is best replaced by an examination of use, then of course there is no single publicly agreed upon meaning. — Banno

Agreed. But what then are the different, not-publicly-agreed upon meanings that different people try to use, if not private ones, which you seemed to dismiss?

But what then are the different, not-publicly-agreed upon meanings that different people try to use, if not private ones, which you seemed to dismiss? — Pfhorrest

Not at all sure what you are asking. What then are the different, not-publicly-agreed upon uses that different people try to use...?

People try to use words to do things. We call the thing they’re trying to use them for, or the thing they actually accomplish by using them (which might or might not coincide), the meanings of those words. Sometimes there is clear public agreement on what a given word is to be used for. Other times, one person tries to use it for one thing, and another person takes their use of it in a different way — they disagree on the proper use of, or the meaning of, the word. But they each still mean something by it — they’re trying to use it for something, even if there isn’t public agreement on what to use it for. What is that then, if not a private meaning?

We seem to be a long way off course - private meaning and so on.

Seems to me that pragmatism rests on extensional results rather than intensional results; is your point that pragmatism denies the intensional? — Banno

Somewhat, I'm not sure how else to specify this as. Pierce might have argued in favor of this, with James, otherwise.

We seem to be a long way off course - private meaning and so on. — Banno

I’m just responding to you, where you said:

nor on a notion of meaning as a subjective, indeed private entity. — Banno

Though now that you mention it I’m not clear why you brought that up on this topic.

Well, I'd supposed that "private meaning" might be a marker for you - "here be dragons"; but that doesn't seem to be the case.

Harlem
BY LANGSTON HUGHES
What happens to a dream deferred?

Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore—
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over—
like a syrupy sweet?

Maybe it just sags
like a heavy load.

Or does it explode?

I guess I'd just ask if what Langston Hughes is doing with these words gets at the meaning of the poem or sentences. The very structure of the poem, where the sentences are broken up, changes the meaning I'd argue -- try it one for size:

Does it dry up like a raisin the sun?


Compared to:


Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?




I have respect for the notion that the use of a sentence is what we should look to in order to determine meaning because it gives me a picture of an investigator, searching for clues, context, things outside the individual sentence -- a speaker, a history, the sentences surrounding it, the physical book or -- in this case -- digital encoding on the poetry foundation's website.

So the picture of meaning I get is one that encourages reading the words and making guesses based upon context, rather than having something in my head, some intensional something.

But perhaps it's still the wrong picture. But if it were the wrong picture, then I'd argue there's a falsity somewhere -- and that truth and meaning ain't strictly pragmatic, even though said theories conveniently solve a lot of philosophical problems.