It was the best interpretation I could give your assertion.

But apparently it was wrong.

I don't think I'd say that any void is a hole, then -- as you appear to be saying. Or perhaps you're just saying that there are no holes?

I'm saying the opposite: holes, empty spaces, voids are far more in evidence than 'stuff'.

Btw, that Feyerabend quote in your profile recall the pleasure I've had reading that book. Maybe time for another reread. :smirk:

I don't think it works like that. Consider that you can make a doughnut from the plane in two ways; make a horizontal cylinder and bend it round, or make a vertical cylinder and bend it round.

So I make a horizontal cylinder, but standing at the back of flat Pac-world, and the 'corners are now left and right middle facing me. Now I bend the cylinder around, and the corners are on the inside of the hole facing away from me. Or I can do the same thing with the vertical cylinder. So is the hole N-S or E-W? Or to put it another way, one pair of edges forms the inner ring around the hole, and the other pair goes through the hole. But which is which? — unenlightened

Ok, I got a piece of paper out to simulate these movements and I think I'm following, now. Please correct me if I'm not :D.

I think I would agree with you if Pac-man's world were a Taurus within our space. So if we pulled pac-man's world off the screen and bent it into a donut in our space then yes, I agree.

However I think I'd say that Pac-man's world's space is shaped like a Taurus, in the same way our space resembles Euclidean geometry at the scales we're used to. So there isn't a hole at all or edges at all, and if Pac-man stands at the origin of our screen, where he'd be in four places at once, this is just because we are projecting the Taurus shape onto a 2-dimensional representation so that we, in the empirical space we're used to operating within, can see it easily.

After all, it's donut shape isn't obvious -- I got this from somebody else, I didn't make it up :D.

So for Pacman, at least, there is no through the hole or outside the hole -- rather, it is a Taurus without a hole.

Ahhhh, OK. Sorry for misunderstanding.

So the aspect you're referencing is void -- there is stuff and void, though void is more present than stuff.

So you agree that holes exist because materiality has void, and there's nothing unusual in admitting that void has being? Does that sound like a fair inference of your take?

No. What the hell does "void has being" even mean? Your heideggerasty, y'know, is against my irreligion... :mask: "My take" is simply this, Moliere :point:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/555628

*shrugs* Ok. I guess I just don't understand it, then.

Calling a "hole" an ontologically parasitic entity seems quite Platonist. Whatever works though.

I contend that this is an epistemological issue since breaching ontological commitment beyond anthropomorphism is rife with nonsense and gibberish.

Or I'm not expressing what I mean intelligibly.

You can’t have a hole that exists on its own, whereas you can have an object that exists on its own. — Wayfarer

Objects do not exist "on their own" any more than holes do. Naive realism.

:up:

Btw, that Feyerabend quote in your profile recall the pleasure I've had reading that book. Maybe time for another reread. :smirk: — 180 Proof

Hell yeah. :D

Still my favorite philosopher of science.

Or I'm not expressing what I mean intelligibly. — 180 Proof

Do you think you could give it another go?

Likely this is a naive materialist response, but for the example in the OP, the word "hole" identifies a collection of physical objects occupying a particular space. What are the objects? Air molecules, dust, perhaps the odd bird that happens to fly by, etc. So this particular "hole" has mass and occupies a reasonably well defined space. To my naive way of thinking that's sufficient to say that it exists.

What about if this hole is on an airless asteroid in outer space - in a vacuum? There's no air. But there are still countless atomic and subatomic particles flying through, not to mention the quantum foam and energy fields that permeate even the deepest vacuum in space.

So I have no problem saying that holes exists. Not sure about shadows, tho. Will have to think about that some more.

:sweat:

Hi, could either of you expound? Or provide a link to an appropriate SEP article? I don't think I'm familiar with this yet.

Expound on what?

I would consider objects to exist "on their own" otherwise they wouldn't exist. Aside from idealism I'm not well-versed in alternatives. So interested in reading up on it and in the meantime interested in why you take issue with "on their own".

I am skeptical of holes being a typographic feature, however, given the ability to represent a donut on a plane without a hole in a topologically identical manner. — Moliere

A torus in 3D is not topologically equivalent to a rectangle: you cannot continuously transform one into the other. In your demonstration you had to make cuts. You might as well "prove" that a solid rectangle has a hole in the middle... by taking scissors to it :)

In any case, finding one way to fail to detect a hole as a topological feature does not establish your general thesis, which I take to be that a hole cannot be conceptualized solely as a property of the entity that encompasses it. I think you are straining too hard to deny the obvious. Of course you can conceptualize holes in solid objects by focusing on the objects themselves, rather than the holes, and mathematics has the tools to do that precisely (if mathematical precision is what you are after), although it's a bit trickier than one might imagine, as simple topological criteria can detect some types of holes but miss others. A donut is an eminently holey object though: it's not even simply connected (unlike a shell, for example).

The question is not whether you can conceptualize holes that way, but whether you must, as a matter of principle. I don't think so, but then I have a loosey-goosey attitude towards metaphysics. Our language and our conceptual faculties are flexible and diverse; why should we dogmatically limit them? Must there be a fact of the matter about what holes Really Are (or Really Aren't)? In this case, the insistence that holes do not exist probably comes from seeing the world as a collection of self-sufficient individuals. Which is, admittedly, a handy concept that we employ in our everyday lives, mostly unconsciously. But it's not the only possibly concept, and sometimes not the best suited one.

I would consider objects to exist "on their own" otherwise they wouldn't exist. — Benkei

I think it's a mix of wholism and pragmatism. There's one world. Any way we might subdivide it is dependent on our needs (which are also a part of the world). For example, if there's a banana on the table we can pick it up and move it to the right. We can't do the same to a hole that's on the table (and we can use that for comic effect in fiction, such as the movie Yellow Submarine). The defference doesn't strike me as one of existent, but as one of relations: what we can do with the object.

A hole's existence is wholly dependent on the thing it's in.

A ceiling's existence is dependent on walls, though it's contstituent parts will continue to exist when the wall comes down. There's a lot of room for discussion here.

A box exists "on its own" in a prototypical sense, i.e. this tells us more about "on its own" than it does about boxes. However, a box has constituent parts, and if too many of them go missing the box ceases to be box, though the constituent parts being else where (or even assembled differently) still exist.

***

On the linguistics side, my take of reference is not:

Words refer to things. It's Words refer to concepts, and a certain class of objects evoke the same concepts. It's only in that way that we can say words refer to things. Change within a person can start on any end here, and its all embedded in how we live, and we live with others.

Concepts have to do with how we divvy up the world, but the world exists even if we don't divvy it up at all. So what we call "a hole" exists regardless of whether we interact with it or not, except that if we don't interact with it it's not a "hole". What's missing is the interaction. Any act of naming is interaction, and asking of a hole if it exists is a form of interaction (though if it's done in abstract no actual "holes" have to be involved, only the types of concepts that holes or the word "hole" usually evoke.)

***

All of this is a lot more complicated, but that's pretty much where I stand.

A torus in 3D is not topologically equivalent to a rectangle — SophistiCat

The story is there to help understand why I'd say such a thing. Strictly speaking the torus is not in 3D, but rather space itself is a torus in Pacman's world, and in our perspective we represent that space as a rectangle that teleports to the other side -- it's the surface of a torus which is the shape of the space, not the whole donut itself.

Now, I'll fully grant that this, mathematically, is a bit beyond my ken and I'm making some guesswork. The topology of pacman's world was pointed out to me in an unrelated conversation I had some time ago, and it just occurred to me here. I believe they are correct, but I couldn't demonstrate it or prove it in a manner more rigorous than the story I've told.

(EDIT: Also this leads to the deliciousiously abstract and totally silly but still interesting question: Are there such things as 2-dimensional holes? lol)

In any case, finding one way to fail to detect a hole as a topological feature does not establish your general thesis, which I take to be that a hole cannot be conceptualized solely as a property of the entity that encompasses it — SophistiCat

At first I was uncertain about whether I'd posit that holes exist, but now I'm leaning towards the belief that holes exist. So, mostly, I think my thesis is just that holes exist, and I'm asking how you countenance that -- also, it's a question that gets at some of the popular topics 'round here without invoking the usual suspects ;)

I don't know if I'd say that it cannot be conceptualized that way... that's a bit more a priori than my approach has been so far. If the pacman example is wrong, consider the argument from predicates that I put towards Benkie here.

So my thesis is this: There exists a hole such that the hole is 0.17 km2, and it is in Kimberley.

And the question is: How's that work, on your view?

I pulled up some notional thoughts on Quine to jump from. What would you say about the existence of the hole?

The question is not whether you can conceptualize holes that way, but whether you must, as a matter of principle. — SophistiCat

I believe my question is a little broader -- upon accepting that holes exist, how do we then countenance our beliefs about inferring what exists?

I only needed one example because it was a direct response to @Benkei'sinquiry of a donut without a hole, which he seemed to believe was impossible.

Correction. I don't believe it was impossible, I know it's impossible much like a "married bachelor" is impossible.

Sure.

But if it's analytic, then I'd say my charge of begging the question still holds: it's a knowledge of self-definition.

Honestly I find myself becoming more and more a naive realist, but being surprised at what that really entails...

Likely this is a naive materialist response, but for the example in the OP, the word "hole" identifies a collection of physical objects occupying a particular space. What are the objects? Air molecules, dust, perhaps the odd bird that happens to fly by, etc. So this particular "hole" has mass and occupies a reasonably well defined space. To my naive way of thinking that's sufficient to say that it exists.

What about if this hole is on an airless asteroid in outer space - in a vacuum? There's no air. But there are still countless atomic and subatomic particles flying through, not to mention the quantum foam and energy fields that permeate even the deepest vacuum in space.

So I have no problem saying that holes exists. Not sure about shadows, tho. Will have to think about that some more. — EricH

If you happen to come up with a conclusion, please share it with me.

It's not begging the question :

If all donuts have holes
And this shape doesn't have a hole
Then it cannot be a donut

If all donuts have holes
And this shape has a hole
Then it could be a donut

We'll note the premise does not assume the truth of the conclusion so no begging of questions here. We'll also note that "a 2-dimensional representation of a donut" is not a "donut" for rather obvious reasons.

The premise being begged is in the first conditional: "all donuts have holes"

How do we know that?

By the definition of what a donut is.

Hence the charge.

I understand that you're not convinced by the example, so I won't continue on with it with you. But this charge doesn't change from dropping the example with you.

It's not a convincing example because you apparently don't understand how the fallacy of begging the question works. Denial of analytical truths leads to logical contradictions, which is basically what you're doing. By analogy, you're insisting on the existence of "unmarried bachelors" when insisting on "donuts without holes". Both are obviously incoherent.

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?

Seems Quine doesn't honor/accept that distinction.

Hi, could either of you expound? Or provide a link to an appropriate SEP article? I don't think I'm familiar with this yet. — Benkei

I posted this in the "independent Existence" thread. Basically the same issue , so I copy it here:

I would count as an object of awareness or consciousness anything that stands out, whether that be a hole, a surface, a mountain, a tree, an animal, a thought, a feeling and so on endlessly. Ontological democracy and interdependence; the individual stands out but nothing stands alone.

Honestly I find myself becoming more and more a naive realist, but being surprised at what that really entails... — Moliere

Now, I'm moved to ask you for further exposition.

Haha I'm still figuring it out!

And maybe it's not the right way of putting it, but I've noticed I'm entertaining beliefs I would not have before, at least.

Holes provide a good example -- in another life I would have made a division between ordinary and philosophical speech (as I have here, but different), but would have favored a more scientific ontology that probably doesn't look at holes as really existing things but rather as artifacts of our cognitive apparatus -- so that statements like "The hole in Kimberley is 0.17 km2" would be true, but the background in which they were true is more like the Manifest Image rather than the Scientific Image.

Something along those lines. This is all very much an exploration for me still, even if I'm beginning to have some opinions on the matter.

(EDIT: A sort of naturalized Kantianism that I find myself no longer believing)

Not to be rude, but it seems we're at that point of repeating ourselves, no? I'm not sure what else to say than what I've already said, at least...