Also, going off of what you've just written, if mind is needed to actualize such potential, it would itself have to be actual in order to do so; since potentiality can't actualize itself or another. So there would still be something, namely, mind, that existed independently of this potential, which proceeds to actualize it. — aRealidealist

Your reasoning is ok however I have adopted pre-existent into my own metaphysics and have an entry titled “pre-existent” in my book glossary explaining what I mean. Although the term is a conventional one in the way you have show it in your post: ‘Commonly used & understood, "pre-exist" means existed before’ in the metaphysical sense I use it, is an original term of my own choice.

I suppose you are familiar with philosophers who found fit to adopt terms with a new meaning; useful for their philosophies, or to create new terms just to explain what they mean. In my book glossary I group my adopted or created terms in two categories: Original Metaphysical Terms, and Meaning-Modified Conventional Terms.

I classified ‘pre-existent’ as an original metaphysical term since the use of it which you mentioned is not metaphysical. Do you believe I should have classify it as a meaning-modified term, just because it is written the same way, or would you agree with me in the basis of my use of it (and meaning) being metaphysical?

In relation to whether mind needs to be an existent to actualize potentialities I do not regard it as part of the universe substratum, it is genetically sourced, was designed to be the actualizer of existence, and it is foreign to the natural world. It neither exist or pre-exist, it is genetic for sure and perhaps you could suggest what the correct adjective for it should be other than ‘existing’ or ‘pre-existing’.

Oh, I like that. Yours? — Mww

As far as I know it is. I googled it and could not find it anywhere.

Perception informs of a general affect on sense, sensation informs which sense is affected. Both of which are sufficient for being aware of the presence of objects. But neither tells us what is affecting, nothing is yet being constructed, conceptually nor intuitively. The cognitive system that does the constructing, is not yet in play.

From the physical point of view, all that is between the external world out there, and the brain in here. The eyes, ears, skin, etc., don’t tell us anything at all about what is affecting them, only that there is something. — Mww

I count perception as the act or process of something being perceived. So, for me it is a cognitive act. "No perception without conception (however minimal)". We always see something, hear something, feel something, smell something, taste something and so on, and for me, we do not have to know exactly what that something is in order for a sensory process to count as perception. A sensory process (the affect of an organ of sense by light, sound, or molecule) of which we are totally unaware I would not count as perception.

But I guess this is a matter of definition. I would say that definitional differences or distinctions all carry their own suite of presuppositions, though.

I can see the legitimacy of saying we sense phenomena, in effect, that’s exactly what we do. But I do not grant legitimacy to the notion that phenomena are sensations. Phenomena are that to which the sensations belong, not that that’s what they are. — Mww

I would not say that phenomena are sensation either, but that they are what impinges on. or affects, the senses. I see this as being prior to perception; and would say that once we have perceived something it has become an object; something more than a mere phenomenon.

Of course these terms are somewhat plastic, though, so we each may have different takes on their definitions and ambits of application. It might be reasonable to say it's largely a matter of taste. :smile:

I count perception as the act or process of something being perceived. So, for me it is a cognitive act. — Janus

Maybe. But even science acknowledges that the energy input to the sense organs is not the same kind of energy output. From that it follows that upstream is a physical act or process, but on the downstream it is a cognitive act or process. But then, of course, the physicalist says even if the output energy is of a different kind, it is still energy. To which the metaphysician rejoins, output energy must then be merely representational of input energy.....and the war continues unabated.
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once we have perceived something it has become an object; something more than a mere phenomenon. — Janus

I would agree, in that what we perceive is an object, but further stipulate that which we do not perceive as still a possible object. Otherwise we are left with the absurdity that anything we don’t perceive isn’t an object, and that inevitably reduces to the mandate for our creation of reality, necessarily. Might be better to say that while it is true what we perceive is an object, but it doesn’t become an object merely upon once being perceived.

Following you by the letters, yes, what we perceive becomes an object.....but only FOR US. This permits what we perceive to have always been an object, even antecedent to its perception. Also by the letters, yes, objects are more than mere phenomena, insofar as objects are naturally complete in themselves, whereas phenomena are incomplete by our own logical inference.

I do understand that phenomena are generally taken to mean all that is external to us, of which we as yet have no knowledge, which is, as you say, that which impinges on the senses. The contradiction only arises when one thinks the impingement is the sensation, but also says sensation is not phenomenon. So the one contradicts the other, or the one or the other contradicts itself.
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Matter of taste, indeed. The object though, is to find common taste. People been trying for thousands of years....ain’t quite there yet.

But then, of course, the physicalist says even if the output energy is of a different kind, it is still energy. To which the metaphysician rejoins, output energy must then be merely representational of input energy.....and the war continues unabated. — Mww

Yes, the physicalist will say that cognition or perception is a physical process, but is also to be counted as a mental or neural process. The energetic impingement on the senses, along with the established neural structures formed gradually by prior impingement, give rise to perception, which is always already perceiving as. So, perception is always already conceptually shaped, and the eliminative physicalist is not denying personal experience or consciousness, but merely denying that the mental is what we intuitively think it is. To which one may retort that the physical is not what one intuitively think it is either. Personally I find it a tedious debate; it's like a threshing machine with strawmen flying in all directions, and no one noticing that they are strawmen mean since they are all in tiny pieces.

I do understand that phenomena are generally taken to mean all that is external to us, of which we as yet have no knowledge, which is, as you say, that which impinges on the senses. The contradiction only arises when one thinks the impingement is the sensation, but also says sensation is not phenomenon. So the one contradicts the other, or the one or the other contradicts itself. — Mww

I agree; insofar as the act of sensing is itself sensed and/or studied, then it too is a phenomenon. The internal act, or as some might say the illusion of an internal act, is not something which seems to be susceptible to awareness, though; but in saying that I am speaking only from my own experience; others may experience, or interpret their experience, differently, so...

Matter of taste, indeed. The object though, is to find common taste. People been trying for thousands of years....ain’t quite there yet. — Mww

OP has been banned for soliciting.

Yeah, sent me a personal message asking if I wanted to read their book, which I ignored.