Neither seem satisfactory to me. I think that we definitely need both, and I see no need to prioritize one, let alone kill one with the other. I can't bridge the gap either, but oh well. — Wosret

If you say that things are different in some ways, and the same in other ways, this appears to prioritize difference, as these "ways" must be different. Then again, that they are both said to be "ways", indicates that they are the same.

I dunno, I think that I lean towards some neutral zone. Literally, as if we pry the two apart, and sit in the gap in the middle.

Not an explanation of course, just an image.

What if things have identities which are constituted by differences? :-O

Then there's infinitely many incommensurable ones -- or maybe a finite amount, but that means a different unique, completely unrelated identity for every single difference that exists.

Suppose 'universality' is a product of language, that the reduction of what is particular (real) to difference is a function of naming and using of language.

If it is wholly a "product of language", and doesn't actually relate to any objective features of the world (besides language itself) then it remains incommensurable, and the implication is that it's arbitrary, without non-circular, non-self-referential standard, or comparison.

Then there's infinitely many incommensurable ones — Wosret

That's only if you presuppose the opposite system in which identity is basic. But if difference is basic, and identity is a product of difference, then there is no problem - differences simply cannot be incommensurable, they are always dialectical - one difference presupposes the other, and together they form the fractured, always incomplete whole.

For something to be incommensurable with something else presupposes that they have clear and fixed natures. Something is A and something is ~A. ~A is defined and hence constituted with reference to the identity A = A. But if A and ~A are both equally real (as it would make sense for them to be), then both are constituted by their difference, which makes their identities possible.

In other words, to specify ~A you must already specify A. And to specify A you must already specify ~A. This presupposes an underlying difference as foundational to their identity. An identity is constituted through difference.

No, incommensurable means that there's no standard, or measurement that applies to both things in question.

That's clearly not true. Identity is constituted by the difference between categories, and proper names, the difference between universal, and not individual things.

No, incommensurable means that there's no standard, or measurement that applies to both things in question. — Wosret

That's logically incoherent though. Fire is always different from banana for example, even though they are incommensurable. To specify what fire is, one must negate everything that it is not.

If it is wholly a "product of language", and doesn't actually relate to any objective features of the world (besides language itself) then it remains incommensurable, and the implication is that it's arbitrary, without non-circular, non-self-referential standard, or comparison.

,

But isn't that the way reality is, i.e., totally contingent.

We're all completely alone babbling at each other then... I do often fear that is the case, but I hope not!

Hence normativity

See, you don't like that idea either, so you try to smuggle universality back in.

No. There is no universality in reality, unless you believe in god...there is only agreement and disagreement as to what is.

Normativity, though you may think solves the problem because it is "performed" or something doesn't. Because in order to judge something normative, there must be a standard to which they both can be measured. So, doing anything, or not doing anything is equally normative -- and it isn't like rocks are all toeing lines.

I agree that normativity does not solve the problem. The correspondence between what we say about reality and what reality is, can't be solved but it can be agreed upon.

But it's not that 'everything is different', it's that 'everything is different (or similar!) with respect to....' Without this 'with respect to', its very hard to talk about this stuff. What's necessary to take into account here is the primacy of indifference. The world of the flea, for instance, is entirely indifferent except for three things: the light which indicates the end of a branch, the smell of a mammal below it, and texture of skin that allows it to figure out where to burrow (not near a hair follicle!). Beyond these, there is neither identity nor difference for the flea.

That, at least, is the first step. The next step is to recognize that these parameters are themselves subject to change: a flea embryo will have different markers of identity and difference (different things will be significant for an embryo) such that these notions are not static, but developmental. They themselves are the results of developmental processes - ecological, biological, molecular - which sustain or undo these parameters of similarity/difference. So these notions can't be thought of statically - it's not there there simply are 'differences' or 'similarities' out there, 'in themselves'; rather, these notions come into being and are sustained by dynamic processes that underlie them, or bring about their undoing (the flea dies...).

I repeatly suggested the need for a standard ("with respect to" doesn't sound too different from that), and of course everything can't be reduced to a single unity. One can't judge dogs with a cat standard. There still must be a common strain running through them, developmental or otherwise, which isn't given in experience, beyond the intuit that they're similar.

We can of course consciously, deliberately construct categories, but we'll just be trying to formalize our intuition, rather than actually describing a literal ubiquitous feature.

it's not there there simply are 'differences' or 'similarities' out there, 'in themselves'; rather, these notions come into being and are sustained by dynamic processes that underlie them, or bring about their undoing (the flea dies...). — StreetlightX

I agree to this. But difference is inherent in this dynamic process you mention - un-eliminable. Indeed identity develops in this process as the result of the interplay of difference.

How does it develop from radical alterity? In what form precisely?

Though SLX doesn't seem to be suggesting that things begin with difference, but indifference, which is a disposition... a neutral disposition. I'll have to think about that more.

Indifference from the perspective of constituted differences and similarities. It might well be the case that viewed from the 'process' side of things, 'difference' and 'similarity' are simply not very appropriate words to use; grammatically unfit to get at 'what's really going on' - or at least, of use only in a circumscribed and limited fashion (unless, as some philosophers have done, one undertakes a very through reworking of what 'difference' means, apart from our usual understanding of the term).

"Indifference" seems too anthropomorphic to me, too steeped in intentional emotional states. I do think that intention or emotion is ubiquitous with living things, so that the flea is a fine example, but it seems to me that I'd have to yield to some form of panpyschism. Maybe the rocks are toeing lines. It makes sense to talk of the fleas investments and indifference... but the rock can't be indifferent in the relevant sense, otherwise it wouldn't be similar to other rocks. It must be invested in being a rock.

How about in-significant? Wind might be insignificant for a rock unless it reaches a certain velocity, depending also on the rock's weight, the force of gravity (what planet is under discussion?), the way in which it is perched, the particular direction of the wind, etc etc. To de-anthropormise here, just think of 'difference' as 'that which makes a difference', that affects a change. No intentionality required.

Significance is also a psychological disposition. At best these must be metapors or analogies for some third thing which must be of the same kind of thing as difference and unity...

Maybe those are not the best terms to use when discussing the topic... but are psychological terms really better?

Like I said, if you take these terms to simply mean a difference which makes a difference, you can empty them of psychological baggage. It's just not as neat to have to spell out each time that 'wind is a difference that makes a difference if and when...'; just, 'wind is significant if...'

What does "a difference which makes a difference" mean other than "a difference that matters"? Which is, again, a disposition.

I don't see much import of talking like that.

Ok. Because nothing in nature makes a difference to anything else unless it has a disposition. Got it.