But of course you are able to use the word "heap" effectively, not despite it's imprecision, but in virtue of its imprecision.

Compare "throw yours on the heap" to "add your twenty-seven to that four thousand, two hundred and seventy three".

An excess of precision impairs our actions.

And precision is available, as required.

Well, yes; but, the paradox is still pertinent.

Asides from that, I understand that "heaps" or "holes" have this vagueness that irritates philosophers. I'm not necessarily asking for a more precise meaning as much as asking why do these words make philosophers talk about them at length?

And, even counterfactually, what does this reveal about language and human perception in language games?

Unsure if you might find this more interesting than the other thread, @I like sushi?

the paradox is still pertinent. — Shawn

Well, no, there is no paradox. The supposed question" how many items make a pile?" simply misunderstands the use of "pile"; there is no precision, and yet it functions adequately.

this vagueness that irritates philosophers. — Shawn

That's a psychological problem for philosophers, not a philosophical problem. What it reveals is that language functions despite an excessive expectation of precision on the part of certain individuals.

There isn't a conceptual problem here, only the misplaced discomfort of a few odd folk.

That is the case with most supposed philosophical issues.

Contrary to what you are implying, that the use of pile is adequate perhaps by the latter Wittgenstein, I think there's reason for doubt or concern by other philosophers. These vague predicates are very heavily loaded with human perception and often cause confusion in language.

Or another way I just thought is that for the case of the heap of sand is where phenomenological issues manifest in language.

Have you heard of the Problem of the Criterion?

Why do you think this vagueness of the predicates such as a "heap" or a "hole" arise in language? — Shawn

My own instinct is that language has usage, not meaning and for everyday functioning such words have been more than adequate. I have more concerns with words like democracy and truth.

These vague predicates are very heavily loaded with human perception and often cause confusion in language. — Shawn

SO give an example of that confusion.

But neat that you relate this to the Problem of the Criterion; there's a similar unjustified expectation of exactitude in what one counts as knowledge, or as true. We don't need a definitive understanding of knowledge in order to establish that we know this thread is in English.

SO again, there isn't a conceptual problem here, only the misplaced discomfort of a few odd folk.

My own instinct is that language has usage, not meaning and for everyday functioning such words have been more than adequate. — Tom Storm

Well, it's a prime example in philosophy, and with my concern over epistemic discursions over criteria I think, it's a really interesting case example to argue for a more formal way of using language.

I would even argue that cognitively a "heap" is what can be called a phenomenological expression if its so inexact.

SO give an example of that confusion. — Banno

It might seem trivial; but, once you see the vague predicate and assume doubt it instantly becomes a problem rather than not.

Such as,

'What is a "heap"?'

'What is a "heap"?' — Shawn

An untidy collection of objects, place on top of each other.

Old English heap "pile (of things); great number, crowd, multitude (of persons)," from West Germanic *haupaz (source also of Old Saxon hop, Old Frisian hap, Middle Low German hupe, Dutch hoop, German Haufe "heap"), of uncertain origin. The group is perhaps related to Old English heah "high" (see high), but OED suggests a common origin with Latin cubare "lie down," and Boutkan says it is probably not Indo-European at all.

But you understood that, and as a competent speaker of English you use the word correctly, as well as in jest.

SO what is the confusion?

An untidy collection of objects, place on top of each other. — Banno

But you understood that, and as a competent speaker of English you use the word correctly, as well as in jest.

SO what is the confusion? — Banno

An epistemist might ask you a question such as,

"Does the Sorites paradox entail a too strict principle of bivalence by (what you call) a prejudice of the arising doubt or is there any need to maintain the principle of bivalence towards what constitutes a "heap"?"

I can state this more eloquently, as,

"Why does epistemicism cause confusions around what constitutes a "heap"?

There's no confusion, just folk expecting exactitude in a language game which does not involve exactitude.

I would even argue that cognitively a "heap" is what can be called a phenomenological expression if its so inexact. — Shawn

It's always seemed to me that the real issue with the so-called "Sorites paradox" isn't that the idea of a heap is vague so it's hard to know what is and what isn't. As others have noted, we don't generally have any trouble using the word "heap" without confusing people. I see the real issue being the arbitrariness of the distinctions we make for everything we talk about. A heap is just an easily understood example.

The world is the world. There are no paradoxes in the world. We starting confusing ourselves when we lose track of the difference between the world and the words we use to describe it. That's what we're talking about when we talk about paradoxes.

I see the real issue being the arbitrariness of the distinctions we make for everything we talk about. A heap is just an easily understood example. — T Clark

There's a way of understanding what a heap is, that is not dependent on an explicit formulation of what constitutes a heap in each and every case. Instead, it is demonstrated in actually using "heap" in real situations.

Set the task of discovering if someone knew what "heap" meant, should you be satisfied with their providing the dictionary definition? Or should you note their use of the word "heap" in comparison and contrast to "pile", "stack", "mound" and so on?

It's not that the use of "heap" is arbitrary; Capricious, whimsical, random.

And yes, this goes for everything we talk about. It's the upshot of use in the place of meaning.

Well, I beg to differ.

Let's assume that vagueness arises where the law of bivalence is not clearly defined or sharp, for a heap. Therefore, what can one say about this problem of the valence of what a "heap" actually is.

Well, it's a prime example in philosophy, and with my concern over epistemic discursions over criteria I think, it's a really interesting case example to argue for a more formal way of using language. — Shawn

I understand your point but my version for the world doesn't have straight lines or precise definitions (except by explicit agreement) so it is a problem which doesn't impact. It's context. If someone says to me; 'I'll give you heaps of money." I might ask, "How much is heaps?" But if someone says, "There's a heap of wood in the back yard for the fire", I probably will be satisfied by this.

I just thought this article might be more useful than me trying to get across the vagueness of these predicates by logic alone.

Have at it:

https://aeon.co/ideas/on-vagueness-when-is-a-heap-of-sand-not-a-heap-of-sand

It's context. If someone says to me; 'I'll give you heaps of money." I might ask, "How much is heaps?" But if someone says, "There's a heap of wood in the back yard for the fire", I probably will be satisfied by this. — Tom Storm

How is it context? I'm no specialist in language theory; but, to me this is such a phenomenon widespread in informal languages, that I don't really see this as a way of meaning as use. More akin to treating 'tall' as a relative term, a 'heap' or a 'hole' seem to be associated with the problem of the principle of bivalence not being able to suffice for the way that term is used by philosophers.

Which, is puzzling and interesting as to why the principle of bivalence or even fuzzy logic might not even help.

How is it context? — Shawn

How is it not context?

Can you show me a specific example of how this language imprecision cause harm or an insurmountable problem?

We starting confusing ourselves when we lose track of the difference between the world and the words we use to describe it. That's what we're talking about when we talk about paradoxes. — T Clark

So, what kind of world does the ontology of a 'heap' inhabit? Purely, "worldly" or phenomenological; because the law of excluded middle wont let both be satisfied at the same time, no? I might be wrong; but, a heap comes off as a epistemological problem, as specified by philosophers and their criteria for other terms such as 'holes' or heaps upon heaps.

How is it not context? — Tom Storm

On a face value reading, it might seem as a context issue. But, I'm not trying to look at this through a lens of preciseness only. I think, it also seems to me to be an issue about inherent vagueness in language for not only 'heaps'; but, something of the sort of, 'the worn out sole of my shoe', 'the smelly bathroom', or 'the tall man'. If it's so apparent, then doesn't this warrant what's going on language that this is so easy for it to arise?

Can you show me a specific example of how this language imprecision cause harm or an insurmountable problem? — Tom Storm

In determining valency or affect in language as a general measure? I think there's the issue of realism in language or whether it's really all a correspondence theory that's on shaky grounds?

What does "heap" correspond to?

Shawn, I may be missing something, I am not a philosopher but isn't language arbitrary sounds used to describe things we experience differently? I am more shocked when there is exactness. For this I guess math is a source of gratification. Perhaps Banno can clarify this for us.

The expression 'hard work' always stuck me as delightfully fecund.

It's not that the use of "heap" is arbitrary; Capricious, whimsical, random. — Banno

I said the distinction between what is considered a heap and what isn't is arbitrary. Maybe I used the wrong word. The line we draw between heap and not-heap is one we've drawn. It's a choice we've made based on the kinds of things we want to say. It doesn't necessarily correspond to some natural boundary. And, as we've both noted, we make that choice with all the words we use.

So, what kind of world does the ontology of a 'heap' inhabit? Purely, "worldly" or phenomenological; because the law of excluded middle wont let both be satisfied at the same time, no? I might be wrong; but, a heap comes off as a epistemological problem, as specified by philosophers and their criteria for other terms such as 'holes' or heaps upon heaps. — Shawn

I don't think I understand what you mean by "worldly" or "phenomenological" in this situation. "Heap" is a label we put on a phenomenon we observe in the world. The word is artificial, human-made. Is that what you mean by phenomenological?

You are misusing bivalence.

"Heap" is a label we put on a phenomenon we observe in the world. The word is artificial, human-made. Is that what you mean by phenomenological? — T Clark

No, I think that it makes sense to state that it is phenomenological; but, don't think that's what I'm trying to say.

Mainly, when we say that a 'heap' exists, what does that mean about how we perceive reality? In a direct-1-1-correspondence of the word to a pile of sand? Then how does that make sense when the pile of sand cannot be specified precisely?

Other interesting questions could be, "can a heap be specified more precisely"?

Sorry mate, what am I missing in Shawn's identified problem here?

When you say

"We starting confusing ourselves when we lose track of the difference between the world and the words we use to describe it. That's what we're talking about when we talk about paradoxes."

this is exactly right and well put. The example I like to use to illustrate this is the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?". Most people seem to mix up "nothing" itself and the mind's conception of "nothing". In "nothing" itself, no minds, including that of the person thinking about it, are there.

In applying what you say to a "heap", a heap is just a term that everyone has their own definition of about how big a collection of items is. The real point to me is what causes a heap, or any collection of items, to exist as a separate entity from the items considered individually. My view is that a grouping of items is an existent entity wherever that grouping exists, whether that's in a person's mind or outside the mind. In other words, there's one existent heap outside the mind, but another existent entity is a person's mental image of that heap. Anyways, that's my view.

My view is that a grouping of items is an existent entity wherever that grouping exists, whether that's in a person's mind or outside the mind. In other words, there's one existent heap outside the mind, but another existent entity is a person's mental image of that heap. Anyways, that's my view. — Roger

I feel differently. I don't think things exist as phenomena separate from the undifferentiated world until someone like us brings them into existence by naming them. That is the essence of what Lao Tzu wrote in the Tao Te Ching.

...what am I missing in Shawn's identified problem here? — Tom Storm

Let's assume that vagueness arises where the law of bivalence is not clearly defined or sharp, for a heap. Therefore, what can one say about this problem of the valence of what a "heap" actually is. — Shawn

The Law of Bivalence: A statement is either true or it is false; no middle value is available.

Hence, "This is a heap of sand" is either true, or it is false.

Nothing here is "not clearly defined or sharp".

If there are ten grains piled up, is that a heap? A hundred? a thousand? The idea is that we must specify a number, such that more than that number is a heap, less is not a heap. But that's not how heaps work.

Suppose John says it is a heap, but Jenny says it isn't. Is one of them right, as a matter of fact, and the other wrong? We don't say things such as this, except in unusual situations. We say "Heap that stuff up for me", "Use that heap of sand in your concrete", or "make those two heaps into one big heap".

We can contrive a situation in which we do talk of this being a heap, but no that. Jenny has a heap of coins, a hundred in all. John shows his, which contains a thousand, saying "that's not a heap, this is a heap!"

Does it follow that when Jenny says "This is a heap of a hundred coins", she is uttering a falsehood?

Nothing here is a breach of bivalence. To do that we would need Jenny to assert something like "This is a heap, and it is also not a heap".

Jenny says it is a heap, John says it isn't. This is not a disagreement as to the facts, but as to the use of the word "heap".

Thank you. I figured it was an issue about usage, as issues so often seem to be.