You know exactly what I am talking about. You qualified the word guided with the prefix -un. You know what un means.

I have told you what I mean by unguided. I want to know what your objection is to the argument I made in support of my premise.

It implies there is a thing such as guided evolution.

Yes. What is your objection?

The intention of the argument is to prove that guided evolution is the case.

Yes. What is your objection to premise 1?

It supposes you would know the difference between the two.

A peahen is an agent. Peahens have sexual preferences that guide the evolution of peacock tails. According to Bartricks's definition, sexual selection among peahens is guided evolution (as far as I care at least).

No it doesn't.

Look, I don't think you have a clear objection. Why don't you read what I said in defence of 1?

Awareness requires being in a mental state that has representative contents. Or do you think otherwise?

And a state can only represent something if it is being used by an agent to do so - no representation without a representer. Or do you think otherwise?

No, it'd be guided. You have just said that Peahens are agents. So some of their behaviour is now guided. By themselves. Yes? It expresses their sexual tastes. So why did you then say that by my definition it'd be unguided?

No, it'd be guided. — Bartricks

Yes; just a typo... corrected.

And your objection is....

And your objection is.... — Bartricks

Already stated, multiple times. Your premise does not follow from your arguments.

How so? Look, I can't punch a cloud. Say something substantial so that I can knock its lights out.

It supposes you would know the difference between the two. — Cheshire

↪Cheshire No it doesn't. — Bartricks

Yes it does. You state 1 type of evolution results in 1 type of awareness. It is the entire cornerstone of your position.

Look, I don't think you have a clear objection. Why don't you read what I said in defence of 1? — Bartricks

Objection: You suppose 2 types of evolution and to know the result of each as a binary effect on your concept called awareness. I submit your powers of observation don't provide you with the ability to pick between them. Which you for some reason agree with...

It supposes you would know the difference between the two. — Cheshire

↪Cheshire No it doesn't. — Bartricks

Did you intend to concede the position or would you like to reverse this statement?

How so? — Bartricks

You just worry about this unresolved incoherency for now. This is the latest post there. We're well over a dozen posts into the reply 1 (before we get back to the original in this line), and you're still as inconsistent as you were then. Knock that light out.

Start by telling me either how one can have a faculty of introspection without awareness, or what it means for things to be introspectively indistinguishable without such faculties.

Get in the ring and get your smacking. Come along.

I have literally no idea what you are on about. Are you trying to question premise 2 now?

Get in the ring and get your smacking. — Bartricks

Ah, I see. You'd rather crow than address the inconsistency.

what inconsistency?

If you don't know what words mean then you are never wrong I suppose.

Well, that's a bit out of leftfield. And it's wrong.

what inconsistency? — Bartricks

Already provided. Here's the re-re-spoonfeed of it.

This is the latest post there. — InPitzotl

Start by telling me either how one can have a faculty of introspection without awareness, or what it means for things to be introspectively indistinguishable without such faculties. — InPitzotl

So two is the latest count of the number of times I referred to it again. I even rebuilt the link in this quote for you, so you wouldn't have to be bothered to use your mouse scroll button to scroll up a single screen full. I'm afraid I cannot click that link for you.

But zero is the number of responses so far to that post. I thought you were going to knock its light out?

Saying "I don't know what your talking about" is an evasive dismissal; instead of accusing you of this crime I gave you the benefit of the doubt. Your first premise is non-sequitur by your own admission.

IF you can't discern between the products of guided or unguided evolution, then it does not follow you can state with certainty the effect it has on awareness.

Premise 1 states there would be no awareness in the case of unguided.
Premise 1 could state there would be awareness in the case of unguided without contradicting any evidence.

Start by telling me either how one can have a faculty of introspection without awareness, or what it means for things to be introspectively indistinguishable without such faculties. — InPitzotl

You can have a faculty of introspection without being aware of anything, just as you can have a faculty of sight without seeing anything (I explained above - I don't know to which of you bozos I explained it, as you've all congealed into one big mass of stupid in my mind - but if my eyelids are sealed shut, then I would still have a faulty of sight, but I would not be seeing anything with it).

But anyway, as I keep stressing - and the point seems too subtle to register with you (and it is not very subtle) - for two mental states to qualify as introspectively indiscernible, no one needs to be failing introspectively to discern them. So, the claim that a mental state is introspectively indiscernible from another does not presuppose that there are people with working faculties of introspection. This is not a hard point to grasp.

My argument is that if our faculties are built by unguided natural selection, then they will not create in us any states of awareness, just states introspectively indiscernible from states of awareness. Under those circumstances - circumstances I have argued do not obtain - no-one would have a faculty of introspection, just 'faculties of introspection'. That's not a problem. That doesn't indicate some incoherence in my claim.

I have suggested that you must think otherwise and that this silly point is somehow at the heart of your mysterious objection. But you have replied that you accept this. Yet you persist in pointing out that if no-one has a faculty of introspection, no one will be failing to introspectively discern that which is introspectively indiscernible.

So again, I do not know what your objection is. I don't think you have one. Lights out.

Saying "I don't know what your talking about" is an evasive dismissal; instead of accusing you of this crime I gave you the benefit of the doubt. Your first premise is non-sequitur by your own admission. — Cheshire

No, it is just true. And i haven't admitted anything about my first premise - again, what are you on about? My first premise is true, and I provided argumentative support for it. You've said nothing to address anything I have argued. Nothing.

IF you can't discern between the products of guided or unguided evolution, then it does not follow you can state with certainty the effect it has on awareness. — Cheshire

Where did I argue that you can't discern them? The argument itself establishes that our mental states are 'not' the product of unguided evolution. There: they are discerned from states that would be introspectively indiscernible from them but would provide no awareness if the produced by unguided evolutionary forces.

Again: we 'are' aware of things. SO we are sometimes in states of awareness. Those states are 'introspectively' indiscernible from states that are not states of awareness. But so what?

↪Cheshire
Saying "I don't know what your talking about" is an evasive dismissal; — Bartricks

- again, what are you on about? — Bartricks

Where did I argue that you can't discern them? — Bartricks

It supposes you would know the difference between the two. — Cheshire

↪Cheshire No it doesn't. — Bartricks

You can have a faculty of introspection without being aware of anything, just as you can have a faculty of sight without seeing anything — Bartricks

Slightly wrong in the vision department, but workable. You can have a faculty of vision without seeing anything (hypothetically), and you can also lack a faculty of vision without seeing anything. The difference between these two things is that a person with a faculty of vision can see.

Analogously, an entity can have a faculty of introspection without introspecting something, and one can also lack a faculty of introspection without introspecting something. The difference between these two things is that the entity with the faculty of introspection can introspect.

So let's suppose there's a bot-built entity:

What I am arguing is that if all of our faculties are bot-built, then they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs' (where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one). — Bartricks

...that you're describing here. Either the bot-built entity has a faculty of introspection, or it does not have a faculty of introspection. In the former case, the bot-built entity is capable of awareness. In the latter case, it's meaningless to discuss introspective discernibility.

But anyway, as I keep stressing — Bartricks

Yes, you do, and it keeps being irrelevant.

Yet you persist in pointing out that if no-one has a faculty of introspection, no one will be failing to introspectively discern that which is introspectively indiscernible. — Bartricks

This is still incoherent. Let's call the swatches in China A, B, and C. Introduce Tom, who is totally blind from birth. A and B are the metamers; they're red. C is green.

Tom has no faculty of vision, so Tom is "failing to visually discern" B from C. But as you said:

you can have a faculty of sight without seeing anything — Bartricks

...I can have a faculty of vision without seeing B and C. In that case, I too am "failing to visually discern" B from C. So does that make B and C visually indiscernible to me?

Point? Do you have one?

↪InPitzotl
Start by telling me either how one can have a faculty of introspection without awareness, or what it means for things to be introspectively indistinguishable without such faculties.
— InPitzotl — Bartricks

So, you asked me how one can have a faculty without having any awareness, yes?

I then answered that stupid and irrelevant question (irrelevant because it in no way bears on the credibility of my argument). If I have a faculty of sight but my eyelids are sealed shut, then I have a faculty of sight, but no visual awareness. So one can have a faculty without having any of the awareness the faculty is in principle capable of giving you.

Your question showed that this did not occur to you. That, as far as you are concerned, having a faculty of awareness involves being aware of things. That's a mistake, as I have just shown you. It's also irrelevant to my argument - but it is a mistake. A mistake on your part. Consider that a big punch on the nose.

So let's suppose there's a bot-built entity:
— InPitzotl

What I am arguing is that if all of our faculties are bot-built, then they won't create any beliefs, just 'beliefs' (where a 'belief' is introspectively indiscernible from a belief, but nevertheless isn't one).
— Bartricks — InPitzotl

...that you're describing here. Either the bot-built entity has a faculty of introspection, or it does not have a faculty of introspection. In the former case, the bot-built entity is capable of awareness. In the latter case, it's meaningless to discuss introspective discernibility. — InPitzotl

Not really following things are you? It doesn't have a faculty of introspection. It has a 'faculty of introspection' - that is, a faculty that will generate in its possessor states that are introspectively indiscernible from states giving introspective awareness.

And no, it is not meaningless to discuss introspective indiscernibility in that case, for......and for God's sake will you please grow the relevant part of the brain needed to grasp this simple point - whether two states are introspectively indiscernible or not does not depend upon anyone failing introspectively to discern them. Christ! The creature in question will not have a faculty of introspection. They will have a 'faculty of introspection'. And they will not have any introspective awareness of anything. They will be in states that are introspectively indiscernible from states of introspective awareness. But they will not be in any states of introspective awareness. This isn't hard.

The rest was just the failure to recognize this simple point made over and over again.

Now, once more, you haven't actually objected to anything I have argued. What is your objection to premise 1?