↪The Great Whatever Obviously not from a strictly logical standpoint, but let's be charitable, shall we, and take the phenomenological approach here, and realize that if something is good then that something is something that we want to be maximized. — darthbarracuda

Not if it's something that doesn't make sense to maximize. You can maximize the profits of a business because there's some quantitative measurement of profit, and a time during which it has to be accumulated. Pleasure isn't like that. For instance, if I live for three years, and I have a hot shower every day, then that may make life better at the time of the showers, but it doesn't mean that, at 'the end of life,' I will have lived 'better' than someone who only took one once every two days because I 'racked up more pleasure.' Pleasure does not 'rack up' -- it is good insofar as it is pleasant, which is precisely insofar as it's being experienced, now. We live on a razor's edge in the moment and always act in that moment, not across a span of time where we have to 'accumulate' the best results.

The difference is, with the low pleasures, hunger will always be there to spice the food. Appreciation of music is a sort of frivolity by comparison, so the qualities that make it impressive are likewise frivolous. There is no bodily need to enjoy music that presses down on you torturously. I say this as someone who used to spend a good portion of his life devouring and loving music, and who just doesn't care too much for it anymore. Yet I still care about filling my stomach, because I have no choice. — The Great Whatever

Well, I think my and John's experience differs from yours: perhaps we're a lot older :) I think the question of 'caring' about something is what we're debating, and there is a quality to 'caring' about some things that, for me, has diminished as far as the appetitive pleasures go, and has become enhanced in respect of (for example) philosophy and more difficult music - including the difficulties of making and harmonising music.

You can maximize the profits of a business because there's some quantitative measurement of profit, and a time during which it has to be accumulated. Pleasure isn't like that — The Great Whatever

I agree. Aristotle argues for a 'mean' as the 'virtuous' act, and for me there's also a mean in the taking of pleasure. A 24-hour marathon of Schubert might put me off for life. Each in its measure. And then a little light relief. Even frivolity, in your phrase, TGW.

I don't think it's about a mean, either. I really don't see anything inherently wrong with indulgence that classical virtue ethicists would be appalled at: hedonism includes, but isn't limited to, raunchy or sensual hedonism. It's just that no matter how you slice it, it's not about 'scoring points.' It should be obvious, but some ethicists do treat life as if it had a scoreboard, which is the only thing I can see that would make the notion of 'maximization' make sense here.

Don't mean to butt-in but isn't that one of the problems with Hedonism...the Good can't be 'Gooder', but pleasure can always be more pleasurable. — Cavacava

I think TGW is saying all pleasures are inherently good, but this doesn't mean all pleasures are not dynamic. For example, a warm bath might be pleasurable for a while, but too long, it becomes boring or not pleasurable anymore. So the pleasures change with circumstance.

Also, BitterCrank brings up an interesting point about complicated pleasures. Let's say someone would get enormous pleasure out of inventing something innovative and groundbreaking. However, they lack the capacity to do so. Not everyone can be an Einstein or an Edison. This complicated pleasure may never be achieved. The struggle for this complicated pleasure doesn't get at it. Only having attained it does in this scenario. So, due to various capacities (based on contingent factors of environment and aptitudes), one may never fully gain the kind of pleasures that one wants. This frustration goes nicely with pessimism's understanding that goals/desires are often frustrated and that suffering is not distributed evenly.

Even if pleasure is the only inherent good:
It can certainly be stated that:
-pleasures can change with circumstance.
-preferred pleasures can often be frustrated or not achieved
-some pleasures lead to pain
-preferred pleasures are not distributed evenly in human lives.

Perennial strategies for dealing with non-evenly distributed pleasures include:
-trying not to be attached to achieving pleasures
-trying to aim one's focus on something different than one's preferences for pleasure

Possible complications with strategies:
-trying not to be attached to achieving pleasures may be an impossibility in terms (except if one has conditions like anhedonia or are on certain drugs perhaps?)
-trying to aim one's focus on something different than one's preferences for pleasures may be an impossibility. One may SUPPRESS one's pursuit of one's preferences for pleasures, but it may not really get rid of one's frustration. One can conceive of a sage that suppresses all pursuits of pleasure, but then even this is a preference for the pleasure of not having pleasure, and this too can be frustrated thus going back to the idea that not all suffering is distributed evenly.

Just some thoughts:

The accumulation of money might make someone happy, thereby granting an example of quantitative happiness.

I agree that there isn't some kind of measurement device, a "Utilometer 2000", that racks up happys.

But you said that

Pleasure does not 'rack up' -- it is good insofar as it is pleasant, which is precisely insofar as it's being experienced, now. We live on a razor's edge in the moment and always act in that moment, not across a span of time where we have to 'accumulate' the best results. — The Great Whatever

So one could instead focus on maximizing the time spent experiencing such pleasures.

So one could instead focus on maximizing the time spent experiencing such pleasures.

No -- time doesn't rack up either. We live within a moment.

@darthbarracuda -- It might be helpful to realize that there are more ways of conceiving of pleasure than along a spectrum or number line or something akin to a subjective experience that can fade or grow more powerful.

By all means this is how people today tend to think of pleasure -- as a subjective experience that can be maximized or minimized -- but there's more to pleasure than this. For instance, Epicurean pleasure is had in the fulfillment of natural and necessary desires. It's not along a spectrum, and I would argue that it's not specifically a subjective experience as the British Empiricists imagine it, but that pleasure, in this formulation, has an objective quality to it [hence, why the master could teach others the ways of pleasure, rather than everyone going about individually needing to see "what they happen to like"]

Another sort of pleasure is the pleasure in fulfilling some task -- playing the piano masterfully is a usual example here. There is a pleasure derived by doing, but it is not quantifiable -- we are just fulfilling a desire [something we lack], or reproducing desire [and so it becomes more pleasurable over time]. It's something experienced in the act, and it is experienced because we find fulfillment in doing things well [or, to take an Aristotelian stab, because we are fulfilling our human nature in excellence]



I actually think a good deal of confusion arises because we lack the cultural resources to discuss the complexity of pleasure. In common it's thought of subjective, and along an axis. But there's so much more to pleasure and desire. But I suppose I'm getting off track with that comment. It's just something that's been flitting around in my brain-box for awhile.

Also, is "to live it well" a state of being (a status) or is it perhaps a dynamic process of constant change and adaptations? I feel it is the latter; thus making any fixed points of status (including what one believe one knows as what is good) when it comes to notions of value are shortsighted, as it would have to 'disinclude' the accumulation of any information/experiences that might cause a change in what one deems (attributes/asserts) to be what they 'know' as good. — Mayor of Simpleton

Ahh Mayor! We're very close to agreeing here, but not quite... Indeed, I agree that "to live it well" is a dynamic process of adaptation, in the words of the Daoists, a way without a way, and a path without a path. But perfecting this process requires principles, which unfortunately would have to be fixed. While the strategies/techniques/tactics used at different points in time need to always change, and one cannot rely on the same techniques for all time (hence a way without a way, a doing without a doing), this does not include principles, whose nature is entirely negative, and whose role is entirely regulative (hence why the way without a way is still a way). Negative in-so-far as they do not arbitrate between possibilities (but merely rule out impossibilities), and regulative in-so-far as they focus the mind clearly and distinctly on real possibilities and away from impossibilities which could distract and confuse it, and thus render it less efficient. Principles are free to be fixed since they are not bound by the conditions of being true (or pointing to any particular real). They are merely those things which regulate and focus the mind on that which is true (or real). For example, Marcus Aurelius states:

"On the occasion of everything that causes you sadness, remember to use this "dogma": not only is this not a misfortune, but it is a piece of good fortune for you to bear up under it courageously"

Notice the statement doesn't arbitrate between possibilities, as any negative actuality necessarily entails the possibility of one practicing to bear it courageously. Also notice the statement plays a regulative role for the mind; refocusing it on the possibilities that can always be implemented, and away from those which are impossible - such as for example, remaining sad and thinking over and over how misfortune could have been prevented.

As such, principles cannot be questioned, once one has understood their essence and function. Principles are also tautologies at base, which are entirely empty. However, this emptiness plays a regulative role for the mind, hence they are useful and must not be given up.

But, having said this, principles are not enough. Strategies, techniques, tactics, etc. are also required to be a master at something. These latter are acquired empirically, through experience, while the latter are acquired rationally, through pure reason. However, both of them are necessary, with the former (principles) often becoming the factor which makes the difference at the highest levels of performance in any domain. However, principles don't necessarily have to be learned formally, and could indeed end up abstracted from experience, although this is slower.

It might be helpful to realize that there are more ways of conceiving of pleasure than along a spectrum or number line or something akin to a subjective experience that can fade or grow more powerful. — Moliere

I agree, I'm not a bare hedonist.

No -- time doesn't rack up either. We live within a moment. — The Great Whatever

So what the hell does it mean to live well then? We might live moment by moment, but we're constantly thinking about the past and the future, and we make choices based on that.

It should be obvious, but some ethicists do treat life as if it had a scoreboard, which is the only thing I can see that would make the notion of 'maximization' make sense here. — The Great Whatever

What I was thinking with the OPs question is that, if one is a hedonist, how might one go about having as much pleasure as they can with as little suffering? And of course there is a time element involved, where the hedonist is planning on how they might make choices or structure their life to accomplish that. It's not about keeping score, although it certainly helps to have more pleasurable memories. There is also a satisfaction with life element. The happy hedonist planned well and maximized their opportunities for pleasures while minimizing pain (perhaps in the form of negative consequences). They can feel good about that.

So for example, a hedonist might ask themselves if habitual drug use will bring them the most enjoyment, but then they might calculate that the negative consequences would make it not worth becoming addicted.

I disagree with your assessment that time does not rack up. How else are we to live?

Ah what an excellent thread! So many people have GREAT points here, it's such a pleasure to read. @darthbarracuda, I think you have attracted attention to something very important, namely in investigating the relationship between desire and pleasure. In a way, it could be argued that pleasure is merely the satisfaction of desire, and it is that that we are really after. Pleasure serves, as @Marchesk has argued, merely as a subjective indicator.

We can imagine being hurt by the presence of pleasure if we do not desire it. For example, our husband/wife offering sex right after one of our parents died will not probably make us happy. Neither would someone having sex with us by force as @darthbarracuda has argued; unless of course we secretly harbour a fantasy (read desire) to get raped, in which case we may enjoy it, even greatly enjoy it, provided that our sense of morality permits it, and would not get in the way of the actualisation of our fantasy.

I think @The Great Whatever has hit the nail on the head with life not being a score-board, as well as with pleasure not accumulating, and with the idea of maximising pleasure not being necessitated. Contra @darthbarracuda, it may be that the enemy of pleasure is more pleasure in certain instances ;) . TGW's ideas instead force us to refocus on the present moment, which is truly the only moment we ever have, instead of attempting to judge life as a whole, which is indeed incoherent.

And now, we finally get to @mcdoodle who has argued along with Aristotle that excellence is the goal of life, and for humans, this consists in character building (virtue), which is not accumulated over a life-time, but rather is something that exists in the moment. As such, virtue is what best enables one to enjoy life in the present moment; it is the skill with which one handles the present. Hence, as TGW tells us, ethics is not about specific ways in which to live your life, it's not a self-help guide. It is, I would say, a character building act, which ensures that one has the right character (as opposed to rule book) to handle best different situations.

So what the hell does it mean to live well then? We might live moment by moment, but we're constantly thinking about the past and the future, and we make choices based on that. — Marchesk

Maybe it's to think about the past/present only so-much as we need it in order to make a decision, and the rest of the time live focused on the present. Living in the present, and doing so with excellence, is, I think, a good life. Nothing more could be added at that point. Extending that life, or shortening it can do nothing to take away its excellence, which is a quality that is independent of time, just as a geometric figure being a circle is independent of the length of its radius.

What I was thinking with the OPs question is that, if one is a hedonist, how might one go about having as much pleasure as they can with as little suffering? — Marchesk

I think this would be the wrong question because it assumes that pleasure and suffering accumulate in time. A better question would be how to have pleasure right now? To which no specific answer could be given. I could say you go about it with skill. But that will be of no help.

Of course, the problem is that if your philosophy is bad, what you decide to do will be self-contradictory on its own terms. In the Socratic tradition, the focus moves away from 'evil' to ignorance. By removing our ignorance about what is good, we ipso facto remove our temptations and inclinations to do things that, by the very standards we couch them in, make no sense or don't work. If something is actually bad, understanding why it's bad will destroy the temptation to do it. — The Great Whatever

Hence, TGW, even you are forced to admit here of philosophy as a therapy, which does indeed lead us to the good life - similar, but not exactly the same as self-help :)

So what the hell does it mean to live well then? We might live moment by moment, but we're constantly thinking about the past and the future, and we make choices based on that. — Marchesk

The kind of mastery attributed to the sage in my tradition is one of lack of superstition, adaptability, and enjoyment. Most thinking about the past and future is not helpful,and where it is it is because that thinking is in the present. Yesterday is gone, tomorrow unclear. Our aiming at tomorrow itself comes from a mastery within the moment. The sage naturally secures the future without having to worry about it by his momentary mastery.

What I was thinking with the OPs question is that, if one is a hedonist, how might one go about having as much pleasure as they can with as little suffering? — Marchesk

I don't think that question has a straightforward answer, because people's constitutions are very different, and so what is good advice for one person will be bad for another. This is why philosophy cannot coherently be a self-help guide. What it can do is attack the roots underlying error and inconsistency, insofar as one commits themselves to them.

So for example, a hedonist might ask themselves if habitual drug use will bring them the most enjoyment, but then they might calculate that the negative consequences would make it not worth becoming addicted. — Marchesk

I agree that you can make a decision about whether to use drugs from a hedonist standpoint, but I disagree that you can do it by calculating. Again, it has to do with a kind of momentary mastery -- whether one can 'smell' a bad idea or not. And acquiring that kind of bodily taste is what living well involves.

And now, we finally get to mcdoodle who has argued along with Aristotle that excellence is the goal of life, and for humans, this consists in character building (virtue), which is not accumulated over a life-time, but rather is something that exists in the moment. As such, virtue is what best enables one to enjoy life in the present moment; it is the skill with which one handles the present. Hence, as TGW tells us, ethics is not about specific ways in which to live your life, it's not a self-help guide. It is, I would say, a character building act, which ensures that one has the right character (as opposed to rule book) to handle best different situations. — Agustino

If I implied this momentary notion, I didn't mean to. Aristotle expressly argues that the state of character is accumulated over a lifetime, and is careful to speak of living well 'in a complete life'. He doesn't mean there's a calculus over a life, though. He means that experience over a complete life, and the deliberation you undertake based upon that experience, prepares you for the moments when your choice of action will matter to you, and to others.

If I implied this momentary notion, I didn't mean to. Aristotle expressly argues that the state of character is accumulated over a lifetime, and is careful to speak of living well 'in a complete life'. He doesn't mean there's a calculus over a life, though. He means that experience over a complete life, and the deliberation you undertake based upon that experience, prepares you for the moments when your choice of action will matter to you, and to others. — mcdoodle

No doubt - but the value exists in the moment, not in the future.

If I implied this momentary notion, I didn't mean to. Aristotle expressly argues that the state of character is accumulated over a lifetime, and is careful to speak of living well 'in a complete life'. He doesn't mean there's a calculus over a life, though. He means that experience over a complete life, and the deliberation you undertake based upon that experience, prepares you for the moments when your choice of action will matter to you, and to others. — mcdoodle

Aristotle wanted to look cool in front of his philosopher friends.

When I listen to a song I enjoy, presumably I assume you would agree that I am experiencing pleasure.

Stopping the song and turning off my music player would not be something I desire, because I enjoy the prolonged experience of the song. The song is pleasurable over a course of several minutes.

This means that pleasure can be, and should be, (under your [vague] hedonism) maximized and measured by how long a pleasurable experience is and the intensity of this experience.

Presumably if it were possible for a person to experience a never-ending, constantly increasing amount of pleasure, that would be (under your hedonism) the best thing possible. I don't see how you could object to this without contradicting your hedonism.

We make judgement calls (i.e. what we should do in a situation) often by predicting how long a certain experience will last and the intensity of this experience, and whether or not the cost to experience this experience is worth it. For example, buying a fifty-dollar ice cream cone would be absurdly irresponsible, because you would be using a rather large amount of money for a simple pleasure that lasts but a few minutes. And we decide to get immunization shots because, although they do indeed hurt, they only hurt for a short amount of time and the intensity is not high enough for us to fear, while at the same time we are doing much good because we will not get sick in the future.

No doubt - but the value exists in the moment, not in the future — Agustino

Well, on the Aristotelian model one cultivates the habits of virtue by doing virtuous acts. One learns to live well by doing the things that enable a person like oneself to live well. Perhaps one savours the pleasure of them more, thanks to habit and deliberation. He's certainly not arguing for the 'momentary', which has a feeling of the appetitive, the hedonist. 'One day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.' (Ethics 1098a 17-19)

I think there is a misunderstanding here. I'm not saying that Aristotle argues that a man can BECOME blessed and happy in a short day, and in here I agree. However, once someone is blessed and happy, that is a quality of their character, and it is not made better or worse by its prolongation in time. That is something that, as far as I see, is not contradictory to the Aristotelian vision.

When I listen to a song I enjoy, presumably I assume you would agree that I am experiencing pleasure.

Stopping the song and turning off my music player would not be something I desire, because I enjoy the prolonged experience of the song. The song is pleasurable over a course of several minutes. — darthbarracuda

Yes but you feel pleasure in the moment. Therefore your aim is to feel pleasure right now. The fact that you add up the minutes afterwards, and think "oh, I've felt pleasure for 10 mins" is not itself pleasurable. Therefore this does not follow:

This means that pleasure can be, and should be, (under your [vague] hedonism) maximized and measured by how long a pleasurable experience is and the intensity of this experience. — darthbarracuda

Instead, what follows is that you must strive such that every single moment you feel pleasure. That is the goal. Not that you accumulate the maximum number of pleasurable moments, since the accumulation itself adds nothing to your pleasure and is not a pleasure in and of itself.

We make judgement calls (i.e. what we should do in a situation) often by predicting how long a certain experience will last and the intensity of this experience, and whether or not the cost to experience this experience is worth it. For example, buying a fifty-dollar ice cream cone would be absurdly irresponsible, because you would be using a rather large amount of money for a simple pleasure that lasts but a few minutes. — darthbarracuda

The length of the experience itself is not the source of pleasure. Neither does one get more pleasure because one felt it over a longer time. You feel pleasure in the moment, therefore pleasure can only exist at the moment when you feel it, hence pleasure just cannot add up.

And we decide to get immunization shots because, although they do indeed hurt, they only hurt for a short amount of time and the intensity is not high enough for us to fear, while at the same time we are doing much good because we will not get sick in the future. — darthbarracuda

This is factually wrong to begin with. Many people (such as myself) have always refused immunisation shots. Neither are the scientific findings strong enough to support them, in my humble opinion.

Instead, what follows is that you must strive such that every single moment you feel pleasure. That is the goal. Not that you accumulate the maximum number of pleasurable moments, since the accumulation itself adds nothing to your pleasure and is not a pleasure in and of itself. — Agustino

Thus, the goal is to maximize your [future] time spent experiencing pleasure.

This is factually wrong to begin with. Many people (such as myself) have always refused immunisation shots. Neither are the scientific findings strong enough to support them, in my humble opinion. — Agustino

Please note that you are potentially endangering the lives of people who cannot get immunized.

Thus, the goal is to maximize your [future] time spent experiencing pleasure. — darthbarracuda

No. The goal is merely to have pleasure now. That is my concern, not "future" pleasure which doesn't exist. It's a moment by moment mastery.

Please note that you are potentially endangering the lives of people who cannot get immunized. — darthbarracuda

Hm?

No. The goal is merely to have pleasure now. That is my concern, not "future" pleasure which doesn't exist. It's a moment by moment mastery. — Agustino

I don't necessarily disagree with you, I'm trying to argue with the position that TGW has.

But either way if you are a hedonist, then pleasure is good. Presumably this means that you would strive to maximize the amount of time spent experiencing pleasure in the future, so that when the future comes to be the present, you are experiencing pleasure in the now.

Instead, what follows is that you must strive such that every single moment you feel pleasure. That is the goal. Not that you accumulate the maximum number of pleasurable moments, since the accumulation itself adds nothing to your pleasure and is not a pleasure in and of itself. — Agustino

Without the accumulation over time there is no pleasure in the moment. The moment, as a point instant in time, is a chimera.

No. The goal is merely to have pleasure now. That is my concern, not "future" pleasure which doesn't exist. It's a moment by moment mastery. — Agustino

Your enjoyment of pleasure now is partly resulting from an accumulation of the effects of past pleasurable moments and the anticipation that pleasure (in the sense of joy) will continue, and grow into the future. Think about when you are in love.

Instead, what follows is that you must strive such that every single moment you feel pleasure. That is the goal. Not that you accumulate the maximum number of pleasurable moments, since the accumulation itself adds nothing to your pleasure and is not a pleasure in and of itself. — Agustino

I think this is still a slave to future expectations. Why must I seek to strive for pleasure at every moment? If I am always seeking to gain pleasure, I'm clearly not feeling it at any moment. At any point were I was feeling pleasure, striving for pleasure is exactly what I would NOT have to do, as I already had it. Striving to feel pleasure in every single moment is, just another attempt to accumulate the maximum number of pleasure points. One is still thinking in terms of gaining the most number pleasure points possible. Mastery of the moment, of feeling pleasure or contentment in one's present in exactly what it is not.

Describing "the good life" in terms of feeling pleasure works I think. To be good always feel nice. But it is always about feeling pleasure, not gaining pleasure. Getting some amount of pleasure is not what makes life good. It is the moment of feeling it which does. (thus, hedonism sort of gets it wrong in a significant way).

This is a good point in principle, but I doubt any of us actually live in the moment entirely without anticipation of future joy (or suffering).

The true part of what you say is that we do not find pleasure through seeking it, which produces tension and emotional shrinkage, but rather through acceptance of where we are, which produces relaxation and emotional expansion.

Where we are always involves retention and protention, though; there is no 'pure living in the moment', even for those suffering from brain disorders like anterograde and retrograde amnesia, although the former loses the ability to form new memories while retaining memories prior to the onset of the disorder and the latter is the opposite; they form new memories but all past memories are gone. These conditions affect in different ways the quality of experience of the present.

I agree, your criticism is correct. I stand corrected.

Anticipation of future joy or suffering isn't prohibited. We do that all the time. Even those who have mastery of the moment. What matters is for the state of anticipating future joy or suffering to be, itself, a state of feeling pleasure, rather than a desperation for something which is yet to occur.

Mastery of the moment is, I think, is frequently characterised by feeling pleasure in the moment while also holding anticipation or knowledge about the future of the past. When someone can know of the past of future, but not let that control their sense of worth in the moment, they have learnt to live and feel in the moment. They get everything inescapable as thinking feeling humans, the knowledge of joy and pain, of the future and the past, of gain and loss, without the destructive stipulation obtaining something when it is not present or losing a state when it is is yet to pass. Tragedy without despair. Fear without panic. Desire without anxiety. Inevitable suffering without the sense it is all that characterises life.

The idea there is no "living in the moment" because of our recall of the past and anticipation of the future is just another example of thinking we need to be something we are not. It supposes the past or future is so compelling that we couldn't possibly think about it without wanting it immediately. In the strongest sense, it is a failure to live in the moment. Supposedly, we want the future or the past so strongly, we cannot possibly be content with our present. It is to hold we must be always be desperate for the past or future because are present can't be anything but unbearable. It is to still view ones worth about obtaining something you don't have rather just being yourself. Obviously, this will never work because if one is seeking to obtain, they lack what need. The past and future never arrive.