Do you actually think there is no brain activity while you sleep? If so I can't very much help you — khaled
Of course I don't believe that! However,
1. NREM sleep -> Brain off — TheMadFool
If you don't believe that then brain not off. Brain always on. — khaled
Second, if physicalism is true and if the brain is always on whether one's awake, sleeping, daydreaming, dreaming, whathaveyou, then consciousness doesn't have physical correlates. — TheMadFool
Non sequitor. First off, I think consciousness is a neurological state. It's not an independent existence that "has neurological correlates", no it's a pattern of neurological states. Mind is to a brain what an algorithm is to a computer. — khaled
Then you typing this post about your thought of Aphrodite isnt a physical action? What about the statues and paintings of Aphrodite? Those were not produced by physical actions? How can one produce a statue or hit keys on a keyboard spelling out Aphrodite without first having the thought of Aphrodite? — Harry Hindu
Ergo, the brain state and consciousness correlation coefficient is ZERO. — TheMadFool
Yes this is precisely the non sequitor. — khaled
First off, I think consciousness is a neurological state. — khaled
Why do some patterns of brain activity result in conscious awareness while others (the vast majority of what the brain does) don't? — RogueAI
Do you think computers will eventually become conscious (or already are)? — RogueAI
So, that being said, did ancient people who had knowledge of their minds also have knowledge of their brains? — RogueAI
You're claiming ancient people did NOT have knowledge of their own minds? — RogueAI
Firstly no, knowing that something is a pattern does not grant knowledge of that pattern in the first place. — khaled
Then minds are not identical to brains. How are they different? — RogueAI
No one said that minds are identical to brains, not even physicalists. — khaled
"The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain." — RogueAI
Is the brain state that corresponds to "stubbing your toe" identical to the mental state "stubbing your toe"? — RogueAI
Do you claim that the pain of stubbing your toe is identical to some configuration/pattern of matter? — RogueAI
Do you claim that the pain of stubbing your toe is identical to some configuration/pattern of matter?
— RogueAI
Yes. — khaled
You're committed to saying that Mary can know what it's like to see red without having the mental experience "seeing red". — RogueAI
You're committed to saying that two people meaningfully talking about their mental states are also meaningfully talking about configurations of brain matter, since mental state = certain configuration of brain matter — RogueAI
No I'm claiming that people can have knowledge of their minds but not their brains. Knowledge of the pattern without knowledge of the specifics. Like how you know how to use this site without knowing the code that comprises it. — khaled
You have no explanation for why certain patterns of matter are identical to the pain of stubbing a toe — RogueAI
Are these pattenrs substrate dependent — RogueAI
and how would you verify whether a non-organic pattern of matter that you conclude is conscious is actually conscious? — RogueAI
No because the meaning of "know" in both instances is different. When we tell someone "You don't know X emotion" or X color we mean "You haven't had X emotion" or seen X color, not "You don't know the neurological basis for X emotion". If the latter was what we meant we woudn't be able to talk about emotions or colors without knowing the neurology, yet we do so all the time. In the same way that you can use this site without knowing the code, so can we talk about emotions without knowing the neurology, and vice versa, EVEN THOUGH the emotion is no more than a neurological pattern (and the site is no more than the code). So no, Mary doesn't know red, even though she knows everything physical about seeing red. — khaled
Same as above. Two people talking thephilosophyforum need not know about the code that comprises the site. Even though the site is no more than the code, or do we disagree there? Is there something more to this site than its code? Something that you need to add to the code to get thephilosopphyforum? I've already mentioned this previously: — khaled
You have no explanation for why certain patterns of matter are identical to the pain of stubbing a toe
— RogueAI
Do you have an explanation for why vanilla ice cream is vanilla ice cream? — khaled
Are these pattenrs substrate dependent
— RogueAI
Definitional. — khaled
Again with the dualist view, suggesting there is a real object or property called "consciousness" that is added to physical stuff, that we can detect. There is no such thing. — khaled
Is Mary surprised when she sees red? — RogueAI
Are you saying the philosophy forum is identical to a computer code? I don't agree with that. The forum is computer code and a community of people talking about philosophy. Don't you agree that defining the forum as purely computer code is an incomplete definition? — RogueAI
OK, consciousness is an immaterial mind. — RogueAI
YOU are saying the taste of vanilla ice cream is actually pattern of matter A,B,C. YOU must then provide an explanation for why pattern of matter A,B,C is the taste of vanilla ice cream and not pattern of matter X,Y,Z or E,F,G. — RogueAI
I'm not a materialist. I'm not claiming the taste of vanilla ice cream is anything other than the taste of vanilla ice cream. — RogueAI
Are these pattenrs substrate dependent — khaled
There is no real property called consciousness? — RogueAI
If yes, how would you prove it? — RogueAI
I'm talking about the website itself. Is the website more than the code? No. — khaled
↪RogueAI
Is Mary surprised when she sees red?
— RogueAI
Yes. — khaled
Maybe a car is a better analogy. We can say "This car can move at X km/h", without knowing anything about the engine or how cars are built. — khaled
Me: A car is actually this specific combination of parts
You: So why is a car not this other specific combination of parts?
Does that make sense to you? How would you begin to answer that question? We can agree that a car is a combination of parts and no more yes? Engine, wheels, steering wheel, etc. Now if someone asks you "Ok but why is a car not a combination of biscuits, chocolate, and cream" how do you respond to them?
Explain to me why a car is a combination of parts (engine, wheels, steering wheel, etc) and not (biscuits, chocolate and cream), then I'll explain to you why stubbing your toe is pattern ABC not XYZ ok? — khaled
Rogue AI: Are these pattenrs substrate dependent
— khaled
No I don't think so, but some define them as such. That's what I meant.
Let me ask you on the other hand, supposedly consciousness is an immaterial mind. How can you tell that your duplicate has an immaterial mind? You can't make a detector for it, because it's immaterial. So how could you tell? Or can you not tell? — khaled
When you observe this website you observe philosophical discussions. — RogueAI
Maybe a car is a better analogy. We can say "This car can move at X km/h", without knowing anything about the engine or how cars are built. You can know things about the pattern without knowing the specifics. — khaled
Why is Mary surprised? She already knows everything there is to know about seeing red. — RogueAI
Yes, but you're not claiming the car is identical to "moving at X km/h". I think what you're trying to say is that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, so talk of Phosphorus is talk of Hesperus even if the person has never heard of Hesperus. — RogueAI
But you're not sure. — RogueAI
So how would you go about verifying whether anything other than neurons can be conscious? — RogueAI
I think I addressed this with the Hesperus/Phosph — RogueAI
But now you have to prove whether brains alone are conscious. And of course you can't. There's no way in principle to verify the consciousness of anything outside yourself. — RogueAI
Not only can she not disprove solipsism — RogueAI
Unlike matter, we know that mind and thought and consciousness exist. — RogueAI
My only problem is whether solipsism is true or not. — RogueAI
Not only can she not disprove solipsism, she can't prove the material stuff she thinks brains are made of even exists (it's a non-verifiable belief), and she also can't prove whether a machine duplicate of a brain is conscious or not. — RogueAI
I'm done for the night! Great discussion, Khaled. I'll reply tomorrow. — RogueAI
A more serious objection to Mind-Brain Type Identity, one that to this day has not been satisfactorily resolved, concerns various non-intensional properties of mental states (on the one hand), and physical states (on the other). After-images, for example, may be green or purple in color, but nobody could reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple — RogueAI
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