But is there, in all of Heaven and Earth, a domain of Lord of the Rings, containing hobbits? — bongo fury

There are no fictive folk? — Banno

Literally, obviously not. Don't you care to describe fictive language-use literally?

Mention-selection is one way.

Frodo is a Hobbit; hence there are Hobbits.

You seem to be denying that existential generalisation applies to fiction.

Are you sure that's what you want?

One alternative might be to suppose that existential generalisation works perfectly well in fictional situations, but does not imply that Frodo is not a fictional character.

It's rather simple as I understand it.

Quantification over domains of categories isn't hard to do for mythological creatures like Pegasus.

So, talking about historical or literary facts about Pegasus, isn't as misleading as stating that Pegasus both exists and doesn't.

SO there isn't a problem here, is there? No one is proposing that we need to make plans to defend against the Dark Lord, after all. The issue is more to do with setting the grammar of existential statements out consistently.

A flying horse or species?

It's all about word economy. Normally humans don't use extra words. Two words will suffice: 'real' and 'exists';

Santa and Pagasus exist, in the sense that we refer to them.

Santa and Pagasus are all mythical, so they aren't real.

"Real magic isn't real. Only fake magic is real." (Dennett)

When we say "Is Santa Claus real?" we're implicitly ruling out the Santa Claus that is real as a referent. We don't mean this guy:



we mean this guy:



who's a mishmash of the other guy, older pagan and mythological figures like Thor, and a hugely successful Coca Cola advertising campaign.

We confuse ourselves because when we can all describe and recognise the same thing, we meet a criterion for objective reality (consensus), but the second Santa Claus only exists as a class of symbols in media. It is second-hand evidence only.

You can be deceived into believing it's real and that first-hand evidence is evidence that he is a real object (meeting him in his grotto as an impressionable child), or you can go along with the fun knowing that Santa Claus doesn't actually exist as an object (even though there was a real Saint Nicholas, we don't mean him). Either way, this puts him in a category along with lies, deceptions and hallucinations: things we can refer to because we have the ability to encode (recall, describe, perhaps agree about) symbols that resemble signifiers but aren't.

I could make up a fictional character on the spot and ask if she is real, and we'd probably agree she is not, and yet she would have her encoded symbols, perhaps not as exhaustive as Santa's but enough to refer to her with in conversation. The only difference with Samantha Smooth, dentist by day, vigilante at night except when she's DJing, is that most people wouldn't know who I was talking about, or know of her symbols to talk about her, which is just the consensus = objective trick of fiction.

You seem to be denying that existential generalisation applies to fiction. — Banno

Not at all. I'm denying that such an application creates a new species of existence, any more than it creates actual unicorns or hobbits.

So, talking about historical or literary facts about Pegasus, isn't as misleading as stating that Pegasus both exists and doesn't. — Shawn

So, to avoid contradiction, you will refrain from denying that 'Pegasus' refers?

A flying horse or species? — Cheshire

No difference. — bongo fury

Two words will suffice: 'real' and 'exists'; — Wheatley

One will do. Any child too smart for their own good knows that distinguishing "existing" from "real" (and from "actual", "subsisting" etc.) is merely,

pretending that its usual meaning is other than it is: which is that certain words are or aren't succeeding in referring to certain objects. — bongo fury

Either way, this puts him in a category along with lies, deceptions and hallucinations: things we can refer to because we have the ability to encode (recall, describe, perhaps agree about) symbols that resemble signifiers but aren't. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, although it's useful to avoid confusing use and mention, as Elgin explains, above.

usual meaning — bongo fury

:chin:

The issue is more to do with setting the grammar of existential statements out consistently. — Banno

If the only issue is about what the referent denotes, then stating the denoting fact about Pegasus seems elucidating, no?

So, to avoid contradiction, you will refrain from denying that 'Pegasus' refers? — bongo fury

Some information about Pegasus refers to literary factoids about "Pegasus", no? So, if something needs to be referred to, then we can phrase it as, the fact that Pegasus has "X" according to "Y" literary or historical fact, yes?

Ah, I think I see. Facts not things? Because Tractatus? We probably aren't much help to each other. Anyway my question wasn't very focused. Still. Interesting thread, so thanks.

Btw I'm confused by your employment of "referent", "denotes" and "denoting fact"... please clarify?

Ah, I think I see. Facts not things? Because Tractatus? — bongo fury

Pretty much. It's all in the OP about what I think is the proper thing to do when confronted with such issues as a non-denoting flaccid designator such as "Santa" or "Pegasus".

Btw I'm confused by your employment of "referent", "denotes" and "denoting fact"... please clarify? — bongo fury

I'm not sure I'll be of help here, as my use of "literary fact" or "historical factoid" might be interchangeable with "denoting" or "denoting fact".

I'm denying that such an application creates a new species of existence, any more than it creates actual unicorns or hobbits. — bongo fury

Did someone claim it did?

stating the denoting — Shawn

The what now?

Okydoke.

Did someone claim it did? — Banno

There are no fictive folk? — Banno

See the "?"?

Santa has a red hat, therefore Santa exists.

But Santa does not exist.

How do you reconcile this?

Isn't it that in the first case the domain ranges over fictional characters, while in the second it ranges over things that are real?

That doesn't imply that we have two sorts of existence, but that existence can be used for different cases.

That doesn't imply that we have two sorts of existence, but that existence can be used for different cases. — Banno

Different cases? Clearly not. Different treatments of the same case. Different senses of "exist". Different sorts.

The cop-out is to allow the meaning by disrespecting the usual implication, and instead multiplying allowable senses of "exist". E.g. "exists mythically", "exists in the fictional domain", etc. — bongo fury

The desperate sophistry is unnecessary if you can overcome your aversion to the study of reference as a relation to things. Merely allow that Santa is not one of the things so related. Study instead the indirect reference to (e.g. mention-selection of) Santa-pictures, beardy-old-man-pictures, real beardy old men etc.

Yeah, I can't see anything useful in your comment. That is, I can't make out what it is you are claiming about reference and existence.

I can't see anything useful in your comment. — Banno

I know.

So we go back and go over it again, slowly and carefully...

I'll drag this over from elsewhere...

Here be dragons.

Notice that existential generalisation takes Q(a) and concludes that there are things which have the property Q. You want to take Q(a) and conclude that (a) exists. It's not the same.

(a) is assumed in setting up the domain... (a, b, c,...)

SO that (a) exists is an assumption of the system, not a conclusion. — Banno

The existence of Pegasus is take as granted in setting up a discussion of Pegasus.

DO you have an objection to anything here?

Since existential generalization is a rule of inference in an artificial language, whether it applies in this case is up to how the logician defines that language.

You can have logics that allow it, or logics that don't. It really doesn't matter.

In some sense there's no problem about the existence of fictional objects – we all know precisely well what we mean by saying they do or don't exist, and no one is confused. The problems only come in when we try to formalize languages talking about these things and try to keep the rules of inference straight among them.

There are two goals creating such a language might have – as an engineering project, to make sure everything works in the way we want it to, or as an empirical project, to formalize something that approximates 'natural' speech about fictional objects.

As to the former, you can do whatever you want. As to the latter, I tend to think the issue was definitively settled by the Lewisian analysis from the 70s that made use of Kripkean modal logics, and that there is no interesting issue here. People continue to write about it, but that's the nature of philosophy – when your salary is paid by writing about something, you'll write about it.

More or less, I agree. Especially the bit about "there's no problem about the existence of fictional objects".

slowly and carefully... — Banno

No comment.

The existence of Pegasus is taken as granted in setting up a discussion of Pegasus. — Banno

Neither slow nor careful.

we all know precisely well what we mean by saying they do or don't exist, and no one is confused. — Snakes Alive

Right, no need for Quine to write On What There Is, then.

The problems only come in when we try to formalize languages talking about these things — Snakes Alive

Hard to see how you got that impression. Quine very deftly traces the problem to ancient puzzles of ordinary language.

I tend to think the issue was definitively settled by the Lewisian analysis from the 70s that made use of Kripkean modal logics, — Snakes Alive

Ok ...

The existence of Pegasus is taken as granted in setting up a discussion of Pegasus.
— Banno

Neither slow nor careful. — bongo fury

Good point. I could have worded that better. That we can talk about Pegasus is taken for granted in setting up a discussion about Pegasus. What I have in mind is much the same as setting up individual constants.

It's pretty straightforward, no?

The fact that Santa exists is a fiction of sorts.

So too, Pegasus.

Right, no need for Quine to write On What There Is, then. — bongo fury

Agreed!

Hard to see how you got that impression. Quine very deftly traces the problem to ancient puzzles of ordinary language. — bongo fury

Who is honestly puzzled by fictional entities? Who is confused about what they are? Is there anyone who is worried, for example, that they will run into Harry Potter on the subway? No; we all know what we mean in saying either that he exists or doesn't, and what a character in a book is. It's only philosophers that confuse themselves.