My claim that there can be introspectively indiscernible states from those that give us awareness, yet that do not give us any awareness due to lacking representative contents.
— Bartricks
That's incoherent. Introspection employs self observation and implies self awareness. — InPitzotl

There's nothing incoherent about it. Let's use the visual analogy. There can be a visually indiscernible painting from a genuine Van Gogh, and it not be a Van Gogh. Presumably you think that's incoherent. It clearly is not. Fakers endeavor to create them. And sometimes they succeed.

Note too that to say two states are introspectively indiscernible, is not to suppose that there is someone who is failing introspectively to discern them. You seem to think it does suppose that (Christ knows why - that's like thinking that the claim there can be a visually indiscernible Sunflowers painting that is not by Van Gogh supposes that there is someone who is visually failing to discern them).

The problem would be if you claim both that they are visually indiscernible and to have visually confirmed which is the real one — InPitzotl

What are you on about? The claim that two paintings - a genuine Van Gogh and a fake one - are visually indiscernible is not equivalent to the claim that the two paintings are indiscernible tout court, is it?

Similarly, the claim that two mental states - one a genuine state of awareness and the other not - can be introspectively indiscernible is not equivalent to the claim that those two states are indiscernible tout court, is it?

Indeed, look at what I am arguing. I am arguing that we 'are' aware of things - for to hold that we are unaware of everything is to have a self-refuting position - and thus we can know that at least some of our conscious states genuinely represent things to be the case. And we can also know, by the kind of careful reasoning that I have engaged in above (and that you seem incapable of following, perhaps because you are so determined that I am confused), that this would not be possible unless our faculties were not wholly the product of blind evolutionary forces. And thus we can, by careful exercise of our faculty of reason, realize that some of our mental states are genuine representations. We are not noticing this by introspection, but by intellection.

There's nothing incoherent about it. — Bartricks

Sure there is. Incidentally, you just quoted my description of why it's incoherent, yet failed to address it.

Let's use the visual analogy. — Bartricks

The visual analogy is not analogous. Van Gogh's can be visually indiscernible from fakes. That has nothing to do with introspection requiring self awareness.

Similarly, the claim that two mental states - one a genuine state of awareness and the other not - can be introspectively indiscernible... — Bartricks

If I'm looking at two paint swatches I cannot distinguish, they could possibly be metamers. But to talk about my inability to visually distinguish C from E flat is simply a category error. It's only the former case that distinguishability is an issue; the latter case is more fundamental.

Looking at a paint swatch is analogous to introspecting on a mental state. But whereas looking employs vision, introspection employs self awareness. To introspect on a mental state is to be aware of a mental state, never mind whether that state per se is awareness.

That's the first issue. The second one is:

The problem would be if you claim both that they are visually indiscernible and to have visually confirmed which is the real one — InPitzotl

Similarly, the claim that two mental states - one a genuine state of awareness and the other not - can be introspectively indiscernible is not equivalent to the claim that those two states are indiscernible tout court, is it? — Bartricks

...what are you objecting to? The bolded part of your response certainly does not align with the bolded part of the thing you replied to.

And we can also know, by the kind of careful reasoning that I have engaged in above — Bartricks

You are mocking yourself. You're referring to the use of careful reasoning in your response to my post, and you have completely failed to notice what the objections were. If this is supposed to indicate how good your argument is, then you must be completely failing to address your premise analogously to your complete failure to understand the post you just replied to.

Utter nonsense. This is now too tedious for words.

There is no contradiction because a faculty and what it gives one an awareness of are distinct. For example, if my eyelids are sealed shut then I still have a faculty of sight, but it is now impotent to make me aware of anything. I have sight, but I am unable to see. — Bartricks

Thanks for directly addressing the matter. I found this defense of the premise to be much more coherent and informative.

I think what you are trying to say is evolution alone can not account for the ways in which humans think as there aren't environmental stresses that move an animal to paint a picture or write a song.

But like I say, this is pointless quibbling. — Bartricks

The value placed on a discussion is subjective I suppose. It may be pointless if you have a belief already established and this is an effort at rationalizing it.

I consider it cavilling because we are talking merely about the appropriate term to use to refer to a mechanism that may or may not be capable of generating states of awareness in its possessor.

For an analogy, imagine a faker of banknotes has made a machine for printing notes that are physically indistinguishable from genuine currency. That machine is not printing money. It is printing fake money. What do we call such a machine? Well, that's not a philosophical question and it really doesn't matter when the point that is being made is that this machine - whatever we may call it - is not printing money, even if it is identical, mechanically, to those machines that do print money. For whether a machine is printing money or fake money is not a matter determined solely by how the machine functions or the intrinsic properties of its product, but also its relational properties.

Your analysis of my argument is wrong. Again, using the forging machine above to illustrate: we have a machine that is spitting out notes that are physically indistinguishable from genuine banknotes. Is it printing money? Well, that depends on who made it and who is using it, right? You can't tell from just inspecting and describing the machinery in ever more detail or scrutinizing the notes themselves, for by hypothesis the notes are physically identical.

That's what I am arguing in respect of the faculties that create some of our mental states, namely those by means of which we gain awareness, if gain it we do. Those states are the pieces of paper that the mechanism is producing. To be capable of giving us awareness they need to have 'representative contents'. In this analogy that is equivalent to the property of being a genuine banknote as opposed to a fake. And I am arguing that to have that status, the mental states in question need to have been produced by a mechanism that was designed to give its bearer the contents in question, or is being used to do so. So in the analogy, that would be like saying that the machine that produced the note needs to be being used to do so by some legitimizing government agency.

I am arguing, then, that if our mechanisms of mental state production are the creation of blind evolutionary forces, then the mental states they create in us, though introspectively indiscernible from the genuine article, will be fake and thus will not give us any genuine awareness of anything.

Any why is this? For I have not blankly stated it, but argued for it. Here's why. In order for a mental state to give one an awareness of something, the mental state in question needs to have 'representative contents'. That is, it needs to represent something to be the case. It needs, in effect, to be telling us something.

However- and this is my argument - only minds can make representations. For 'representing' is an activity - an activity of mind. Mental states themselves do not make representations. That is as confused as thinking that thoughts think. Thoughts do not think. Thinkers think (and they think by having thoughts). But thoughts do not themselves 'think'. And likewise, no mental state makes a representation. Minds make representations, but mental states do not.

How, then, can a mental state 'tell us' anything about anything? Well, the same way a note can. A note saying 'close the window' is not itself telling you to close the window. Rather, someone is using the note to convey to you their desire that the window be closed. When that's the case, we may say "the note told me to close the window", but this is not literal: we mean by it that someone told us to close the window by means of the note. Likewise, our mental states cannot literally make representations. But we can talk about them as if they do when they are being used by an agent to make representations.

But if the faculties that generate our mental states - including those we take to have representative contents - are built by blind forces, then the states in question will not have any representative contents. And thus they will be incapable of giving us any awareness of anything, even though our introspective situation will be indiscernible from what it would be if they were genuine representations.

Your analysis of my argument is wrong. — Bartricks

Your attempting a reductio ad absurdum against secular scientific evolution. Saying that if it was unguided, then it would be otherwise. Which supposes the effects of non-intervention on a theoretical human mind. I'd be more likely to just believe it out right than think anyone could correctly guess the outcomes of an evolutionary system sans divine intervention. So, if you are correct, your argument is impossible. I wish I could help.

Well, I clearly wasted my time with that explanation above, didn't I? Sigh.

if you are correct, your argument is impossible. I wish I could help. — Cheshire

What on earth are you on about? No it isn't! And what 'help' do you think I need? I have made an argument apparently demonstrating beyond all doubt that our faculties are the product of design, not chance. And you think I need help?

I have made an argument apparently demonstrating beyond all doubt that our faculties are the product of design, not chance. And you think I need help? — Bartricks

Yes, and for this reason. cheers

I want a justificatory reason, not a causal reason. Anyway, you're clearly not one for doing too much thinking, so tara.

Utter nonsense. — Bartricks

It's the same essential objection as the one three days ago.

This is now too tedious for words. — Bartricks

Okay, but why is this too tedious for words now? You've spent 10 replies on this:

• In reply 1 you questioned where you said you were not introspectively aware of things; I showed you where you did exactly that.
• In reply 2 you said I was either stupid or couldn't read, fantasized that I called you stupid as well and was incompetent at driving whereas you were a qualified driving instructor, and found some spare time to conflate a parenthetical phrase with a consequent.
• In reply 3 you emphasized that you said 'if' to try to pass off your parenthetical phrase as a consequent.
• In reply 4 you claimed you did not say what I showed you saying in reply 1, because you said some other thing in the OP.
• In reply 5, you said I couldn't speak English, because what I showed you in reply 1 contradicts your position.
• In reply 6, you confused the fact that your reply 1 means you're not introspectively aware with the fact that you were accused of having that position.
• In reply 7, you continued that confusion, asking me why you would say the thing I showed you in reply 1 if you said some other thing in the OP.
• In reply 8 (part of a double reply), you offered your help showing how dumb I was, presented the Van Gogh genuine/fake example, fantasized about me calling you dumb this time (apparently I'm always calling you what you call me), fantasized about my saying that indistinguishibility implies something about Rolf Harris, and fantasized about me saying I'm better at chess than you are.
• In reply 9 you confused my claim that introspective indiscernibility implies lack of introspective awareness of distinctions with my claiming that you don't think we are aware of things, and called me consequently confused. In the same reply you strongly suggested introspection can exist without awareness ("my claim that there can be introspectively indiscernible states from those that give us awareness, yet that do not give us any awareness"), for which you were called out (given that, you know, your entire argument is supposed to be about having awareness at all).
• In reply 10 you confused the problem pointed out to you in reply 9 (that introspection requires awareness) with some claim that introspected mental states themselves can differ.

We can leave this hanging if you really want. But the original problem is still there.

Indeed. I think everything you've said is a load of Pollocks. — Bartricks

You must have been working on your charm class homework very hard. Some many compliments.

But you have still failed to address what I said.

From a psychological point of view it is extremely interesting to see how you abuse others that fail to meet your pathetic expectations even when they have the courtesy to write replies to your hogwash. But you do not even have the courtesy to reply.

Indeed, I think that everything you have said is a load of bollocks that is completely unsustainable in any form that you care to spout it.

But the original problem is still there. — InPitzotl

Your right about that, and he will probably stick around for a while longer. :rofl:

Does your "theory" take into account the most recent discovery of a human species more closely related to humanity than Neanderthals? No, it was released today. Do you see the issue? Fact/Researched based evolution is always catching up with itself; but you presuppose an entire understanding of unknown information, then "deduce" the effects of a change to it. It can't be done under any logical framework. Did God effect evolution? Dunno, too many variables. Imposing an anthropic framework over a reverse inductive argument with the confidence of an eye surgeon denotes mistakes were made. Handle it.

In reply 5, you said I couldn't speak English, because what I showed you in reply 1 contradicts your position. — InPitzotl

This made my Friday worthwhile. Thank you.

For anyone still on here. Take this on your way out of the troll's cave:

https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/thephilosophyforum-ignore/makbinojcaolplmpbneielaccnondnko

Credits to @SophistiCat.

It's the same essential objection as the one three days ago. — InPitzotl

Well, it hasn't improved with time. I mean, I don't know what you objection is. You just keep saying that there is something incoherent in the idea of, well, what? Two mental states that are introspectively indiscernible, but one of which is a state of awareness and the other not?

I have said what I need to about that. There is nothing remotely incoherent about it, as countless examples show. I can keep coming up with them until the cows come home.

I mean, what the hell do you think is going on in a case of hallucination? It's possible you're hallucinating right now, yes? Well, there's quite a big difference between a case of hallucination and a case of veridical perception. There's a debate over exactly what the difference is, but the fact remains that a case of hallucination is introspectively indiscernible from a case of veridical perception. So the notion of introspective indiscernibility is a coherent one, else we could not even make sense of the possibility of hallucinatory experiences.

So I don't think your objection can really be that the notion of introspective indiscernibility is incoherent, for it just so plainly isn't. I am at a loss, therefore, to understand what your objection is. You seem very confused to me. Yet at the same time you seem very confident that you've got some stunning objection to me. I really don't see it.

↪Bartricks Does your "theory" take into account the most recent discovery of a human species more closely related to humanity than Neanderthals? No, it was released today. Do you see the issue? Fact/Researched based evolution is always catching up with itself; but you presuppose an entire understanding of unknown information, then "deduce" the effects of a change to it. It can't be done under any logical framework. Did God effect evolution? Dunno, too many variables. Imposing an anthropic framework over a reverse inductive argument with the confidence of an eye surgeon denotes mistakes were made. Handle it. — Cheshire

I have literally no idea what you're on about. Here's my argument from the OP:

1. If our faculties of awareness are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then they do not give us an awareness of anything
2. Our faculties of awareness do provide us with some awareness of something
3. Therefore our faculties of awareness are not wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces — Bartricks

I then defended 1 and 2. Now, which premise are these Neanderthal cousins questioning? (Perhaps InPitzotl can help us out)

You just keep saying that there is something incoherent in the idea of, well, what? Two mental states that are introspectively indiscernible, but one of which is a state of awareness and the other not? — Bartricks

This really confuses you? I'm aware that I have thoughts. Whether or not the thoughts are awareness, being aware of thoughts is in and of itself awareness (of thoughts).

Well, there's quite a big difference between a case of hallucination and a case of veridical perception. — Bartricks

Sure. If I genuinely see a cup, there's a cup there. If I hallucinate a cup, there typically isn't a cup there.

But both require having a percept. If you did not in fact have the experience of seeing a cup, you did not hallucinate it. Analogous to the big difference between a hallucination and veridical perception, there is a big difference between reporting having a hallucination and lying about having one.

So I don't think your objection can really be that the notion of introspective indiscernibility is incoherent, for it just so plainly isn't. — Bartricks

That's not where the incoherency lies. "Introspective indiscernibility" is perfectly coherent. What's incoherent is the suggestion that you can introspect about something without awareness.

I have literally no idea what you're on about. Here's my argument from the OP: — Bartricks

You have implied there exist such a thing as

unguided evolutionary forces — Bartricks

or guided evolutionary forces which is implied. Then supposed you could know the difference one or the other would have on human cognition. Essentially stating, because things are the way they are I am correct. But, you take a step further and pretend to know how they would be different. The nature of an evolutionary system sort of disallows the ability to make that claim with confidence. Agree or disagree aside, do you understand my complaint?

This really confuses you? I'm aware that I have thoughts. Whether or not the thoughts are awareness, being aware of thoughts is in and of itself awareness (of thoughts). — InPitzotl

No, I don't know what you're arguing. You are confused. Not me. You. I don't think you have a criticism.

But both require having a percept. — InPitzotl

No. A belief is not a percept. Yet if I believe I am perceiving something, then my situation is introspectively indiscernible from what it would be if I was in fact perceiving something.

That's not where the incoherency lies. "Introspective indiscernibility" is perfectly coherent. What's incoherent is the suggestion that you can introspect about something without awareness. — InPitzotl

Why don't you actually read what I take the trouble to write? I addressed this stupid and irrelevant point earlier. Here:

Note too that to say two states are introspectively indiscernible, is not to suppose that there is someone who is failing introspectively to discern them. You seem to think it does suppose that (Christ knows why - that's like thinking that the claim there can be a visually indiscernible Sunflowers painting that is not by Van Gogh supposes that there is someone who is visually failing to discern them). — Bartricks

So once more, InPenetrablyS, what - just what - is your objection? You don't have one, right?

Read the OP again. Then challenge a premise of my syllogism by presenting some reason to think there can be representations absent a representer.

Agree or disagree aside, do you understand my complaint? — Cheshire

Nope, still haven't a clue what you're saying. The OP starts by presenting a syllogism. Which premise are you trying to take issue with?

Sure. If I genuinely see a cup, there's a cup there. If I hallucinate a cup, there typically isn't a cup there.
But both require having a percept. — InPitzotl

No. A belief is not a percept. Yet if I believe I am perceiving something, then my situation is introspectively indiscernible from what it would be if I was in fact perceiving something. — Bartricks

But a hallucination is not a belief; it is a fictive percept. A person with Charles Bonnet Syndrome (CBS) for example experiences hallucinations, but does not confuse the hallucinated objects with real objects (which is a giant problem for you; they introspectively distinguish the reality of their percepts). They do, however, have fictive percepts.

So:

You are confused. Not me. You. — Bartricks

...you must be confused about hallucinations.

That's not where the incoherency lies. "Introspective indiscernibility" is perfectly coherent. (A) What's incoherent is the suggestion that you can introspect about something without awareness. — InPitzotl

Why don't you actually read what I take the trouble to write? (B) I addressed this stupid and irrelevant point earlier. Here: — Bartricks

(C)Note too that to say two states are introspectively indiscernible, is not to suppose that there is someone who is failing introspectively to discern them. (D)You seem to think it does suppose that — Bartricks

(D) is wrong; I think no such thing. (A) does not imply (C) is wrong. Therefore, (B) is wrong; (B) does not address (A), (B) addresses your confusion about (A).

Analogously, I can see; in particular I have color vision. There are spectra I can distinguish (loosely, colors) and spectra I cannot distinguish (metamers). I need not be looking at the things for this to make sense; somewhere in China there are three paint swatches, where two are metamers and the third is a different color. We can talk about this because I have vision. By contrast, Cleverbot does not have color vision, or vision at all (or self awareness or awareness); any speak about what Cleverbot can visually distinguish is a category error.

That you think the problem I pointed out has to do with the objects of introspection is your own fault. The problem is that introspection in and of itself presupposes awareness just as vision in and of itself presupposes sight.

(D) is wrong; I think no such thing. (A) does not imply (C) is wrong. Therefore, (B) is wrong; (B) does not address (A), (B) addresses your confusion about (A). — InPitzotl

Oh, that's soooo clear. Jesus. Let's unpick that mess, shall we? (Bet you hoped I wouldn't).

So, you have said that D is false. Thus, assuming you understand English (which is bloody generous of me) ,you do not think that 'introspective indiscernibility' requires that any introspection be occurring. Thus two mental states - X and Y - can be introspectively indiscernible, even if no one is failing introspectively to discern them.

And thus if no one has a faculty of introspection capable of generating any states of awareness, that is entirely compatible with there existing mental states that are introspectively indiscernible from states of awareness.

So that's what you think, given you have just said that D is wrong. And it's what I believe too.

Then you say that A - the claim that the notion of introspective indiscernibility is coherent - does not imply that there needs to be someone who is failing introspectively to discern them.

Er, I know. I said that. Thanks for saying what I said a whole order of magnitude less clearly. Your point??

But then you say - bizarrely - that therefore B is wrong. That is, that somehow what you just said above shows that you did read and understood what I said. No, how on earth does that follow?

Now, once more, what is your actual objection to what I have argued? This?

The problem is that introspection in and of itself presupposes awareness just as vision in and of itself presupposes sight. — InPitzotl

Yes, so? Introspective indiscernibility - as you have now acknowledged - does not require that anyone actually be failing introspectively to discern anything. So what on earth are you challenging with this banal claim? Be clear: what are you challenging?

I presented a syllogism in the OP. What is your objection to it? WHich premise do you deny and why?

Oh, that's soooo clear. — Bartricks

Apparently so. You're just now grasping that I'm not talking about what you fantasized I was.

if no one has a faculty of introspection capable of generating any states of awareness, that is entirely compatible with there existing mental states that are introspectively indiscernible from states of awareness. — Bartricks

That is incoherent. It's a tangled mess. There's no such thing as a faculty of introspection incapable of generating states of awareness. Without introspection, there's no such thing as introspective discernibility/indiscernibility in the first place.

So that's what you think, given you have just said that D is wrong. — Bartricks

Nonsense. I don't think such a thing... it's incoherent.

Nope, still haven't a clue what you're saying. The OP starts by presenting a syllogism. Which premise are you trying to take issue with? — Bartricks

Mostly this one.

If our faculties of awareness are wholly the product of unguided evolutionary forces, then they do not give us an awareness of anything — Bartricks

What is an unguided evolutionary force? Secular evolution?

I say in the OP. Unguided by any agency. So, not expressive of an agent's intentions.

Is that some how different than secular evolution?

It is what it is. I don't exactly know what 'secular' evolution is. But if it expresses the idea that evolutionary forces do not express the will of an agent, then yes.

We can categorize views all day. It is the view itself that is important, not what label you put on it. Now, I have told you what I mean by unguided evolution. What is your objection to the case I made in support of premise 1?

It supposes there is a thing called guided evolution which would include knowledge of a mechanism and agency of which there is no evidence.

I don't know what you are talking about.