Physical reaction is not equivalent to awareness — Hanover

I thought of that too but there's a problem in this. We can't distinguish between real consciousness and simulated consciousness (I suspect you want to make this distinction). Having access only to the external behavior of matter, I'm forced to conclude that plants have consciousness.

I thought of that too but there's a problem in this. We can't distinguish between real consciousness and simulated consciousness (I suspect you want to make this distinction). Having access only to the external behavior of matter, I'm forced to conclude that plants have consciousness. — TheMadFool

That's a really good conclusion. I'll keep that in mind so that every time you say something questionable, I can offer the retort, "but then again, you think plants have consciousness."

Have you considered that purposeful physical events can occur unconsciously, like your heart, for example, as it pumps blood through your body. And do we really need to give examples for why you might not conclude that plants have consciousness when in truth you really don't believe they do. If you insist, though, that plants are conscious, then I think we need a new word for how I use the term, considering I really do see a distinction between how I respond to the sun and how a plant does.

I think we don't agree on the meaning of the term ''consciousness''. You seem to think, and that is expected, that consciousness is a phenomenon that only animals have. Perhaps you even think humans have the most evolved form of this faculty.

I have no issue with that. I think animal consciousness is unique too and deserving of distinction between it and the rest of phenomena and the term ''consciousness'' is appropriate and exclusively applied to it.

However, how do we come to know whether something is conscious or not? We have access only to external behavior. We can't directly experience the consciousness of another entity, can we? So, a plant growing towards the sun and a man looking for shade in the hot sun are indistinguishable.

So, a plant growing towards the sun and a man looking for shade in the hot sun are indistinguishable. — TheMadFool

I am capable of distinguishing the two. In fact, it's far more difficult to find similarities than distinctions.

I am capable of distinguishing the two. In fact, it's far more difficult to find similarities than distinctions — Hanover

How then are they separable as distinct from each other? We don't have direct access to the minds of other animals. All we have is their external behavior (how they respond to the environment). Again I think we have very different conception of the term ''consciousness''.

How then are they separable as distinct from each other? We don't have direct access to the minds of other animals. All we have is their external behavior (how they respond to the environment). Again I think we have very different conception of the term ''consciousness''. — TheMadFool

That is actually a big problem. The problem of other minds takes on a new meaning when we start to think about animals. I think it is clear that some animals have consciousness, but the problem is that we cannot know what it is like to be said animals. We have no idea which animals and which behaviors are unconscious reactions and conscious decisions without using specific measures. These measures, like an animal recognizing itself in the mirror, are only available for animals with relatively high mental capabilities, like dolphins and some primates.

And then I think that it is difficult to be conscious of something else and not to be conscious of myself or to be conscious of myself and not be conscious of other things. I think that one implies the other. You mean that these philosophers say that self-consciousness is not about that? — mew

No, I think you're right about that. Your being aware (i.e. having the perceptual knowledge) that there are objects in the world that exist independently of your perception of them requires awareness that you can potentially experience them -- i.e. that they be potential objects of experience. You arrived at this conclusion without Kant's help. Congratulations! — Pierre-Normand

Don't you have to first establish that the sensations and experiences you have are about, or of things that exist independently of your perception of them to even say that awareness is happening? For instance, idealists and anti-realists state that their experiences aren't about some world that exists independently of their mind. The contents of their mind aren't representations of some external world but are things themselves - similar to how a universe with no observers would be. If there is no aboutness to the sensations you experience, then how can you say that you are aware of anything? What would you be aware of?

Many conflate self-awareness with consciousness. Being aware of yourself is simply one of many things to be aware of. I am also aware of my wife, a tv show, a philosophy forum, scribbles on a screen, etc. At any moment my attention is focused on certain things. What I'm focused on is what I'm aware of, so it seems to me that to be conscious requires attention - of filtering out certain sensory impressions in favor of others in order to accomplish the current goal.

I believe that animals with a central nervous system as opposed to a nerve net (like jellyfish or starfish) are conscious. The brain provides a central location where all sensory inputs come together into a whole experience - or an information architecture that represents the immediate environment. Humans seem to have accomplished the feat of turning their thoughts back on itself - of thinking about thinking - of being aware of being aware.

We could possibly design a robot to be conscious like humans. If they could create a model of sensory information and use that model to navigate the world and to contemplate themselves being aware of their world, then why would we say that this robot isn't conscious, or self-aware?

We could possibly design a robot to be conscious like humans. If they could create a model of sensory information and use that model to navigate the world and to contemplate themselves being aware of their world, then why would we say that this robot isn't conscious, or self-aware? — Harry Hindu

For sure. Such a robot would be aware that there are objects its world. This sort of objective empirical knowledge is dependent on the existence of a form of reflexive self-knowledge about ones own capacity for empirical knowledge (and of its fallibility -- the possibility of illusion). This robot's awareness, accompanied by self-awareness, would be qualitatively distincts from a cat's mere awareness of mice in its vicinity. That's something that falls short from an awareness that there objectively are mice in its vicinity.

There is more to having the relevant form of self-consciousness than possessing a descriptive "self-model", though. (Aristotle hints at the relevant distinction with the example of the physician who heals herself. There are two distinct ways one can heal oneself: as one would also heal another, through "prescribing" oneself exercise or some medicine, say, or spontaneously, through merely facilitating the natural process of cicatrisation, say. The relevant sort of self-knowledge that grounds empirical knowledge is likewise "spontaneous", in a sense. It characterizes the form of empirical knowledge -- that is: the form of the conceptual activity involved in the shaping of the experience, with the tacit self-acknowledgement of the epistemic responsibility from the knowing subject in bringing to bear the right concepts to her experience -- rather than just specifying its object by description as just one more item in the world who merely happens to refer to herself as "I".

How then are they separable as distinct from each other? We don't have direct access to the minds of other animals. — TheMadFool

First of all, we weren't talking about animal consciousness. We were talking about plant consciousness. Second, we don't have direct access to any mind other than our own, which means we can't conclude the existence of any mind other than our own. To the extent we use behavior to determine the existence of other consciousness, we can look at the behavior of plants and recognize their behavior as distinct from animals. The simple fact that a branch bends towards the sun is not sufficient to prove the plant is conscious.

I could, I suppose, list the various differences between plants and people in order to point out how the former lacks the behavioral manifestations of consciousness, but I'd not be proving anything that isn't already fully accepted, and I don't feel like performing a mindless academic task.

Plants are slow moving, they look a lot more alive sped up.

First using gravity, and then light to balance themselves. A hell of a lot more impressive than that though, is that plants release odors that attract predators of things that prey on them, and release different ones depending on what's attacking them. Implying not simply a stimulus, and reaction, but stimulus, some kind of identification/differentiation/discernment must also be at play, then reaction.

Saw it on The Nature of Things. Thanks David Suzuki!

The simple fact that a branch bends towards the sun is not sufficient to prove the plant is conscious — Hanover

How do you define ''consciousness''?

For me something is conscious if said thing responds to its environment.

I see a big difference between things with brains though. I prefer "intention" or "emotion" as what I'd call fundamental to living things, and not really consciousness. Consciousness is too wrapped up in brain stuff. Plants don't have an internal nexus/singularity to which all things in its being move towards, and orbit. They don't have mirror neurons with which to reflect, and represent things to themselves.

They definitely aren't self-conscious, they lack the... ahem... equipment.

For me something is conscious if said thing responds to its environment. — TheMadFool

Everything responds to its environment. The sea that responds to a strong wind; the metal that responds to magnets; the plates on the table that respond to me pulling the cloth out from under it...

Seems to me that what you mean by consciousness isn't what the rest of us mean. So I wonder how you've come to use the word this way. Was it an intentional change from the norm? If so, why?

Too broad a definition?

Well, I think the domain of discussion is ''living things''. Does my definition make sense now?

Consciousness is simply a few chemical reactions in the brain, nothing more, nothing magical science can't explain.

I'm not really clear on what you are saying here. Prescribing oneself exercise or medicine is a conscious, willful act and cicatrisation isn't voluntary at all, but simply a response to certain environmental conditions and the body is the mind's immediate and most important part of the environment to have information about.

The integral parts of consciousness are simply memory and attention. Memory is what allows the temporal flow of consciousness as it retains and forgets certain bits of information over time. Attention is what provides the "subjective" feel of consciousness - of focusing on certain bits of sensory information over others that relate to the goal currently present in the mind. That is all that is needed. Self-awareness is simply a group of sensory impressions that are the focus of the attention as opposed to not being the focus. It isn't necessary for defining consciousness, as we are merely talking about the focus of one's attention on certain bits of sensory information. A cat or a mouse can both be conscious if they have a memory and attention. A computer has memory and a central executive that focuses on certain bits of information in it's memory at any moment in order to accomplish a certain goal. They are self-conscious when anything their attention focuses on is related to their mental or bodily processes.

Cats may not be able to recognize themselves in the mirror, but they certainly seem to recognize their own "meow" and smell, as they don't act like there's another cat in the vicinity when they hear there own "meow" or smell their own urine and feces. It is simply a categorization of certain sensory impressions as belonging to the self, and not others.

I could, I suppose, list the various differences between plants and people in order to point out how the former lacks the behavioral manifestations of consciousness, but I'd not be proving anything that isn't already fully accepted, and I don't feel like performing a mindless academic task. — Hanover

I actually think this would be an interesting exercise. I struggle to maintain the distinction that apparently seems so clear to you, namely between behaviour which is evidence of consciousness and behaviour which is not. I'd be very interested in your method for placing a behaviour in one category or the other.

Do we know how it works? If we don't know how it works, do we really know what it is? — mew

Sure we do. It's an imaginary fiction created by Western academic philosophers so that they can have a "problem" to write about.

There's the animal. That's it. Regard the animal as a unitary thing, instead of artificially dissecting him/her into body and "Consciousness".

Michael Ossipoff