Santa and Pegasus do not have a material existence but they do exist as symbols [characters in popular culture for Santa, a character in classical culture for Pegasus]. Othello in a play and an opera; Mimi in an opera; Al Parker in gay porn films [a role played by a man not named Al Parker]; Bartleby the scrivener in a story by Herman Melville who generally preferred not to do whatever was asked of him--all these characters have an existence in our culture and in our minds. That is why we can talk about them.

Not having a material existence is no bar to existence for immaterial beings. The Holy Spirit does not have a material existence. Dead authors whose books we read do not now have a material existence. People have no problem speaking to the Holy Spirit and referencing what Karl Marx or Hammurabi said. The latter, Hammurabi, wrote a code of laws which he claimed to have received from Shamash, the Babylonian god of justice. Shamash doesn't have much of an existence these days, because the culture in which he once existed is long, long gone. He probably hasn't had a message in his inbox for 3,000 years. But we can still name him, and I suppose under an odd set of circumstances, he could become a hot cultural item again.

If language is use, then we give life to immaterial things (like the Holy Spirit or the milk of human kindness, and a zillion other things), so that "they exist".

Most of the time we do not have any difficulty maintaining the line (in our heads) between material beings (like your cleaning lady), perpetually immaterial beings like Santa Claus, and immaterial beings who were once actual warm bodies -- like Henry VIII or Cleopatra. Sometimes we trip over the categories.

Towards these immaterial beings, does the fact obtain by precising it if and only if it is described as a historical account of its (to sound like Kripke) baptism?

@Banno, what do you think?

Santa and Pegasus are things, not facts; the simplest way to work with "facts" is to treat them as true statements.

Does Pegasus exist? Depends on what you mean, but once you set that straight, it's pretty straight forward. Pegasus is a mythical creature, hence pegasus exists as a mythical creature. But of course pegasus is not real, so Pegasus does not exist, too.

That's the sort of analysis that results from the linguistic turn, as in the later Wittgenstein and company, so they are of use here.

Pegasus is a mythical creature, hence pegasus exists as a mythical creature. But of course pegasus is not real, so Pegasus does not exist, too. — Banno

My point is that stating the fact that Pegasus exists already reduces the issue to stating it as a mythical issue. Hence no need for stating that it does or does not exist.

So, with that in mind, what's wrong with asking if some ontological entity obtains as a fact, in resolving how it obtains as one of factual or some intersubjective sort? — Shawn

People know how to talk about Santa Claus and Pegasus the same way we know how to talk about Joe Biden and shoe horns; love and chickens; and coelacanths and electrons. After a certain age and with a certain level of education, we know what other people mean when they use these words. There isn't any confusion.

Serious question - Given all that, does it matter whether the existence or reality of something is a fact?

I was so puzzled by how many children believed in Santa Claus, when I knew that there was no evidence for such a person. I knew that my parents gave presents to me and the chimneys were blocked. Personally, I find the idea of Santa Claus as one of the most unhelpful ideas, although I do see this as a basis for thinking about the fictionious, especially in the ideas presented to children.

I was so puzzled by how many children believed in Santa Claus, when I knew that there was no evidence for such a person. I knew that my parents gave presents to me and the chimneys were blocked. Personally, I find the idea of Santa Claus as one of the most unhelpful ideas, although I do see this as a basis for thinking about the fictionious, especially in the ideas presented to children. — Jack Cummins

I like the idea of Santa Claus. I think it, along with other things, teaches kids that the world cares for them. That they belong here. Santa certainly isn't necessary for that, but it's an important lesson children need. They need to build a world for themselves that they can trust and believe.

The thread seems to have ontology underwriting it. The idea of something 'obtaining as a fact' seems a bit unnecessarily confused to me. If we're looking to effectively exhaust what things like Santa and Pegasus are, then it seems that the simplest way is best. I do not think that introducing "facts" helps here.

Similar to Banno's categorization of Pegasus as "mythical", both Pegasus and Santa are fictional characters. Fictional characters are not best described as 'not real'. Fictional characters have actual effects/affects. Thus, they are most certainly real, just as all things that have an effect/affect are.

if ... a hole is real — Shawn

What a profound topic for debate. Really. It would seem 'nothing' is real. Apparently it goes for a premium of $3,500+ a square foot. Wow. That makes the last few years of my love life priceless.

My point is that stating the fact that Pegasus exists already reduces the issue to stating it as a mythical issue. Hence no need for stating that it does or does not exist. — Shawn

"Pegasus is a myth" implies that there is a Pegasus. It doesn't imply that Pegasus is a physical animal.

the simplest way to work with "facts" is to treat them as true statements. — Banno

Maybe the simplest, when the simple is enough, but not correct when the going is not-so-simple. The distinction being between "fact" and "true." Strictly speaking - and often not even strictly speaking - they are not the same thing. Sometimes it's easy to tell the difference and lazy not to; sometimes not-so-easy and a mistake not to.

The true is always true, except when it isn't. Facts are never true, except under the criteria of exceptions that allow them to be taken as true. And not even for a second do I think I'm telling you anythng you do not already know, and probably better then I do.

I don't think you are making a point any different to the one I made. There are a pair of ways of speaking of facts.

"The cat is black" is a fact. Here the fact is a true statement. "Fact" is a synonym for "true statement".

That the cat is black is also a fact.

Hence we can write "the cat is black" is true only if the cat is black. Facts as true statements and facts as how things are are two ways of saying the same thing.

"The cat is black" is a fact — Banno

Oh dear. The cat is black as fact is an historical fact. It may well have been black, and that quite recently. But it would take some doing to make into a true statement - and by true I mean true at the moment of being said, whenever said.

And the statement that it was black falls under the same criticism. Is this useful as a practical matter? Certainly not, in many cases. And in some cases it makes all the difference.

Hence we can write "the cat is black" is true only if the cat is black. — Banno

And how, exactly, do you manage to do that? I and the world both grant and use fact and true informally as interchangeable. The cat was black yesterday and even a few minutes ago, near as I could tell. I expect it will be black when it shows up at feeding time. So much for cats. But cats don't make "true" and "fact" mean the same thing.

Oh dear. The cat is black as fact is an historical fact. It may well have been black, and that quite recently. But it would take some doing to make into a true statement - and by true I mean true at the moment of being said, whenever said. — tim wood

What ever. All of that can be assumed for the purposes of the example.

"This sentence contains five words" is true IFF that sentence contains five words.

I don't see a substantive point to your reply.

I don't see a substantive point to your reply. — Banno

Sure you do. The two words mean different things. They do not mean the same thing, informal/ignorant usage acknowledged but notwithstanding. Or do you think they mean the same thing?

"Pegasus is a myth" implies that there is a Pegasus. — Banno

Spoken by certain philosophers, maybe. Usually, it implies the opposite.

and by true I mean true at the moment of being said, whenever said. — tim wood

The only tenable attitude toward quantifiers and other notations of modern logic is to construe them always, in all contexts, as timeless. — Quine: Mr Strawson

What two words. "fact" and "true"? But I didn't say otherwise.

Spoken by certain philosophers, maybe. Usually, it implies the opposite. — bongo fury

Yep. That's the point of this thread.

And the challenge is to allow meaning in the myth (or fiction) while respecting the usual implication.

The cop-out is to allow the meaning by disrespecting the usual implication, and instead multiplying allowable senses of "exist". E.g. "exists mythically", "exists in the fictional domain", etc.

You want "exists" to have one true meaning, when all it has is its use in conversation.

You want "exists" to have one true meaning, — Banno

I don't want to evade the puzzles that it poses by pretending that its usual meaning is other than it is: which is that certain words are or aren't succeeding in referring to certain objects.

Then provide your explanation.

You are pretending that words have meanings.

Then provide your explanation. — Banno

Goodman's very neat solution is then to read "images of characters" e.g. "picture of Pickwick" not as requiring two separate denotata, a picture and a Pickwick, but as long (if only slightly) for "Pickwick-picture", a one-place predicate applying to a certain sub-class of pictures. — bongo fury

You are pretending that words have meanings — Banno

Only in a manner of speaking.

that its usual meaning [use] is other than it is: which is [to imply] that — bongo fury

Half an explanation. Set it out.

Edit: actually it's not so much an explanation as saying "look over there!"

I know you won't accept that 'horse' denotes horses, but...

Occasionally someone suggests that although 'horse' denotes horses, 'unicorn' denotes portions of unicorn stories. This thesis is untenable, for it rests on a confusion of use and mention. When 'unicorn' is applied to such stories it is applied mention-selectively. It singles out the words and phrases in the story that are unicorn-mentions. When applied denotively (hence, used), it denotes nothing. For among the world's fauna no unicorns are to be found. Indeed, were the thesis correct, a sentence like 'There are no such things as unicorns' would be not only false, but self-defeating. For the sentence itself contains a unicorn-mention which, according to the proposal, is what the term 'unicorn' denotes.

Fictive terms do not, of course, appear exclusively in works of fiction. It was noted above that fictive terms whose origin is in works of fiction also appear in works about fiction. This use of fictive terms is parasitic on their original use, for the ways they are originally used in fiction constrain the ways their replicas may be used in works about fiction. In addition, fictive terms are applied metaphorically in a number of contexts. Discussion of this use of fictive terms must, however, be postponed until an account of metaphor has been presented. There is yet another use of fictive terms. They are employed in factual works whose subject matter, unlike that of literary history or criticism, is not fiction. In particular, I am concerned here with the use of fictive terms in the sciences. Scientists use such terms as 'a perfect vacuum', 'an ideal gas', 'a free market', despite the widespread recognition that there are, properly speaking, no perfect vacuums, ideal gases, or free markets. These expressions function not denotively, but mention-selectively. — Elgin, With Reference to Reference

I notice the slip from individuals - Santa and Pegasus - to kinds - horses and unicorns.

Can you re-parse your point in terms of individuals?

No difference. Not a slip. But if you like,

An example is the disagreement among Shakespearean scholars as to whether the Falstaff of The Merry Wives of Windsor is the same as the Falstaff who appears in Henry IV. The disagreement is to be resolved by deciding what limits a system for describing the plays places on the application of 'Falstaff-description'. — Elgin, With Reference to Reference

'unicorn' denotes portions of unicorn stories. — Elgin, With Reference to Reference

OK, then: who does this?

As opposed to, say, the claim that "Pegasus" refers to a fictive flying horse?

OK, then: who does this? — Banno

A subtler opponent than the believer in fictive entities.

A subtler opponent than the believer in fictive entities. — bongo fury

So you don't believe Frodo walked into Mordor? There are no fictive folk?