The issue of realness, which is my main interest, is not boarded, penetrated, or even significantly reach by the cultural use of language, not even by specialty uses of language of writers such as Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, etcetera because what is handled by them is logic. — Nelson E Garcia

As @Banno points out, that is not what they were doing. Among other things, they offered critiques of how language goes astray when not woven into our ordinary actions. See, for example, Wittgenstein's private language argument and Ryle's influential book The Concept of Mind. Following Austin's advice, a good place to start for understanding how the word real is used is to check the dictionary. That provides a shared basis for communication which is really what has been lacking in this thread (there's that word!) Then say what you want to say in connection with that.

So if you have a prejudice against dualities, — Nelson E Garcia

Not a prejudice. Just aware of how disconnected they can be from ordinary life.

From there you need to determine what the consequences would be should I be right, and for this enterprise to be successful, you must take my claims as correct for a suitable period of time carefully considering significant consequences and ramifications. If you do that, find no way to significantly disprove my claims, and as a result you end up either liking or fearing the consequences foreseen by your figuring out, you will respect me as metaphysician and could become a member of my persuasion. — Nelson E Garcia

I'd like to agree with you but finding it difficult. Your presentation is rather idiosyncratic.

But I do have some general comments to make on the relationship of various idealisms to the generally realist critics of it, specifically

The scientific view is that the Earth came into existence billions of years in the past and has undergone many changes prior to the emergence of human beings. — Andrew M

I think I have mentioned previously the discussion of this topic in Magee's book Schopenhauer's Philosophy. The context is a discussion of Schopenhauer's defense of Kant with respect to just this question. The objector states:

'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'

Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was [that] the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

Bryan Magee Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Pp 106-107.

What the realist objection overlooks, is the role of the observing subject in the establishment of what counts as 'before h.sapiens evolved'. A remark made in a post I was reading says 'Like Kant and subsequently Niels Bohr, Ulfbeck and (Aage) Bohr [Neils Bohr's son, also a physicist] view space and time as “a scene established for the ordering of experiences.” 'It is obviously a hard thing to accept, but I think the point that is being made is that time and space have no intrinsic, observer-independent reality, but are instead inextricably intertwined with the sense of perspective that an observer brings to the question.

I think the realist view takes for granted the reality which any fundamental philosophy is required to question. The underlying issue is that realism forgets the sense in which 'naturalism assumes nature' - meaning that naturalism begins with the apparently obvious reality of the empirical domain, which is really a methodological premise, but then too easily forgets that it is methodological, and instead projects it as a metaphysical certainty. That, I think, accounts for many realist criticisms of idealist philosophies.

Not a prejudice. Just aware of how disconnected they can be from ordinary life. — Andrew M

Ordinary life is cultural, and my writing is mostly about metaphysical issues, my writing does not intend to explain everyday cultural manifestations or how the use of expressed language affects cultural interactions. It centers on metaphysical fundamentals and the use of the senses rather than the details of communication. So you could put aside my comment about Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, etcetera who I choose to mention because you mentioned them, what I mean is that most philosophy (not only theirs) is based on logical schemes that do not reach the metaphysical bases of realness. So consider me a philosopher who does not like the philosophical method, I get tired of logical schemes and seek to get straight, or as close as possible, to my target which is realness (reality, perception).
Regarding dualities I value highly my determinations, definitions and conclusions about them, reception and perception, actuality and reality, receptor and perceptor, etcetera are crucial components of my metaphysics, so I felt compelled to tell you if you have a prejudice about them it could become an obstacle for your understanding of my persuasion.

I'd like to agree with you but finding it difficult. Your presentation is rather idiosyncratic. — Wayfarer

Are you open-minded to an idiosyncratic philosopher? I am a self-taught one who has no much formal education but makes up with considerable vocation for metaphysics. Regarding the example of the earth being a fact long before mind, I have no doubt about that, I only rate facts differently, perceptive facts require perception that depends on direct, concurrent subject-object targeting and those facts are the facts of reality. Logical facts, such as the earth taking form long before mind, do not require mind to be a “fact” but are facts of inference not of reality.
So if what you care about is whether: “the earth took form long before mind” is a solid fact, yes it is. However do not confuse logical facts with perceptive facts. Regarding my metaphysical persuasion it is neither idealism or realism, reality is “realized” (actualized in perception {by mind} over epistemological-practical foundations in synthesis with external world substrata) by human perceptors, and you should tell me whether such realization by mind is realism proper, or something else.

Presentation of what, to what? — Mww

Presentation of objects to consciousness.

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

To say that the empirical world is a creation of the understanding is an unfounded presumption: we don't know, beyond the current theory of genesis, how it came to be. We know that we apprehend it via consciousness, that is all.

Just as there may be naive realism, this is an example of naive idealism.Naivete in this context consists in thinking that we know what we don't know. Socrates warned against that failing nearly 2500 years ago, and many still have not learned the lesson.

If you’d said representations of objects, as phenomena, I would have agreed, but that’s still only half of it.

As far as being parsimonious.....ehhhh, sometimes we need to be down and dirty, not merely conventional.

Of course we call the objects presented to consciousness 'phenomena'. You haven't said anything about what is left out.

Also the formulation 'objects presented to consciousness' is not any more conventional than any other; they all have a long history.

the formulation 'objects presented to consciousness' is not any more conventional than any other — Janus

No, it isn’t any more conventional; it is nonetheless conventional. Unqualified, stand-alone objects, as such, are conventionally that which is in space and time.

Of course we call the objects presented to consciousness 'phenomena'. — Janus

I don’t. Objects aren’t presented to consciousness; phenomena are but phenomena aren’t objects. Objects are presented to sensibility....the faculties for physical impressions, the senses.

What I haven’t said anything about, the other half of it, is the a priori presentation to consciousness of mere conceptions, fully abstracted notions, ideas....the things we think but never perceive.

Are you open-minded to an idiosyncratic philosopher? I am a self-taught one who has no much formal education but makes up with considerable vocation for metaphysics — Nelson E Garcia

Sure! I think you're on the right track, where others might not. But the point about academia
is not only to impart knowledge, but also to help you to articulate and situate your ideas in respect of the work of other philosophers. When you use phrases like

the metaphysical bases of realness — Nelson E Garcia

do not confuse logical facts with perceptive facts — Nelson E Garcia

If you were presenting in an academic context, you would be required to explain those ideas in terms intelligible to others, and also in comparison to other like-minded philosophers. ‘Unlike Husserl, I think that X’. I think I know what you’re getting at, but I’m predisposed towards idealism. But that is where I think your terminology is idiosyncratic. (I should add, I'm not an admirer of much of what goes under the name of philosophy in the 20th century.)

you should tell me whether such realization by mind is realism proper, or something else. — Nelson E Garcia

I think it has a lot in common with transcendental idealism, which is why I mentioned that particular passage about Schopenhauer. Until the late 19th Century various forms of metaphysical idealism were the mainstream of philosophy, in Europe, Britain and the US. But there was a backlash against idealism in the early 20th Century. Philosophy became, in my view, a lot more utilitarian after that.

There are some idealists in physics also. Have a read of The Mental Universe, Richard Conn Henry. He’s probably a maverick in a lot of people’s eyes, but they’re out there.

Sorry, I’m not meaning to lecture you, it is intended in the spirit of constructive criticism. Hope that is OK.

Risking your disappointment, let me clarify my position about idealism. I take idealism as a foundation, my metaphysics begins accepting Berkeley and Kant, as being right about certain limitations of the human sensory system. But as I progress, it becomes clear their positions are only a building block that I can use to achieve something stronger. It turns out they did not go far enough, idealism in itself, if you stop there, is weak, and in my persuasion it belongs to the frame of mind of immature people, receptors in my lexicon. A mature individual; a perceptor in my lexicon, achieves the materiality stage not because materiality exists independently in the world but by mental actualization of it. Therefore reconsider whether my metaphysics can be classified as transcendental idealism learning that an initial epistemological arrangement could turn later as actualized materiality.

“....We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origins. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And lo! It is our own....”
(Arthur Eddington, in Quantum Physics and Ultimate Reality—Mystical Writings of Great Physicists, Michael Green, 2013)

Risking your disappointment, let me clarify my position about idealism. — Nelson E Garcia

Not at all, I have no expectations.

my metaphysics begins accepting Berkeley and Kant, as being right about certain limitations of the human sensory system. — Nelson E Garcia

You know that after Kant published the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason, many of his critics said he was saying the same as Berkeley. So in the next edition, he included a section differentiating his work from Berkeley's. I'll spare you the details but it's worth noting that Kant himself said that did not subscribe to Berkeley's philosophy.

Therefore reconsider whether my metaphysics can be classified as transcendental idealism learning that an initial epistemological arrangement could turn later as actualized materiality. — Nelson E Garcia

Based on what you had said so far, that is what I came up with, but I'm not trying to impose that categorisation on you. I thought it might be useful in orienting your ideas in respect of other philosophers. Obviously at this point I can't anticipate what you mean by 'actualised materiality'.

**

A note on my own philosophical background - I first encountered a detailed exposition of Kant in a text called The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, published in 1955, by T R V Murti. Murti compares Kant with the Madhyamika dialectiic of Nāgārjuna. It is nowadays considered dated and has fallen out of favour but it helped me, because it situated Kant in relation to an actual philosophical praxis or way of life, namely, that of Mahāyāna Buddhists.

The passage I quoted from Bryan Magee's book on Schopenhauer continues:

This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood, so that these statements appear faulty in ways in which, properly understood, they are not. Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices. — Bryan Magee

Chapter 15 in that book is 'A Note on Schopenhauer and Buddhism' which expands on that theme in more detail.

I thought it might be useful in orienting your ideas in respect of other philosophers. Obviously at this point I can't anticipate what you mean by 'actualised materiality'. — Wayfarer

Let me ask you a couple of questions about Kant and Berkeley. You just told me Kant did not agree with Berkeley, but Kant was an idealist as Berkeley was right?

Does Idealism mean: you do not see the object as it is in itself (in both cases for Kant and for Berkeley)?

Does materialism mean: you see the object as it is in itself?

Berkeley believed that objects are ideas, or collections of ideas, in the minds of perceivers. That is why he said esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. There are no material substances ('substance' in the philosophical sense as 'bearer of attributes' not as a type of material) - only finite mental substances - humans - and the infinite mental substance - God.

It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. — Principle of Human Knowledge§1

There's no thing in itself for Berkeley, because there's really no thing independent of perception. This leads to the well-known couplet of limericks about Berkeley - a student musing on whether a tree in the University quadrangle continues to exist when there's nobody about:

There once was a man who said "God
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree
Continues to be
When there's no one about in the Quad."


Dear Sir,
Your astonishment's odd.
I am always about in the Quad.
And that's why the tree
Will continue to be
Since observed by
Yours faithfully,
God

(Modern English versions of Berkeley's texts can be found here.)

Kant's views can't be summarised easily, but he rejected the notion that there are only ideas. As I mentioned, many of Kant's critics said that his Critique of Pure Reason was the same as Berkeley's philosophy, which enraged Kant - in the next edition he published a 'refutation of idealism'.

'At the present time I am aware of the specific temporal order of many of my past experiences, an awareness produced by memory. But what is it about what I remember that allows me to determine the temporal order of my experiences? There must be something by reference to which I can correlate the remembered experiences that allows me to determine their temporal order. But first, I have no conscious states that can play this role. Further, this reference cannot be time itself, for “time by itself is not perceived." — SEP

Kant also said that we don't perceive things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us. The gist of it is, objects of perception are interpreted by us according to the categories of the understanding, by which we perceive phenomena - phenomena literally means 'what appears' - but we don't see them as they really are in themselves. That has caused debates for centuries. I don't find it problematical. The best short intro to Kant I'm aware of is this one although Kant is notoriously hard to understand and writings by and about him are voluminous.

Does materialism mean: you see the object as it is in itself? — Nelson E Garcia

My view of materialism is that it claims that material bodies are real in their own right, irrespective of whether perceived or not, and that furthermore, material bodies, or nowadays what is understood to be matter-energy, is the only real subject, and that the mind is a product of that, via evolution. In my view, that is more or less the default attitude of modern scientific ciultures, although of course it has its critics.

Berkeley believed that objects are ideas, or collections of ideas, in the minds of perceivers. That is why he said esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. There are no material substances ('substance' in the philosophical sense as 'bearer of attributes' not as a type of material) - only finite mental substances - humans - and the infinite mental substance - God. — Wayfarer

What's the difference between saying this and just sticking with material bodies being real in their own right.

On the one hand you have objects as ideas, except there is an omnipresent "idea maintainer" called God that makes sure rocks don't go anywhere by looking at them all the time. On the other hand you have objects always being real in their own right, the rocks don't go anywhere at all. It seems to me like there is not much actual difference here. What are the advantages or disadvantages of both? What does having the combination of impermanent ideas, with an omnipresent "idea maintainer" allow you to say that that just having permanent objects doesn't, or vice versa?

For Berkeley, what exactly are the "perceivers" that are having the ideas? Are those ideas in the mind of God too?

My view of materialism is that it claims that material bodies are real in their own right, irrespective of whether perceived or not, and that furthermore, material bodies, or nowadays what is understood to be matter-energy, is the only real subject, and that the mind is a product of that, via evolution. — Wayfarer

I don't see how this is incompatible with Kant:

Kant also said that we don't perceive things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us. The gist of it is, objects of perception are interpreted by us according to the categories of the understanding, by which we perceive phenomena - phenomena literally means 'what appears' - but we don't see them as they really are in themselves. — Wayfarer

The first is an ontological statement. The second an epistemological statement. It can be the case that material bodies are real in their own right and that we don't perceive things as they are in themselves but only as they appear to us.

For Berkeley, what exactly are the "perceivers" that are having the ideas? Are those ideas in the mind of God too? — khaled

Berkeley believes that 'we're are spirits in a material world', to quote Sting. Material objects exist but they have no inherent reality.

It can be the case that material bodies are real in their own right and that we don't perceive things as they are in themselves but only as they appear to us. — khaled

I guess that's true, but again, the ambiguous nature of sub-atomic phenomena really undermines the idea of the mind-independent reality of fundamental objects.

Material objects exist but they have no inherent reality. — Wayfarer

I'm reading this as: Material objects are actually just ideas in the mind of an observer.

Regardless though, this doesn't answer my question. What are "perceivers" for Berkeley? Are they also ideas in the mind of an observer? If not, what are they?

I guess that's true, but again, the ambiguous nature of sub-atomic phenomena really undermines the idea of the mind-independent reality of fundamental objects. — Wayfarer

You use the word "reality" weirdly so I can't tell what you're saying here exactly. And, again, QM has epistemological interpretations that don't touch the mind-independent reality of matter.

Regardless though, can we agree that matter has a mind-independent existence of some sort? That if we take out all the minds in the world that there would still exist something (called matter)?

nowadays what is understood to be matter-energy, is the only real subject — Wayfarer

Subject?

Sorry meant ‘substance’.

1610......Whoa!! Something really weird about Saturn.
1612......HOLY _____!!!! (Sorry, Lord) There’s something REALLY weird about Saturn.
1613......Man, I ain’t diggin’ this chit. That 1610 thing about Saturn, that disappeared two years later? Well, guess what. It’s back.
1655......Hey, dudes!!! That thing with Saturn? We’re looking at rings!! Yea, that’s right, detached....er....stuff!!!
1659........Rings is right, but that mystery of 1612 is solved, cuz we’re just looking at them edge-on every so often. Phases of the moon kinda thing, doncha know.
1787.....Yeah, well, guess what. Rings? Yeah, but there’s a whole bunch of ‘em. All just....like....there. Not stuck to anything, not flyin’ off, not doing much of anything but throw shadows.
—————

Prussian guy comes along, says some Irish guy says God did everything, and accedes that maybe he did. So God put that stuff around Saturn just to give some Italian guy something to look at. But then he thinks maybe it doesn’t matter who or what did what was seen about Saturn, it is reasonable that Saturn always did what we see it doing, long before we ever noticed it. Otherwise, he continues (yaddayaddayadda), Saturn had no handles at all until Italian guy invented his looking device, which means God put the handles there simultaneously with being looked at, per Irish guy’s esse est percipi, which means God knew all about Italian guy thinking about, then creating his telescope, per the Biblical account. Possible, sure. It is God after all.

But still, he thinks, that’s hardly a thoroughly natural way to do things, disregarding he’s never seen a platypus, seeing as how Nature shouldn’t be inclined to cater to those guys, plus an English guy, plus a Dutch guy, plus a quasi-French guy, plus a really French guy, just because they-all questioned Her inner workings, all with respect to the exact same thing. If that were true, and She did so cater to all those questioners, each would see a completely different Saturn according to a corresponding idea in the mind of God to which Nature must adhere, and all different from the farmer out in the fields who doesn’t question anything, but sees merely a spot of light in the night sky. Now we got maybe a whole basketfull of Saturns, and that just seems awful stupid. Much better to say there’s rather many ways for us to see the one thing, whatever the mind of God or Nature is doing.

To follow up on that gem of rationality, and which makes more sense actually, he then suggests, Prussian guy does, even if God did it a long time ago, let’s suppose the rings had been in existence as long as Saturn itself, which makes them, as far as he’s concerned anyway, even if at one time mere ideas in the mind of God, per Irish guy, existing long before they happened to be perceived after the perception and hence the existence of Saturn itself. And if that is the case, we can safely say Saturn, rings and all, once perceived as merely different from stars but subsequently perceived as different than stars and at the same time also different from other planets, is a thing all its own, or, a thing-in-itself. A thing that is as it is, whether we know of it, its differences, or its parts, or not. Then he goes ahead and spends ten years and fully 1700 total pages justifying it, consequently destroying the esse est percipi establishment.

True story. Saturn’s rings were just another discovery in the 1610 natural philosophy domain, but blew up the 1781 metaphysical philosophy domain and from which it thankfully never recovered. Big whoop, things exist. Yea. Real things out there, and even some real things waaaaayyyyy out there. Matters not a whit that some real things can’t be touched as can a banana or a cannon ball, all it needs be is not a measly idea in the mind. We don’t care that things exist near or far; we want to know what things exist as, and the things out there can never give that to us.

And the beat goes on...........

Think that's an end to this discussion. — Banno

Bell rings.

There is something fundamentally wrong with defining knowledge with the requirement that it must always be true. The only thing that is always true is a theoretical statement that corresponds exactly to the actual state of affairs. I believe we often make this theoretical statement, but we also fall short of it and produce an approximation that can be improved upon. To say these approximations that we work with everyday to model and test our reality are not knowledge; misinterprets the human condition and it's unmediated connection to the world.

Or not.
In addendum if "false knowledge" is incoherent because it changes the logical operation of 'true' then "true belief" is just as incoherent, because it removes the logical operator 'or'.

I don't need God. Idealism does! — madfool

Idealism just needs other minds, not necessarily god.

. Yea. Real things out there, and even some real things waaaaayyyyy out there. — Mww

but…..

No, it isn’t any more conventional; it is nonetheless conventional. Unqualified, stand-alone objects, as such, are conventionally that which is in space and time. — Mww

I would count as an object of awareness or consciousness anything that stands out, whether that be a hole, a surface, a mountain, a tree, an animal,a thought, a feeling and so on endlessly. Ontological democracy and interdependence; the individual stands out but nothing stands alone.

Of course we call the objects presented to consciousness 'phenomena'. — Janus


I don’t. Objects aren’t presented to consciousness; phenomena are but phenomena aren’t objects. Objects are presented to sensibility....the faculties for physical impressions, the senses.

What I haven’t said anything about, the other half of it, is the a priori presentation to consciousness of mere conceptions, fully abstracted notions, ideas....the things we think but never perceive. — Mww

I would put it exactly the opposite way: what we sense are phenomena; light, texture, sound, taste, smell, mass, etc., and from that "buzzing, blooming confusion" we pick out objects by becoming aware of them. To be sure becoming aware of them does entail something of construction, but that process of conceptual construction is not, and cannot be, conscious.

"Conceptions, fully abstracted notions, ideas" are not "things we think but never perceive", but simply another kind of phenomena we do perceive or more accurately enact in the act of thinking ( if it is a conscious act, at least). So, that enaction may be either conscious or unconscious (subconscious).

..., the substratum is independent of mind but it does not amount to existence, it pre-exists. — Nelson E Garcia

Well, there's your own rebuttal. For, on your view, this "substratum" exists independently, since "pre-existence" doesn't mean "non-existence" but solely existence before another; as, for example, my parents pre-existed me, yet that doesn't mean that they didn't exist before me, but contrariwise.

On another note, dependency can't ultimately be without independency (yet not vice vers); & contrariwise can't be so, because what's dependent would have no foundation that's different from it to emerge out of. The coupling of an individual with another makes two of them; the fact of these two depending on the coupling of one individual with another individual who are both independent, & also the condition, of it. Thus dependency is impossible without independence, i.e., dependency is always conditioned on some form of independence.

Pre-existent means potential to exist, should mind provide the complementing appearances needed to actualize its existence.

So if one says that two people pre-existed their child's birth, they mean that those two people didn't actually exist, but only had the potential to, before their child's birth? That can't be right. Commonly used & understood, "pre-exist" means existed before, & not the potential to exist (any dictionary definition will attest to this).

Also, going off of what you've just written, if mind is needed to actualize such potential, it would itself have to be actual in order to do so; since potentiality can't actualize itself or another. So there would still be something, namely, mind, that existed independently of this potential, which proceeds to actualize it.

Ontological democracy — Janus

Oh, I like that. Yours?

To be sure becoming aware of them does entail something of construction, but that process of conceptual construction is not, and cannot be, conscious. — Janus

Perception informs of a general affect on sense, sensation informs which sense is affected. Both of which are sufficient for being aware of the presence of objects. But neither tells us what is affecting, nothing is yet being constructed, conceptually nor intuitively. The cognitive system that does the constructing, is not yet in play.

From the physical point of view, all that is between the external world out there, and the brain in here. The eyes, ears, skin, etc., don’t tell us anything at all about what is affecting them, only that there is something.
—————

what we sense are phenomena; light, texture, sound, taste, smell, mass, etc., and from that "buzzing, blooming confusion" we pick out objects by becoming aware of them. — Janus

If I get stung on the back of my neck, where’s the buzzing blooming confusion of phenomena in that? There is only one, the sting. I never taste the sting, I never smell it, it is not lit. The confusion resides solely in the object that stung me in accordance with a particular kind of sensation, which relates my confusion to some unknown object, and it is a phenomenon to me for that reason. I know I’ve been stung, but I may not know what stung me.

I can see the legitimacy of saying we sense phenomena, in effect, that’s exactly what we do. But I do not grant legitimacy to the notion that phenomena are sensations. Phenomena are that to which the sensations belong, not that that’s what they are. It may at first appear non-contradictory to say we experience smells, but if that were the case, we should be able to experience smell without ever having perceived anything with the nose. I can’t do that, myself, and I suspect no human has that capacity. I can easily think occasions where I smell bacon, say, but I cannot actually smell bacon unless there actually is bacon readily available, affecting my nose.
————-

"Conceptions, fully abstracted notions, ideas" are not "things we think but never perceive", but simply another kind of phenomena we do perceive or more accurately enact in the act of thinking ( if it is a conscious act, at least). So, that enaction may be either conscious or unconscious (subconscious). — Janus

Are you saying justice is not a fully abstracted notion, and that justice is a kind of phenomenon we perceive? That we perceive justice in that which is just? While that may be true, it is so iff we already know what justice is, in order for that which we perceive as just, conforms to it necessarily. Justice must be antecedent to all its instances, and that which is antecedent to all instances of anything at all, is thought. So yes, conception is an enactment of thinking, but it is not a different kind of phenomenon.

Food for thought: subconscious enactment is imagination, and, no thought can be subconscious.

I see where you’re coming from, but if we look closer at how we might do what you say is being done, we might find it doesn’t hold as well as it first appears. Of course, you might have a better methodology than I, so, there is that......

Good refresher article. Thanks.
(Sidebar, of little or no import: right across the inlet from Harris Island, is the 1718 Sayward-Wheeler House, a colonial mansion/museum. Ancestry, perhaps? Dunno.)

What do we as Everydayman gain, by knowing of the extremely large or the extremely small? Nothing whatsoever, I say, which reduces those sciences to mere interest. That we are part of the large and the small is a part of us, is given, but quite irrelevant to the general public.

Case in point....I read somewhere, given the double slit and the extension of it to massive objects like toaster ovens and such, the dynamics of the experiment would have to be of the scale which makes them impossible to enact. The dimensions of the slit, in relation to the dimensions of the electron that passes through it, scaled up to the dimensions of dump trucks as passing objects, just to prove the invariant validity of a scientific principle......ain’t happenin’.

That, and spooky action at a distance is up to, what......34 miles now? Fascinating, indeed, but still.......

Sum over histories, while rationally sustainable, presupposes a possibility all objects of experience are prohibited from manifesting. Which reduces to....for that which is impossible to experience, to that is permitted its own laws.

There’s always gonna be a “but”, no matter what, isn’t there. Seems like that’s what we do best.